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ANNALS
AMERICAN ACADEMY
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.
ISSUED BI-MONTHLY.
VOL. IX. JANUARY, 1897— JUNE, 1897.
Editor: iiftl1/ '
ROLAND P. FALKNER.
Associate Editors: Edmund J. James. Emory r. Johnson.
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PHILADELPHIA : American Academy oe Powticai, and Sociai, Science.
1897.
i.
A-4-
CONTENTS.
PRINCIPAL PAPERS.
PAGE.
Cooley, C. H. Genius, Fame, and the Comparison of
Races 317
— Durand, E. Dana. Political and Municipal Legisla- tion in 1896 231
Falkner, Roland P. Crime and the Census .... 42 — Falkner, Roland P. In Memoriam : Francis Amasa
Walker 173
James, Edmund J. The First Apportionment of Fed- eral Representatives in the United States .... 1 — Johnson, Emory R. Current Transportation Topics . 107
Levasseur, E. The Concentration of Industry, and
Machinery in the United States ........ 178
Scott, Wm. A. The Quantity Theory 212
Taylor, W. G. L. Values, Positive and Relative . . 70
Tiedeman, C. G. Silver Free Coinage and the Legal
Tender Decisions 198
Webster, W. C. A Comparative Study of the State
Constitutions of the American Revolution .... 380
Williams, Talcott. Silver in China 359
Proceedings of the academy 421
MISCELLANY. Meeting of the American Economic Association 285
PERSONAL NOTES.
Mains, W. C, 247. Twiss, Travers, 425. Walker, F. A., 246.
Ward, G. M., 246. Young, J. T., 246.
\J
(iii)
BOOK DEPARTMENT.
CONDUCTED BY HENRY R. SEAGER-
REVIEWS.
PAGE.
Andrews, C. M. The Historical Development of Modern
Europe.—/. H. Robinson 253
Ansiaux, M. Heures de Travail et Salaires. — IV. A. Scott . . . 430 Cannan, Edw. (Editor). Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue
and Arms, Delivered by Adam Smith 450
Channing, Edw. The United States of America, 1 765-1865.—
H Friedenwald 255
Channing, Edw. and Hart, A. B. Guide to the Study of
American History. — B. C. Steiner 256
Davenport, H. J. Outlines of Economic Theory.—/. IV. Crook . 259 Du Bois, W. E. B. Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the
United States. — B. C. Steiner 432
Fisher, Irving. Appreciation and Interest. — H H. Powers . .122 Appreciation and Interest, — A Rejoinder. — /. Fisher . . 282 Foli,ETT, M. P. The Speaker of the House of Representatives. —
/. Q. Adams 434
Godkin, E. L. Problems of Modern Democracy. — G. H. Haynes 436
Hadi,ey, A. T. Economics.— -J. H. Hollander 439
Hake, A. E. and Wessi^au, O. E. The Coming Individualism. —
/. H. Hollander 126
Harding, S. B. Ratification of the Federal Constitution in
Massachusetts. — G. H. Haynes 262
Hart, A. B. See Channing.
Hoffman, F. L. Race Traits and Tendencies of the American
Negro. — IV. E. B. Du Bois 127
Hoivi^ANDER, J. H. (Editor). Letters of David Ricardo to John
Ramsay McCulloch.— C. H. Hull 133
Keasbey, L. M. The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doc- trine.— E. R. Johnson 264
Lodge, R. Richelieu. — C. H. Lincoln 267
Lowei«i„ A. L. Governments and Parties in Continental
Europe. — C. F. A. Currier 135
Lucas, D. B. Nicaragua, The War of the Filibusters.— L. M.
Keasbey 139
(iv)
Contents. v
PAGE.
MacCorklE, W. A. The Nicaragua Canal. — L. M. Keasbey . . 139 McLaughlin, J. F. The Monroe Doctrine. — L. M. Keasbey . , 139 McLennan, J. F. Studies in Ancient History ; The Second
Series. — F. H. Giddings 269
MeiTZEn, A. Siedelung und Agrarwesen der Westgermanen und
Ostgermanen. — E. P. Cheyney 440
Merry, W. L. The Nicaragua Canal. — L. M. Keasbey 139
MorlEy, John. The Life of Richard Cobden. — F. I. Herriott . 272 Pareto, V. Cours d'ljconomie politique. — H. L. Moore .... 444
RaTzel, F. History of Mankind. — L. M. Keasbey 447
Ratzel, F. Der Staat und sein Boden. — E. C. Semple 274
Shaw, Wm. A. Select Tracts and Documents Illustrative of
English Monetary History, 1626-1730. — C. H. Hull 276
Smith, Adam. See Cannan.
Tallack, Wm. Penological and Preventive Principles. — S. M.
Lindsay 455
Wessi.au, O. B. See Hake.
Wickseix, K. Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen nebst Dar-
stellung und Kritik des Steuerwesens Schwedens. — W. A.
Scott 142
NOTES.
Adams, G. B. Growth of the French Nation 248
Annales de la Soci^te* d'Economie politique 426
Booth, Charles. Life and Labour of the People of London,
Vol. VIII 426
Chaiu,EY-BerT, J. L£on Say 249
Conway, M. D. The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. IV . . . 117
Curtis, W. E. Venezuela 117
Dupuis, C. See Funck-Brentano
Family Budgets 427
Funck-Brentano and Dupuis, C. Les Tarifs Douaniers et les
Traites de Commerce 117
Gomel, C. Histoire financi^re de l'Assembl£e Constituante . . 248
GuyoT, Y. Quesnay et la Physiocratie 249
Hassall, A. The Balance of Power, 1715-1789 118
de JEKELEALUSSY, J. The Millennium of Hungary and Its
People 428
vi Annals of the American Academy.
PAGE.
Keasbey, L. M. The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doc- trine nS
Money and Prices in Foreign Countries • 119
Mui<hai,i„ M. G. Industries and Wealth of Nations 429
Munro, R. Rambles and Studies in Bosnia-Herzegovina ... 119 Norway, A. H. History of the Post Office Packet Service . . .120
Progressive Review, The • 120
Rapport de l'Administration des Monnaies et Medailles .... 249
Report of the Commissioner of Navigation 250
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 252
Stammhammer, J. Bibliographic der Socialpolitik 429
Viu^ri, P. Niccolo Villari, Vol. Ill 255
CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY.
October 1 to November 15, 1896 145
November 15, 1896, to March 10, 1897 457
Books received 170, 315, 484
NOTES ON MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
CONDUCTED BY I,. S. ROWE.
Aberdeen 162
Birmingham 305
Boston 155, 293, 470
Buffalo 156, 302, 468
Chicago 291, 469
Cincinnati 472
Civil Service System of Massachusetts 292
Cleveland 299
Corrupt Practices Law in Ohio 473
English Municipal Legislation 303
Glasgow 304
Iowa Municipal Legislation 474
London , 159, 474
Minnesota Municipal Legislation 473.
New Orleans 157
Contents. vii
PAGE.
New York 152, 289, 465
Park Commission of Massachusetts . . 469
Philadelphia 152
San Francisco 296
Washington 298
SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.
CONDUCTED BY S. M. LINDSAY.
Charities Department in New York 306
Charities in London 310
Cigar Clipping Collectors' Association in Berlin 313
College Settlements 162, 309
Co-operation in England 311
Cultivation of Vacant City Lots 481
Insurance Against Non-Employment in Switzerland 166
Kingsley House, Pittsburgh 166
Municipal Pawn Shops in Paris 163
Negro Department of the Tennessee Centennial 314
Negro Education 314
Provident Loan Society of New York 479
Sociology, College Courses in 313
Sociology, Teaching of, at the New York University 480
Workingmen's Loan Association of Boston 475
viii Annals of the American Academy.
SUPPLEMENT.
Handbook of the Academy, 83 pp.
Supplement^ May, 1897.
JAN. 1897.
ANNALS
OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE.
THE FIRST APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL REP- RESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES.
The proper basis of apportioning or dividing representa- tion in political assemblies among the various units entitled to membership in such bodies has become one of the most difficult questions in the working of representative govern- ment. Whether population, or wealth, or social position, or profession should be accepted as the fundamental prin- ciple, or some basis combining one or more of these, is still a mooted question in every civilized country.
The tendency of late, indeed, has been toward recognizing the principle of population as the most important and funda- mental one. Of the large nations, however, only France and the United States have as yet gone very far toward the actual realization of such a principle; while the United States, though the first to recognize the principle in the construction of its national government, is still very far from carrying it to its legitimate consequence.
So long as representative assemblies were simply a means of controlling the government, and confined their functions largely to granting or refusing taxes, or vetoing or approv- ing laws or codes previously prepared by the government,
2 AnnaIvS of the American Academy.
as was so long the case in England, it made little differ- ence how they were constituted. So long as the con- trolling classes of society are sufficiently represented by typical members, to make sure that the general sense of the nation is expressed ; so long as the political consciousness of the great mass of the people is still in an undeveloped state, so that the majority of the population is willing that the minority should make their laws and administer the government: the question of assigning representatives, though not always a simple, is scarcely ever a dangerous question.
As soon, however, as legislatures themselves begin to act independently of the government in framing laws and in determining policies ; as soon as they begin to control and, certainly when they begin to make and unmake, the gov- ernments themselves, then it becomes a matter of high importance that every class of the community shall be fairly represented; since in the struggle of interests in such bodies, unrepresented classes are likely to be placed at a disadvantage. It is no mere accident that the political con- sciousness of the people should have been gradually aroused, as in England, as a result of this very struggle for repre- sentation in an assembly which had come to be the chief instrument for lawmaking and law-unmaking. Indeed, this very struggle itself had, perhaps, more to do with turning the attention of the various classes concerned to the neces- sity of taking an active part in politics than any other one circumstance.
Other elements, however, were also of great importance. The whole intellectual movement of the last century in Europe and America was in its political tendencies steadily toward the view that every individual member of the nation is a citizen and, as such, is entitled to have his interests adequately represented in the lawmaking body of the country. Since the general adoption of the representative system in modern Europe, since the era of the French
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 3
Revolution, the tendency has been to realize this principle by organizing a legislative assembly in which the nation shall be represented on the basis of population, though nowhere has this tendency been able to work out its logical result.
The United States in its Federal Government was the first nation of any importance to accept fully the principle of national representation on the basis of population in the constitution of its IyOwer House. It might have been a long time before the nation would have accepted this principle had it not been for the peculiar circumstances under which the national government was formed. The state governments had been largely growths, and slow growths at that, and thus had not been compelled to face the problem of a readjustment of representation in any acute form; but the Federal Government, was a new creation, and had to adopt and put in operation some definite principle as a preliminary to the organization of the government itself. The states have not even yet all modeled their governments on the principle then accepted by the nation for its federal form, though the example of the latter has worked steadily to shape and reshape the former.
The struggle over the basis of representation in the Con- stitutional Convention of 1787 was long and acrimonious. The fact that colonial governments, later state governments, were in existence which had gradually become more and more independent of any superior authority, made it impos- sible to adopt a consolidated national government without a struggle, which would probably have resulted in a civil war. A federal form with a large degree of state autonomy was therefore the only practical form of national government. As some of the states were very large and populous, while some of them were very small and only thinly populated, it was evident that a national assembly based on population alone would not be acceptable and could not be adopted by the free consent of all the states. The proposition to give
4 Annai^ of the American Academy.
to wealth a specific representation commanded practically no support. The compromise accepted was a double chamber system. One House was based on the recognition of the political units called states, giving to each state the same absolute number of representatives. The other House, while recognizing the states as political entities, was based on a distribution of members among them according to popula- tion. Thus, our House of Representatives was the first considerable legislative body in the world based upon a numerical representation of the population of the nation. Provision was made for keeping the body upon this basis by prescribing in the Constitution that a census should be taken every ten years, implying thereby, although not explicitly commanding it, that a reapportionment of the members of this House should be made in pursuance of each census.*
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that even in the House of Representatives the principle of numerical rep- resentation was carried through exactly. The application of the principle was confused, and thwarted by two things : first, the existence of slavery and the compromises connected with it; second, the recognition of the states as political units in the distribution of representatives.
The slaveholders maintained that the slaves should be counted in computing the population for purposes of repre-
*How important such a constitutional provision in regard to the reappor- tionment of representatives is to the actual preservation of the numerical principle may be seen in the history of the German Reichstag. The German Constitution provides for a representation based upon population, but the Reichstag, in the actual distribution of its members, is very far from corresponding to such a sys- tem. The Parliamentary election law adopted by the German Confederation in 1867, which in this respect is still in force, adopted a representative unit, or ratio of 100,000, which made a House in 1873 of 397 members. The population at present is over fifty millions, and would call for a House on the same basis of 520 mem- bers, but no change has been made since 1867, except such as was occasioned by the accession of the South German States and the annexation of Alsace and Iyor- raine. The electoral districts are many of them based upon the provisional apportionment of 1848, so that it is not too much to say that the actual distribution of members in the German Reichstag of to-day is based upon the distribution made fifty years ago. Thus, although in form it is a House based upon numerical representation, it has long ceased to be such as a matter of fact.
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 5
sentation. Their opponents objected to this on the ground that as slaves were property, pure and simple, and not persons, such a scheme would be a practical recognition of wealth as the basis of representation, which all parties had agreed to reject. Since the insistence by each party on its extreme view would have prevented the peaceful organiza- tion of a national government, a compromise was finally effected, according to which five slaves should be counted as three free persons in computing the representative popula- tion. As a part of this compromise, it was further provided that direct taxes, before being collected, should be appor- tioned among the states on the basis of the representative population.
With the disappearance of slavery, the apportionment of representatives became purely numerical in principle so far as this feature was concerned, since the actual population was now equal to the representative population. But the other difficulty in the way of applying exactly the principle of nu- merical representation, namely, the recognition of the states as such in the process of apportionment, still remained.*
* It is of course a still more important point in discussing the subject of repre- sentation in the United States not to lose sight of the fact that, inasmuch as the representation in the Lower House was to be assigned upon the basis of popula- tion, while the states were left to determine entirely for themselves who should be entitled to take part in the choice of representatives, the question of whether the national House was a more or less truly representative body turned always upon the policy which the states adopted in regard to the elective franchise. If any state limited the right to vote to a small class, or if it intimidated and drove away from the exercise of the right to vote any considerable number, it would thereby increase the proportional value of each vote belonging to those who possessed the franchise, as compared with similar persons in other states. The latter was ex- actly what happened at the close of the Civil War in the Southern States. The representation was considerably enlarged over what it had been in the days of slavery, for five negroes were now counted as five persons instead of three, and as the white population determined to prevent negroes from voting, and actually did so in those states where their numbers threatened to swamp the white vote, the relative power of the white man's vote was very greatly increased over that of a corresponding person in states where no such policy was followed. The same thing is accomplished by a law limiting the right to vote to those who can read and write, or those who possess a certain amount of property. This consideration, although extremely important in a study of the question whether our scheme, as at present worked, is a truly representative one or not, does not fall within the scope of this paper.
6 AnnaIvS of the American Academy.
The Constitution provides that the total number of repre- sentatives shall be distributed first among the states on the basis of their respective numbers. This means that the states themselves are the primary representative districts, and that in constructing representative districts, no state line should be crossed, that parts of two or more different states should not be combined in the process of making dis- tricts, etc.*
A moment's reflection will make it plain that such a provision makes impossible the exact application of the numerical principle of apportionment. If it were made the duty of Congress:
i . To determine the number of members in the House of Representatives ;
2. To divide the whole population of the country by such number in order to ascertain the number of people entitled to a representative;
♦In the early laws regarding apportionment, the states were so plainly regarded as the primary representative districts that Congress did not undertake to make any other sub-division at all, nor to require the states to make any sub-division. The actual sub-division of the states is left entirely to the individual state governments; although Congress has since 1842 provided by law that the state governments should divide the states into a number of districts equal to the total number of representatives to which they are entitled. The history of the action of the states in this respect is an interesting one.
New Hampshire did not sub-divide the state until 1824, when the state was di- vided into single member districts for one election. In subsequent elections no- sub-division was made until after the census of 1840, when the single member dis- trict system was adopted and has been observed since.
Connecticut seems to have followed the general ticket system with no sub-divi- sion until 1835.
Pennsylvania followed sometimes one system and sometimes another, com- bining oftentimes several plural member districts with single member dis- tricts.
New Jersey seems to have followed something of the same plan, though it adopted the general ticket system from 1813 to 1842.
Virginia seems to have been consistent in the application of the single member district system after the year 1802.
Georgia seems to have followed the general ticket system, with no sub-division into districts until 1843.
The early states, with the exception of the original thirteen, seem to have fol- lowed different systems, but it was evidently taken for granted by all parties that the states were allowed by the constitution to do as they chose in this matter, and the law that Congress passed in pursuance of the census of 1840, requiring the division into single member districts, aroused a great deal of bitter feeling.
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 7
3. To divide the whole country into a number of districts equal to the number of the House, each containing the population entitled to a representative ;
And if in doing this, it were authorized to disregard state, county, city and other existing lines of political division, it might be possible to make an exact apportionment upon the basis of numbers.
If, however, it must regard existing lines, it is evident that such an exact distribution will be impossible, owing to the fact that members themselves are not divisible, while population numbers are not likely to be round.
In one case only might it be possible, even under such conditions, to make an exact apportionment. The case, however, is so little likely to occur that it may be dis- missed as, practically speaking, impossible. Thus, if the population of each state, as ascertained by the census, should, as a matter of fact, bear the same exact ratio to the entire population of the country as the representatives assigned to it bear to the total number of representatives in the House; or, to put it differently, — if a common divisor could be found which would divide exactly the total popu- lation of each state in such a way that the sum of the quo- tients would be equal to the total number of members in the House, then an exact assignment on the basis of numbers could be made under the present Constitution. Thus, sup- pose that six states have populations as follows: A, 100,000; B, 200,000; C, 300,000; D, 400,000; B, 500,000; F, 600,000; and that the number of persons entitled to a representative be 100,000; it is evident that an exact assignment could be made in strict proportion to population ; giving to A 1 ; to B 2; to C 3; to D 4; to K 5; to F 6. But no such exact multiples of the unit of representation have ever been re- turned by the census or ever will be. There will always be remainders after dividing the population of the state by the number of people entitled to a representative, and so long as this is true, an exact division on a numerical basis is
8 Annai£ of the American Academy.
impossible, if state lines must be observed in the process of apportionment. *
It might seem at first glance as if the assignment of representatives, the basis of representation being agreed upon, would be a very simple matter; — a mere matter of arithmetic, indeed. And so it would, if the national ter- ritory could be divided simply with reference to the appor- tionment itself; or, if the population numbers of the different states would arrange themselves in such relation to each other, and to the population of the union, as a whole, as would enable an exact assignment to be made; neither of which supposi- tions is realized under our present system as noted above. It might seem also as if the question itself would be in any case of comparatively little importance, since the difference in representation could never amount to so very much after all. In the most extreme case, it could only mean that a state would have a number of people unrepresented which is less than the number entitled to one representative. In the case of a large state with many representatives, this would become so slight a matter that it might be neglected with propriety. In the case of a small state, it would seem to be more serious, but as apportionment is often made under our system, the unrepresented portion would not probably alwajrs be large, and a large unrepresented re- mainder at one time would be balanced, or offset, by a small unrepresented remainder at another. In any case, such a state would have relatively so large a representation in the Senate, as compared with the other states, that it might well be content with being at a little disadvantage in the House.
