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M. TULLII CICERONIS
DE NATURA DEORUM
LIBRI TRES

WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

BY

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TOGETHER WITH

A NEW COLLATION OF SEVERAL OF THE ENGLISH MSS.

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VOL. I.

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FRATRI DILECTO

JOHANNI E. B. MAYOR,
LATINARUM LITTERARUM APUD CANTABRIGIENSES PROFESSORI,
QUI PRIMUS PÆRILEM MIHI MENTEM
QUO ET IPSE PÆR FLÄGRÅBAT
ANTIQUITATIS AMORE IMBUIT,
HIC GRATI LABORIS FRUCTUS
DEDICATUR.
HN mēn oûn prō tīc tōy Kyrīou parougēiас eīc dikaiocynh
ELLHIN ἀναγκαία φιλοσοφία, ηνύν δὲ χρήσιμη prōs theoseiēian
γίνεται, προπαδεία τιc oûca toīc tīn πίειτι dī ἀποδείξεως καρ-

Nam, ut vere loquamur, superstitia fusa per gentes oppressit omnium fere
animos atque hominum imbécillitatem occupavit. Quod et in iis libris dictum
est, qui sunt de natura deorum, et hae disputazione id maxime omissus.
Multum enim et nobismet ipsis et nostris profuturi videbamus, si cam fun-
ditus sustulimus. Nec cero (id enim diligentur intelliendi volo) superstitione
tollenda religio tollitur. Nam et majorum instituta tueri sacris caerimonii-
que retinendis sapientis est, et esse praesitam aliquam aeternamque natu-
ram, et cam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi pulchritudo
mundi ordoqueorum caelestium cogit confirri. Quam ob rem, ut religio
propaganda etiam est, quae est juncta cum cognitione naturae, sic supersti-
In bringing out the First Volume of my edition of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, I have to return my best thanks to the Syndics of the University Press for having undertaken its publication, and both to them and to Mr J. H. Swainson, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the use of the collations of various English MSS. made by the latter, and placed by him in the hands of the Syndicate; also to Mr Samuel Allen of Dublin for the loan of two valuable MSS., an account of which is given in the fifth section of my Introduction. I have further to acknowledge with my hearty thanks the assistance received from friends who have looked over portions of the proof-sheets, as they were passing through the press, especially to my brother, the Rev. John E. B. Mayor, Professor of Latin
at Cambridge, and to my former pupil, Mr H. P. Richards, now Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College, Oxford; but above all to Mr J. S. Reid, whose name is well known to scholars from his excellent editions of the Academica and other works of Cicero, and to my old and valued friend Mr H. J. Roby. The help which I have received from the two latter is only imperfectly represented by the additions and corrections marked with the signature R., in the case of those supplied by Mr Roby, and J. S. R., in the case of those supplied by Mr Reid. Many of my own notes have been modified, and perhaps more should have been, in deference to their candid and searching criticism.

The remaining volume will, I hope, be completed for publication during the course of next year.

April, 1880.
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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY FROM
THALES TO CICERO*.

As Cicero continually refers to the views of earlier philosophers, it seems desirable here to give a short preliminary sketch, which may serve to show their relations to each other, leaving points of detail to be discussed in the notes on each particular passage.

Greek philosophy had its origin not in the mother country, but in the colonies of Asia Minor and Magna Graecia. This is owing partly to the reflectiveness belonging to a more advanced civilization, and partly to the fact that the colonists were brought in contact with the customs and ideas of foreign nations. The philosophers of the earliest, or Pre-Socratic period, are broadly divided into the Ionic and the Italic Schools. Both had the same object of interest, to ascertain the nature, the origin, the laws, the destiny of the visible

* The modern works which have been found most useful in drawing up this sketch are the following, arranged in what I consider to be their order of importance. Full references will be found in the two which stand at the head of the list.

Ritter and Preller, Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta.
Zeller, History of Greek Philosophy.
Grote, History of Greece, together with his Plato and Aristotle.
Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. i. tr. by Morris.
Schwegler, Hist. of Philosophy, tr. by Sterling.
Krische, Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker.
Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, Vol. i.
A. Butler, Lectures on Ancient Philosophy.
The Fragmenta Philosophorum in Didot's series ought to have been more useful than any of these, but its value is much lessened by the want of discrimination shown in the selection and arrangement of the writers quoted.

M. C.
world. But while the former with the Ionic sensitiveness to all outward influences dwelt more upon the material element itself and the life which manifested itself in its ever-changing developments, the latter (who, if not themselves Dorian, were yet surrounded by Dorian settlers, with their Doric ideal of discipline, order, stability, superiority to sense, as opposed to the Ionic ideal of free growth, of ease, beauty and nature,) turned their thoughts more to the laws by which the world was governed, or the one unchanging substance which they believed to underlie its shifting phenomena.

The first name in Greek philosophy is the so-called founder of the Ionic or physical school, Thales of Miletus, a contemporary of Solon (B.C. 640—550), said to be of Phenician descent. With him begins the transition from the mythological to the scientific interpretation of nature, the transition, as Grote puts it, from the question Who sends rain, or thunder, or earthquakes, and why does he send it? to the question What are the antecedent conditions of rain, thunder, or earthquakes? The old cosmogonies and theogonies suggested the idea of development under the form of a personal history of a number of supernatural beings variously related to each other. The first parent of all, according to Homer, was Oceanus (II. xiv. 201, 210), perhaps a nature-myth to be interpreted of the sun rising and setting in the sea. Thales stripped him of his personality, and laid down the proposition that water is the one original substance out of which all things are produced. Aristotle conjectures that he was led to this belief by observing that moisture is essential to animal and vegetable life: probably it was also from the fact that water supplies the most obvious example of the transmutation of matter under its three forms, solid, fluid and gaseous. Thales further held that the universe is a living creature; which he expressed by saying that 'all things are full of God,' and in agreement with this he is reported to have said that 'the magnet had a soul.' It is this portion of his doctrine which is travestied by the Epicurean critic in Bk. i § 25.

The second of the Ionic philosophers was Anaximander, also an inhabitant of Miletus (B.C. 610—540). He followed Thales in seeking for an original substance to which he gave the name of ἀφρός, but he found this not in Water, but in the αἰεωρ, matter indeterminate (i.e. not yet developed into any one of the forms familiar to us) and infinite, which we may regard as bearing the same relation to Hesiod's primaeval Chaos, as Water did to the Homeric Oceanus.
The elementary contraries, hot, cold, moist, dry, are separated from this first matter by virtue of the eternal movement belonging to it; thus are produced the four elements; the earth was in the form of a cylinder, self-poised, in the centre of the universe; round it was air, and round that again a fiery sphere which was broken up so as to form the heavenly bodies. As all substances are produced out of the Infinite so they are resolved into it, thus ‘atoning for their injustice’ in arrogating to themselves a separate individual existence. The Infinite is divine, containing and directing all things: divine too are the innumerable worlds which it is ever generating and re-absorbing into its own bosom. (N. D. i 25.)

After Anaximander comes Anaximenes, also of Miletus, who is supposed to have flourished about 520 B.C. While his doctrine approaches in many respects to that of Anaximander, he nevertheless returned to the principle of Thales in so far that he assumed as the ἄρχη, a definite substance, Air, in contradistinction to the indefinite ἀπαρχη of his immediate predecessor. Air is infinite in extent and eternal in duration. It is in continual motion, and produces all things out of itself by condensation and rarefaction, passing through successive stages from fire downwards to wind, cloud, water, earth and stone. As man’s life is supported by breathing, so the universe subsists by the air which encompasses it. We are told that Anaximenes gave the name of God both to his first principle Air, and to certain of its products, probably the stars. (N. D. i 26.)

The greatest of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus, known among the ancients as the obscure and the weeping philosopher, was a little junior to Anaximenes. Following in the steps of his predecessor, he held that it was one and the same substance which by processes of condensation and rarefaction changed itself into all the elements known by us, but he preferred to name this from its highest potency fire, rather than to stop at the intermediate stage of air. But the point of main interest with him was not the original substance, but the process, the everlasting movement upwards and downwards, fire (including air), water, earth; earth, water, fire. All death is birth into a new form, all birth the death of the previous form. There is properly no existence but only ‘becoming,’ i.e. a continual passing from one existence into another. Each moment is the union of opposites, being and not-being: the life of the world is maintained by conflict, πόλεμος παρηρ.
πάντων. Every particle of matter is in continual movement. All things are in flux like the waters of a river. One thing alone is permanent, the universal law which reveals itself in this movement. This is Zeus, the all-pervading reason of the world. It is only the illusion of the senses which makes us fancy that there are such things as permanent substances. Fire exhibits most clearly the incessant movement and activity of the world: confined in the body it constitutes the human soul, in the universe at large it is God (the substance and the process being thus identified).

Heraclitus is the first philosopher of whom we read that he referred to the doctrines of other philosophers. He is said to have spoken highly of some of the seven Wise Men, but condemned severely Pythagoras and Xenophanes as well as the poets Hesiod, Homer and Archilochus. Though I agree with Ueberweg in classing him with the older Ionics, yet his philosophy was no doubt largely developed with a reference to the rival schools of Italy.

In the N. D. allusion is twice made to the obscurity of Heraclitus (i 74, iii 35), but he does not appear in the catalogue of philosophers criticized by Velleius, and this though Philodemus had certainly treated of him, as we may see from the allusions in the Fragments (Compertz, pp. 70, 81). The reason for this omission is probably that, his philosophy having been incorporated into the Stoic system, it was unnecessary to discuss it separately. See Hirzel, p. 7 f. foll., and N. D. iii 35, i 74.

We must now cross the water with Pythagoras of Samos, born 582 B.C., who settled at Crotone in Italy, 529 B.C., and there founded what is known as the Italic school. He seems to have found in the mysteries and in the Orphic hymns the starting point which Thales had discovered in Homer; and there can be little doubt that his doctrine and system were also in part suggested by his travels in Egypt. He established a sort of religious brotherhood with strict rules and a severe initiation, insisted on training in gymnastics, mathematics and music, and taught the doctrines of immortality and of the transmigration of souls, and the duty of abstaining from animal food. He is said to have committed nothing to writing himself; but his doctrines were religiously guarded by his disciples (cf. N. D. i 10), and recorded by Archytas and Philolus, the latter a contemporary of Socrates.