* It is worthy of note that exactly the same difficulty has arisen in the discussion of assignment of representatives under the minority or proportional representa- tion plan among the various parties entitled to representation. If the parties would cast their votes in such a way that the number of people entitled to a rep- resentative should be exactly contained without remainders in the vote of the different parties, then an exact proportional assignment, or distribution, could be easily made. But political parties are so obstinate that no such vote casting has ever occurred, except in purely hypothetical calculations in academic discussions. The method of solving this question has come to be one of the most prominent characteristics of different schools of proportional representation.
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 9
This seems to have been the view of the men who drafted the Constitution, — if, indeed, they ever thought of the matter at all; for there is no indication that this subject was discussed, either in the Constitutional Convention or in the ratifying conventions, or in the pamphlet literature of the time, either before or after the adoption of the Constitu- tion. It would seem to have been taken for granted that after the basis of apportionment were once acccepted, the mere details of assignment in accordance with the popula- tion would be so simple as to offer no difficult3\
And yet, the settlement of this question, simple as it appears, rocked the Government of the United States to its foundation within three years after it was organized. It gave rise to the first constitutional debate, in which the value of the union itself was openly canvassed. It occas- ioned the President and his advisers the greatest anxiety ; it called forth the first presidential veto; and was finally decided in accordance with a principle, which, after being accepted for fifty years, was ultimately rejected as being unconstitutional and unfair. The subject, therefore, is cer- tainly not without interest to the student of political science.
The first session of the Second Congress of the United States met at Philadelphia, Monday, October 24, 1791. One of the first subjects of discussion was the apportionment of representatives in pursuance of the census of 1790. The returns were all completed except those from South Caro- lina, which were not finally declared until early in 1792.
The discussion of apportionment was begun during the first week of the session, and continued until the twenty- fourth of November, when a bill was passed in the House by a vote of 43 to 12, giving to each state in the union one representative for every 30,000 of its population, disregard- ing any remainders or so-called fractions which might occur. The bill was then sent to the Senate. After a fortnight's discussion, on December 8, the Senate by a vote of 13 to 12, the Vice-President giving the casting vote, amended the
io AnnaIvS of the American Academy.
House bill by substituting the number 33,000 for 30,000, leaving the rest of the bill unchanged. This the House, after a long discussion, refused to accept on December 14. On December 15 the Senate, by a vote of 13 to 12, the Vice- President giving the casting vote, declared its intention of insisting on the amendment. The House again discussed the subject at length, ending on December 19, by another refusal, by a vote of 32 to 27, to accept the Senate amend- ments. The Senate, on December 20, again considered the question, but decided by the same vote as before, the Vice- President giving the casting vote, to adhere to its amend- ment. The House then dropped the matter and the bill was thus lost. It is interesting to note that the bill which ultimately became a law was this first House bill as amended by the Senate.
On January 6, 1792, the House resolved to appoint a com- mittee to bring in a bill relating to apportionment. A proposition relating to the subject was discussed January 24, and a committee was appointed to report a bill according to certain directions of the House. The bill was reported Thursday, February 7, and, after a discussion which took a wide range, it was passed February 21 by a vote of 34 to 16. The bill was similar to the first bill passed by the House, accepting a ratio of 30,000 to be divided into the population of each state, disregarding fractions, in order to determine the number of representatives to be assigned to the state. Coupled with this, however, was a provision for a new census, and a new apportionment in 1797, the House evi- dently hoping to persuade the Senate to accept its proposi- tion by holding out the inducement of a speedy reapportion- ment.
The Senate discussed the bill from February 2 1 to March 12, and passed it on that date by a vote of 14 to 13, amended in some important respects. The Senate struck out the provision for a new census. The representative number 30,000, proposed by the House, was accepted, but instead
Apportionment op Federal Representatives, h
of giving to each state one representative for every 30,000 and no more, it gave one additional representative each to the eight states having the largest remainders or fractions. The method pursued in determining the number was not indi- cated in the bill, but either of two ways amounting to the same thing on the whole may have been pursued. Accept- ing 30,000 as the representative unit and dividing it into the population of the different states, as indicated by the census of 1790, would give a certain number of represent- atives amounting in all to the number 112, supposing that South Carolina was to have six. Then, adding together the remainders, or unrepresented fractions, in the different states, it would be found that nearly 260,000 people were still unrepresented, — that is, a number equal to somewhat more than eight full ratios. Eight members would then be distributed, by giving them to the states having the largest remainders.
Another method of reaching the same end would be as follows :
Accepting 30,000 as the representative ratio, it might be divided into the total population of the union, which, accord- ing to the census of 1790, was 3,615,937, in order to deter- mine the total number of members in the House. This would give 120. Then dividing the population of each state by 30,000, and assigning a number of representatives equal to the respective quotients, 112 members only would be assigned, leaving eight members, the difference between 112 and 1 20, to be assigned to the states having the largest remainders.
The House, after discussing the bill, again refused, by a vote of 31 to 30, to accede to the Senate amendments, and on the seventeenth of March requested a conference with the Senate. A conference committee was appointed, but on March 22 it reported in both Houses that no agreement could be reached. The Senate then voted to insist on its amendments by a vote of 14 to 13. On the next day the
12 Annans of the American Academy.
House finally accepted the Senate amendments by a vote of 31 to 29, and on March 28 the bill was sent to the President for his signature.
Having kept the bill as long as he could without its becom- ing a law, the President returned it with his veto on April 5. On the next day an attempt was made to pass it over the President's veto in the House, which failed, since only 33 votes could be obtained for it, which was not the required two-thirds.
The House then, on April 10, drafted a third bill, incor- porating the principle of the Senate amendment to the orig- inal bill as passed by the House, which was accepted by both Houses, and signed by the President on the fourteenth of April. It provided for giving to each state in the union one representative for every full ratio of 33,000 and no more, giving a House of 105 members.
The opening debate in the House of Representatives on the first bill evidently covered a wide range of considera- tions, though the report of the debate in the Annals of Congress is so meagre that we cannot be sure of the relative prominence which these various considerations assumed in the minds of the members of the House, and we are some- what dependent on outside sources for an adequate account of the course which the discussion actually took. The debate was more largel}~ academic in character than at a later time, and an air of calmness and deliberation prevailed which soon disappeared.
There seems to have been no difference of opinion at the beginning as to the proper method of assigning representa- tives. It seems to have been almost taken for granted by the members of the House that the first thing to do was to decide what number of people should be entitled to a repre- sentative, or, in the technical language of the discussion at that time, and subsequently, what number should be taken for the representative unit or ratio. Having determined this, the next step was to divide this number into the
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 13
representative population of each state, assigning to each state a number of representatives equal to the number of times its representative population contained the represen- tative ratio. The size of the House then appeared by adding together these various quotients. As individual representa- tives could not be divided, it was evident that any remainder left after dividing the representative ratio into the represen- tative population of the state would have to be disregarded. This remainder came to be known technically as a fraction, and was spoken of as an unrepresented remainder, or an unrepresented fraction. So evident did it seem to the House that this method was a simple, logical and the only proper one, that no provision looking to a different method of assigning representatives seems to have even been sug- gested in this first debate.*
It is not probable that any other method would have been proposed at any stage of the debate if, as a matter of fact, the population numbers of the different states had been so related to each other that an exact common divisor could have been found which, being divided into the population of the respective states, would have left no remainders. And it was only because the number 30,000, or indeed any other number proposed, was so far from being an exact common divisor that the question, by what method the inequalities of an assignment made upon such a basis could be remedied, became a burning one.
There was a decided difference of opinion in the House as to the number of people to be taken as the ratio, and that for very different reasons. Some members were in favor of
* Jefferson in his letter to the President, advising him to veto the bill as it lay before him, makes much of this point, and argues that it was not until a later period of the discussion, when some members saw a chance to gain something for their own states by adopting a different method, that any other plan was pro- posed. The answer to Jefferson's argument is of course plain. The longer the matter was discussed.the plainer did it become that the so-called simple and natural method resulted in a decided inequality of representation, and thus ir> a viola- tion of the constitutional rule that representatives should be apportioned accord- ing to population.
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fixing upon a relatively large number as the representative ratio, thus obtaining a relatively small House ; others were in favor of taking a small representative ratio, thus obtain- ing a relatively large House. The greatest difference, how- ever, between the two extreme ratios seriously proposed would not seem to us, judged by our present standards, to be very much, or the matter whether one or the other was taken to be of very great importance. It is difficult for us to understand, without an examination of the circumstances, how this difference of opinion could have occasioned such a tempest as actually arose. The Constitution in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, declares that, "The number of repre- sentatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, but each state shall have at least one representative. ' '
One or two members proposed a ratio of 50,000, but no serious proposition supported by any considerable number of members was made looking toward a larger ratio than 40,000; so that the choice lay between 30,000 and 40,000, and a House of 112 members and one of 82, respectively.
Different members favored taking as the ratio one or another of the round numbers between 30,000 and 40,000 on different grounds. Upon dividing the representative popu- lation of each state by the round numbers from 30,000 to 40,000, respectively, it was found that in the case of some of these numbers there were fewer remainders and conse- quently a smaller unrepresented population than in the case of other numbers. That is to say, that some of these num- bers were found to be more nearly true common divisors than others. The number 33,000 was a favorite unit, because it left, relatively speaking, a comparatively small number of unrepresented people, while it allowed a considerable increase in the size of the House, and those members whose attention was fixed upon the question of an equal and fair distribution naturally inclined to favor this number. Other members, who were impressed by the desirability of having as large a House as possible favored 33,000 rather than 40,000,
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 15
because it gave a House of 105 instead of a House of 82. But they favored still more the number 30,000 because it gave a House of 112 instead of a House of 105, and they were more moved by the advantages of a large House than by the disadvantage of a more unequal distribution of members.
There was another consideration which ought not to be lost sight of, for it has been of permanent influence in deter- mining the ratio in every successive apportionment since 1792. It was found that, according as one or the other of these numbers was taken as a divisor, one or another state, or one or another section, would gain or lose a representa- tive, and there is no doubt that this fact had weight with the members of the House in this very first debate, although it did not become nearly so prominent as at a later period of the deliberations.
According to the report of the proceedings, the question of the justice or injustice of having large unrepresented fractions was raised at a very early period and was evidently considered in the committees as well as in the House, in all its different aspects, for in the second debate on the bill, as amended by the Senate, Mr. Madison declared that the whole subject of fractions had been thoroughly threshed out in the first debate, and that no new considerations had been introduced of sufficient importance to lead the House to alter its mind upon this important subject.
As to the question of adopting some other method than that of simply dividing the representative ratio into the various populations, disregarding fractions, which should come more nearly to producing a distribution of representa- tives in accordance with population, there seems, as said above, to have been no proposition whatever, for when the bill came back from the Senate amended by striking out 30,000 and putting in 33,000 and the argument was advanced that the Senate had been moved to this step by the fact that in this way the unrepresented fractions were reduced to a
1 6 Annai^s of the American Academy.
much smaller total, Mr. Benson remarked that there was another possible way for assigning representatives which, if it had been thought of in time, that is during the first debate in the House, might have commanded the assent of all the members. He then proceeded to set forth a method which had been proposed in the Senate as an amendment to the bill, but which had been voted down. It was ultimately incorporated in the second bill as passed by the two Houses, and vetoed by the President. It is fully set forth on page ii above.
The sentiment of the House during this first debate was very plainly in favor of the largest House which was allowed by the consitutional method of assigning one to every 30,000 of the population. The debate upon the question of whether the House should be a large or small body, although, as said above, rather academic and theoretical than practical in character, is of interest as throwing some light upon the experience of the country in representative institutions up to that time. Those who favored a large House argued as follows: In the first place, in a country as large as the United States was at that time, with a population so scat- tered throughout its extensive territory, the only way in which a fairly adequate representation could be secured was by having a large number of representatives, and, conse- quently, a comparatively small body of constituents to each representative. It would make but little difference in a thickly populated country whether a man represented 30,000 or 150,000 people, for it would be possible for him to become more or less well acquainted with the needs and wishes of a very large population. But in a sparsely settled country, it would be simply impossible for the representative to get over his district in such a way as to obtain an adequate view of the conditions, needs, wants and wishes of his constitu- ents. It was also urged, that in a small constituency it would be possible for the individual members to become more thoroughly acquainted with the character and ability
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 17
of their representative, and they would thus be enabled to exercise a more effective check upon his actions.
It was, moreover, in the opinion of some members, neces- sary just at this time to build up in the House a make- weight against the overwhelming influence of the President and Senate. The latter were both removed, by indirect election, from immediate control by the people. They had both been invested with very superior authority to that of the House. By their position, they occupied naturally a larger place in the public eye, inspired more respect and reverence and, by that fact, enforced their will more easily as against the House. The only way to remedy this was to make the House itself so closely representative of the people, so plainly and distinctly a mouthpiece of the popular will, as to check, and, if need be, overawe the executive and the Senate. This could not be done with the relatively small powers assigned to the House in any other way than by making it so numerous that it would become by that mere fact more distinctly than either of the other factors the rep- resentative of the people. This would enable it to speak with authority in any case of dispute between itself and other branches of the government
There was still another point. It was necessary at the time to enlist a warm popular support in behalf of the new government. This could be done only by increasing the number of representatives in such a way that each indi- vidual citizen would feel that he had a direct and important share in the choice of this body, and by multiplying the members in such a way that they would be enabled to reach and influence every citizen of the United States in favor of the government of which they formed a part.
There was, moreover, unfortunately, a very strong popular suspicion in the states of the character of the new govern- ment. It was looked upon as likely to become oligarchical in its instincts and actions because of its small size as com- pared with the large number of people whose interests were
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to be subserved. The only way to disarm this feeling of suspicion and to enlist a public interest and public sup- port in behalf of the new government was to show once for all that it was to be made popular as rapidly as possible and to be kept popular in all time to come. If the tendency should be to make the House a comparatively small body, and keep it so, as the population grew the smaller states would even lose representatives absolutely, which could only result in rendering them still more restive under the feeling that their interests were not being adequately cared for in a body which was practically under the control of three or four of the larger states.
There was another, and perhaps a no less important con- sideration. The people of the country were used to large representative chambers. They had experienced in their own history how the English government, when it was con- cerned about diminishing the share of the people in the government of the colonies, always made as its first step a reduction in the number of representatives chosen by the people. They had, consequently, come to feel that popular safety and popular liberty lay in a numerous representative branch. The legislatures in all of the states were larger than the House of Representatives. From one to four hundred was no uncommon number. Having worked out in their own experience chambers of such size, they would naturally look in the national chamber for some expression of this same experience.
Finally, entirely aside from the arguments which might be advanced in favor of a large House, there was no doubt whatever that whether reasonable or unreasonable there was a strong popular demand for as large a House as the Consti- tution would allow, and that this demand must be met.
That there was such a demand was evident from the fol- lowing considerations:
The discussion in the Constitutional Convention itself showed that there was very general suspicion and hesitancy
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 19
in the way of allowing the Congress to decide this matter for itself. And during the discussion upon this subj ect, although it was proposed to limit the size of the House by constitu- tional provision in such a way as to make and keep it a small body, the provision actually inserted into the Consti- tution at the suggestion of President Washington himself, that the number should not exceed one for every 30,000 of the population, showed, considering the circumstances under which it was adopted, that the general expectation was that, for the present at least, that number should be taken as the representative ratio. There was an added circumstance that the number finally settled upon was supposed to represent about one for every 30,000 of the population.
When the Constitution went to the individual states for rati- fication, there were few points more exhaustively discussed than that relating to the size of the House of Representa- tives, and at least five states had ratified the Constitution with a distinct recommendation that this provision of the Constitution should be altered. Finally, when the first Congress assembled, the very first proposition for an amend- ment, adopted by two-thirds of both Houses and sent to the individual states for their ratification, was one concerning this very subject, and providing for a large House in such a way as to prevent Congress from diminishing the number. The pamphlet literature of the time, moreover, was full of evidence that there was considerable public excitement upon the subject, and the general demand that the House of Rep- resentatives should be made as soon as possible a larger body.
To the objection that might be made to a large House that there would be difficulty in the way of its transacting the business with proper dispatch, it was answered that, as nobody proposed to have a House of more than 112 members, that argument would of itself seem so ridiculous as to be hardly worthy of consideration, since no one would suppose a House of such size to be in any sense unwieldy.
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There was, moreover, another consideration which ought not to be overlooked, and that was the growing influence of the money power, as illustrated in the rise of the bank, and other similar evidences, and a consequent danger that this power would influence the deliberations and policy of the national government. A small House would make it pos- sible for the bank, by the proper distribution of shares and the utilization of its influence in other directions, to corrupt a sufficient number to secure such legislation as it desired, no matter how opposed it might be to the interests of the country as a whole.
Those who opposed any considerable enlargement of the House joined issue on almost every one of these points. They admitted that the subject had been discussed very fully in the Constitutional Convention, in the ratifying con- ventions, in Congress and in the pamphlet literature of the time, but they insisted that while the voice had been heard of those who were in favor of a large House, that the other party, which really made up the bulk of the nation, had not expressed its sentiment at all. The result was that after all the discussion a limit had been set upon the size of the House by the constitutional provision showing that there was some fear of Congress unduly enlarging it. The action of the ratifying conventions could not be adduced as conclusive, since the eagerness of those who favored the Constitution led them at many points to agree to proposals for amendments which they did not regard as desirable or feasible, relying upon the good sense of the representatives of the people at a subsequent date to dispose of such propo- sitions. And even so, five states only had expressed any desire whatever on this subject. As to the amendment which had been adopted, it was perfectly well known that Congress had accepted all the amendments, not because it was convinced in all cases that they were wise, but because they wished to dispose absolutely of the charge that they were unwilling to leave the matter to the people for decision ;
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 21
and, as a matter of fact, up to that time a majority of the states had not acted upon this amendment and probably never would. As to the pamphlet literature favoring a large House, that was no argument at all, since those who were in favor of a change would naturally be the ones to stir up agitation, while those who were satisfied with the present provision, and opposed to a change would naturally not trouble themselves about the matter until it should become a serious question, which at present it was not. As to the merits of the question, if Congress should now undertake to enlarge the House of Representatives to the full limit of the Constitution, it would set an example for subsequent con- gresses which it would be difficult for them to refuse to fol- low, and the House of Representatives might easily become such an unwieldy body as to permit of no efficient consid- eration of the public needs. It would tend to become a mere mob. As to the small constituencies being more able to judge of the abilities and character of their representatives, it was a well-known fact that the smaller the constituency, the smaller the calibre of the man chosen in it, and that the only way to secure really first class men in the representa- tive chamber was to make the constituency so large that there should be an adequate supply of such men available for the work. It would be far easier to get sixty-five or seventy -five of the ablest men of the country into a small representative chamber than it would be to get the same absolute number of men into a chamber of 200 or 300, and the relative power of this class in a large chamber would, of course, be far smaller. There was, moreover, a general fear in the country at large of a tendency to extravagance and large appropriations on the part of the Federal Government, and to increase largely the representation at the present time would be to burden unduly the budget of the govern- ment, which was already in financial difficulties.
The smaller states which might, in course of time, lose some of their representatives by the increasing population
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of the larger states, could really not justly complain of such a development, since they had already received in the Senate an entirely undue proportion of influence, and it was not fair to ask the country that they should also be preserved in their relative position in the House. Every state would have at least one representative in the House, and if its population did not keep relative pace with that of other states, it certainly would have no reason to complain, con- sidering that it had the same representation in the Senate, as even the largest of its sister communities.
These considerations in favor of a large representation outweighed even the feeling of many that if the ratio of 30,000 were taken, there there would be a less fair and equal distribution of representatives than would be accom- plished by the ratio of 33,000. The matter went to the Senate. As already indicated, we have no reports of the debate in that body, but the Journal of the Senate mentions several different amendments which were proposed to the House bill, among others, the one described above, which became a feature of the second or vetoed bill. The minutes of the Senate, as reported in the Journal^ seem to show, in the votes of that body, a decided determination to secure a- fairer distribution of representation, if possible, than that which was effected by the House bill. The vote in the- Senate, as already seen, was an extremely close one, and this fact formed an element of considerable importance in President Washington's decision to veto the bill. He saw that it had been carried through the House, as we shall see subsequently, by mere pressure on the part of the Senate, and only with the greatest reluctance in that body. He saw, moreover, that it had passed the Senate uniformly by the casting vote of the Vice-President, and he thus had upon his side the weight of the majority of the House and the fact that the Senate itself was able to come to no agreement upon the subject.
The Senate amended the bill finally, rejecting all proposed
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 23
amendments by adopting a ratio of 33,000, applying the same method of determining the size of the House as that which the House had used in the bill.
When the bill was returned to the House with the Senate's amendments, proposing the sum 33,000 instead of 30,000, evidence soon began to show itself of a growing heat on the subject, and the excitement began which continued until the final settlement of the question in the following April.
It was argued in the first place that this was a question which belonged particularly to the House ; one which really did not concern the Senate at all, and although the Consti- tution gave to Congress, or the legislative authority of the Federal Government, the right to determine the size of the House, and the actual apportionment in accordance with the constitutional rule, yet, after all, it was something which, by its very nature, pertained especially to the House, and with which the Senate ought not to interfere, especially as it had passed the House, both in committee of the whole and in ordinary session, by a large majority.
But the return of the bill gave occasion to a more careful discussion of the subject of fair apportionment than that question had received during the first debate. The reason was given in the House for the Senate amendment that a better regard was had to fractions and that there was consequently a more exact apportionment under the Senate proposition of 33,000 than under the House proposition of 30,000. It was urged, however, in answer to this propo- sition that this subject had been fully discussed in the House and distinctly rejected after a careful deliberation on all sides. Mr. Madison observed, with more ingenuity than reasonableness, that the Senate amendment seemed to have been favored because it reduced the aggregate of the fractions, whereas, to his mind, if it had increased the fractions in the case of any states it was equally objec- tionable to the House bill itself. Emphasis was now laid upon the fact which had been observed before, that the
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effect of adopting the ratio of 33,000 instead of 30,000 was to diminish the fractions in the Northern and East- ern states and increase them in the Southern, and that the real reason for the adoption of the 33,000 was not that it secured a greater degree of fairness in the distribution, but that it secured for the controlling element in the Senate an additional power. The fraction of Massachusetts had been reduced from 25,327, under the ratio of 30,000, to 13,327, under the ratio of 33,000. The fraction of Pennsyl- vania had been reduced from 12,879, under the ratio of 30,000, to 3879, under the ratio of 33,000. The fraction of New Jersey had been reduced from 29,559, under the ratio of 30,000, to 14,570, under the ratio of 33,000. The fraction of New Hampshire had been reduced from 21,822, under the ratio of 30,000, to 9822, under the ratio of 33,000. The fraction of Vermont had been reduced from 25,533, under the ratio of 30,000, to 19,533, under the ratio of 33,000. Virginia was increased from 560, under the ratio of 30,000, to 3560, under the ratio of 33,000. The fraction of North Carolina had been left unchanged. Georgia and Kentucky had been slightly decreased, as also Rhode Island and Dela- ware.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont and New Jersey had all large fractions under the 30,000 apportionment, while the Southern states, Virginia, Mary- land, Georgia, Kentucky had relatively small ones, though the remainders of Delaware and North Carolina were rela- tively large.
There was evidently a growing consciousness in this debate of the inequality in the 30,000 basis of representa- tion, and the opposition of the Senate gave new strength to the opposers of the measure in the House. It was urged strongly that the 30,000 basis gave an undue advantage to the large states over the smaller, and to the Southern over the Eastern and Northern. In answer to this it was urged that the smaller states already had a strong representation
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 25
in the Senate and that if there was to be any inequality it ought to be to their disadvantage, rather than to the disad- vantage of the large states which were placed in such an inferior position, considering their relative size and popu- lation, in the upper chamber. The advocates of the smaller states, however, replied that the constitution of the Senate was one of the compromises of the Constitution, and that they were not called upon to give up such advantage as they received in the Senate, by consenting to be put at a disad- vantage in the House.
Much the same argument was used in regard to the Southern states. It was held by the one party that the South had the decided advantage over the North, under the apportionment taking 30,000 as the unit, and that the 33,000 came more nearly to doing justice to the North. It was admitted that under the 33,000 ratio the North was some- what over represented, but it was held that it was much better to have the North slightly over- represented than the South enormously over-represented, more especially as the South had already received an advantage in the Constitu- tion of the House by being allowed a representation for its property in the form of slaves. To this the Southerners replied that that was also one of the compromises of the Constitution, and that they were not called upon by any demand of equity to give up this advantage which had been conceded to them in the Constitution by consenting to an inequitable assignment of representatives. It was, more- over, in their opinion, a grave question whether the South had, after all, taken sufficient guarantees of the North in regard to the matter of slavery, and whether the growing disproportion between the North and the South in wealth and population would not call for still further guarantees in behalf of the South in course of time.
It was at this time that the amendment proposed in the Senate providing that the ratio of 30,000 should be accepted, but that additional members should be assigned for large
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unrepresented fractions, was proposed in the House ; but it was disposed of very cavalierly as scarcely worthy of dis- cussion.
After a vigorous debate the House decided to abide by its original proposition and returned the bill to the Senate. The Senate, however, by the same majority as in the previous case, insisted on its own amendment, and returned the bill to the House. The third debate on the subject brought out finally all the different points of view, and the arguments for them, in such a way that there was really nothing further to be said in the course of the debate as a whole, and nothing further was really added to the discus- sion by subsequent debates. It was at this time of the proceedings that the proposition to adopt the 30,000 basis, assigning additional members for large unrepresented frac- tions, was discussed in extenso.
Mr. Ames, of Massachusetts, seems to have championed the proposition most vigorously, and he insisted very strongly that the idea of a fair and just apportionment was fundamental to the peaceful working of the government, and then undertook to show how neither of the ratios pro- posed, 33,000 and 30,000, provided for as fair a distribution as the 30,000 combined with the assigning of additional repre- sentatives to large unrepresented fractions. Thus he showed that the State of Virginia, under the House ratio of 30,000, without reference to fractions, had twenty- one members, a number which was entirely out of proportion to the number given to other states, no matter by what standard of fairness one was willing to judge the case. Thus, if the population of Virginia be compared to the total population of the union, it would be found that instead of being entitled to twenty-one representatives, she was entitled to only nineteen, and was thus, as against other states as a whole, placed at a very decided advantage. If, on the other hand, you compared her with other states it would be found that the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 27
and Delaware have together 766,428 persons, a number more than 130,000 in excess of the population of Virginia, and that these states, taken together, would have only the same number of representatives as Virginia. That is to say, Virginia would have an advantage of four representatives over these six states for the same number of people. And if one chose to take still another standard, namely, that of securing in as many of the states as possible a ratio as near to that accepted as a normal one as could be obtained, it would be found that the ratio of 30,000 assigning members to the eight states with the largest remainders or fractions, would be such a method.
It will be found, for example, upon an actual application of this method that fifty members would be chosen in six states with only a very slight departure from the normal number accepted, each of them being a little less than 30,000. Thus it would be in
New Hampshire 28,365
Massachusetts 29,924
Connecticut 29,805
Vermont 28,511
New Jersey 29,826
North Carolina 29,460
and even Delaware would depart only slightly, though some- what more than these six states, its ratio being 27,769.
Fifty-five other members would be chosen in the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia by ratios only slightly in excess of 30,000. Thus:
New York < 30, 144
Pennsylvania 30,919
Maryland 30,946
Virginia 30,026
So that 107 members would, in effect, be chosen by a ratio of one to 30,000. It is true that by this bill some states would lose members, and some would gain, but a comparison of the respective gains and losses would show that, on the whole, a much nearer approximation to equality would be
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obtained by this method than by any other. Mr. Ames also held that the arguments against this method were really no arguments at all, notably, the one that the discrimination against the small states in the original House bill was justi- fied by the greater advantage the small states had in the Senate; since the large states were injured as well as the small ones. Massachusetts and North Carolina could not be benefited by giving Virginia two extra members, while the small ones were also injured as respects each other. Delaware would have only one, Rhode Island two, yet the latter had only 9000 more people than the former.
Mr. Ames made the further argument that the same rule was to be adopted in regard to the apportionment of direct taxes as in regard to the apportionment of representatives. They were to be distributed on the basis of representative population. Now would Virginia consent to assume such a disproportionate share of the taxes as it had received of the representatives? This could hardly be thought to be likely, and no one indeed asked that Virginia should assume an unfair proportion of direct taxes, nor was he content to have it receive an undue share of representatives.
The chief argument against this position of Mr. Ames was a constitutional one. It was pointed out that by such an assignment the number of people within certain of the states who should receive a representative would be smaller than 30,000, whereas the Constitution declared distinctly that the number of representatives should not exceed one for every 30,000. This is an important point, because it wTas one of the two grounds upon the consideration of which President Washington made up his mind to veto the bill.
Those who favored this method of apportionment de- clared, however, that that was a wrong interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitution declared that the number of representatives should not exceed one for every 30,000; it said nothing in express terms as to whether it meant 30,000 of the population in the respective states,
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 29
or 30,000 in the country as a whole. It was proper to give no meaning to this phrase which would practically nullify or render meaningless that other distinct and express provision of the Constitution that the apportionment among the states should be according to their respective numbers. No method of actually making this apportionment was pre- scribed, and, consequently, any method was proper provided it gave an exact distribution of the representatives, and of two or more methods which might be applied that one was plainly and constitutionally speaking, obligatory which secured the nearest approximation to an exact numerical apportionment. And to the argument repeatedly made up to that time in the course of the discussion that the Southern states were not called upon to give up any advantage accru- ing to them out of the application of the constitutional rule, it was declared that there was no such constitutional rule ; that the expression might have either meaning if taken by itself, but that the context made it perfectly plain that it meant the number of representatives was not to exceed one for every 30,000 of the entire population of the union. It was also maintained that the amendment which had been proposed by Congress to the various states, and which had already been accepted by a number of them, although using practically the same language as the Constitution, was capable really only of the one interpretation, limiting the size of the House not by the number of times 30,000 was contained in the population of the respective states, disre- garding fractions, but the number of times it was contained in the population of the union as a whole.
Jefferson was undoubtedly right, as already suggested, in saying that this method of distributing the representa- tives did not seem to have occurred to anybody as a serious proposition in the early stages of the debate. Perhaps he was also right when he said that it had been found out by those who saw that if it were adopted a different distribution of members would ensue, and, consequently some states would
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gain at the cost of others. There is no doubt that some states did gain under the application of the preceding prin- ciple, and there is no doubt that the smaller states contended for their advantage as against the larger, and that the Southern states contended for their advantage as against the Northern and Eastern, and vice versa.
But, on the other hand, no one who studies the history of the debate, can deny the fact that the sentiment of the Senate was irresistibly driven toward the acceptance of this rule, because of the plainly unequal distribution effected by the application of the rule adopted by the House.
It was an admirable illustration of a true constitutional question, a provision in a written instrument capable Of two interpretations, conferring, according as one or the other interpretation was taken, distinctive and solid advantage upon one or another political element, in this case, one or another state, or one or another section. It became perfectly plain that the jealousy which had existed more or less as a latent force during the colonial and revolutionary periods, which had shown itself in such a marked way in the Consti- tutional Convention, had by no means been allayed by the four or five years which had intervened. On the contrary, the signs were already ominous of the conflicts of the future, and this first debate brought to a head and to an open ex- pression suspicions and jealousies which men had been more or less trying to cover up and repress. It is noticeable that Virginia had been picked out especially as a state whicJi profited by the application of the ratio of 30,000, regarding fractions; and it was three Virginians who persuaded the President to insist on the principle of the House bill.*
In spite of the able and long discussion, the House insisted upon its original amendment, and the bill was returned to the Senate. The Senate, however, refused to recede, and the bill was lost. When it was taken up again, there was a repetition of the same arguments and the same points of
* See p. 33
Apportionment op Federal Representatives. 31
view, but the House decided in the second bill, described above, to insist upon the method which it had adopted before, but it incorporated two provisions by which it hoped to dis- arm the opposition of the Senate. It provided for a new census within a brief period of five years, and provided, moreover, that the principle of apportionment should be fixed in advance of the taking of the census. It was openly stated, and with a great deal of truth, that if the House had agreed upon some method of apportionment before the actual returns of the census had shown which states would be placed at a relative advantage or disadvantage under the -application of such rule, there would have been no difficulty in the first place, and the provision of the House involved making the apportionment a mere ministerial act on the part of the President, but in accordance with the principles which it proposed to apply now to the first apportionment.
These sops, however, did not tempt the Senate. After another discussion of considerable length, the Senate took up the amendment which had been proposed first by a member of the Senate, namely, the application of the 30,000 ratio with the representation of large remainders, or, to put it another way, the application of the ratio by dividing it into the total population of the union to determine the number of the House, and then the assignment of the consequent number of members among the states in proportion as nearly as might be to their population. This was returned to the House ; the House refused to accept it. A conference committee was appointed, which failed to agree. The House then receded from its decision and finally accepted the proposed amend- ment of the Senate. The bill then went to the President.
On Thursday, April 5, 1792, the President sent to the House of Representatives a veto of the bill which had been passed on March 28. The veto read as follows:
" Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:
" I have Considered the act passed by the two Houses, entitled * An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives among the several States
32 Annai^ of the American Academy.
according to the first Enumeration,' and return it to your House wherein it originated with the following objections;
"First. The Constitution has prescribed that representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, and there is no one proportion or divisor which, applied to the respective numbers of the states, will yield the number and allot- ment of representatives proposed by the bill.
"Second. The Constitution has also provided that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, which restriction is by the context and by fair and obvious construction to be applied to the respective and separate numbers of the states, and the bill has allotted to eight of the states more than one for every 30,000.
(Signed) " G. Washington."
It will be observed that the President retained the bill in his hands as long as it was possible for him to do so without its becoming a law by the provision of the Constitution that all laws shall pass into effect ten days (Sundays excepted) after they have been sent to the President, unless he returns them to the House with his veto, or Congress, by its ad- journment, refuses to allow him the ten days for considera- tion. This period he had used in a most careful and anxious consideration of the bill. The great excitement which it had caused ; the very close vote by which it was passed in both Houses ; the open charge that one section was trying to get the advantage of the other ; the bitterness which had appeared in the course of the discussion — all combined to give President Washington a very serious problem, which caused him much worry and thought. He asked the opinion in writing of each member of his cabinet. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, of New York, and the Secretary of War, Knox, of Massachusetts, approved the bill on the whole, and advised him to sign it. The Secre- tary of War was rather undecided in his opinion, and the Secretary of the Treasury, thinking that neither of the mooted constructions of the Constitution could be absolutely rejected, held that it would be proper to accede to the inter- pretation given by the legislature. The Secretary of State, Jefferson, and the Attorney-General, Randolph, both of
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 33
whom were from Virginia, expressed their disapproval. It will be seen that the division in the cabinet was as strictly along geographical lines as it had been in the House. This made it naturally very difficult for a man of as impartial and judicious a mind as Washington to come to a decision upon the question.
Jefferson, with his general tendency to claim credit for nearly all the positive actions of Washington which were in accordance with his views, states in his Diary that he and Randolph drew up the veto message. *
He declares that on April the sixth, f the President called upon him before breakfast to have further conversation upon the apportionment bill, in reference to which Jefferson had already given his opinion in writing. Washington agreed that the method provided in the bill was contrary to the common understanding of that instrument and to what was understood at the time by the makers of it, but that the Constitution would bear the construction which the bill implied. And, inasmuch as the vote for and against the bill was perfectly geographical, a Northern against a South- ern vote, he feared that he should be thought to be taking sides with the Southern party if he sent in a veto. Jefferson admitted the motive of delicac3T, but insisted that the Presi- dent should not allow this feeling to lead him to a wrong course of action in the matter, and urged the dangers to which the scramble for the fractional members would lead if such a principle should once be adopted. Washington then expressed his fear that there would, ere long, be a separation of the union, for the public mind seemed to be dissatisfied and tending toward this end. Upon returning home, he sent for Randolph, the Attorney- General, and asked him to get Mr. Madison, and if after conference with Jefferson they all three concurred in the opinion that he
* Compare " The Writings of Thomas Jefferson," edited by H. A. Washington, New York, 1861, Vol. ix, p. 115.
t Evidently a mistake on Jefferson's part or a misprint for April 5th, since the veto was sent to Congress on April 5th.