The new and startling feature in the Pythagorean philosophy
as opposed to the Ionic systems, was that it found its ἀφροζή, its key of the universe, not in any known substance, but in number and proportion. This might naturally have occurred to one who had listened to the teaching of Thales and Anaximander. After all it makes no difference, he might say, what we take as our original matter, it is the law of development, the measure of condensation which determines the nature of each thing. Number rules the harmonies of music, the proportions of sculpture and architecture, the movements of the heavenly bodies. It is Number which makes the universe into a κόσμος, and is the secret of a virtuous and orderly life. Then by a confusion similar to that which led Herachitus to identify the law of movement with Fire, the Pythagoreans went on to identify number with substance. One, the Monad, evolved out of itself Limit (order) and the Unlimited (freedom, expansiveness), the Dyad; out of the harmonious mixture of these contraries all particular things were produced. Again, One was the point, Two the line, Three the plane, Four the concrete solid (but from another point of view, as being the first square number, equal into equal, it was conceived to be Justice). Yet once more, One was the central fire, the hearth of the universe, the throne of Zeus, round which revolved not only the heavenly bodies, but the earth itself. The Decad is the ordered universe surrounded by its fiery envelope. The Pythagorean doctrine of the soul and of God is variously reported. Zeller thinks that Cicero's representation belongs to the later teachers, and not to Pythagoras himself, as it is not supported by Plato and Aristotle. If we may trust the oldest accounts, there does not seem to have been any close connexion between the religious and philosophical opinions of Pythagoras. We are told that he believed in One God eternal, unchangeable, ruling and upholding all things, that the soul was a 'harmony,' that the body was its prison, in which it was punished for past sin and disciplined for a divine life after death, that those who failed to profit by this discipline would pass into lower forms of life, or suffer severer penalties in Hades (N. D. i 27, 74, iii 27, 88).

The second of the Italic schools was the Eleatic, founded by Xenophanes of Colophon in Asia Minor (b. 569 B.C.), who migrated to Elea in Italy about 540 B.C. While the Pythagoreans strove to explain nature mathematically and symbolically, the Eleatics in their later developments did the same by their metaphysical abstractions. Xenophanes himself seems to have received his first philosophical
impulse in the revulsion from the popular mythology. He condemned anthropomorphism and polytheism altogether, and said that Homer and Hesiod had attributed to the Gods conduct which would have been disgraceful in men. God is one, all eye, all ear, all understanding; he is for ever unmoved, unchangeable, a vast all-embracing sphere. See N. D. i 28. It is disputed whether the last expression is to be taken literally, implying that the universe is God, or whether it is a metaphor to express God's perfection and omnipresence. The chief representative of the Eleatic School is Parmenides (b. 515 B.C.). He disengaged the doctrine of Xenophanes from its theological form, and ascribed to Being what his predecessor had ascribed to God. His philosophy is the antithesis of that of Heraclitus. While Heraclitus said all is motion and change, the appearance of fixity is merely illusion of the senses; Parmenides asserted, with distinct reference to him, that all that exists has existed and will exist the same for ever, that it is change and multiplicity which is illusory. It is only by thought we can become conscious of the really existent; being and thought are the same, sense can only give rise to uncertain opinion. In such language we see partly a protest against the vagueness of the conception of development or 'becoming,' by which the Ionic philosophers endeavoured to explain the origin of things, 'You say fire becomes water, but each thing is what it is, and can never be otherwise;' partly an idea of the indestructibility of matter; partly an anticipation of the later distinction between necessary and contingent truth; thus one point dwelt upon by him was the impossibility of any separation of parts of space.

But though truth only belonged to the world of real existence, Parmenides condescended to give his romance of nature for the benefit of those who could not penetrate beyond the world of phenomena. He begins with two principles, light and darkness, also called fire and earth, or male and female; and supposes all things to proceed from their mixture. The existing universe consists of a central fire, the seat of the presiding Deity, and of several concentric rings of mingled light and darkness, bounded on the outside by a wall of flame. The first-born of Gods was Love, by whom the union of opposites is brought about. In this we may trace a reminiscence of the Hesiodic "Eros (N. D. i 28).

Zeno of Elea (b. 490 B.C.) is chiefly known from his arguments showing the absurd consequences of the ordinary belief in the
phenomenal world. Parmenides must be right in denying motion and multiplicity, for their assertion leads to self-contradiction. Zeno was in consequence called the inventor of Dialectic. His arguments, especially the famous ‘Achilles,’ still find a place in treatises on Logic (N. D. iii 82).

The clearly marked opposition between the Ionic and the Eleatic views of nature, as shown in Heraclitus and Parmenides, had a powerful influence on the subsequent course of philosophy. Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists agreed in accepting the Eleatic principle of the immutability of substance, while denying its absolute Oneness; and they explained the Ionic ‘becoming’ as the result of the mixture of a number of unchangeable substances. Empedocles of Agrigentum (b. 500 B.C.) held that there were four eternal, self-subsistent elements or ‘roots of things,’ which were being continually separated and combined under the influence of Love and Hatred. At times Love has the upper hand, at times Hate. When Love has the complete supremacy the elements are at rest, united in one all-including sphere (Σφαῖρα); when Hate prevails, the elements are entirely separate. The soul, like all other things, is formed by the mixture of the elements, and is thus capable of perception, for like can only be perceived by like. In his opinions on the Gods and on religion, Empedocles was chiefly influenced by Pythagoras. He believed in the existence of Daemons intermediate between Gods and men, some of which had passed into mortal bodies as an atonement for former sins, and could only be restored to their original state after long ages of discipline. While he speaks of God at one time as one spirit pervading the world in swift thought, in other places he speaks of Gods produced like men from the mixture of the elements, but possessed of a longer existence, and then again we find divinity attributed to Sphaerus and the four elements and two moving powers (N. D. i 29).

Returning now to Ionia, we see the effect of the Eleatic school in the speculations of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (b. 500 B.C.), of whom Aristotle says that he appeared among the older philosophers like a sober man among drunkards. Instead of the four elements of Empedocles, which he declared to be themselves compounds, he assumed an indefinite number of ‘seeds’ of the different kinds of matter. To these seeds later philosophers gave the distinctive name
of ‘homooemerics,’ denoting that the constituent particles of bodies were of the same nature as the bodies which they composed, while the unqualified atoms of Democritus gave rise to the different qualities of their compounds by the mode in which they were compounded. In the beginning these seeds were huddled together in a confused chaos, then came Nous, the pure self-moving intelligence, almighty and all-wise (this takes the place of the half-conscious Love and Hate of Empedocles), and communicated a rotatory impulse to the inert mass, by means of which the cognate particles were gradually brought together and reduced to order. Nous is the soul of the world and dwells in all living things, even plants, as the principle of their life. Whether Anaxagoras called it by the name of God is doubtful. Plato and Aristotle complain that, having begun well, he failed to make full use of the right principle with which he started, and turned his attention to mechanical causes, only having recourse to Nous as a deus ex machina when the others failed. (N. D. i 26.)

Diogenes of Apollonia in Crete was a younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, against whom he took up a reactionary position and defended the older Ionic doctrine, assuming Air to be the one principle out of which all things were produced, and assigning to it all the attributes of Nous. Both he and Anaxagoras taught at Athens, but were compelled to leave it on a charge of impiety. (N. D. i 29.)

Of far greater importance is Democritus, born at the Ionic colony of Abdera in Thrace, B.C. 460, the chief expositor of the Atomic theory, which was originated by his elder contemporary and friend, Leucippus the Eleatic (N. D. i 66). Briefly stated, their doctrine is that of Anaxagoras, minus Nous and the qualitative diversity in the seeds or atoms. They adopted the Eleatic view so far as relates to the eternal sameness of Being, applying this to the indivisible, unchangeable atoms, but they denied its unity, continuity and immobility, and they asserted that ‘Not-being’ (the Vacuum of their system) existed no less than ‘Being,’ and was no less essential as an ἀρχή, since without it motion would be impossible. The atoms are absolutely solid and incompressible, they are without any secondary qualities, and differ only in size (and therefore in weight), in figure, position and arrangement. Though too small to be seen or felt by us, they produce all things by their combinations; and the compounds have various qualities in accordance with the differences in
the constituent atoms, the mode of arrangement, and the larger or smaller amount of vacuum separating the atoms. Thus Soul, the divine element pervading the world, is a sort of fire made up of small, round, smooth atoms in continual motion, and largely mixed with vacuum. The account given by Democritus of the origin of the existing universe is that there were, to begin with, an infinite number of atoms carried downwards by their own inherent gravity at different rates in proportion to their magnitude, that thus they impinged one upon another, and gave rise to all sorts of oblique and contrary movements, out of which was generated an all-absorbing rotatory motion or vortex. Under these various movements corresponding atoms found their fitting places and became entangled and hooked together so as to form bodies. Thus the earthy and watery particles were drawn to the centre where they remained at rest, while the airy and fiery rebounded from them and rose to the circumference, forming a sort of shell between the organized world and the infinitude of unorganized atoms on the outside. There was an endless number of such worlds in various stages of growth or decay under the influx or efflux of atoms; the destruction of each world followed upon its collision with another world.

The account given of the mind and its operations was, as follows:—Particles of mind or soul were distributed throughout the body, and were continually escaping owing to their subtle nature, but, as they escaped, their place was taken by other particles inhaled in the breath. When breathing ceased there was nothing to recruit the living particles, and death speedily followed. Every mental impression was of the nature of touch, and was caused either by actual contact with atoms as in the case of taste and hearing, or by images thrown off from bodies external to us, and entering in through the pores.