34 Annals of the American Academy.
ought to veto the bill, he desired to hear nothing more about it, but that they should draw up the instrument for him to sign. Randolph, Madison and Jefferson having come to- gether with their minds made up beforehand, drew the instrument, and Randolph took it to the President with the statement that they all three agreed to it. Washington walked with him to the door, and, as if he still wished to avoid the responsibility for the action, said to him, ' 'And you say you approve this yourself?" Randolph replied, ' 'I do upon my honor;' ' upon which Washington instantly sent the veto to the House of Representatives.
Jefferson's opinion upon the desirability of vetoing the message is by far the most elaborate and carefully consid- ered one of those submitted, and deserves, therefore, especial attention, particularly as it incorporated the views which the President finally accepted in the message itself.*
Jefferson admitted, as, indeed, was generally admitted on all hands, that the principle incorporated in the bill sent to Washington secured in its application a "tolerably just result," and could not be objected to on the score of justice, if it were obtained by the constitutional method. His first objection was that representatives were not apportioned by it among the several states according to their respective numbers. He aims to prove this by showing that there is no common ratio or divisor which applied to the numbers of each state, will give to them the number of representatives allotted in the bill, for by taking the several ratios, 29, 30,
♦ This opinion on the bill apportioning representatives, dated April 4, 1792, was printed in full in "The Writings of Thomas Jefferson," edited by H. A. Washing- ton, New York, 1861, Vol. vii, p. 594. It is reprinted in "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States," by Roger Foster, Boston, 1895, page 424 and following. The opinions of Knox, Jefferson, Hamilton and Randolph are also printed with a recapitulation of the arguments by Jefferson in " The Works of Alexander Hamilton," edited by John C. Hamilton, New York, 1851, Vol. iv, pp. 196 to 215.
An account of the proceedings of the Senate and House in regard to the first apportionment bill, including a copy of Washington's veto, is to be found in the " History of Congress." I^ee & Blanchard, Philadelphia, 1843, pp. 193 to 217. The regular publications of Congress contain of course the debates and a copy of Washington's veto.
Apportionment op Federal Representatives. 35
31, 32 and 33, it will be found that they distribute respec- tively 118, 112, 109, 107 and 105 members. As he maintains that the distribution must be effected by the application of that method, and no number can be found which used in that way will result in giving such a number of representa- tives, it is plain that the House bill must have adopted a false method. In answer to the objection that the same method ought to be applied to the distribution of taxes, as to the distribution of representatives, he said that that was plainly impossible; for, while it was, logically speaking, perfectly practicable to make an exact division of taxes, it would be impossible to find a common ratio which would divide into the population of the states without any re- mainders. The Constitution must be supposed to have con- templated such results as were a necessary outcome of the application of its provisions, and consequently it must be assumed to have contemplated the existence of fractions, or remainders, which should be unrepresented. Aside from this fact that such remainders were a necessary incident to the apportionment of representatives among the states, it must also be allowed that in the long run, owing to the varying relations between the population numbers and the number of representatives, this inequality would more or less roughly distribute itself among the states in the succeeding censuses.
As the bill states no method by which the apportionment has been made, we are left, says Jefferson, to ascertain the method, if possible, by a study of its results. An examina- tion will reveal the fact that at least two distinct ratios were adopted ; one of 30,000, applied to the states of Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Ken- tucky and Georgia; and one of 27,770 to the other eight states; namely, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North and South Caro- lina. Now, if two ratios may be applied, then fifteen may, and there is consequently no restriction upon the arbitrary
36 AnnaIvS of the American Academy.
will of Congress in assigning the representatives if this principle be once granted. Jefferson emphasizes very strongly the argument that the Constitution provides that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, whereas, the bill gives to eight of the states a num- ber exceeding one for every 30,000, namely, one for every 27,770. The fact that the Constitution provided that each state shall have at least one representative shows that it was understood that in the absence of any mention to the contrary, no representation should be given to any smaller number than the common ratio in any case; con- sequently fractions and remainders would have to go unrep- resented.
But it is urged, he says, that the phrase in the Constitu- tion may mean either 30,000 in each state, or 30,000 in the whole union. Suppose it may. As a matter of fact, what was the idea of the framers of the Constitution? What was the common and generally accepted notion from the beginning of the debate until it was found that by accepting some other idea an advantage could be gotten under the scheme of apportionment for certain states and sections?
But, even if we allow that the 30,000 is meant to give the aggregate of representatives and not at all to influence their apportionment, the bill still does not distribute the 120 according to the constitutional rule; that is, according to the numbers of the respective states, for in order to make the apportionment we must take the nearest common divisor as the ratio of distribution; that is to say, that divisor which, applied to every state, gives to them such numbers as added together comes nearest to 120.*
This nearest common ratio will be found to be 28,858 and will distribute 119 of the 120 members, leaving only a single residuary one. It will be found to place 96,648 fractional
* This is the system which is known as the D'Hondt System in the discussions on proportional representation.
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 37
numbers in the eight Northern states, and 105,582 in the Southernmost. The following table shows it :
|
Ratio of 28.858. |
Fractions. |
||
|
Vermont .... |
85,532 |
2 |
27,186 |
|
New Hampshire . |
141,823 |
4 |
26,391 |
|
Massachusetts . . |
475,327 |
16 |
13,599 |
|
Rhode Island . . |
68,444 |
2 |
10,728 |
|
Connecticut . . . |
235,941 |
8 |
5,077 |
|
New York .... |
352,915* |
12 |
6,408 |
|
New Jersey . . . |
179,556 |
6 |
IO |
|
Pennsylvania . . |
432,880 |
15 |
. . . |
|
Delaware .... |
55,538 |
1 |
26,680 |
|
Maryland .... |
278,513 |
9 |
18,791 |
|
Virginia |
630,558 |
21 |
24,540 |
|
Kentucky .... |
68,705 |
2 |
10,989 |
|
North Carolina . . |
353,521 |
12 |
7,225 |
|
South Carolina . . |
206,263 |
7 |
4,230 |
|
Georgia |
70,843 |
2 |
13,127 |
96,648
105,582
3,636,312 119 202,230 202,230
Whatever may have been the intention, the effect of re- jecting the nearest divisor which leaves but one residuary member and adopting another one which leaves eight, is merely to take a member from New York and Pennsylvania each and to give them to Vermont and New Hampshire.
Jefferson then undertakes to show that, if we allow the doctrine that fractions ought to be represented, there will be grave difficulties in the way of applying it. He shows how it is possible that eight of the states might get an additional representative as compared with the other seven, although their population in each case should be only one
* It will be observed that the population numbers assigned to the different states vary in the tables used by Jefferson from those printed elsewhere. There seem to be small discrepancies in all the tables, very few of them being exactly alike, but Jefferson has a very serious discrepancy. He prints the population of New York as 352,915, whereas it appears in other places as 331,589. This would appear to be a mistake on Jefferson's part, owing to the fact that he did not make the dis- tinction between the total population of New York and the representative popu- lation, the latter being the total free population plus three-fifths, of the slave population. This would make a change in the distribution of members under Jefferson's scheme, though it does not affect the argument particularly.
38 Annates of the American Academy.
more than that in the other seven states. Moreover, if you permit the large fractions in one state to choose a repre- sentative for one of the small fractions in another state, you take from the latter its election, which constitutes real rep- resentation, and substitute a virtual representation of the disfranchised fractions. There is still another point which ought not to be lost sight of, in that the bill does not say distinctly that it gives an additional representative to the states having the eight largest fractions, though in fact it has done so. It seems to have avoided establishing that into a rule lest it might not suit on another occasion. Some other time they might distribute the members among the smallest states, no matter what their fractions were, on the ground that was openly advanced in the debate that the smaller states would suffer more from a large unrepresented fraction, than the larger states. Such a rule would, there- fore, open the way for any amount of corrupt bargaining, and scrambling for the representatives which are supposed to stand for the fractions or remainders. Whereas, the principle of adopting a common ratio and assigning as many members as that will give, disregarding fractions, is a plain and simple method which even the wayfaring man can understand. So that if we regard the bill either as a viola- tion of the Constitution, which it seems to be, or as giving merely an inconvenient and difficult interpretation to its words, it is a case wherein the President ought to interpose his veto, and that for the following reasons :
i . The non-user of his negative begins already to excite the belief that no president will ever venture to use it. This has consequently begotten a desire to raise up barriers in the state legislatures against Congress throwing off the control of the Constitution.
2. The veto can never be used more pleasingly to the public than in protecting the Constitution.
3. No invasions of the Constitution by Congress are so fundamentally dangerous as the tricks played on their own
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 39
numbers, apportionment and other circumstances respect- ing themselves, and affecting their local qualifications to legislate for the union.
4. The majorities by which this bill has been carried, to wit, one in the Senate and two in the House of Representa- tives, show how divided the opinions were there.
5. Everybody admits that the Constitution will bear the interpretation here insisted upon, whereas a large minority, both in and out of Congress, deny that it will bear that of the bill.
6. The application of any one ratio is intelligible to the people and will, therefore, be approved, whereas the com- plex operations of the bill can never be comprehended by them, and though they may acquiesce, they certainly cannot approve what they do not understand.*
It is interesting to note how squarely the drift of subse- quent opinions expressed by jurists and practical men set against the conclusions of Jefferson and Washington. The veto of Washington practically settled the policy of the gov- ernment for fifty years, and indeed no serious discussion again took place in regard to the question for forty years after the passage of the apportionment bill of 1792; but when the debate was resumed in 1830, the party opposed to the most important portion of Washington's opinion, although it did not carry its point immediately, convinced the country of the justice of its view, so that it was adopted as the next apportionment bill in pursuance of the census of 1840, and has remained up to the present time the rule of action. Judge Storey, in his ' ' Commentaries' ' f says : ' ' The first reason assigned by Washington is as open to question as any one which can well be imagined, in the case of real difficulty of construction. It assumes at its basis that a common ratio or divisor is to be taken and applied to each
* There is an interesting contemporary view set forth in Marshall's " Life of Washington," Vol. v, p. 319. 1 5th Ed., §682.
4o Annals of the American Academy.
state, let the fractions and inequalities left be what they may. Now this is a plain departure from the terms of the Constitution. It is not there said that an}" such ratio shall be taken. The language is that the representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers; that is, according to the proportion of the whole population of each state to the aggregate of all the states. To apportion according to any ratio short of the whole number in a state is not an apportionment accord- ing to the respective numbers of the state. If it is said that it is impracticable to follow the meaning of the terms liter- ally, that may be admitted, but it does not follow that they are to be wholly disregarded, or language substituted essen- tially different in its import and effect. If we must depart, we must depart as little as practicable. We are to act on the doctrine of c*y prSsy or act as nearly as possible to the rule of the Constitution. If we are at liberty to adopt a rule varying from the terms of the Constitution arguing ab incon- venienti, then it is clearly just as open to others to reason on the other side from opposing inconvenience and injustice."
This expresses, on the whole, the opinion to which the great majority of fair-minded men who have considered the question are driven; a conclusion which rejects as entirely unsound the line of reasoning adopted by Washington in his first objection to the bill, and by Jefferson in his opinion to the President as to the desirability of vetoing the bill.
Washington's second objection to the bill ceased to have any possible significance after the second census, since nobody proposed to extend the size of the House in such a way as to make it possible for any state to have more than one representative for every 30,000, except in the case of those states which were entitled to only one representative and whose population failed to reach this figure. Webster and Everett, in their celebrated arguments for the repre- sentation of fractions, both agreed that Washington's objection was a valid one, but in neither case was any special
Apportionment of Federal Representatives. 41
attention given to the question since it had no significance for the matter before them, and it was a part of the policy of both these astute reasoners to concede every unessential point to their opponents.
It is difficult, however, to see on what ground the first objection can be sustained which is not applicable to the second also, although Judge Storey declares that the second reason assigned by the President against the bill was well founded, in fact, and entirely conclusive. It would seem on the contrary, if the argument be fully examined in both cases, that there is no better reason for one objection than for the other; indeed that both rest upon the same view as to the necessary interpretation of a certain clause in the Constitution which our commentators and statesmen have since come to agree is plainly wrong, and, so far from being deducible from the Constitution, flies directly in the face of its plain and simple meaning.
It has then come to be generally accepted by all parties that the Constitution requires an apportionment of the rep- resentatives among the states as nearly as possible according to their respective numbers and that, although no method is expressly prescribed by that instrument, yet of all the pos- sible methods that one is plainly the constitutional one by which a result corresponding to the rule of strict proportion- ality is secured.
The general rule adopted to secure this is to determine the amount of the population which should be entitled to one representative in Congress and, after having allowed a representative for each of these numbers, to allow to every state an additional member for each fraction of its numbers exceeding one-half of the ratio, rejecting from consideration the smaller fractions. This rule has, however, not been observed strictly and its adoption has not made apportion- ment the perfectly simple and easy problem which it would seem at first blush that it should be.
University of Chicago. EDMUND J. JAMES.
CRIME AND THE CENSUS.
Questions concerning the general aspects of crime in a community usually turn upon considerations of its quantity or amount. The amount of crime is a popular standard of the morality of a people. The progress of a people in moral- ity and the tendency to crime of the different elements of the population are frequently judged by the same measure. The expression, amount of crime, conveys, perhaps, to the popular mind a somewhat vague notion, but for the statisti- cian it has acquired a technical signification. It means the comparison of the number of crimes committed in a given period with the numbers of the population. Such a ratio is necessarily imperfect and open to criticism. In comparing different countries it is properly objected that the standard of what constitutes crime varies. Within narrower limits, the objection is valid against comparisons in the amount of crime, at different periods in the same country. On the other hand, it has no force for the com- parisons of different groups of population, living in the same country, and subject to the same laws.
It has been said that such ratios are always inadequate since they are based upon the crimes detected and deter- mined, and do not, therefore, include those crimes which never come to the cognizance of the authorities, or for which the responsibility is never placed. If in any given instance there is a wide dissimilarity in the care and thor- oughness with which the laws are administered, the argu- ment may have some weight. In the great majority of cases in which a resort is had to statistics of crime, the objection may be disregarded. It may be assumed, that the number of cases undiscovered and unpunished maintains a more or less consistent relation to the total number of offences against the law. Unless this assumption, which is
(42)
Crime and the Census. 43
akin to many which must be made in statistical practice, be accepted, the possibility of crime statistics vanishes. Nor can we close our eyes to the fact that, despite the objections which have been urged, figures in regard to crime and its frequency are in universal use. The statistical measurement of the facts of social life can never be absolutely accurate. If we should, therefore, reject the statistical method we should lose an insight into many problems of the gravest import for society and civilization.
With all its inherent imperfections, the amount of crime, or the ratio between the number of crimes which are pun- ished in a given period and the population, is a measure of frequent use and of great importance. It is to be noted that we speak of the number of crimes and not of the number of offenders. It cannot be denied that the moral tone of a community which records ten offences a year by one indi- vidual, differs from that of one which records ten similar offences by ten distinct individuals. Yet, however desirable it might be to record the offenders rather than the offences, it is quite impracticable. As the amount of crime, thus understood, is the measure by which we estimate the crim- inal tendencies of different communities and of different groups within the same community, it is of the highest im- portance that its application should be thorough, systematic and reasonable. The appeal to statistics should always be final as to the facts. There may be wide differences of opinion as to the significance, economic or moral, to be attached to statements of fact, but the facts stated should be beyond question. The subject of crime is one to which the public is not, and can not be indifferent. If crime increase is it not proof of radical defects in our social organization ? There is a vast amount of popular and scientific reasoning based upon the supposed tendencies to crime of our popula- tion as a whole and of its different elements. Our policy toward the negro and the immigrant, for instance, is often discussed upon the basis of their criminal tendencies.
44 Annai,s of the American Academy.
These are questions not of scientific interest only, but of the gravest practical importance.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine the basis upon which such reasoning stands. We ask the questions : ' ' Have we adequate means of knowing what are the criminal tend- encies of the people of the United States? Do the existing statistical agencies furnish us a safe basis for the judgment of these questions?" Much depends upon the answer to these questions. If the basis is wrong, the conclusions which have been drawn, and the popular conceptions which have arisen from them, may be wrong also. They are not necessarily wrong even though the argument upon which they are commonly based is incorrect, but, if not wholly wrong, they are probably wrong in part, wrong in degree.
While in regard to crime, other sources of information exist, the United States census is the principal repository of facts. It is proper for us, therefore, to concern ourselves with the census and to ask whether it is adequate. If sources of information which have been considered to be sec- ondary, should prove to have a more correct statistical basis than the census itself, it is obvious that their importance is increased. If further, the census is upon an unsatisfactory basis, it is open to improvement, and if we should succeed in demonstrating that it furnishes at present a defective basis for the study of crime in the United States, we may also point out methods by which greater accuracy might be attained.
Popular interest in the subject of crime in the United States attaches chiefly to the alleged increase in crime and to the greater criminality of the foreign-born and colored elements as compared with the native and white. We shall, therefore, examine the evidence of the census on these points.
The Christian preacher, the sociologist or the reformer who turns his attention to the moral condition of the people of the United States is haunted by the spectre of increasing
Crime and the Census.
45
crime. The vision is not a pleasant one, and spurs his imagination of gloomy forecasts of the future. If an opti- mist, he does not abandon hope that the nation will surmount the danger, but if a pessimist, he finds in this contemplation a confirmation of his melancholy forebodings. But whether pessimist or optimist, he does not call into question the state- ment that crime is increasing. He points with conviction to the figures of the census as indisputable proof. To most persons an increase in crime is obvious from the following table:
TABLE I.— Number of Prisoners.
|
Prisoners. |
Prisoners per 1,000,000 Population. |
|||||
|
Census Years. |
Number. |
I^ater years compared with |
||||
|
1850. |
i860. |
1870. |
1880. |
|||
|
1850 . . i860 . . 1870 . . 1880 . . 1890 . . |
6,737 19,086 32,901 58,609 82,329 |
290 607 853 1,169 1,315 |
IOO 206 294 403 453 |
|||
|
IOO 144 193 217 |
IOO 137 154 |
IOO 113 |
In this table the first two columns are taken directly from the census volume. The increase in the relative number of prisoners is perhaps sufficiently recorded in the second column, but that it may appear in its exact proportions we have added columns which compare the later years with those which precede them. If 1850 be used as a basis, the relative number of prisoners in 1890 is 353 per cent greater. Each column shows plainly an increase in the number of prisoners reported at each succeeding census. It would seem clear that the table records an increase in crime. But it should be noted that in this latter statement there lies an assumption not expressly stated, namely, that the number of prisoners at a given epoch is indicative of the amount of crime at the same period. This assumption underlies much of the analysis of the present statistics which is to be found in the census volume. We shall examine later, whether the assumption which appears to be self-evident, is entirely
46
Annai^ of the American Academy.
warranted. Accepting it for the present we may ask our- selves the simpler question, to what extent the figures indi- cate an increase in the number of prisoners.
The first question to be examined is whether prisoners have been reported at each census upon the same basis. The census analysis tells us that the figures prior to 1880 are not reliable, and that the printed figures cannot, there- fore, be taken to represent the facts. In 1880 and 1890, the enumeration was made in a thoroughly systematic manner to include all prisoners. In 1870, as we are informed, the houses of correction were not reported, consequently the number falls short of what would have been given had the system in vogue in later years been used. Concerning i860 and 1850, no statement is made in census volumes regarding the methods by which the figures were collected or the classes of institutions which they included. For most of our pur- poses, therefore, we must disregard these figures. We can, however, utilize the figures for 1870 for a comparison with later years by omitting from consideration in 1880 and 1890 the inmates of houses of correction. Thus modified we have the following table of prisoners exclusive of the inmates of houses of correction :
TABLE II. — Prisoners, Excluding Houses of Correction.
Census Years.
Prisoners.
Prisoners per 1,000,000 Population.
Number.
Compared with 1870.
1870 1880 1890
32,901
50,754 72,361
853 I,OI2
1,155
IOO 119 135
It will be seen from the foregoing table, that the per cent of increase in the twenty years from 1870 to 1890 is reduced by this correction from fifty-four to thirty-five. There is still so large a difference between the figures for 1870 and 1890, and those for 1850 and i860, that it seems difficult to account for it solely through changes in the method of
Crime and the Census.
47
obtaining figures. There are, in fact, other considerations which would explain a part of the increase observed. The Civil War wrought great changes in the population. The return to civil life, after a period of war, brought with it inevitably a disturbance of social relations which would be reflected in an increase in crime and thus in some degree influence the number of prisoners. But the most important change was the emancipation of the negroes. Three millions of blacks became full members of society. As slaves they were chattels, unable to commit crime. It is worthy of examination, whether a part of the increase of prisoners which has been recorded was not due to this factor. If such were the case, while problems of prison administration are not lessened, it is clear that the moral judgment which has been passed upon the increase of prisoners must certainly be modified. If the number of prisoners is an indication of morality it surely makes a difference whether this increase has occurred generally throughout the population or is due to the injection of a new element. The following tables give the number of prisoners in the South Atlantic and Southern Central sections where the negroes are an impor- tant element, distinct from the other sections of the United States, and a comparison of the relative results.
TABI^E III.— Prisoners in Certain Sections.
Census Years.
Prisoners.
1850
i860
1870
1880
1890
Prisoners per 1,000,000 Population.
1850
i860
1870
1880
1890 . .
South Atlantic States.
904
827
4,795
7,927
11,409
193
I54 819
1,043 1,288
Southern Central States.
911
2,023
5,029
11,147
16,084
212
351
782
1,250
1,466
346
799
913
i,i75
1,286
|
All Other States. |
United States. |
|
4,922 16,236 23,077 39,535 54,836 |
6,737 19,086 32,901 58,609 82,329 |
290
607 853
1,169 1,315
48
Annans of the American Academy.
TABIvE IV. — Comparison of Relative Number of Prisoners.
Compared with 1850.
1850
i860
1870
1880
1890
Compared with i860.
i860
1870
1880
1890
Compared with 1870.
1870
1880
1890
|
South Atlantic |
Southern Central |
All Other States. |
|
States. |
States. |
|
|
IOO |
IOO |
IOO |
|
81 |
166 |
231 |
|
424 |
366 |
264 |
|
541 |
590 |
340 |
|
668 |
692 |
371 |
|
IOO |
IOO |
IOO |
|
532 |
223 |
114 |
|
677 |
356 |
147 |
|
836 |
418 |
161 |
|
IOO |
IOO |
IOO |
|
125 |
160 |
129 |
|
157 |
187 |
149 |
United States.
IOO
206
294 403
453
IOO
144 193 217
IOO
137 154
From a consideration of these tables it is clearly apparent that the increase in the number of prisoners has been greater in the South than in the other sections of the coun- trj\ If then, we consider the United States exclusive of the two southern sections, we find the rate of increase by our system of comparisons with preceding years, to be less than appears in the general figures. This comparison is, of course, subject to all the limitations which arise from differ- ences in methods of enumeration. If the year 1870 be taken as a basis of comparison, and if, in the following years, the houses of correction be eliminated, we have the following table :
TABLE V. — Prisoners, Omitting Houses of Correction, in all States Except South Atlantic and Southern Central States.
Census Years.
1870 1880 1890
Prisoners.
23,077
32,345 45,886
Prisoners per
1,000,000 Population.
913
962
1,072
The same compared with 1870.
IOO I05 117
Crime and the Census. 49.
The relative increase in prisoners, in the last twenty- years, is seventeen per cent in the northern section of the United States, where the population is substantially the same now as it was in 1870. This is the only section for which, in our view, any judgment in regard to the moral condition of the people, based upon the number of prisoners, might be admissible. It is evident that the usual methods of calculation have unduly magnified the increase and have led to a severer moral judgment than the facts justify.
Our calculations of the relative number of prisoners, which correspond to those of the census, have been based upon the total number of prisoners, irrespective of whether they were awaiting trial, under sentence or confined for some other reason. There could be no objection to using the total number of prisoners for such calculations, if the ratio between those sentenced and those merely awaiting trial were always constant. Of this, however, we have no guarantee. In fact, an examination of the returns for 1880 and 1890 shows that a somewhat larger number of prisoners were not under sentence in 1890 than in 1880. If we com- pare the ratio of all prisoners to the population in 1880 and 1890 we have an increase of 12.5 per cent. If we consider alone those who were under sentence, we find in 1880, 52,394 prisoners, and in 1890, 72,209, or per million inhabitants, 1045 and 1 155, or an increase of 10.5 per cent.
We may next inquire whether the figures of the census give us a sufficiently correct statement of the number of pris- oners. The census records the number of prisoners who are . found in the various places of detention on the census day. Thus, at intervals of ten years, we have a statement of the population of such institutions on a single day. If the figures have any value, it is obvious that they must stand for the average population of prisons at the period in question. The point has sometimes been raised that the returns for a single day could not be so regarded, that the number of prisoners was subject to variation from day to
50 Annai^s of the American Academy.
day and that consequently the census might fall upon a time when the prison was full or when it was very empty. For those trained in statistical matters it is hardly necessary to answer such an objection. They are aware that such extreme cases tend to compensate each other, especially when distributed over a large area and including a large number of institutions. While this statement is based upon general conditions which are accepted by students of sta- tistics, it has been thought best to make a concrete test. An examination has been made of the last obtainable reports of the larger institutions of the United States. In each case, where the report contains a statement of the average popu- lation, we have compared this with the population at the date of the report. In some cases it has also been possible to give the largest and smallest population for the period to which the report refers.
Table VI indicates the report of population, which is analogous to the population on the census day, expressed in terms of the average population. The largest percentage is found in Sioux Falls, S. D. This is due to the fact that the population of that prison is rapidly growing, which is also the case at Anamosa, Iowa. These institutions, located where population grows very rapidly, have a somewhat exceptional character. The next highest variation is to be found at Windsor, Vt. , for reasons which do not appear on the surface. If we except these three institutions the range of variation observed is inconsiderable. While in some — perhaps the majority, since the prison population tends to increase — the report population is larger than the average, in others it falls below. Thus, in the sum total, the varia- tions tend to compensate. If the final columns of the table be considered, it is clear that even the largest and the smallest populations do not differ widely from the average. If it were true that the largest population should agree on the same day for all the prisons, then the returns for a single day would be inadequate to represent the average. The
Crime and the Census.
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52 Annai^ of the American Academy.
same would be true if the smallest population should agree on the same day. The probability of these contingencies is extremely remote. Had the reports been for the same period of time, we should have attempted to demonstrate this concretely, but the difference in report years renders this impracticable.
We have seen that the figures of the census give us the number of prisoners at each decade with sufficient accuracy, and from them we may calculate the relative increase in the number of prisoners. We may now approach the larger question, to what extent the number of prisoners is indica- tive of the amount of crime, remembering that the amount of crime has been defined as the ratio between the crimes of a given period and the number of population at the same time. It is clear that the number of prisoners at any time depends not only upon the number who have been sent to prison, but also upon the length of the sentences which have been imposed upon them. This is seen very clearly by an extreme case. If in the town A, a man is sent to prison every day, with a sentence of one year's imprisonment, the prison will, at the end of the year, contain 365 prisoners. If, now, in town B, a prisoner is received at the prison daily, with but the short sentence of a single day, there will be, at the end of the year, one prisoner. The number of offences has been the same, yet the population of the two prisons gives no clue to this fact. The case is an extreme one, but it illustrates the working of this factor. An illustration which is more within the range of probability will show the practical importance of the same principle. If in a given prison 100 convicts are received annually, with a uniform sentence of two years each, there will be in two years after the opening of the prison and in subsequent years 200 indi- viduals in prison. If in another prison 100 prisoners are received annually, with a uniform sentence of three years, there will be at the end of the third year, and in all subse- quent years, 300 prisoners in that prison. For our present
Crime and the Census. 53
problem this may be of importance, for if the length of sen- tences increase the number of prisoners at a given date will increase without a proportional increase in the number of convicts received. Or if the length of sentences decrease, the number of prisoners at any given time may decrease without a corresponding decrease in the number of convic- tions.
It follows from these considerations that the report popu- lation does not represent the crimes of the year. Some of the convicts have been in prison more than one year, and were sentenced, therefore, in previous years. This is well illustrated by a concrete example. The following statement relating to the population of the Wisconsin State Prison, on the thirtieth of September, 1894, gives the dates at which the prisoners were received :
1861 1 1881 1
1862 1 1883 . 5
1867 1 1884 7
1868 1 1885 6
1870 1 1886 4
1871 1 1887 9
1872 3 1888 7
1874 4 1889 11
1875 1 1890 25
1876 3 1891 33
1877 1 1892 88
1878 1 1893 163
1879 1 1894 282
1880 1
Total 662
On the other hand, many prisoners sentenced to prison during the year to which the census relates will have received sentences of less than one year, and will already have been dismissed when the figures are taken. The population at a given date, therefore, includes some who belong to other years, and omits others who belong to the year immediately preceding the report.
It may, however, be argued that there is always a con- stant relation between the prison population and the crime of the year in question; that the ratio of long and short
54 Annai^s of the American Academy.
sentences is practically unchanging. If such position as this be taken, it should not be left to inference, but should be distinctly proven. There are evidences in the census report that the position is not tenable. In 1890, the average sentences of those sentenced for definite terms was 3.88 years; in 1880, it was 4.14 years. This would seem to indicate a larger number of short term prisoners in 1890 than in 1880, and we find, in fact, that 29.13 percent of the prisoners having definite sentences in 1890 received terms of less than one year, while in 1880, the corresponding figure was 26.91 per cent. It is by no means certain that one period will be the same as another in this respect. The laws made at one time may, at a later period, be adminis- tered with greater severity. The law itself does not remain unchanged. It is constantly creating new offences. It is probable that with the development of the criminal law and the greater severity with which it is administered, that minor offenders are much more numerous at the present time than they were formerly. If this be the case, calcula- tions of relative crime based on the number of prisoners have little meaning.
It is our problem to discover, if possible, what is the value of the census returns for comparisons of the amount of crime at different periods, the amount of crime in dif- ferent sections of the country and among different elements of the population. We can do this if we shall succeed in establishing any relation between the number of prisoners at a given time, and the number of offences committed in the preceding year. If it is impossible to establish such a relation, it will be impossible to make a judgment in regard to the amount of crime.
It has been seen that there is no necessary relation between the average number of prisoners and the amount of crime committed in the year to which the average refers. If the sentences be long, the number of prisoners will be large; if short, the number will be less. The average
Crime and the Census. 55
population, therefore, is a function of two variables, the num- ber of prisoners committed and the length of time for which they are committed. In our illustrations, we have spoken of a uniform sentence. Of course, such a sentence does not exist in fact. We might, in our illustrations, have spoken with equal propriety of the average sentence of the convicts of a year. The census reports, however, give us no material for computing such an average. We have, in the census documents, the average sentence of those in prison, but this is not satisfactory. In forming this average, the long term sentences have too great a weight. The difference between the two is shown in the following illustration :
Sent to Prison. ,;»„♦.«„» Remaining in
Annually. sentence. Prison.
Class A .... 10 1 year. 10
Class B .... 10 . 6 mos. 5
Total. . . 20 Av.,Q.mos. 15
The average sentence of those sent to prison is nine months. Knowing this, we could calculate the number remaining, if the number sent were known, or if the number remaining were known we could calculate the number sent. The average sentence of those remaining is ten months. If, knowing this, we should confuse it with the former average, and attempt to calculate the number received, we would obtain as the result eighteen prisoners received, which is contrary to the facts. If, however, we know all the facts in the last two columns, we can obtain the right result. Of Class A there must have been received io-^- 1 = 10 and of Class B 5 -v- 0.5 = 10, or 20 in all.
With all these elements at our disposal, we could, from the number of persons in prison, calculate the number which was received annually. Of course, such a calculation pro- ceeds upon the assumption that the total number of prisoners does not essentially vary, and that men are sentenced to prison for each term at a given yearly rate. For long sen- tences especially such a supposition is manifestly incorrect.
56
Annals of the American Academy.
As the population grows the number of prisoners grows with it, and may indeed grow in excess of it. The number received at each rate of sentence is constantly growing. We know no method by which allowance can be made for such an increase. In applying the method before described to the returns of the census, we are quite conscious of the fact that it is only approximately correct.
As the sentences are given in detail in the census volumes, we may make a calculation for the United States. It applies only to those whose sentences are expressed in definite terms of years, months and days. It does not include all the per- sons sentenced to punishment for crime, since sentences to death, for life, to pay a fine, and those not definitely stated, among which are included the indeterminate sentences of reformatories, must be omitted. In the following calcula- tion fractions of years are not given in detail. The small number sentenced for fractional parts of a year have been grouped in the first part of the calculation in half year periods, and in the quarter year periods for sentences of less than three years. The calculation relates to all persons sentenced for one year or over. The following table shows the method of calculation and the result :
TABLE VII. — Estimate of Commitments for Long Terms in 1890.
Calculated
Number
Committed.
84.85
.66
2.36
* * *
97-45
418.00
151.II
3,602.00
152.57
948.66
467.20
5,536.oo
15,294.90
Crime and the Census.
57
In general, no allowance is made for the shortening of prison terms through good time laws, executive clemency or death. It did not, however, seem proper to neglect these factors for the longer terms, and sentences of over twenty years' duration were counted as of twenty years.
The marked difference between the results and those of the census is very striking. We have approximately 15,295 serious offenders for the year 1890. This is approximately the number of persons of this class committed in the census year, while of the 45,115 reported by the census many belong to other years.
The following table gives a similar calculation for the prisoners reported in 1890, with sentences of less than one year's duration : TABLE VIII.— Estimate of Commitments for Short Terms in 1890.
|
Months. |
Expressed in Years. |
Prisoners Reported. |
Calculated Number Committed. |
|
II |
O.916 O.833 O.750 O.667 O.583 O.500 O.416 0.333 O.250 O.167 O.083 O.027 |
84 212 451 324 155 3»659 430 70 3,327 1,799 5,034 2,267 |
91.70 254.50 601.33 485.15 265.86 7,318.00 1,03365 2,390.39 13,308.00 10,772.45 60,650.60 83,962.96 |
|
10 |
|||
|
Q |
|||
|
8 |
|||
|
7 |
|||
|
6 |
|||
|
c |
|||
|
A |
|||
|
% |
|||
|
2 . . |
|||
|
I |
|||
|
10 days • • • . . |
|||
|
Total |
18,538 |
181,134.59 |
|
If the former table decreased the number, this largely mag- nifies it. Combining the two it appears that in the census year ending June 1, 1890, there were approximately 196,429 sent to prison, while the number in prison having definite terms was 63,653. While the results of our calculation can make no claim to be more than an approximation, they show that the figure upon which the amount of crime should be calculated is quite different from that returned in the census.
58
Annals of the American Academy.
To compare the census returns of 1880 and 1890 on this basis is impracticable. The report of 1880 does not give the sentences of less than one year's duration. For those of more than one year's duration it gives only by years omitting fractions. Reducing our figures for 1890 to the same basis, we have constructed the following table giving an estimate for 1880 and 1890:
TABLE IX. — Estimate of Commitments for Long Terms in 1880 and 1890.
Sentences. Years.
20 and over
19 ... •
18 ... .
17 ... •
16 ... .
15 .. •
14 ... .
13 ... •
12 ... .
11 ... .
10 ... .
9 . . . .
8 . . . .
7 . . . •
6 . . . .
5 • • • •
4 • • . .
3 • • • •
2 . . . .
1 . . . .
Total.
1880. Prisoners.
1,052 26
137 62
65 657 153
89 337
77
2,316
206
653 1,291 1,021
2,355 5,026 6,028
3,647
30,310
1880. Calculated
Number Committed
in Year.
52.60 1.36 7.61
3-64
4.06 43.8o IO.92
6.84 28.08
7.00
231.60
22.88
81.62
184.42
170.16
1,022.42
588.75 1,675.33
3,014.00
3,647.00
10,804.09
1890. Prisoners.
1,697 56 198 84 113 945 264 149
573 148 3,236 358 982
i,597 1,360 7,372 3,385 5,93i 8,857 7,810
45,H5
1890.
Calculated
Number
Received in
Year.