These images were a kind of film consisting of the surface atoms which were continually floating off from all bodies without any disturbance of their mutual order, and were, so to speak, a sample of the object from which they were detached. Democritus also used the same word (εἰδωλα) for the anthropomorphic combinations of the finest soul-atoms which he believed to exist in the air, and to be at times perceived by men. These were the Gods of the popular religion, not immortal, though longer lived than men: some were friendly, some malignant; he prayed that he might himself only meet with the former. Cf. N. D. 1 29 & 120.
Democritus closes the series of the pre-Socratic dogmatists, men who devoted themselves to the investigation of Nature as a whole, believing that the investigation would lead to the discovery of the truth. Between these and Socrates, the great regenerator of philosophy, is interposed the sceptical or Sophistic era. That the latter was a natural and necessary stage in the development of Greek thought will be apparent from the following considerations:—

What we are told about Pythagoras and his disciples must have been more or less true of all the early philosophers. The sage no less than the poet believed himself the organ of a special inspiration, which in the case of the former revealed to him the inner truth of nature; those who were worthy to receive the revelation listened with reverence to his teaching, and rested their faith implicitly on their master's authority. But when different schools sprang up, each asserting their own doctrines with equal positiveness; when the increase of intercommunication spread the knowledge of these contradictory systems throughout the Greek-speaking world; when philosophical questions began to be popularized by poets like Euripides, and discussed in the saloons of a Pericles or an Aspasia; when Zeno's criticisms had made clear to the public, what had been an esoteric truth to the hearers of Parmenides and Heraclitus, that not merely traditional beliefs, but even the evidence of the senses was incapable of standing against the reason of the philosophers,—the result of all this was a widespread scepticism either as to the existence of objective truth altogether (Protagoras) or as to the possibility of the attainment of physical truth by man (Socrates). If we remember at the same time the incredibly rapid development in every department of life which took place in Greece and especially in Athens during the 5th century b.c.; the sense which must have forced itself on all the more thoughtful minds, of the incompetency of the old beliefs to explain the problems of the new age which was dawning upon them; and on the other hand the growing importance of oratory and the immense stimulus to ambition, held out in a state like Athens, to those who were of a more practical turn of mind,—we shall not be surprised if there was much curiosity to learn the opinions of the most advanced thinkers, and much eagerness to acquire the argumentative power by which a Zeno could make the worse cause appear the better. The enlightened men who came forward to supply this demand called themselves by the name of Sophists, or teachers of wisdom. They were the first who made
a profession of the higher education, and some of them amassed considerable fortunes by their lectures on rhetoric, the art of speaking, which was also made to include instruction in regard to political and social life. The speculative interest of the older philosophers was in them changed into a predominantly practical interest, 1st, as to how to acquire wealth and notoriety for themselves, and 2ndly, as a means to this, to attract by omniscient pretensions, by brilliant declamation and startling paradox, clever and ambitious young men of the richer classes; and then to secure their continued discipleship by careful training with a view to the attainment of political power*.

Protagoras of Abdera (B.C. 490—415) and Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily (B.C. 480—375) are the earliest of the so-called Sophists. Protagoras taught in Sicily and at Athens, from which latter place he was banished on a charge of impiety in consequence of his treatise on Theology referred to by Cicero, N. D. i 29 & 63. His treatise on Truth began with the famous sentence, ‘Man is the measure of all things;’ meaning that truth is relative, not absolute, that what each man holds to be true, that is true to him; and similarly in regard to conduct, that it is impossible to pronounce universally that one kind of conduct is right, another wrong: right and wrong depend upon opinion; what is generally thought right is right generally; what each thinks right is right for him, just as each man’s sensations are true for him, though perhaps not for another; there is therefore no more reason for one general assertion than for another, perhaps an opposite assertion. It is plain that this was a sort of conciliation theory naturally springing from the fact of the opposition of philosophical schools: ‘each of you are equally right relatively, equally wrong absolutely; there is no need for quarrel.’ Protagoras also wrote on Grammar and Philology. Gorgias is said to have first come to Athens in B.C. 427, and afterwards to have travelled about giving lectures from town to town. He devoted himself mainly to the cultivation of rhetoric, but also wrote a treatise περὶ φύσεως, in which he maintained 1st ‘that nothing exists’ (i.e. doubtless ‘in the absolute Eleatic sense’); 2nd that if anything did exist, still it could not be known; 3rd that even if it could be known, the knowledge of it could not be communicated

* The general features of the Sophistic period are photographed in the Clouds of Aristophanes, and in Thucydides’ chapters on the Plague of Athens and the Corecyrean revolution, and his speeches generally.
to others. Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were some twenty years younger than Protagoras. The former was best known for his scientific attainments: he is said to have given utterance to the revolutionary sentiment of the age in the phrase, 'Law is a tyrant over men, forcing them to do many things contrary to nature.' Prodicus is famed for his moral apologue on the Choice of Hercules narrated by Xenophon. Cicero (N. D. i 118), following Philodemus, reports that he considered the Gods of popular religion to be merely deified utilities, Bacchus wine, Ceres corn, &c.

But the extreme effects of the disintegration of established beliefs were not seen in the teachers, but in some of their pupils who were less dependent on public opinion, young aristocrats who fretted under democratic rule, and were eager to take advantage of the disorganized state of society in order to grasp at power for themselves. Such was the Callicles of the Gorgias, such Critias and Alcibiades, both disciples of Socrates, of whom we have now to speak.

Socrates was born at Athens 470 B.C.; he was the son of Sophroniscus a sculptor, and Phaenarete a midwife. While sharing the general scepticism as to the possibility of arriving at certainty in regard to the Natural Philosophy which had formed the almost exclusive subject of earlier speculation, he maintained, in opposition to most of the popular teachers of his time, the certainty of moral distinctions, and laid down a method for the discovery of error on the one side, and the establishment of objective truth on the other. The main lines of his philosophy are given in three famous sentences: (1) that of Cicero, that he brought down philosophy from heaven to earth; (2) his own assertion that he practised in regard to the soul the art (μαθητική) which his mother had practised in regard to the body, bringing to birth and consciousness truths before held unconsciously; (3) Aristotle's statement that Socrates was the first to introduce inductive reasoning and general definitions. But more important than any innovation in regard to method was the immense personal influence of Socrates. His force of will, his indifference to conventionalities, his intense earnestness, both moral and intellectual, contrasting so strongly with the dilettantism of ordinary teachers, and yet combined with such universal interest and sympathy in all varieties of life and character, his warm and genial nature, his humour, his irony, his extraordinary conversational
powers, these formed a whole unique in the history of the world; and we can well believe that they acted like an electric shock on the more susceptible minds of his time. For we must remember that Socrates did not, like earlier philosophers, content himself with imparting the results of solitary meditation to a few favoured disciples: nor did he, like the Sophists, lecture to a paying audience on a set subject; but obeying, as he believed, a divine call, he mixed with men of every class wherever they were to be found, cross-questioning them as to the grounds of their beliefs, and endeavouring to awaken in them a consciousness of their ignorance and a desire for real knowledge. His own account of his call is as follows: one of his disciples was told by the Oracle at Delphi that Socrates was the wisest of men. Socrates could not conceive how this should be, as he was conscious only of ignorance; but he determined to question some of those who had the highest repute for wisdom; accordingly he went to statesmen and poets and orators, and last of all to craftsmen, but everywhere met with the same response: none really knew what were the true ends of life, but each one fancied that he knew, and most were angry when Socrates attempted to disturb their illusion of knowledge. Thus he arrived at the conclusion that what the oracle meant was that the first step to knowledge was the consciousness of ignorance, and he believed, in consequence of other divine warnings, that it was his special mission to bring men to this consciousness.

The next step on the way to knowledge was to get clear general notions, by comparing a number of specific cases in which the same general term was employed; or, according to the phraseology of ancient philosophy, to see the One (the kind or genus, the general principle, the law, the idea,) in the Many (the subordinate species or individuals, the particulars, the phenomena, the facts) and conversely to rise from the Many to the One. The process of doing this he called Dialectic, i.e. discourse, since it was by question and answer that he believed the proposed definition could be best tested, and the universal idea which was latent in each individual could be brought to light. Truth and right were the same for all: it was only ignorance, mistake, confusion which made them seem different to different men. And similarly it is ignorance which leads men to commit vicious actions: no one willingly does wrong, since to do right is the only way to happiness, and every man desires happiness. Thus virtue is a knowledge of the way to happiness,
and more generally, right action is reasonable action; in other words, virtue is wisdom, and each particular virtue, such as courage or temperance, wisdom in reference to particular circumstances or a particular class of objects. Self-mastery and superiority to the outward conditions of life are essential to happiness.

In regard to religion, Socrates, while often employing language suited to the popular polytheism, held that there was one supreme God who was to the universe what the soul of man was to his body, that all things were arranged and ordered by Him for good, and that man was the object of His special providence and might look for guidance from Him in oracles and otherwise. The soul was immortal, and had in it a divine element. Socrates believed that he was himself favoured beyond others in the warning sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον) which checked him whenever he was about to take an ill-judged step.

The personal enmity provoked by the use of the Socratic ἔλενχος, and the more general dislike to the Socratic method as unsettling the grounds of belief and undermining authority, a dislike which showed itself in the Clouds of Aristophanes as early as 423 B.C., combined with the democratic reaction, after the overthrow of the Thirty, to bring about the execution of Socrates in the year 399 B.C. The charges on which he was condemned were that he did not believe in the Gods of the established religion, that he introduced new Gods, and that he corrupted the young; the last charge probably referring to the fact that Socrates freely pointed out the faults of the Athenian constitution, and that many of his disciples took the anti-popular side (N. D. ii 18, 167).

Our authorities for the life of Socrates are the writings of his two disciples, Xenophon and Plato. The former (440—355 B.C.) was a soldier and country gentleman with a taste for literature, who endeavoured to clear his master's memory from the imputation of impiety and immorality by publishing the Memorabilia, a collection of his noteworthy sayings and discourses. Xenophon was banished from Athens for fighting in the Spartan ranks at Coronea. Plato is distinguished from the other disciples of Socrates as the one who represents most truly the many-sidedness of his master, completing indeed and developing what was defective in him and incorporating all that was valuable in the earlier philosophers. Before treating of him it will be convenient to speak shortly of the 'imperfect' or one-sided Socraticists.
Euclides of Megara, the founder of the Megaric and so ultimately of the Sceptic school, was chiefly attracted by the negative teaching of Socrates, and his followers are noted as the inventors of various sophisms which served them as offensive weapons against their opponents. The main positive doctrine attributed to them is that they identified the Good, which Socrates called the highest object of knowledge, with the Absolute One of Parmenides, denying the existence of Evil.