84.85
2.94
II.OO
4-94 7.06 63.OO 18.85 II.46 47-75 13-45 23.60
39-77
122.75
228.14
226.66
1,474.40
846.25
1,977.00
4,428.50
7,810.00
17,742.37
It seems that our result for 1890 is not the same as in a former calculation. The change in the grouping of sen- tences brings about the difference. In the last calculation all the sentences of one year and less than two are in the group one year, and so on throughout. It probably affects the calculation for 1880 in about the same way. The number of long term prisoners, according to the census
Crime and the Census.
59
report, increased from 30,130 1045,115, or 48.84 percent. By our calculation, the number received increased from 10,804 to 17,742, or 64.20 per cent. The difference in the result is due to the relatively greater frequence in 1890 of the shorter terms, especially the one year sentences. What may have been the increase among minor offences it is im- possible to surmise. Our calculations are far from estab- lishing a correct basis for a calculation of the increase of crime from 1880 to 1890. They indicate, however, that prison population cannot be accepted as a satisfactory basis for such a calculation, and that we are wholly in the dark in regard to the exact movement of crime in the aggregate. If the number of prisoners affords no accurate basis for a judgment in regard to the increase of crime, it may be equally deficient as a basis for other judgments commonly based upon the census figures. Statements in regard to the territorial distribution of crime rest upon the same basis. If sentences do not differ, no injustice is done to any section. But if in one section long sentences prevail, prisoners will be relatively more numerous than in another where short sentences are the rule. Dividing sentences into two groups, making one year the line, we find in the following table, the distribution of prisoners according to the census report in each section of the country :
TABIvE X. — Prisoners Sentenced to Definite Terms, 1890, by Sections.
|
Number of Prisoners Sentenced. |
Percentages. |
0 5P «3 |
||||||
|
Sections. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
n |
|
|
North Atlantic . South Atlantic . Northern Central Southern Central Western .... |
13,835 6,765 11,361 9,210 3,944 |
10,072 2,188 3,227 i,737 i,3M |
23,907 8,953 14,588 io,947 5,258 |
30.67 14.99 25.18 20.42 8.74 |
54-33 II.80 17.41 9-37 7.09 |
37-56 14.06 22.92 17.20 8.26 |
34.32 13-86 24.11 19.54 8.17 |
|
|
United States . . |
■ • |
45,H5 |
18,538 |
63,653 |
ICO. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
6o
Annals of the American Academy.
The final column of the table shows that the distribution of all prisoners does not materially differ from that of those having a definite sentence. The table shows a marked dif- ference between the columns of sentences for one year and over and that for shorter sentences. In the latter, the pre- ponderance of the North Atlantic states is more marked, while the shares of all the sections are less. This is notably the case in the Southern Central group. The percentages for all sentences approach more closely those for longer terms than for shorter terms. In the aggregate of crime, however, the minor offences are more numerous.
Pursuing the method of this paper we may arrive at an approximation of the number of commitments to prison in the census year. This is given in the following table :
TABI«E XI. — Estimate of Number of Prisoners Committed 1890, by Sections.
|
Numbbr op Prisoners Committed. |
Percentages. |
|||||
|
Sections. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
.Total. |
|
North Atlantic .... South Atlantic .... Northern Central . . . Southern Central . . . Western . |
5,909 2,544 4,648 3,i97 i,444 |
93,427 19,100 43,995 19,158 18,261 |
99,336 21,644 48,643 22,355 19,705 |
33-31 H-34 26.19 18.12 8.14 |
48.17 9.85 22.68 9.88 9.42 |
46.93 IO.22 22.98 IO.56 931 |
|
United States |
17,742 |
193,941 |
211,683 |
100. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
In this table we have in the final column a distribution of all the prisoners, which differs considerably from that of the census report. If the calculation be correct it would appear that in the census statement the proportion of the North Atlantic section is too small, and Southern Central too large.
It will be noted that in this table the general percentages approach most closely those for sentences of short duration. As these far exceed the others in number, they must be of
Crime and the Census. 6i
greatest influence in determining the amount of crime in a community. We have refrained from making any ratios between our results and the population, as we are well aware of the tentative character of these results. They can only serve as an indication of where the census gives wrong notions, but cannot be a substitute for them.
Ratios of prisoners to population are used in discussing the criminal tendencies of different elements in the com- munity. This is applied to males and females. The census shows 6405 female prisoners, or 7.78 percent of the total number. But remembering that the length of sentences affects seriously the number of prisoners, and finding that for males the average sentence is 4.07 years and for females 1 . 59, we may suspect that the showing for females is more favorable than the facts warrant. We may summarize the census figures and the probable commitments calculated by methods already described in the following statement :
Prisoners with Definite tw*i i*Am«.i.B Females,
Sentences. TotaL ^males. per cent;
One year and over . .... 45,115 1,681 3.73
Under one year 18,538 3,154 17.01
Total 63,653 4,835 7.60
All prisoners 82,329 6,405 7.78
Estimated Commitments.
One year and over 17,742 882 4.97
Under one year and over . . 193,941 33,IX7 i7-°8
Total . 211,683 33,999 16.07
Since the amount of crime must be counted from the com- mitments rather than from the population, the percentage of 16.07 f°r females is more nearly correct than the 7.78 per cent of the census. It is moreover interesting to note that it accords more closely with the experience of foreign countries than the figures of the census.* The vaunted difference between the United States and European countries would appear to be a misapprehension.
The share of different elements of the population in the sum total of crime committed is a subject of frequent
•In Germany there were in 1885-90, twenty-one females for one hundred male criminals or approximately 17.4 per cent female.
62
Annai^ of the American Academy.
comment and discussion. As in the preceding considera- tions in regard to crime, the census can here do justice to the different elements only on the supposition of a uniform dis- tribution of sentences. If one class receive longer sentences than another, or commit classes of crimes for which longer sentences are given, it will appear unduly magnified in the census report. The following statement summarizes the facts of the census report, regarding sentences where a definite term has been imposed by the courts:
TABLE XII. — Sentences of the Prison Population in 1890, by Elements of the Population.
Groups.
Total
Total white
Total native white
Native white, native parents
Native white, one parent foreign
Native white, foreign parents
Native white, parents un- known
Foreign-born white
White, nativity unknown . .
Total colored
Negroes
Average
Sentence,
Years.
3-88 346 3.67 4.15
3-53 2.96
357 2.97 2.41 4.87 4.84
Prisoners
with Definite Sentences.
63,653 44,856 32,076 16,414
2,364 IO,375
2,923
12,434
346
18,797 18,322
Sentences of Under One Year.
18,538
14,688
9,141
3,788
638 3,861
854 5,425
122 3,850
3,737
Percent of Sentence*
Under One Year.
29.I3
32.74 28.50 23.08
26.99 37.21
29.22 4363 35-26 20.48 20.39
The variation in average sentences is quite considerable. The short term offenders really constitute the bulk of the total commitments of a year, but as we have seen do not exercise the greatest influence upon the census totals. If the short term sentences fall below the average, as in the case of the negroes, that element receives undue prominence in the census. If they rise above the average, as in the case of the foreign-born, that element has not its appropriate quota in the census figures.
For the principal elements of the population we may again calculate the approximate number of commitments in the census year. This is done in the following table :
Crime and the Census.
63
TABI^E XIII. — Prison Population in 1890 and Estimate of Commit- ments, by Elements of the Population.
|
Prisoners Sentenced or Committed. |
Percentages. |
"8 t |
|||||
|
Groups. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
M to to |
|
Sentenced. Native white . . F 0 r e i g n-born white .... Negroes .... Other elements,* |
22,935 7,009 14,585 586 |
9,141 5,425 3,737 235 |
32,076 12,434 18,322 821 |
50.84 15.51 32.55 I.20 |
49.31 29.26 20.16 I.27 |
50.41 19.53 28.78 I.28 |
49.16 19.35 29.49 2.00 |
|
Total . . . |
45,H5 |
18,538 |
63,653 |
TOO. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
|
Committed. Native white . . Foreign-born white .... Negroes .... Other elements, |
9,283 2,890 5,445 124 |
96,470 59,374 35,036 3,o6i |
105,753 62,264 40,481 3,i85 |
52.32 16.29 30.69 •70 |
49.76 30.61 18.06 1-57 |
49.96 29.42 19.12 1.50 |
. . . |
|
Total . . . |
17,742 |
193,941 |
211,683 |
IOO. |
IOO. |
IOO. |
. . . |
If we compare the percentages for the prison population we see that the long sentences have the greatest weight in determining the average for all. In the probable commit- ments the contrary is the case. Our calculations do not affect the proportion of native white, but they reverse the positions of the negro and the foreign-born white. As our results are indications rather than exact measurements, we may again omit ratios to the population. Such ratios should, however, be calculated with the adult population and not with the general population, f
It may be further pointed out that the method employed in the census report gives an altogether incorrect idea of the relative frequency of different classes of crime. Homicide,
* Includes prisoners whose nativity is unknown, Chinese, Japanese and Indians.
t See the author's "Annual Statistics of Prisoners, 1890," or H. H. Hart, "Immi- gration and Crime," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. ii, p. 369, November, 1896.
64
Annai^ of thk American Academy.
which brings with it a long, usually life, sentence, is repre- sented by a large number of persons whose crimes were committed oftentimes many years before the date of the census. The same would, of course, be true of burglary, or any other serious offence. On the other hand, minor offences, particularly those against the public peace, would, in the census 3rear, be relatively much more numerous than the census would permit us to infer. We cannot measure exactly the influence of the length of sentences upon this factor, since the analysis of sentences by groups of crime is not so complete as by locality, sex and race. We can, more- over, consider only the general divisions of crime and not particular offences. Such information as the census affords is summarized in the following table :
|
TABLE XIV.- |
-Sentences of Prison Population Crime. |
1890, by Groups of |
||||||
|
*• — u > c£ |
Prisoners with Sentences. |
Percentages. |
«4H O to |
|||||
|
Crimes Against |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
One Year and Over. |
Under One Year. |
Total. |
<u u |
|
|
Government . . Society .... Persons .... Property ... Miscellaneous . |
2.76 O.76 7-77 3.85 4.51 |
1,301 2,857 9,552 28,155 3,250 |
239 11,237 1,782 4,571 709 |
1,540 14,094 H,334 32,726 3,959 |
2.90 6-33 21.17 62.40 7.20 |
I.29 60.61 9.61 24.66 3.82 |
2.42 22.14 17.81 51.41 6.22 |
2.23 22. 9r 20.99 45-8o 8.07 |
|
3-88 |
45,H5 |
18,538 |
63,653 |
IOO. |
IOO. |
ICO. |
IOO. |
A casual glance at the average sentences shows wide variations. Crimes against a person have sentences twice as long as the average, even when life sentences, by reason of their indefinite character, are omitted. On the other hand, crimes against society receive sentences which average about one-fifth as long as the average sentence. The effect of this is seen somewhat more clearly in the more detailed statements. It will be remembered that in forming the average, the long sentences have greater weight than the
Crimk and the; Census. 65
short sentences, whereas, in the crimes committed in the given year the short term sentences far outweigh the more serious crimes. Among the shorter terms crimes against society constitute 60.60 per cent of the total, but as they are relatively infrequent among the longer sentences they do not, in the total, show a much larger percentage than crimes against the person. These crimes, which are relatively infrequent among the shorter sentences, are more numerous among the longer sentences and affect the total in exactly the opposite fashion. It must be considered that, as a pic- ture of crime at a given time the census report paints the situation too darkly. Crimes against the person and against property are not in any given year nearly so numerous as the census would lead us to infer. It should be noted in passing that the difference in the percentages for prisoners with different sentences, and those in the last column, for all offenders vary chiefly by reason of life sentences, not included in the first but which in the second tend to con- centrate on the crimes against the person and in the miscel- laneous group, which includes double crimes.
It is not impossible that the census methods may, in a minor degree, affect a number of other considerations which are studied in connection with crime. We have no further detailed statement of sentences which permit us to examine into these relations. It is obvious, in regard to age, that a system which records the present population, some of whom have been in prison many years, will tend to give higher ages than if the count had been made at the time when the convicts entered the prison. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the class of prisoners who commit minor offences are apt to be on the average older than those who commit more serious crimes. If by counting the prisoners when they were committed this latter class appeared a larger number in the general result, than it does at present, it would tend to compensate the defect of the present method of statement of ages. We may summarize the results of our
66 Annals of the American Academy.
examination of the census figures as follows : if the amount of crime means the ratio between the offences committed in a given year and the population at that time, the census volume fails to give us a correct idea of crime in the United States:
i. Because it furnishes no basis for a calculation of the increase of crime.
2. Because in depicting the geographical distribution of crimes, it favors one locality at the expense of another.
3. Because it exaggerates the number of the male sex in the aggregate of crime.
4. Because it assigns to the negroes a larger, and to the foreign-born white a smaller, share in the total of crime than belongs to each.
5. Because it distorts the picture of the relative frequency of different classes of crimes.
If the foregoing criticism be correct, something should be done to put our statistics of crime in such a shape that elaborate calculations will not be necessary in order to ascertain their true meaning. In European countries sta- tistics of crime are based uniformly on the proceedings of criminal courts. While in the United States it might be difficult to establish them on such footing, there seems no valid reason why they should not be based upon the number of prisoners received in the course of the year. It is not to be doubted that this would greatly increase the work of the census office, and in view of the hundreds of prisons to which minor offenders are committed, would undoubtedly be a difficult undertaking. The present organization of the census office would be an additional hindrance. Constituted in haste for each census enumeration, it would be difficult for such an office to enter into relation with all of these jails for the period of one year preceding the census enumeration. It is, however, to be hoped that the present organization of the census will not continue, but that we shall soon see the establishment of a permanent bureau, adequately equipped
Crime and the Census. 67
for a continuous statistical service. In such an event the difficulties of the present problem would be readily over- come. The work of preparing the blanks for census pur- poses would be carried on continuously throughout the year, the entries being made at the time when the prisoners were received. In all prisons such a record is kept, and the labor of transcribing it from day to day would not be great. It would be more than could be expected, however, to require a keeper of a county jail to make out at the end of the year, a detailed statement of the prisoners received during that year. In the larger cities this would involve preparing a record for from 10,000 to 30,000 prisoners, a task which would seriously interfere with the clerical work and orderly administration of the prisons. Moreover, it might be diffi- cult, in many cases, to obtain all the facts which the census schedules would demand. The permanent census bureau would, therefore, make it possible, through continuous enumeration, to collect the figures which the necessities of the case demand.
We have thus far spoken of crime in the aggregate. Our discussion, however, has showed that minor crime differs in many particulars from more serious crime. In all our calculations the figures for prisoners having sentences for one year and over showed wide variations from those whose sentences were less than one year. This is not only true for the prison population, as reported by the census, but was, in a large measure, true also of the estimated number of commitments. If we take crime to be the aggregate of offences against the law, we find different characteristics prevailing from those which we find among prisoners who commit more serious crimes. It is with the latter class that the public is in general most interested. If it is impossible to secure accurate figures in regard to crime as a whole, it might be desirable to separate this group.
The consideration which has just been stated shows the possibility of much more accurate information in regard to
68 Annai^s of the American Academy.
crime than we possess at the present time. If the census of 1900 were to adopt as a proper means of measuring crime the number of persons committed in the census year, it would, by confining its enumeration to those having sen- tences of at least one year, materially lighten its labors. By limiting the scope of the investigation there would be comparatively little difficulty in securing the data required. The prisons for serious offenders keep, as a rule, a more accurate system of records, while if anything in addition to these records were needed, it could be obtained by direct questioning of the individuals, who would all of them be in prison, except the small proportion who might have died or have been pardoned. Such limitation of the scope of the census investigation to prisoners sentenced for more serious crime would be much to be commended, in case the organ- ization of the bureau remains as at present. In any event it would, seem desirable, and it is also feasible, to establish a basis for measuring the increase of crime. This could be done by obtaining the facts for commitments in the year preceding the census of 1890 from the prison records. Such records would enable us to ascertain, at least, not only the number but also the chief social facts in regard to these prisoners. To effect such a radical change in methods is only warranted when there are conclusive grounds for be- lieving the innovations to be more correct. We believe that such grounds have been amply demonstrated. The main objection to such innovation is that until the next succeding enumeration take place, it destroys the possibility of com- parison with the past. But by investigating the old records, as has been suggested, this difficulty would be in a large measure overcome.
In case the census office is established on a permanent basis it would seem that there could be no insurmountable difficulty in obtaining for the census year the number of prisoners committed to all of the prisons. Of course, it would not be possible to establish a basis of comparison with
Crime and the Census. 69
the past, but we should have made a right start for the future. For the long term convicts such a basis could be obtained in the method already proposed. As there is a widespread and surely justified interest in this class of criminals it would scarcely tax the resources of a permanent census office to make a yearly report upon the subject. The number in 1890 was probably not over 17,000, and the collection of the material would be rendered easy through spreading the enumeration over the entire year and having the blanks prepared at the same time that the prison record is made. Should our statistics of crime be organized in this manner, we should be able to arrive at a more accurate judgment of the tendencies toward crime in the United States, and afford to all who are interested in the welfare of the country a safe basis for estimating the tendencies which are at work among the people.
Roland P. Fai,kner.
University of Pennsylvania.
VALUES, POSITIVE AND RELATIVE.* The Relativity and Universality of Value.
Ancient controversies about the fundamental basis of moral obligation have reached at least a preliminary solu- tion in the doctrine that that action is right which best satisfies contemporaneous needs. In order, however, to establish the nature of the needs in question, it has been necessary to surmount a preliminary difficulty ; for since it is impossible to identify the needs of the time with those of any individual, it has become necessary to assume that the former needs correspond to a total or average status in existing society, in the particular aspect of social activity under consideration.
What is thus generally true of the obligation of human action, must be true specifically of each category; and the present paper will endeavor to draw conclusions from the working of this principle within the economic category.
The reader is presumed to be familiar with the marginal doctrine of value, which allows value to be treated as a measurable quantity. This quantity, however, has remained individual and subjective. Various consequences reaching out from it to the market and to common economic interests have, indeed, been traced, and a few advanced writers have ventured to add up these individual values or have boldly treated society as an individual making quantitative valua- tions of its own.
It is natural to suppose that some relation between indi- vidual and social values must exist similar to that between individual and social morality; but before we proceed to examine exactly what that relation is, let us pause a moment to convince ourselves of the objective reality of the relative economic standard.