Antisthenes (N. D. 1 32), the founder of the Cynic and indirectly of the Stoic school, was the caricature of the ascetic and unconventional side of Socrates. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing evil but vice. Virtue is wisdom, and the wise man is always perfectly happy because he is self-sufficient and has no wants, no ties and no weaknesses. The mass of men are fools and slaves, and the wise man is their appointed guide and physician. Acting on these principles the Cynics were the mendicant Friars of their time, abstaining from marriage and repudiating all civil claims while they professed themselves to be citizens of a world-wide community. On the subject of religion Antisthenes stated explicitly, what was doubtless implied in the teaching of Socrates, that there was only one God, who is invisible and whose worship consists in a virtuous life.

Aristippus of Cyrene (N. D. 111 77), the founder of the Cyrenaic school, resembled Antisthenes in dwelling exclusively upon the practical side of his master’s teaching. He interpreted the somewhat ambiguous language of Socrates about happiness in a purely eudaemonistic sense and declared that the only rule of life was to enjoy the present moment. Wisdom was essential to this, as it freed the mind from prejudice and passion. It was the boast of Aristippus no less than of Antisthenes ‘mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor’. Among the more prominent members of this school were Theodorus (N. D. 1 2, 63), surnamed the Atheist, who lived towards the close of the 4th century, B.C. He objected to the doctrine of his predecessor on the ground that it did not leave sufficient scope to wisdom, since pleasure and pain are so much dependent on outward circumstances; and put forward as the chief good not the enjoyment of passing pleasure, but the maintaining of a calm and cheerful frame of mind. Euhemerus, whose religious system is referred to by Cicero (N. D. 1 119), was a pupil of his. His contemporary, Hegesias, called παρθέναρος from his gloomy doctrine, considered that as life has more of pain than pleasure, the aim of the wise man should be not
to obtain pleasure, but to steel himself against pain. Thus in the end the Cyrenaic doctrine blends with the Cynic.

PLATO, the *deus philosophorum* (N. D. ii 32), was born at Athens 428 B.C. and became a disciple of Socrates in 408 B.C. After the death of his master he left Athens and lived at Megara with Euclides. From thence he visited Cyrene, Egypt, Magna Graecia and Sicily. After nearly ten years of travelling he took up his residence again at Athens and began to lecture in the gymnasium of the Academia. He died in his eightieth year.

Building on the foundation of Socrates, he insists no less than his master on the importance of negative Dialectic, as a means of testing commonly received opinions; indeed most of his Dialogues come to no positive result, but merely serve to show the difficulties of the subject discussed and the unsatisfactory nature of the solutions hitherto proposed. As he makes Socrates the spokesman in almost all the Dialogues, it is not always easy to determine precisely where the line is to be drawn between the purely Socratic and the Platonic doctrine, but the general relation of the one to the other may be stated as follows.

In his theory of knowledge Plato unites the Socratic definition with the Heraclitean Becoming and the Eleatic Being. Agreeing with Heraclitus that all the objects of the senses are fleeting and unreal in themselves, he held that they are nevertheless participant of Being in so far as they represent to us the general terms after which they are named. Thus we can make no general assertion with regard to this or that concrete triangular thing: it is merely a passing sensation: but by abstraction we may rise from the concrete to the contemplation of the Ideal triangle, which is the object of science, and concerning which we may make universal and absolutely true predications. If we approach the Ideal from below, from the concrete particulars, it takes the form of the class, the common name, the definition, the concept, the Idea; but this is an incomplete view of it. The Ideal exists apart from, and prior to, all concrete embodiment. It is the eternal archetype of which the sensible objects are the copies. It is because the soul in its pre-existent state is already familiar with this archetype that it is capable of being reminded of it when it sees its shadow in the phenomenal existences
which make up the world of sense*. All knowledge is reminiscence. What cannot be traced back to this intuitive consciousness in the soul itself is not knowledge, but mere opinion. Dialectic is the means by which the soul is enabled to recover the lost consciousness of the Ideal. The highest Ideal, which is the foundation of all existence and all knowledge is the Ideal Good, personified as God. He, as the Creator or Demiurgus, formed the universe by imprinting the ideas on the formless chaotic Matter. The process of creation is described in the *Timaeus* under the form of a myth, Plato holding, like Parmenides, that it was not possible to arrive at more than a symbolical adumbration of physical truth. The cause and ground of creation is the goodness of God, who seeks to extend his own blessedness as widely as possible. He begins his work by constructing the soul of the world out of the two elements before him, the immutable harmonious Ideals and changing discordant Matter. This soul he infuses into the mass of matter, which thereupon crystallizes into the geometrical forms of the four elements, and assumes the shape of a perfect sphere rotating on its axis. The Kosmos thus created is divine, imperishable and infinitely beautiful. Further, each element is to have living creatures belonging to it. Those belonging to the element of fire are the Gods, both the heavenly bodies and those of whom tradition tells us. All these were fashioned by the Demiuragus himself, but the creatures belonging to the other elements, including the mortal part of man, were the work of the created gods. The immortal part of man, the reason, is of like substance with the soul of the world, and was distributed by the Demiuragus amongst the stars till the time came for each several particle to enter the body prepared for it by the created gods, where it combined with two other ingredients, the

* The reader will remember the magnificent ode in which Wordsworth has embodied Plato's sublime conception. The fact which underlies it was well illustrated by the late Prof. Sedgwick, commenting on Locke's saying that "the mind previous to experience is a sheet of white paper" (the old *rosa tabula*), "Naked he comes from his mother's womb, endowed with limbs and senses indeed, well fitted to the material world, yet powerless from want of use: and as for knowledge, his soul is one unvaried blank; yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes forth covered with a glorious pattern."—*Discourse* p. 53. The Common-sense Philosophy of the Scotch and the *a priori* judgments of Kant are other forms of the same doctrine.

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appetive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδὲς) which it had to bring into subjection. If it succeeded, it returned to its star on the death of the body; if it failed, it was destined to undergo various transmigrations until its victory was complete. In all these physical speculations Plato was much influenced by the Pythagoreans.

We have now to speak of his ethical doctrines, which were based upon the psychological views mentioned above. The soul is on a small scale what the State or city is on a large scale: it is a constitution which is in its right condition when its parts work harmoniously together, when the governing reason is warmly supported by its auxiliary the heart, and promptly and loyally obeyed by the appetites. Thus perfect virtue arises when wisdom, courage and temperance are bound together by justice. The highest good is the being made like to God; and this is effected by that yearning after the Ideal which we know by the name of Love (N. D. 1 18—24, 30 al.).

Aristotle (longe omnibus—Platonem semper excipio—proestans et ingenio et diligentia, Tusc. 1 22) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony in Thrace, in the year 385 B.C. He came to Athens in his 17th year and studied under Plato for twenty years. In 343 B.C. he was invited by Philip, King of Macedon, to superintend the education of his son Alexander, then a boy of 13. When Alexander set out on his Persian expedition Aristotle returned to Athens and taught in the Lyceum. As he lectured while walking, his disciples were called Peripatetics. On the death of Alexander, Aristotle left Athens to escape from a charge of impiety, and settled at Chalcis in Euboea, where he died 322 B.C.

Aristotle's philosophy may be roughly described as Plato put into prose and worked out in detail. The vague mysticism, the high poetic imagination, of the master was altogether alien to the scholar, but the main lines of the two systems are the same. Plato's Dialectic method was developed by Aristotle into the strict technical science of Logic: Plato's Ideas were shorn of their separate supra-mundane existence and became the first of the four famous Causes of Aristotle, the formal, the material, the efficient, the final, which are really four kinds of antecedent conditions required for the existence of each thing. For instance, in order to the production of a marble statue by Phidias there is needed (1) the pre-
existence in his own mind of the ideal form which is subsequently impressed upon the stone; (2) the existence of the stone; (3) the process of carving; (4) the motive which induced the sculptor to make the statue, as for instance the desire to do honour to the God whose statue it is. But the opposition of form and matter is not confined to such simple cases—it covers the whole range of existence from the First Matter, which is mere potentiality of being at the one extreme, to the First Form which is pure immaterial actuality, the Divine Being, at the other extreme. The intermediate links in the chain are matter or form according as they are viewed from above or below, as marble for instance is form in reference to stone generally, matter in reference to statue; vitality is form in reference to the living body, matter in reference to rationality. God the First Form, is also the First Mover, the cause of the upward striving of the universe, of the development of each thing from the potential into the actual; and this not by any act of creation, for He remains ever unmoved in His own eternity, but by the natural tendency which all things have towards Him as the absolutely Good, the object and end of all effort, of all desire. The universe itself is eternal, a perfect sphere, the circumference of which is composed of the purest element, ether, and is carried round in circular motion by the immediate influence of the Deity. In it are the fixed stars, themselves divine. The lower planetary spheres have a less perfect movement and are under the guidance of subordinate divinities. Furthest removed from the First Mover comes the earth which is fixed in the centre, and composed of the four inferior elements. Still it exhibits a constant progressive movement from inorganic into organic, from plant into animal, from life which is nutritive and sensitive only into life which is locomotive and finally rational in man. The human soul is a microcosm uniting in itself all the faculties of the lower orders of animated existence, and possessing besides, the divine and immortal faculty of reason. As each thing attains its end by fulfilling the work for which it is designed by nature, so man achieves happiness by the unobstructed exercise of his special endowment, a rational and virtuous activity. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of such an activity. Virtue, which may be described as perfected nature, belongs potentially to man's nature, but it becomes actual by the repetition of acts in accordance with reason. It is subdivided into intellectual and moral, according as it is a habit of the purely rational part of the soul, or as it is
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a habit of the emotional part which is capable of being influenced by reason, but not itself rational. Every natural impulse is the potential basis of a particular virtue which may be developed by repeated actions freely performed in accordance with the law of reason so as to avoid either excess or defect. Since man is by nature gregarious, his perfection is only attainable in society, and ethical science is thus subordinate to political science (N. D. i 33, ii 42, 44, 95, al.).

The later Peripatetics are of no great importance. Cicero mentions in the N. D. Aristotle’s immediate follower Theophrastus (N. D. i 35), whose treatise on Friendship is copied in the Laelius; and Strato (N. D. i 35), who succeeded Theophrastus as head of the school in the year 288 B.C. Critolaus was one of the three philosophers who were sent by the Athenians as ambassadors to Rome in the year 155 B.C., and whose coming first introduced the Romans to the new world of philosophy. Cratippus presided over the school during the lifetime of Cicero, who sent young Marcus to Athens to attend his lectures.

To return now to the Academy, this is divided into three schools, the Older, the Middle and the New Academy*. To the first belong the names of Speusippus (i 32), Xenocrates (i 34) and Polemo, who successively presided over the school between 317 and 270 B.C., as well as those of Heraclides of Pontus (i 34), Crantor and Crates. They appear to have modified the Platonic doctrines mainly by the admixture of Pythagorean elements. Crantor’s writings were used by Cicero for his Consolatio and Tusculan Disputations. The chief expounders of the Middle Academy were its founder Arcesilaus 315—241 B.C. (i 11, 70), Carneades of Cyrene 214—129 B.C. (i 4, ii 65, iii 44), one of the Athenian ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C., and Clitomachus of Carthage, his successor in the presidency. They neglected the positive doctrine of Plato, and employed themselves mainly in a negative polemic against the dogmatism of the Stoics, professing to follow the example of Socrates, though

* Cicero only recognized the Old and the New Academy, the latter corresponding to what is above called the Middle Academy, but including Philo. Antiochus himself claimed to be a true representative of the Old Academy. Later writers made five Academic schools, the 2nd founded by Arcesilaus, the 3rd by Carneades, the 4th by Philo, the 5th by Antiochus.
they thought that even he had approached too near to dogmatism in saying that he knew that he knew nothing. Probable opinion was the furthest point in the direction of knowledge to which man could attain. The Academic argument put into the mouth of Cotta in the 3rd book of the N. D. is mainly derived from Clitemachus, the literary exponent of the views of his master Carneades, who is said to have never written anything himself. The New Academy commences with Philo (N. D. i 59, 113), a pupil of Clitemachus and one of Cicero’s teachers. In it we see a return to dogmatism combined with an eclectic tendency which showed itself most strongly in Philo's pupil Antiochus (N. D. 1 6, 16), who endeavoured to reform the Academy by uniting Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines with the original Platonism. Cicero studied under him and used some of his writings for the De Finibus. Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, was one of the most distinguished adherents of this stoicized Academy.

We turn now to the two most important developments of post-Aristotelian philosophy, Stoicism and Epicureanism. To understand them it is necessary to look for a moment at the changes which had been brought about by the conquests of Alexander. While Greece proper lost its national life, the Greek language and Greek civilization spread throughout the world, and the Greeks in their turn became familiarized with Oriental thought and religion. Thus the two main supports of the authoritative tradition by which practical life had hitherto been regulated, the law of the State and the old religion of Greece, were shaken from their foundations. The need which was most strongly felt by the best minds was to find some substitute for these, some principle of conduct which should enable a man to retain his self-respect under the rule of brute force to which all were subject. It must be something which would enable him to stand alone, to defy the oppressor, to rise superior to circumstances. Such a principle the Stoics boasted to have found. Zeno (N. D. i 36 al.), the founder of the school, was a native of Citium in Cyprus. He came to Athens about 320 B.C. and attended the lectures of Crates the Cynic and afterwards of Stilpo the Megarian and of some of the Academics, and began to teach in the στοά πουκίλη about 308 B.C. He was succeeded by Cleanthes of Assos in Asia Minor about 260 B.C. (N. D. i 37, ii 13, 24, 40, iii 63). Among his other pupils were Aristo of Chius (N. D. i 37), Herillus of
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Carthage, Persaeus, who like his master was a native of Citium (N. D. i 38), Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, the author of two astronomical poems translated by Cicero (N. D. ii 104—115). Cleunthas was succeeded by Chrysippus of Soli (b. 280, d. 206), who developed and systematized the Stoic philosophy (N. D. i 39 al.). Next came Zeno of Tarsus, and Diogenes of Babylon, one of the three ambassadors to Rome in 155 B.C. From this time forward Stoicism begins to show a softened and eclectic tendency, as we may see in Panaetius of Rhodes (180—111 B.C.), the friend of Scipio and Laelius, whose work περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος formed the basis of the De Officiis (N. D. ii § 118), and also in his pupil Posidonius of Apamea in Syria, who was one of Cicero’s instructors (N. D. i 7 & 123, ii 88), and from whom much of the Stoic argumentation in the N. D. is probably derived.

The end of philosophy with the Stoics was purely practical. Philosophy is identical with virtue. But since virtue consists in bringing the actions into harmony with the general order of the world, it is essential to know what this order is, and thus we arrive at the famous triple division of philosophy into physics, including cosmology and theology, which explains the nature and laws of the universe; logic, which ensures us against deception and supplies the method for attaining to true knowledge; ethics, which draws the conclusion for practical life. The chief point of interest in the Logic of the Stoics is their theory as to the criterion. They considered the soul to resemble a sheet of blank paper on which impressions (φάντασίαι) were produced through the senses. The concept (ίννοια) was produced from the impressions by generalization, which might be either spontaneous and unconscious, giving rise to common ideas or natural anticipations (κοιναί ἱννοιαι, ἐμφυτοὶ προλήψεις), or it might be conscious and methodical, giving rise to artificial concepts. In entire opposition to Plato they held that the individual object alone had real existence; the universal, the general term, existed only in the mind as subjective thought. The truth or falsehood of these impressions and conceptions depended on their possession of τὸ καταληπτικόν, the power of carrying conviction. An impression which was not merely assented to, but forced itself irresistibly on the mind, was a καταληπτική φαντασία, a perception that has a firm grasp of reality. The same irresistible evidence attaches to a προ- λήψεις, but artificial concepts required to have their truth proved by being connected with one or other of these criteria.
The physical theory of the Stoics is a pantheistic materialism. The only real existences are such as can act and be acted upon, and these are bodies, for like can only act on like. But these bodies are not moved simply by mechanical laws, as Democritus supposed. The whole universe is an embodied spiritual force, of which we may call one part passive, one part active, but all is alike material. The active portion is soul, a fiery ether pervading the whole, but having its principal seat in the heaven which encompasses it on every side; the passive portion consists mainly of the inferior elements, water and earth. These latter proceed from the former and are periodically reabsorbed into it in the world-conflagration. The universe itself, as a perfect living creature, is rightly called God, but the name is more particularly given to the soul of the universe, who is also known by many descriptive appellations, Rational or Artistic Fire (πύρ νοερόν, πῦρ τεχνικόν), All-penetrating Air, Spirit, Reason, Nature, Providence, Destiny, Law, Necessity, the Ruling Principle (τὸ ἕγε-μονικόν), and, with reference to his creative and 'informing' power, the Generative Reason (λόγος σπερματικός). The gods of the popular religion represented different activities of the one true Deity. The human soul is an emanation from Him. Although it outlives the body, it will only retain its individual existence till the next conflagration, and that only in the case of the wise. The stars being made of pure fire are divine.

In all this we see the influence of Heraclitus, who was much quoted by the Stoics, though the distinction of the active and passive elements in the universe has been with some probability referred back to the Aristotelian distinction between Form and Matter. They agreed with Aristotle also in holding the unity, finiteness and sphericity of the world, but, unlike him, considered that there was an unlimited void beyond it. That which was peculiarly Stoical was the strong moral colouring which they gave to their materialistic system. The all-pervading fire was at the same time the all-seeing Providence who created and governed all things for the best ends, and makes each several existence, each several fact, conspire together for the good of the whole. It is the privilege of man to be able knowingly and willingly to act as a rational part of the rational whole, instead of yielding himself up to irrational and selfish impulse; but however he acts, he must performe carry out the divine purpose, as Cleanthes says in his noble hymn:
From this it follows that the *sumnum bonum* is to live according to nature and it is through virtue or wisdom that we are enabled to do this. One who thus lives is *aνταρκής*, in need of nothing. External good, external evil are matters of indifference; they only provide the field in which virtue is to exercise itself. Pleasure is a natural concomitant of activity, but is not a natural end: not even if we count as pleasure that high delight which belongs to virtuous activity, for pleasure regarded in itself has a tendency to lead man away from the true end, viz. acting not for self, but for the whole. Man's reason being a part of the reason of the universe reveals to him the divine law. As the emotions are liable to confuse or to disobey reason, it is the part of the wise, i.e. of the virtuous, man to uproot them altogether. Wisdom is not only *speculative*, judging what is in accordance with nature or the divine law, but *practical*, strongly willing what is thus determined to be right. We may distinguish different virtues in thought, but in fact no virtue can exist apart. He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtuous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly vicious. There is no mean. The wise man is perfectly happy, the fool perfectly miserable: all the actions of the former are wise and good; all the actions of the latter foolish and bad. There may be a progress towards wisdom, but, until the actual moment of conversion, even those who are advancing (οἱ προκοπτόντες) must still be classed among the fools. Thus we have the strange union of a highly ideal ethics with a materialistic philosophy. But it was impossible to maintain this uncompromising idealism in practice. The later Stoics found themselves compelled to admit that apart from virtue and vice, the absolute good and evil, there were preferences to be made among things indifferent, from which it followed that besides perfectly virtuous actions (καταρθώματα) there was a subordinate class of appropriate actions (καθήκοντα). In the same way, since they were compelled to allow that their perfectly wise man, whom they vanted to be equal to Zeus, had never existed, they found it necessary to allow a positive value to προκοπή, progress towards wisdom, and to self-control, as contrasted with absolute apathy.

One other characteristic doctrine of the Stoics may be mentioned
here. It will have been noticed that many representatives of the school were not of Greek birth, but only connected with Greece by the Macedonian conquests. It was easy to rise from this fact to the higher doctrine which flowed naturally from their first principle, the doctrine namely that all men were members of one state, that the world is the common City of Gods and men, that all men are brethren as having the same Divine Father.