*The writer wishes to acknowledge valuable suggestions received from Pro- fessor Simon N. Patten as to the proper scope of this paper
(70)
Values, Positive and Relative. 71
Without some standard, we are evidently quite at sea. The sufficiency or insufficiency of individual values (in the payment of debt, for example) cannot be decided according to an ideal standard, since such a standard does not reflect contemporaneous needs ; nor can they be decided by a hap- hazard comparison of the claims of different social classes, nor of the conditions of different individuals (e. g. a creditor and a debtor), since such general considerations lack requi- site definiteness. Just as an ideal standard is too absolute, so a weighing of general interests is not absolute enough. It is necessary, therefore, that individual values be com- pared to a social concept of value.
Such a social concept of value is not a mere fiction nor merely an intellectual necessity. While not tangible in the sense of a yard measure, it is objective in the highest degree, since, as will be shown later, it exerts a direct and powerful effect upon the individual by keeping him in constant touch with economic society, whether that society be viewed in the cross-section of contemporaneous distribution or in the perspective of deferred payments.
Some of the causes that have hitherto delayed the recog- nition of the relative standard of value are mentioned below. It is sufficient at present to notice that the prin- ciple upon which this standard is founded is the tacit assumption and basis of all social and national speculation. It is recognized in popular language. It is common to say that ' 'The times are good, " or " The times are bad. ' ' The former expression means that social values have increased, not merely that social utilities have increased; for an in- crease in the total utilities of society which is followed by a more than equivalent deduction in the form of rent, may not increase the purchasing power of the industrial world. The economist is yet to be heard of who has been able so scrupulously to guard his language as to avoid all statements about social prosperity, while historians speak of "good times" with refreshing naivete. Kven where allusions to
72 Annai^ of the American Academy.
social prosperity, as such, are absent, they are replaced by a reference of private actions to the public point of view. An investment in government bonds, in time of war, may be capitalization from the private point of view, but is probably a loss from the public point of view. This point of view can be no other than the social standard of value. It cannot be that of any individual or class, except by chance, for one individual cannot be presumed to be nearer right than another; nor can it omit the interests of any individual or class, for then the abstraction of some portion of society will render the standard that of a different society from the one in question.
The actuality of a standard of value is thus proved by its necessity and its relativity. The difference between different economic epochs is precisely the difference between the economic standards. They are the normal expressions of the respective epochs. They are, therefore, real and objec- tive.
The positive nature of the standard of value as a social concept having been thus briefly explained, the argument of this paper will be directed toward a more accurate knowl- edge of its properties. Following, therefore, the analogy of the individual in order to obtain the necessary simplified social premises, we shall proceed from individual values by imperceptible steps up to social values.
The preceding remarks have been intended to show the necessity to the human mind, both popular and technical, of the relative and objective idea of value. It is now proper to prove the continuity of this idea with that of individual values. The question of deferred payments is, perhaps, the most important of those that depend upon the social idea of value. The inquiry, therefore, may be made more specific by asking whether this question of deferred payments does not depend upon principles which are continuous with those upon which the ordinary assignments of values depend. The individualistic idea must be reconciled with the social
Values, Positive and Relative. 73
idea. It is fair to assume, subject to later demonstration, that total cost is the sum of all separate costs, and that total values are the sum of all separate values, although the sev- eral separate values may never precisely coincide with the several separate costs. If such a tendency to coincide, how- ever, did not exist, we could not assume that the sum of all values corresponds to the sum of all costs. We must not only show that values are summed up from individual com- modities to social wealth and from individual persons to society, but that the same method of reasoning applies throughout. That total value is the sum of all particular values will be shown to follow directly from the marginal statement of value to the effect that total value is the product of a marginal quantity and of a coefficient denoting the possible number of quantities available as substitutes for it. The marginal quantity must naturally be economic ; that is to say, it must depend upon utility. It may represent marginal utility either directly or by some other economic quantity, e. g. a commodity upon which it depends. A class of multiples obtained in this way may be represented geometrically as a parallelogram, and the writer assumes the liberty of speaking of value as an area. The demonstration, therefore, simply shows graphically that the marginal theory unifies logically all concepts of value. The margin is the point of equilibrium of cost and reward, i. e. the point where it does not pay to put forth further exertion. Value is the product of total cost and marginal reward, i. e. of the reward to the last exertion into all the exertions. So far as costs and rewards are homogeneous, value is continu- ous; it is a sum, and may be reasoned about continuously in the same way. Such homogeneity is coextensive with humanity. Therefore, such equilibria and multiples are equally extensible. There is no disjunction between indi- vidual and social values or costs. Value may, therefore, be predicated of groups as well as of single commodities. That total social value is not palpable to persons unaccustomed to
74 Annai<s of the American Academy.
economic thought does not argue its unreality, but rather proves its psychic or unmaterialistic nature.
The continuity of value, in the wide meaning here indi- cated, is not, indeed, hastily to be assumed. The valuer takes so many different points of view with respect to the thing valued, and his conduct toward it at different times is so varied, that it seems possible that different uses of the term " value" may arise within economic science. That law of thought which makes science a process of generaliza- tion makes it imperative for the economist to search for a single all-embracing concept of value. The result should be that there is but one economic value, while it may have many aspects. Two principal aspects of economic value present themselves in the industrial world : the one is the ratio of contemporaneous values commonly treated in the economics of distribution as the exclusive concept of value; the other is the effect upon the quantities already equated by the first ratio due to another ratio — that of successive social values ; e. g. if the first ratio declares that exchange takes place under the formula a = b, the second ratio de- clares that what was before a = b is now become 2a = 2b. It is necessary to inquire whether the meaning of the term "value" in individuals' valuations is the same as the mean- ing of the term in social valuations. In other words, do the same forces exist in the two sorts of value in such a way that the two values are generically identical?
The two values of which science takes cognizance may be called merchant's value and farmer's value, or value M and value F. The former is represented graphically, as in Fig. 1,* by the quadrilateral abed, in which ab represents the number of commodities, be their marginal utility, and ec the curve of diminishing utility.
* A suggestion for this figure may perhaps be found in Professor Alfred Mar- shall's "Principles of Economics," 3d edition, book iii, ch. iii, g 1, n. 1 : "We may say that the Return of pleasure which a person g*:ts from each additional Dose of a commodity diminishes, till at last a margin is reached at which it is no longer worth his while to acquire any more of it."
Values, Positive and Relative.
75
Value F, on the other hand, disposes of the value forces in a very different manner : a' b' represents the investment or cost of production, V d the marginal reward, and e' cf the curve of diminishing returns.
Value M is employed by persons engaged in exchange and commerce, who chiefly think in terms of money. Value F is employed by those who produce and consume. It allows them to compare cost with rate of returns, and with surplus. They are enabled to weigh exactly whether the total of goods has reached the desired total value, and whether an increase of sacrifice is worth while. The mean- ing of value F, therefore, is that the total number of com- modities represented by the value- area just repays the effort
a«ar
expended to secure them. If a man is a producer, the returns to his last effort indicate that, in his judgment, the utility of those returns repays the effort; if he is a distribu- ter or consumer, the utility of the last commodity purchased repays the purchase-money. In the former case, the utility is represented in the form of commodities, and the cost is an immediate factor in the form of labor or effort ; in the latter case, the cost is represented by commodities and the utility is an immediate factor in the form of price or con- sumption. It follows, therefore, that the same man may make calculations about the same goods from either point of view, and that these calculations will represent the same utilities, the same final efforts, and the same total values.
76 Annals of the American Academy.
In so far as the same forces extend beyond the interests of individuals to groups and to society, the same graphic representation applies. If the conclusions of the first part of this paper are correct, that the forces that go to establish cost, value, and surplus are social as well as individual, then this form of representation applies to society.
Now, there is nothing absurd or impossible in applying to society the form of representation of value M. We can imagine that society is willing to purchase so many goods and no more, simply because the utility of a further incre- ment is not great enough to induce further social sacrifice ; that is, because the satisfaction afforded by it is not at an equilibrium with, i. e. is not equal to the effort to obtain it. In this case, however, marginal cost and reward are indis- tinguishably blended into one line, be, that of utility. There is nothing, therefore, to represent separately the chief objects of social inquiry. The results reached in M are those inter- esting principally to individuals engaged in exchange. Such persons do not care, at the moment, for an analysis. of cost and reward; what they want is a comparison of the combined effect of cost and reward in the case of the mar- ginal commodity, with the total number of commodities. Society, however (F), wishes to compare the returns to its last effort with the total number of equal efforts, and is sat- isfied with the fact that the total amount of commodity- reward really expresses the amount of satisfaction, without setting the latter off by itself. It is, therefore, natural that the students of exchange- value and of distribution should employ value M, whereas students of social prosperity employ value F.
It is found to be true that these two values are identical, the one which admits of the most convenient application, may be taken to represent all cases of value, for the purpose of showing continuity.
At the point at which money calculations cease, M may be dropped without any break in continuity of value. In
Values, Positive and Relative. 77
other words, we may ascribe value as truly to those larger groups whose calculations are in terms of cost and surplus, as to the individuals whose calculations are made in terms of goods and satisfactions. If, finally, we find that present society as a whole is, in a sense, a trader with past and future societies, we may freely revive M as an expression for social value.
Each individual, however, has his value F as well as his value M. Even though he be a merchant, he must continu- ally compare his outlay with his returns. It is this comparison which establishes his individual margin of consumption. He is a microcosm, constantly seeking to obviate waste and to increase efficiency. He inquires how much purchasing power, i. e. productive force, in his case, he shall expend, in order that the marginal return shall be greatest, consistently with a given capital. In selling, he inquires what marginal price will bring the greatest value, consistently with the stock of goods on hand. Now these two values are generically identical. Whether he be a producer or a consumer, he has nothing but value, pure and simple, in mind. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the oneness and universality of economic value in whatever combination its elements may momentarily appear.
The general social use of this duality of value is evidently in order to allow the individual to compare his personal margin of consumption with that of society; and to allow him to effect those adjustments of his private economy, his efforts and self-denials, which shall keep him in normal relation with society. If his efforts are too great, they will fail of appreciation and reward ; if too small, he will be dis- tanced in the social race. If his marginal efforts are too great, he will be paid only the price of the less efforts of others ; if too small, he cannot be paid at a higher rate than the greater efforts of others, and the current rate of payment will not put him in as good a position as others unless he increase his efforts again. At the same time, he is to have
78 Annans of the American Academy.
play for that individual character which affects society and makes for differentiation in it toward the ideal. This dif- ferentiation is chieffy accomplished through extraordinary and unrewarded efforts — through an unusually low indi- vidual margin. An individual marginal effort greater than the normal marginal effort will not be rewarded economically. It will give rise to a moral value ; it takes the activity in question out of economics and into the category of ethics, and even of ideal ethics. When we say that the action of the community is abnormal, we mean that it tends toward a lower ideal. A reformer is one who seeks to stay this retrogression.
Suppose that an individual's marginal production is above what is normal. Then, at the market price of goods, the marginal utility of money will be low to him, and the curve of diminishing utility ("demand curve") will be steep.* He will not be immediately deterred from extending his operations further, and, indeed, ambition, professional pride, or some other motive than that immediately implied in gainful occupation is pretty sure to push him on, if the value of money continues fairly even, until his margin of consumption is reduced to that of society.
If his marginal return is lower than what is normal, then the marginal value of money and of goods will be high to him, and his curve of utility will be flat ; he will inevitably seek for better investments and more favorable opportuni- ties, in order that his margin of production may rise to the normal level.
In the market-price, society possesses a most potent means of creating an absolutely identical margin of production or consumption for all. It is to be noted that the economic prob- lem of the relation of the individual to society is one of equal total production of each individual only in the sense that total production is approximated through equality at the margin ; but equal margins mean very different production
* Alfred Marshall, "Principles of Economics," 3d edition, Vol. i, p. 175, note 1.
Values, Positive and Relative. 79
to different persons. Moreover, society is really not con- cerned with the leveling of individual economics, except in so far as individual effort and enterprise are involved. Those products which are adventitious or due to personal advantage are unsocial and uneconomic. Doubtless, diver- sity in advantage in each line of production is essential to society for reasons that present themselves to the economist as pertaining to the outer ethical world. To him this non- economic or quasi-economic element is the incommensurable portion of his subject-matter. It is measured only by physi- cal standards; it has no marginal or economic measure. Economically it is a residual or a surplus. Measurable elements alone are economic forces. Economic forces play at the margin of effort and reward in such a way as to cor- relate all the measurable elements into one organization; and the argument of this paper is that this play of measur- able forces is as active in the equating of the economic cir- cumstances of society at different times as of different individuals at one time.
This identity of values in exchange (M) with those of production (F) may be graphically demonstrated. The con- struction of Fig. 1 has been already described ; ec probably lies above d d, because, as marginal returns (b' d) decrease, marginal utility (be) decreases less rapidly; in fact, in so far as it depends on absolute returns, relatively increases; be does not absolutely increase because of the independent estimate, which causes utility to decrease with absolute quantity (ab) faster than it increases from scarcity at the margin of returns {& V).
The curve ect therefore, contains two elements : an abso- lute estimate, due to diminishing worth* of successive increments of goods; and a relative estimate, due to the rate of decrease of b' d . The combined result is expressed, at the margin, by the line be.
♦See present writer's article, "Evolution of the Idea of Value." Journal of Political Economy, September, 1895, p. 427.
80 AnnaivS of the American Academy.
The curve d d, however, has only an absolute shape, due to the absolute returns to the investment, which is represented by a' b'. This absolute relation is expressed at the margin by b'd.
If, now, the two quadrilaterals abed and af bf d d' are made up by the same forces acting always in such a way as to produce the same effects, then they may be taken to be equal. At first it would seem as though each was inde- pendent of the other, because the curve ec contains an ele- ment (worth) entirely lacking in d d . Worth is the element in demand which is due to preference for an object for its own sake, independently of its quantity. This only proves that the two curves are independent, but not that the rec- tangles of whose sides c and d are the loci are independent ; for it may be that while worth cannot affect diminishing returns (V c') directly it can produce a sufficient effect upon investment {a! b'). Similarly, while diminishing returns (br d) cannot affect worth, it can affect diminishing utility (be), through it investment {a! b')y and through investment total commodities (ab).
Suppose worth to increase; be will continue to shorten (but more slowly than before) ; a' b' will lengthen propor- tionally faster ; b' d will grow shorter (but not proportion- ally), and ab will lengthen proportionally slower with the shortening of b' d. In other words, be and a! b' will decrease and increase in the same proportion ; while ab and U c will increase and decrease in the same proportion. Thus, both areas M and F will increase absolutely : M, because be de- creases less rapidly than ab increases ; F, because b' c decreases less rapidly than a' b' increases ; but this occurs in such a way that while b' d shortens more rapidly than be, at the same time a' U lengthens more rapidly than ab. Mathematically expressed, -|^— -J^. These ratios being absolutely constant, it follows that the same forces act con- stantly in the two figures in such a way as to produce com- plete compensation, and that consequently a' U X V d = ab X be; i. e. M = F.
Values, Positive and Rklative. 8i
In other words, an expression of value in terms of com- modities and utilities is exactly the same as an expression of value in terms of efforts and rewards. Value is a state- ment either in terms of the utilities that depend on com- modities, or in terms of the commodities on which the utilities depend. Utilities and corresponding commodities must be proportional. Then why not economically equal for all purposes of value measurement? In fact, if not commensurable by physical standards, then their constant relation is best expressed by an equality of value. The dissimilarity between the factors of the respective parallelo- grams is expressed by their difference in form ; the economic identity of product is represented by the equality of areas.
It seems to be sufficiently demonstrated that we may treat value as an area for general purposes of economic investiga- tion. The ground that we have gained is similar to the conclusions of any syllogism. It is a rule of thought that a conclusion once reached may be used as a premise for further argument. This procedure allows us to forget the analyses and combinations by which we arrived at our con- clusion, and to devote our whole attention to a progressive step in our reasoning. The treatment of value as an area allows us to deal with it as a positive quantity presented to the imagination by a symbol of space, and the analogies flowing from the properties of space may be hoped to afford valuable stimulus toward conclusions that will bear the test of economic practice.
Value a Simultaneous Expression for Ratio or Distribution and for Wealth or Prosperity.
While it has been shown that there is no break between the individual and society in the method of reasoning upon questions of value, it is still possible to illustrate more definitely the fact that the marginal theory of value accom- plishes an end which must always mark an advance in science, viz. , it expresses in one concept what had previously
82 Annai^ of the American Academy.
been two separate concepts. The two concepts in question are that of a ratio in exchange and that of wealth, prosper- ity, or want-satisfying power. It is true that the latter concept lies behind the former, since a ratio in exchange is simply a comparison of values ; but the dual statement corre- sponds to an habitual dual treatment by economists which is here sought to be unified.
The idea of value is, of course, a possession of the human race, and while the positive standard of value has fluctuated onstantly, these two characteristics of the idea of value ay be assumed to have been always present, although, erhaps, in varying amount. While the standard of value s objective, the conception of that standard is subjective. [t is perfectly possible that while students of value are ittempting to analyze the standard, it may change. Not- vithstanding the continual presence of these two aspects of ralue, economists have laid very different stress upon them. The object of the present paper is one of combination. The ittempt is to give as nearly as possible a comprehensive rSsumS of the action and reaction of value between distribu- tion and progress.
It has already been shown that all goods have their value, whether they be single goods or composite goods, or even the total goods of society; and we might proceed at once to explain the bearing of this truth upon the standard of de- ferred payments, were it not for the necessity of putting in its true light the relation of exchange-values in a commu- nity, to total values; for exchange-values are the ones con- sidered in the concrete form in which value has usually been treated, in stud}Ting the laws of distribution and pro- duction; while total social values are those necessarily involved in questions of social prosperity.
Political economy tries to explain two principal questions : the first is, ' ' Why do I have to pay a certain price for a commodity?" The second is, "Why am I richer or poorer than I was?" Economists have until recently confined
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their theory of value to the answer of the first question. Evidently, however, the second question involves value no less than the first. If questions of wealth do not involve principles of value, then all talk of value is useless. On account, however, of their restricted use of the term "value, ' ' they were logically forced to treat of questions of prosperity in terms of commodities. Questions of prosperity, however, forced themselves to the front, and, in default of a sufficient theory of value, were treated under the quasi-legal category of quantity of commodities. This method greatly hampered reasoning upon the subject ; for there was no way of account- ing for the fact that a man or a community might become richer, i. e. might increase his or its purchasing power, while at the same time the number of commodities at his or its disposal, when measured by physical standards, might decrease. Economists were not ignorant of the fact, but treated it either as abnormal or as paradoxical or as a curi- osity.