Epicureanism may be roughly described as a combination of the physics of Democritus with the ethics of Aristippus. Epicurus (341—270 B.C.) was an Athenian, born in Samos, where he is said to have received instruction in the doctrines of Plato and Democritus (N. D. i 72 & 93). He founded his school at Athens about 306 B.C., teaching in his own 'Garden,' which became not less famous than the Stoic 'Porch'. Among his most distinguished disciples were Metrodorus (N. D. i 86, 113) and others mentioned N. D. i 93. Cicero mentions among his own contemporaries Phaedrus, Zeno of Sidon (N. D. i 59, 93) and Philodemus of Gadara: and his account of the Epicurean doctrines is probably borrowed from these, especially from the last. Epicureanism had great success among the Romans; but, with the exception of the poet Lucretius, none of the Latin expounders of the system seem to have been of any importance. Cicero speaks with great contempt of Amasinius and Rabirius (cf. Tusc. ii 7, and Zeller on the Epicureans, ch. 15).

The end of the Epicurean philosophy was even more exclusively practical than that of the Stoics. Logic (called by Epicurus 'Canonic', as giving the 'canon' or test of truth) and physics, were merely subordinate to ethics, the art of attaining happiness. Knowledge in itself is of no value or interest. In fact it has a tendency to corrupt and distort our natural judgment and feeling: and thus Epicurus prided himself on being mainly self-taught (N. D. i 72). Truth is based on the senses: our sensations are always to be trusted: error comes in when we begin to interpret them. Repeated sensations produce a permanent image or general notion (πρόληψις, so called because it exists in the mind as an anticipation of the name which would be unmeaning if it could not be referred to a known type). These general notions also are to be trusted as a natural and spontaneous growth. But opinions (υποληψις) about these may be either true or false; true, if testified to by the sensation, or, supposing such direct evidence unattainable, if there is no contrary sensation; false,
in all other cases. Epicurus himself does not seem to have carried his logical investigations further than this.

The only reason for studying physics was to free the soul from superstitious fears, and with this view to prove that the constitution of the universe might be explained from mechanical causes. The two main principles asserted by Epicurus were that nothing could be produced out of nothing, and that what exists cannot become non-existent. From these principles he deduced the truth of the atomic system, differing however from Democritus in one important point, viz. in his explanation of the manner in which the atoms were brought together, Democritus had asserted that the heavier atoms overtook the lighter in their downward course, and thus initiated the collision which finally resulted in a general vortical movement. Epicurus retaining the same crude view of ‘up’ and ‘down’ held that each atom moved with equal speed and that they could only meet by the inherent self-movement of the atoms, which enabled them to swerve from the rigid vertical line, and he found a confirmation of this indeterminate movement of the atoms in the free will of man. In other respects there is little difference between the physical views of Democritus and Epicurus. Both held that there were innumerable worlds continually coming into being and passing out of being in the infinitude of space. As to subordinate arrangements Epicurus thought it unnecessary and indeed impossible to assign any one theory as certain. It was enough if we could imagine theories which were not palpably inadmissible, and which enabled us to dispense with any supernatural cause. Nor was it at all necessary to suppose that the same phenomenon, e.g. sunrise, always proceeded from the same cause. The existence of the present race of animals was explained, as it had been by Empedocles, on a rude Darwinian hypothesis. Out of the innumerable combinations of atoms which had been tried throughout the infinite ages of the past, those only survived which were found to be suited to their environment. The eye was not made to see with, but being made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms it was found on trial to have the property of seeing. But though denying in the strongest terms any creative or governing Reason, Epicurus did not object to Gods who did not interfere with the world or with man. On the contrary he held that the universality of the belief in Gods proved that such belief was based upon a primary notion, a real πρόληψις, though it had been corrupted by the admixture of idle imaginations, ὑπολήψις.
And he pleased himself with the thought that he might find in the Gods a pattern of the true philosophic life. Perfect happiness, immortality and human shape were of the essence of this πρόληψις. Hence he inferred that they must be composed of the finest atoms and enjoy eternal repose in the vacant spaces between the worlds, undisturbed by those labours of sustaining and superintending the universe which were ascribed to them by other schools, as well as by the popular religion (N. D. i 43—56). Such Gods were worthy of the worship and the imitation of the philosophers. On the nature of the soul and the manner in which it receives its impressions by images from without, Epicurus follows Democritus.

While the ethical doctrines of Epicurus are mainly the same as those of Aristippus, he differs from him in attaching more value to permanent tranquillity than to momentary gratification, and also in preferring mental pleasures to bodily, as stronger and more enduring. Virtue is desirable as the means to attain pleasure. The wise man, i.e. the virtuous man, is happy because he is free from the fears of the Gods and of death, because he has learnt to moderate his passions and desires, because he knows how to estimate and compare pleasures and pains so as to secure the largest amount of the former with the least of the latter. The distinction between right and wrong rests merely on utility and has nothing mysterious about it. One chief means of attaining pleasure is the society of friends. To enjoy this we should cultivate the feelings of kindness and benevolence.

The four last mentioned schools, i.e. the Academy, the Lyceum, the Porch and the Garden were, and had long been, the only recognized schools at the time when Cicero was growing up to manhood. Cicero was personally acquainted with the most distinguished living representatives of each. In his 19th year, B.C. 88, he had studied under Phaedrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic at Rome; in his 28th year, B.C. 70, he attended the lectures of the Epicureans Phaedrus and Zeno, as well as of Antiochus, the eclectic Academic, at Athens, and in the following year those of Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic, at Rhodes. Diodotus the Stoic was for many years the honoured inmate of his house. He had also a high esteem for the Peripatetic Cratippus, whom he selected as the tutor for his son at, what we may call, the University of Athens. Nor did he only attend lectures: his letters show that he was a great reader of philosophical books, and he left behind him translations or adaptations of various dialogues
and treatises of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Crantor, Carneades, Panactius, Antiochus, Posidonius, and others. In a word he was confessed to be by far the most learned and accomplished of the philosophical amateurs of his time. As to the nature of his own views, we shall be better able to form a judgment, if we look first at the man and his position. Cicero was much more of a modern Italian than of an ancient Roman. A novus homo, sprung from the Volscian municipium of Arpinum, he had none of that proud, self-centred hardness and toughness of character which marked the Senator of Rome. Nature had gifted him with the sensitive, idealistic temperament of the artist and the orator, and this had been trained to its highest pitch by the excellent education he had received. If he had been less open to ideas, less many-sided, less sympathetic, less conscientious, in a word, if he had been less human, he would have been a worse man, he would have exercised a less potent influence on the future of Western civilization, but he would have been a stronger and more consistent politician, more respected no doubt by the blood-and-iron school of his own day, as of ours. While his imagination pictured to him the glories of old Rome, and inflamed him with the ambition of himself acting a Roman part, as in the matter of Catiline, and in his judgment of Caesar, and while therefore he on the whole espoused the cause of the Senate, as representing the historic greatness of Rome, yet he is never fully convinced in his own mind, never satisfied either with himself or with the party or the persons with whom he is most closely allied. And this indecision of his political views is reflected in his philosophy. Epicureanism indeed he condemns, as heartily as he condemns Clodius or Antony: its want of idealism, its prosaic regard for matter of fact, or rather its exclusive regard for the lower fact to the neglect of the higher, its aversion to public life, above all perhaps its contempt for literature as such, were odious in his eyes. But neither is its rival quite to his taste. While attracted by the lofty tone of its moral and religious teaching, he is repelled by its dogmatism, its extravagance and its technicalities. Of the two remaining schools, the Peripatetic had forgotten the more distinctive portion of the teaching of its founder, until his writings were re-edited by Andronicus of Rhodes (who strangely enough is never mentioned by Cicero, though he must have been lecturing in Rome about the time of his consulship), and it had dwindled accordingly into a colourless doctrine of common sense, of which Cicero speaks with respect indeed, but without
enthusiasm. The Academy on the other hand was endeared to him as being lineally descended from Plato, for whose sublime idealism and consummate beauty of style he cherished an admiration little short of idolatry, and also as being the least dogmatic of systems, and the most helpful to the orator from the importance it attached to the use of negative dialectic. But while Cicero defended the Academic doctrine of Agnosticism in regard to speculative questions of metaphysics, while he held it impossible to give any demonstrative proof either of the immortality of the soul or of the existence of God, he refused, both on the ground of sentiment and of policy to extend his scepticism to practical questions of morality and religion. He held in common with the Stoics that the universal instinct of mankind must be regarded as testifying to a universal truth; and, in common with Scaevola and the elder generation of Roman statesmen, that it was the duty of a good citizen to accept the tenets of the national religion except in so far as they might be inconsistent with the plain rules of morality. Thus the conclusion of his argument on the nature of the Gods may be considered to point the way, vaguely indeed and hesitatingly, to the mysticism of later times, when the human mind wearied out with its fruitless search after truth, abjured reason for faith, and surrendered itself blindly either to the traditions of priests or to the inward vision of the Neo-Platonists.

§ 2. ANALYSIS OF BOOK I.

A. Introduction Ch. i. § 1—Ch. vii § 17.

B. Epicurean Argument Ch. viii § 18—Ch. xx § 56.

C. Academic Criticism of Epicurean Theology Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xliv § 124.

Aa. Importance and difficulty of the subject, variety of opinions, some asserting the existence of the Gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatize, and confines itself to the criticism of other schools. 1—5.
INTRODUCTION.

Ab. C.'s defence against his critics. He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school without stating his own opinion was intentionally adopted to provoke thought. The Academic school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. III 5—v 12.

Ac. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment, C. reports a conversation held at the house of Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by Velleius, the Stoics by Balbus, the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. vi 13—17.

Ba. Epicurean polemic against the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, with their beliefs in a Creator, a mundane God, and a superintending Providence. viii 18—x 24.

Bb. Historical Section.

i. Epicurean criticism of the theological tenets of twenty seven philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon. x 25—xv 41.

ii. Epicurean criticism of the popular belief, as seen in the writings of the poets or in Oriental religions. xvi 42, 43.

Bc. Epicurean exposition. Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness, and immortality of the Gods. Such Gods must be free from care and passion, and are to be regarded with reverence, but without fear. Experience and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours, and are perceptible to the mind alone, not to the bodily senses. That they are immortal is farther shown by the law of equilibrium, which provides that what is deficient in one place is compensated for in another. Thus the destructive forces which prevail in this mortal region are balanced by conservative forces elsewhere. To believe in a divine Creator and Governor of the world is to believe in a God who is full of care and trouble himself, and who causes pain to others, and is therefore an object of superstitious fear. The God of Epicurus passes his time in tranquil contemplation, while worlds are made and unmade by the fortuitous movements of innumerable atoms throughout the infinity of space. xvi 43—xx 56.
Ca. Cotta commences his reply with an expression of his belief in the existence of the Gods, but holds it impossible to arrive at any certainty with regard to the divine nature. xxi 57—xxii 61.