Now, however, that wealth* on the marginal theory is measurable by economic standards, while prices also are measurable in the same standards it is opportune to make a statement of the simultaneous function of value in these two aspects, and of the light which value throws upon the action and reaction between these two categories — that of exchange and that of wealth. Further, the present paper endeavors to show that the same concept of value displays the same relations between social categories of exchange and of wealth. The persons treated of are different, the mode of reasoning is substantially the same.
The complete continuity from one set of values to the other, demonstrates that we have a right to use forms of reasoning with respect to producer's values (F) that were pertinent with respect to exchange-values (M). It will nor.
* By wealth is meant total economic goods. No inference is to be drawn that wealth and value increase together, or that value is a universal measure of wealth. It is simply pointed out that wherever wealth is involved in calculated industry, there value appears.
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be possible to give a more graphic representation of social values than previously in this paper. The point to which attention is called is this, that every case of a change in exchange- value may, or may not, correspond, or may only partially correspond, to a change in total social values; and that the simple representation of value as an area will make this state of affairs perfectly clear. Since merchant's values and farmer's values are equal, and since the latter are the ones chiefly employed in deciding questions of social pros- perity, we are enabled freely to employ them continuously in our discussion. Let it be assumed, therefore, that all the goods in the community are represented by values com- puted upon the basis of investment or cost, and marginal returns. It has already been shown that the social margin, through the market-price or any other influences which tend to equalize men's activities, has a distinct relation with individual margins. Contracts to be executed in the future are made at the margin. In fact, the man who does not accommodate himself to the margin is an economic pariah. It is, indeed, true that many men do not conform to normal industry ; but we do not need to concern ourselves with them further. Strictly speaking, however, it does not appear to be necessary that individual values be reduced to the social margin in order that the sum of them be taken in calculating total social value. Whether an individual value be reduced to the social margin or not, it ever remains the same value. It is true that the social margin has the effect pointed out, of increasing or decreasing individual values; but this is a secondary effect, an effect on production. The mere instantaneous translation of individual values from iso- lated individual economy to organized social economy cannot, geometrically speaking, change their area. If a margin is lengthened, the base, which is the multiplier, will be corre- spondingly shortened. Therefore, we are not called upon to suppose our collection of individuals to compose a strictly economic society. Of course, if they do not, normal action
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cannot be predicated of them, nor will individual values be the same as they would if the social adjustment had taken place. The point is that the mathematical sum of values, costs, and rewards may be taken independently of a common margin, since each individual value once obtained is a posi- tive quantity of the genus value, and hence commensurable with all other quantities of the same genus. Thus, on any hypothesis (either of a common margin or of unrelated margins), total social value is the sum of individual values. The necessity of the social relation is that the social margin be formed and thus a relative standard of value be obtained.*
While the exposition of the comprehensiveness of value may be said to be complete in its general features, it is pos- sible to present its operation more in detail, and, by a further use of the graphic method, to afford a more simultaneous concept of the nexus of actions and reactions between the individual and society, and between exchange and prosper- ity, which has already been traced as far as possible without a new appeal to such aid. The old theory of value as a ratio rises up to confuse us. It leads, indeed, to correct results in many respects. Is it abolished by the new theory ? We certainly could not get along without it. We must con- stantly compare values. In fact, the principal purpose in obtaining values is in order to compare them. The new theory simply says that the value is not the comparison but an absolute prior quantity. The old theory assumed these prior quantities as general economic forces determining ratio of exchange, and called the latter ' Value. ' '
The transition to the new theory is simple: if the ratio of commodities is given, then the ratio of values must be the reciprocal; for the ratio of commodities must be the im- mediate result of the ratio of values. If corn and wheat, measured by physical standards, exchange at 2:1, then the
* Professor Franklin H. Giddings considers that all marginal utility presupposes a social condition. "Principles of Sociology," p. 42. It may therefore be necessary to distinguish the social margin from individual margins which are social, but not the social margin.
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absolute values of corn and wheat must be as i :2. This must be so, since every change in ratio of exchange of com- modities must register a proportional change in the values of those commodities.
The first question, then, that naturally occurs is as to the precise position to which we must relegate the idea of exchange value. The familiar doctrine that the totality of values can neither be increased nor diminished is a corol- lary of the theory of exchange value which cannot be true if the doctrine of absolute values holds. Nevertheless, this assumption has been particularly useful in the attaining of truth with respect to the mutual relations of wages, profits, and prices; the interests of science, therefore, demand its preservation, if it can be harmonized with the graphic method of value areas, i. e. with the marginal theory.
In treating value as an area, it is not at all necessary that the area be graphically represented in the form of a rec- tangular parallelogram. It may equally well be represented by surfaces equal to those in the parallelograms, but bounded by curved lines.
L,et us suppose that the commodities or groups of com- modities to be exchanged against each other in a society are arranged about a circle (Figs. Ai, Bi), and that their exchange ratios are in equilibrium. By this is meant that we may represent the value of all the commodities by equal areas as the most convenient starting-point. In this way departure from original value- quantity will be more easily observed. The values of the commodities or groups, then, are represented by sections of the broad perimeter. Then the total value in society will be represented by the total broad perimeter.
L,et us suppose some disturbing element, either in the factor of cost or in that of reward, to increase the value of wheat. One of two things may take place: either the increase of value will result in an addition to social values or it will not. The old exposition of the theory of
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exchange-values stated that no addition to value could take place. The reason of this statement was that value was looked upon as a ratio and not as an area. On the old sup- position, since the conception of social value-areas was absent, the increase of value of wheat (Fig. A2) was neces- sarily accompanied by an exactly equivalent contraction in value of iron, cotton, meat and sugar, so as to leave the total value-area the same as before. If, now, we can conceive of additions of value as being made successively to the remaining commodities, we find that the possible addi- tions of value are limited in such a way that the values of commodities that have already risen must fall gradually until, when the circuit is completed, the restoration of equilibrium finds us still confined to the same constant value-area (Fig. Ai).
This exchange conception of value may be represented numerically, as follows :
Wheat. Iron. Cotton. Meat. Sugar. Total Value.
Fig. Ai, 5 5 5 5 5 25
Fig. A2, 9 4 4 4 4 25
Fig. A3, 8 8 3 3 3 25
Fig. A4 7 7 7 2 2 25
Fig. A5 6 6 6 6 1 25
Fig. Ai, 5 5 5 5 5 25
The theory of exchange-value, including no concept be- yond that of a ratio, unconsciously identified total values with total mass of commodities, while denying that there was such a thing as total values. It then proceeded, properly enough, to assume that the mass of commodities (z. e. total value on the absolute value theory) remained constant, and easily deduced the result that the extra commodity gains of one class must be the loss of another class of distributees, e. g. that wages fall when profits rise. Instead of openly assuming the constancy of values, that theory tacitly assumed the constancy of goods. It proved that if one class obtained more goods, another obtained less. It also admitted that
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total goods might vary, but denied that the variations could affect values. The great difficulty lay in the fact that it was necessary to assume that, since value was a ratio, values could not increase; while, at the same time, it was admitted that there could be an increase of wealth in society. These two statements were repugnant, but were never reconciled under the old theory. Reasoning about distribution would have been perfectly correct on the supposition of unchange- able value, if positive values had been recognized. Econ- omists, however, were driven to assume unchangeable total of goods or else give up the whole inquiry. But what if goods changed in quantity ? On the supposition of con- stant quantity of goods, economists could at least say that if X did not get the goods, Y did; but in the case of constant quantity of value and changing quantity of goods, the old theory was wholly at sea. It did not consider the case as one of values. It simply admitted that if labor was more efficient, it might obtain higher reward in commodities without lessening the reward of capital; but this conclusion was not one in terms of value. The result was correct so far as it went, but was not economic. No law of substitution was known as a general solvent of present and future distribution through value. Such a law could only be discovered through the marginal theory. Common sense pointed to right con- clusions, but there was no concept broad enough to embrace two periods. At one period a certain ratio 'of exchange exists between commodities; at another period, another. But the differentiation of values by and through which this occurs was too broad a generalization for the earlier stage of the science. Value, as a universal measure of all pro- duction and distribution (within the economic sphere) pres- ent and future, was not dreamed of.
The old theory admitted that the same or different proportional divisions might occur of different funds at dif- ferent periods; but exchange-value gave no way of discov- ering whether the world was better off when a larger fund
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was distributed. It was assumed that such was the case, because what men want is wealth; but that method was unable to measure the new wealth and its effects on differ- ent classes, because it looked only to the distribution of the objects of wealth. A different distribution of objects of wealth, while it certainly will be proportional to the total values then existing in society, may or may not increase the former wealth of the distributee, and it is necessary to be able to measure this fact also. This is what is meant by saying that we must have a test of prosperity as well as of proportion in exchange. A man may have a smaller ratio than formerly and yet may have absolutely greater value; and this might even be true although he received absolutely less commodities.
What was needed, therefore, was a conception of value which should hold equally well for the wealth of to-day and for that of to-morrow, for that of society and for that of individuals, by means of which the connection between them could be traced. This need has been satisfied by means of the social margin of value and total values.
If we regard the object of men's strivings to be not goods, but values, then we see that our theory does not destroy conclusions that follow from the old principle that exchange- values of goods are not totals and only affect pro- portion of distribution of given funds. Moreover, this con- clusion is as easily deduced from the assumption that the value-areas of society increase (Figs. B and C) as from the assumption that they are constant or that goods are constant (Fig. A). If we suppose (Fig. B) a constant increase of values, counterbalanced by no diminutions whatever, we reach again the equilibrium of exchange-values from which we started. We see that profits may, in this case, be in- creased without decreasing wages, because our idea of value has been enlarged to include new values — the idea is more dynamic. Figure B6 represents precisely the same state of exchange- values as Fig. Bi. It is true that the wave of
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rising value, as it sweeps about the circle, is neither preceded nor followed by a depression as in Fig. A ; but it also again reaches a position of equilibrium. The manifest advantage of this demonstration over that of the exchange- value theory is that we here deal exclusively with homogeneous quanti- ties. We are not troubled with a disparate confusion of values, on the one hand, and of goods on the other, but freely increase or decrease our quantities at will. Assuming for Fig. B a constant addition of five, then Fig. B6 is valued at 50, while Fig. Bi is valued at 25, i. e. each group of com- modities is worth 10 instead of 5; but their ratios are unchanged. If, however, the additions to value consist of new wants and provisions for want (Fig. C), then the same total area is attained by length- ening the perimeter instead of broadening it, i. e. new com- modities are introduced, but the value of each and their ratios re- main unchanged.
To recapitulate : the theory of exchange-value contemplates only the condition of affairs rep- resented by Fig. A. Value, as a total, is not conceived of, and, therefore, if it have any representation at all, can only, in the language of areas, be represented as constant. Positive ad- ditions to value being excluded, the only meaning that any stretch of imagination could give to Fig. B under the exclu- sive exchange- value theory would be that additional produc- tion takes place, and that this is what is represented by the accretion of area. (However, area of goods should, perhaps, diminish in order to represent increase of value. ) The result will be the same as in Fig. A ; for, other things being equal, the new production decreases exchange-values as much as it increases them (although it may greatly change absolute val- ues). The distinction between Bi and B6, on that theory, can
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only be one of quantity of products and not one of quantity of values. If A i represent ratios of exchange-value, B6 can only represent ratios of new products corresponding to these same values.
But, if value is an area, then the accretions from Bi to B6 are real additions to total value. Exchange-values vary at each step, and are fully represented by the ratios of the areas of the respective segments, on the principle that values are inversely proportional to exchange ratios of goods, as above explained ; and when the circuit of value-accretion is com- plete, then total values have gained, while exchange-values have been restored to the original equilibrium. The require- ment of the exchange-value theory that total value remain constant is met, and the expansion of value expressed by the marginal theory is also indicated. The supposition in Fig. B is that no diminutions of value take place. The fact would generally be, however, that some diminutions of value-area would take place in the different segments, but that they are, on the whole, more than offset by the accre- tions in an advancing state of prosperity. For sake of clearness, the two processes of relative shrinkage and abso- lute expansion have been separated in the diagrams. The diagrams illustrate the well-known marginal theory that all value-changes, a result of a disturbance of the equilibrium of cost and reward in the case of each commodity, may or may not cause an increase of value in the case of that com- modity, and hence may or may not contribute to increase the sum total of social value; and that, in each case, the question is whether total, i. e. social, value has been changed. The answer is to be found by inquiring whether the change in particular values has had such an effect that total cost has been changed in relation to total marginal reward in such a way as to change total value. If Fig. I be taken to represent total value, it will illustrate the case in question of a sum of values: If we take total cost and reward as constant, then distribution of them through
Values, Positive and Relative. 93
changes in the several marginal equilibria, serves to vary values in exchange without affecting the total surplus.
If we take the relations of the various particular marginal equilibria as constant (as represented in the diagrams by the different segments), then changes of total cost and reward serve to vary total value and surplus without affect- ing exchange values. Both processes take place simultane- ously in practice. Each act of production has an effect both on exchange- value and on wealth, through the mechanism described.
The Application of Value-Areas to the Question of Deferred Payments.
What addition to the exchange-value theory has been gained, it may be asked, by proving the continuity of value through all commodities and groups of commodities and activities of producer and distributer or measurer of com- modities, until we have attained the sum total of commodi- ties? The world is our limit; we cannot compare this total, nor employ it. The answer is that, at least, we could compare our total values with those of Mars, if conditions allowed, and that it would be absurd if we could not. But the practical answer is that total value is the most useful and comparable of all value concepts: exchange- values are the ratios of value-areas of commodities at one and the same moment; total values afford the ratios of the total social value-areas of different moments, periods, and ages, with each other. Total values are the positive norms of different periods and hence must be employed as the stand- ards of deferred payments ; they are thus the only means of solving perhaps the most universally and uniformly appli- cable economic problem. The application of normal reason- ing to deferred payments will, therefore, now occupy our attention.
That society is constantly regulating its deferred pay- ments on the principle of value already set forth, does not,
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of course, appear without explanation. Such is, however, the case. Deferred payments are regulated by the same principles of value as ordinary sales. Two qualifications of the accepted conception of value alone are necessary to prove the truth of the last statement. In the first place, the principle of value which was primarily applied to the exchange of commodities and services, is now applied to a comparison of social totals. It, therefore, results in a ratio or comparison of norms or of social uniformities, for such norms have been shown either to be such totals or to be based upon them. In the second place (and this follows from the former proposition), while exchanges between individuals at one time are under one norm of value, and hence at one social margin of value, exchanges between individuals into which time enters, involve two norms or uniformities of value — that of the time when the obligation is incurred, and that of the time when it is liquidated.
Further: the goods exchanged at any moment, it is agreed, are of equal value; in other words, each party returns the same value that he receives. Now the object of the foregoing reasoning has been to show, that when the return payment is not made on the spot, but after the lapse of time, not only is it still true that the same value is re- turned, but that the delayed return of value is established or governed by the same principles as the immediate return of value. Every one admits, as self-evident, that the debtor should return to the creditor the same value that he receives, but many withhold assent when called upon to make the further admission that the organization of society is such that the same value will naturally be returned. The demon- stration, therefore, has been directed to this point, that in all exchanges values are equated upon the same principles. How is this worked out in practice?
Suppose R receives from S a loan of commodities to be returned in one year. Now, suppose that at the end of a year, the total value of commodities in the community has
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increased. In a state of normal prosperity, this means that investment has increased more rapidly than marginal returns have decreased. We may now permit ourselves to make use of the merchant's value in speaking of society as a whole ; for while for purposes of prosperity-study we gen- erally think of society as a producer rather than as an exchanger, still as we proceed from smaller to larger and larger social groups, no moment can be shown when society ceases to be an exchanger. In fact, as has been already hinted, one age or epoch does, in a sense, exchange with another, for the totality of deferred payments in a society is equivalent to a simultaneous payment from one society to another that has a different margin of production and con- sumption, and a different total value. In making such an exchange allowance must be made for the change in margin, in order that the relation of the particular value to the total or normal value may be known.
There is no reason, therefore, why we should not, at will, transfer our value F into a value M, even when dealing with the sum of social goods and values. The object, of course, is to isolate the value element of utility for comparison between total values of different periods. As has been already shown, the element of utility is concealed in value F, but is isolated as a margin in value M, and hence may be directly employed in that form.
Expressed in M, increased prosperity means that goods have increased more rapidly than their marginal utility has decreased. This increase of goods and decrease of marginal utility is a normal cause of the change in total values. They are, therefore, simply an expression of the law of value engaged in the function of determining the standard, and deferred payments must conform to them. They will con- form in the following manner : the change in normal value will make it necessary for S to return to R more or less goods in order to keep the value equal. The same value will form -a smaller part of the greater aggregate of values in existence
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at the later period, and may require less or more goods to represent it. The proportion of the same value to the greater total will vary inversely as that total; e. g. the value of wheat in Bi is inversely to the total value in B6, as that total value is greater than Bi. Now, this result is conceiv- ably accomplished by increasing the money in the country in direct proportion with the increase in total value; for then, owing to the well-proven law that the demand for money varies uniformly in inverse proportion to the supply, rate of circulation remaining the same, each piece of money will have diminished in exchange value below the exchange value it would have had if values alone had increased and money had remained stationary, exactly in proportion as the whole amount of money has increased. An increase in values, the volume of money remaining constant, would have increased the exchange value of money proportionally. A proportional increase in the volume of money will again reduce its exchange-value to what it originally was. Now, in the case of money, exchange-value is the all-important aspect of value. Therefore, the desideratum in the mechan- ism of deferred payments is that the exchange-value of money remain constant. If this is accomplished, then the same amount of money will always return the same purchas- ing-power. Note the abuse of this lucid proposition by those who pervert " purchasing-power" into power to pur- chase the same number of commodities or the same number of days' labor or the same total utility instead of the same value of commodities or the same value of days' labor, or the same value of utilities. (As to the last point, it will be shown later that those utilities which are not the result of calculation, and thus a subject of economic measure, are not a part of economic value.) Consequently, each piece of money represents the same purchasing-power that it did before, and if S returns to R the price agreed upon when he received them from R, he will return the same purchasing- power.
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L,et P and Q (Fig. 2) represent the total values of the years 1890 and 1900, respectively, in the same society. The small black surface in P represents the value of a debt of $100 incurred in 1890. The same surface in Q represents the same value to be returned in 1900. Value is thus seen to be absolute and permanent. Now, suppose the black sur- face to be tsW of total value P, and xsta of total value Q. It is plain, from the above considerations, that, in order that $100