Cb. Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent. Negatively, such consent is unproved: positively, many have held a contrary opinion. xxiii 62—64.

Cc. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science. If it were true it would be inconsistent with the belief in the immortality of the Gods. When Epicurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. xxiii 65—xxvii 75.

Cd. Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism. If the Gods present themselves to our eyes in human form only, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief among us; elsewhere the case is different. If that form seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of arguing from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. xxvii 76—xxxvii 102.

Ce. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for thinking that there is any reality corresponding to them? or, in any case, for supposing that they reveal to us a blessed and immortal being? Immortality you think proved by your doctrine of equilibrium, but the same doctrine would prove the immortality of men. And how can beings be happy who are without activity and therefore without virtue? As to pleasures of sense they are worse off than men. All that can be predicated of them is absence of pain, yet even this is impossible since they must be in constant fear of dissolution from the influx and efflux of atoms. xxxvii 103—xli 114.

Cf. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What inducement is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? Epicurus' profession of piety was merely a blind to deceive the multitude. xli 115—xliv 124.
§ 3. DRAMATIS PERSONAE.

The Dialogue is represented as taking place on occasion of the *Feriae Latiniæ* at the house of C. Aurelius Cotta. The year of its supposed occurrence has to be determined from the following data supplied by the Dialogue. Cotta and Cicero are both residing at home; the former is Pontifex but not consul, the latter, in spite of his youth, is treated as an authority in philosophical questions, and allusion is made to his Athenian experience, which is however assigned to Cotta. The facts of Cotta's life may be briefly summed up. He was born 124 B.C. and like his brothers Marcus and Lucius (who so warmly espoused the cause of C. against Catiline and Clodius) took an active part in the politics of his time. He belonged to that wise and far-seeing party in the Senate, which aimed at checking the corrupt and oppressive rule of the jury-courts of *equites*, and at breaking the power of the city rabble by giving the franchise to the Italian yeomen' (Wilkins *De Oratore* p. 5). After the murder of their leader Drusus in 91 B.C. (*V. D. iii. 80*), Cotta with many others of the party was driven into exile under the law of Q. Varius (*V. D. iii. 81*), by which all who had encouraged the insurrection of the Italian allies were declared guilty of treason. He remained in exile throughout the Social War, and only returned home when order had been restored by Sulla in 82 B.C. Shortly afterwards he became a member of the college of *pontijices* and in the year 75 B.C. was elected consul. During his year of office he restored to the tribunes some of the privileges which Sulla had taken from them. On ceasing to be consul he was appointed to the province of Gallia, where he gained some unimportant successes for which a triumph was decreed to him, but he died of the effects of an old wound before he was able to enjoy it. He appears in company with P. Sulpicius Rufus as one of the younger interlocutors in the *De Oratore*; and his quiet persuasive style of reasoning is contrasted with the passionate energy of the latter in the *Brutus* § 201 foll. In the 3rd book of the *De Oratore* Cotta is said to have devoted himself to the study of the Academic system of philosophy as part of the training of an orator, in consequence of a speech of Crassus there recorded, see § 115 *numquam conqüiescam ante quam illorum amicii vias rationesque et pro omnibus et contra omnia disputandi*
percepero. One of his most famous speeches was that in defence of his uncle Rutilius alluded to in N.D. iii 80.

To allow of Cotta's being pontifex and not consul, the time of the Dialogue must be laid between 82 and 75 B.C.; and as Cicero was studying at Athens in 79 and 78 and did not return to Rome till 77 B.C., we narrow the possible limits to the interval between 77 and 75, when Cicero was about 30 years of age and Cotta about 48.

Little is known of C. Velleius, the spokesman of the Epicureans, beyond the fact that he was born at Lanuvium (N.D. i 82), was a friend of the orator Crassus (see note on i 58) and held the office of Tribune in the year 90 B.C. He is called rudis dicendi (Or. iii 78), and is described as holding the first place among the Romans of his sect (N.D. i 15). In the De Finibus L. Manlius Torquatus is the Epicurean disputant.

Of Q. Lucilius Balbus, the spokesman of the Stoics, we know even less. He was an interlocutor in the lost dialogue entitled Hortensius and is praised as not inferior to the most distinguished Stoics of Greece. In the De Finibus the Stoics are represented by Cato, in the De Divinatione by Q. Cicero.

In this dialogue as in the De Republica and De Oratore Cicero himself merely appears as a κωφὸν πρὸςωπον; see my note on i 34 s.v. Heraclides.

The dialogue is dedicated to M. Junius Brutus, the conspirator, who had been carefully trained in philosophy by his maternal uncle Cato, and had embraced with ardour the Stoico-Academic doctrines of Antiochus. It is a tribute not less to the weight of character, than to the philosophical attainments of Brutus, that Cicero, twenty one years his senior, dedicated to him four of his treatises besides the Natura Deorum, viz. the Orator, Paradoxa, De Finibus and Tusculanae Disputationes, and has also introduced him as an interlocutor in the dialogue de claris oratoribus which is called after him. It appears from the De Finibus that Brutus had previously addressed a treatise De Virtute to Cicero cf. i 8; quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Quintilian speaks in high terms of the merits of the philosophical writings of Brutus x 1 §123 sufficit ponderi rerum: scias eum sentire quae dicit, with which may be compared Caesar's judgment of the man, magni refert hic quid velit; sed quicquid volet,
valde volat (Att. xiv 1). It is not to be wondered at that Cicero found such a personality to be rather oppressive at times. In a letter to Atticus vi 1 § 7 he complains that Brutus etiam cum royat aliquid, contumaciter, arroganter, ἀκονωμάτως solet scribere. A list of his works is given in Orelli's Onomasticon.

§ 4. ON THE SOURCES OF THE FIRST BOOK OF THE DE NATURA DEORUM.1

It is now generally recognized that Cicero's philosophical treatises are not to be regarded as original works, but are, as he himself calls them, 'adaptations from the Greek'; ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore; quin; verba tantum affero quibus abundo, Att. xii 52. Hence it has been the endeavour of later editors to identify the writers from whom Cicero has borrowed in each case; and careful monographs have been written on the fonts of different treatises, as of the Tusculanae by Heine 1863, and Zietzschmann 1868; of the De Divinatione by Schiche 1875, and by Hartfelder 1878; and K. F. Hermann (De interpretatione Timaei, Göttingen 1842) has given reasons for believing that the translation of the Timaeus was intended to be incorporated in a larger work treating of the origin of the world. Not of course that Cicero was always equally dependent upon his authorities. He naturally moves with more freedom when he is treating of moral and social questions, as in the De Officiis, than when he touches on abstruse points of metaphysics, as in the Academica or De Finibus. We should therefore be justified in supposing with regard to our present treatise, that Cicero had not himself read all the different books referred to in §§ 25—43, probably also that he had not read the Epicurean books referred to in §§ 43, 45, 49; even if this a priori conclusion had not been confirmed by the fortunate discovery, among the Herculanean MSS, of a treatise which is generally held to be the original of a considerable portion of the Epicurean argument con-

1 Compare on this subject Hirzel Untersuchungen zu Cicero's Philosophischen Schriften pp. 4—45, Schwenecke in the Jahrb. f. class. philol. 1879 pp. 49—66, and Diels' Doxographi Graeci p. 121 foll., a work which has appeared since my own remarks were written; also Spengel Philodemus περὶ εἰσοφημίας, Munich 1863; Sauppe Philodemii De Pictate, Göttingen 1861; Nanck Ueber Philodemus περὶ εἰσοφημίας in Mélanges Gr. Rom., St Petersburg 1861; Gomperz Herculaneische Studien vol. 2, Leipzig 1866.
Sources of Book I.

In the first book of the N. D. I will begin with giving a short account of this treatise, proceeding then to point out the more striking resemblances between it and the present work, and will finally examine more in detail the relations of the two to each other.

In the year 1752 great curiosity was excited by the discovery of a library at Herculaneum in the house which has been called after Piso the father-in-law of Caesar, from the fact that 'its site agrees with Cicero's statement that the residence of the Pisos was visible from his own villa at Puteoli' (Hayter's Report on the Herculaneum MSS, London 1811, p. 31); and also from the fact that most of the MSS found there contained treatises by writers belonging to the Epicurean school, of which Piso was an adherent, and that many of them bore the name of Philodemus, who is known (from Cicero's speech in Pisonem) to have been the intimate friend and instructor of Piso. The difficulty of unrolling the charred papyri was very great, and it was not till the year 1793 that the 1st Vol. of Herculaneum (containing the treatise of Philodemus περὶ μονοστάσεως) appeared at Naples. At the instigation of the English Ambassador, Sir W. Hamilton, the Prince of Wales undertook to supply the necessary funds for carrying on the work more actively, and also sent his librarian, the Rev. John Hayter, to assist in opening and copying the MSS; in which he succeeded so well that, in the four years from 1802 to 1806, more than 200 were unrolled. In the latter year the work had to be abandoned in consequence of the French occupation of Naples, but copies of 94 MSS, after remaining for a while at Palermo, were ultimately sent to England and presented to the Bodleian together with four unopened papyri; and in

1 Comparetti, in his paper La Villa di Pisone in Ercolano, Nap. 1879, maintains that two of the busts found there represent Piso and his colleague Gabinius; and certainly they agree remarkably well with Cicero's description of the pair in his speech Pro Sext. 18.

2 Among the unpublished facsimiles at Oxford there is one of considerable interest to students of the N. D. It appears as No. 26 in the catalogue of Herculanean rolls given in the Preface to the Oxford Herculaneum Vol. I, 1824, and is there entitled Φιλοδίγμοι περὶ θεών. Through the kindness of the Sublibrarian, Mr Bywater, I have been enabled to examine this, and find that the real title is περὶ θεῶν, the title-page consisting of four longitudinal strips which have been wrongly pasted together, so as to make a portion of a broken letter look like an θ following θε. There are several pages which are fairly legible, but I did not in the short time at my disposal discover anything which would serve to illustrate the Epicurean argument in Cicero.

d2
the year 1810 a volume of *Herculaneumia*, edited by Drummond and Walpole, was published in London. This contained an anonymous fragment, twelve columns in length, entitled by the editors *περὶ τῶν θεῶν*. The fragment excited considerable interest owing to the resemblances it presented to parts of the speech of Velleius in the first book of the *N. D.*, and it was ably reviewed in the *Quarterly*¹ and *Edinburgh* during the course of the year. Hayter wrote a reply to the former in the same year, speaking of the book as *Φαίδορου περὶ θεῶν*. The same authorship had been already claimed for it by Mürr, in a German translation of Philodemus *περὶ μουσικῆς* (Berlin, 1806), in which he announced that among the forthcoming Herculanean publications there was a treatise entitled *Φαίδορου περὶ φύσεως θεῶν*, which had been made use of by Cicero for his own work on the same subject. Hayter allows that the name Philodemus would naturally suggest itself, but he says the space does not admit of reading so many letters. An improved text with notes was brought out in 1833 by Petersen at Hamburg, under the title *Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anonymi Herculaneensis, de Natura Deorum*. He uses the following arguments to show that Phaedrus must be the author. Since Cicero's chief instructors in the doctrines of Epicurus were Zeno and Phaedrus, both of whom are prominently mentioned in the *N. D.*, it is natural to suppose that he must have borrowed from one or the other. And as Phaedrus is spoken of in terms of warmer praise (see § 93) he seems the more likely of the two; besides Zeno (§ 94) is said to have attacked his own contemporaries, whereas the latest writer criticized in the speech of Velleius is Diogenes of Babylon, who died not later than 150 B.C. The strongest argument however in favour of Phaedrus is, that in a letter to Atticus (xiii 43), written about the time of the composition of the *N. D.*, Cicero asks to have his treatises *περὶ θεῶν et περὶ Παλλάδος*² sent to him; just as in xiii 8 he asks for Panaetius *περὶ προφοίνης* which we know to have been used by him in *N. D.* ii 118, *De Divin. i* 6, 12, ii 88;

¹ See n. on § 39 under *Chrysippus*.

² The older reading is *Φαίδου περὶ ροσάσεων et Ελλαδός*, which was supposed to refer to two books of Diacarebus, C. having asked for other writings of his in earlier letters. It was suggested that the former treatise might be a criticism of the *Phaedrus* of Plato, which D. is known to have condemned as too ornate; while the latter was identified with the *βίος Ελλαδός* of which some fragments still remain.
and in xiii 32 for Dicaearchus, used in Div. 1 5, 113, II 105, Tusce. 1 21, 77.

The question of authorship was thus supposed to be settled, and for several years the fragment was generally referred to as the περὶ φόσεως of Phaedrus; but in 1862 it appeared in the 2nd. vol. of the new series of Herculaneensia published at Naples, as a portion of a much larger whole (12 columns out of 147) bearing the name Φιλο-δήμου ΠΕρὶ εὐσεβείας of which the three capital letters alone are now legible. Whether the remainder were restored from faint traces or on conjecture merely, is not stated; the fact that the volume is found in a collection containing many writings which are undoubtedly by Philodemus, and the marked resemblance of style between those writings and the present2 make it at all events highly probable that it is rightly attributed to him3. What then do we know of this Philodemus beyond the fact of his connexion with Piso? Cicero speaks of him as a man of elegance and taste, distinguished in literature no less than in philosophy, non philosophia solum, sed etiam litteris, quod fere ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicitum, perpolitus (In Pis. 70); and in the de Finibus II 119 Torquatus, the Epicurean speaker, mentions him as an authority to whom difficult questions may be referred. That he had studied the history of philosophy is shown by an allusion in Diog. L. x 3 to the 13th book τῆς τῶν φιλοσόφων συντάξεως written by him. Zeller states (Stoices tr. p. 390), that not less than 36 treatises by him have been discovered at Herculaneum4. He was much influenced by Zeno, whose disciple he was, see his περὶ σημείων p. 24 Gomp. ἡμῖν μὲν ὄνω διαλεγόμενος ὁ Ζήνων καὶ λόγοις τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων τοὺς ἐκκειμένους προεφέρετο καὶ τουαντάς ἀπαντήσει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχριτο, also p. 26, and cf. the reference to Z.'s lectures in the περὶ εὐσεβείας p. 118 Gomp. [ai] Ζήνων γενόμεναι συναγωγαί διασαφός; some of his treatises are professedly based upon those of Zeno, e.g. Petersen p. 8, mentions one under the Latin title De moribus ac vitius, opus ex libro Zenonis contractum; the Herculanean vol. vi, Naples 1839, contains another entitled περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχομενῆς διαγωγῆς κατὰ Ζήνωνα; and in the preface to

1 It had been however already claimed for Philodemus in 1818, by Blomfield on Eisch. Ag. 1. 362, and in the Italian Bullet. Archeolog. for 1835 p. 46.
3 Gomperz has stated all that is known on this point in a letter printed by Diels, Doxographi p. 529.
4 Comparetti (l. c. p. 5) has more recently fixed the number at 26.
the Oxford _Herculanensis_, vol. i p. v. the words Ζήσως σχολῶν occur in the mutilated title of the Philodemian treatise numbered 1389. This is of importance in regard to the question whether the resemblances between Cicero and Philodemus are to be explained by direct copying on the part of the former, or whether both writers may not have borrowed from Zeno.

I proceed now to point out what is the nature of these resemblances, and I think it will be seen that they cannot be simply set aside by such remarks as Schömann's (Introil. p. 18) 'ähnliche Angaben und Urtheile, wie dort, kamen ohne allen Zweifel in gar manchen anderen epikureischen Schriften ebenfalls vor.' General arguments no doubt might be a part of the common Epicurean tradition, but it is most improbable that this should be the case with regard to minute points of criticism and to particular citations from the writings of opponents, some of them misinterpreted, and likely therefore to have been exposed by hostile criticism, if they were in common use. Such references are those to Xenophon's Απομεμονωμένα (Phil. p. 71, N. D. 31); to the Φιλοσόφοι of Antisthenes (Phil. p. 72, N. D. 32), in support of a proposition of which we have no information from other sources; to the 3rd book of Aristotle's περὶ φιλοσοφίας (Phil. p. 72; N. D. 33); to Chrysippus περὶ θεών bk i (Phil. p. 77, N. D. 41), treating of the Stoic theology in general, bk ii (Phil. p. 80, N. D. 41) containing his explanation of the mythology of Orpheus, Musaeus, Homer and Hesiod; to the περὶ τῆς Αθηναίας of Diogenes of Babylon (Phil. p. 82, N. D. 41).

Assuming then, as we may, that there is an undoubted connexion between the two treatises, the next point is to determine its nature and extent. If we compare them broadly together, we find the Epicurean argument in the 1st book of the _N. D._ made up of three parts, (1) a preliminary polemic against the Platonic and Stoic views of the origin of the world and the nature of God (§§ 18—24); (2) a critical review of earlier philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon, followed by a brief notice of the popular mythology in Greece and elsewhere (§§ 25—43); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology. Similarly the Philodemian treatise, as we have it, is made up of three parts (1) a criticism of the popular mythology (pp. 5—61); (2) a criticism of older philosophers (pp. 65—89); (3) an exposition of the Epicurean theology (pp. 93—151). The resemblances noticed above belong to the second, or historical section, which we will now examine more closely. Cicero's list of philosophers is as fol-
lows\(^1\): (1) Thales, (2) Anaximander, (3) Anaximenes, (4) Anaxagoras, (5) Alcmaeon, (6) Pythagoras, (7) Xenophanes, (8) Parmenides, (9) Empedocles, (10) Protagoras, (11) Democritus, (12) Diogenes of Apollonia, (13) Plato, (14) Xenophon, (15) Antisthenes, (16) Socrates, (17) Aristotle, (18) Xenocrates, (19) Heraclides, (20) Theophrastus, (21) Strato, (22) Zeno, (23) Ariston, (24) Cleanthes, (25) Persaeus, (26) Chrysippus, (27) Diogenes of Babylon. The first name which we meet with in the Philodemian fragment is Pythagoras p. 66, but there are clear allusions to Anaximenes (1) in p. 65, to Anaxagoras (2) p. 66 (see nn. on the corresponding passages in the \textit{N. D.}): there is no reference to Alcmaeon or Xenophanes, but after Pythagoras (3) follows Parmenides (4) in p. 67, then Democritus (5) p. 69, Heraclitus (6) p. 70; Diogenes of Apollonia (7) p. 70; Prodicus, alluded to but not named, (8) p. 71, cf. p. 76; Xenophon (9) p. 71; Antisthenes (10) p. 72; Aristotle (11) p. 72; Theophrastus (12) possibly alluded to in p. 73, see n. on \textit{N. D.} i 35; Persaeus (13) p. 75; Chrysippus (14) pp. 77—82; Diogenes of Babylon (15) p. 82; Cleanthes (16) is incidentally alluded to in p. 80, and Zeno (17) in p. 84.

Considering the very fragmentary state of the Philodemian treatise from p. 65 to 75 (i.e. till we reach Persaeus), it is remarkable that more than half of Cicero’s list should be found in it almost in the same order\(^2\); that in both Aristippus should be omitted; lastly that both should end with Diogenes, making no mention of his successors Antipater and Panaceius, the latter of whom exercised a far greater influence over the Romans than any other Stoic\(^3\). It appears strange however that Heraclitus and Prodicus are not included in Cicero’s list. Hirzel thinks this is because Philodemus identifies the teaching of Persaeus with that of Prodicus p. 76, and the teaching of Heraclitus with that of Chrysippus p. 81; to which Schwenke objects that Philod. gives the doctrines of Prodicus and Heraclitus by themselves in the first instance, and only mentions their agreement with

\(^1\) The names which appears only in one list are printed in italics. Diels has facilitated the comparison of Cicero and Philodemus by printing them in parallel columns (\textit{Doxog.} pp. 531—550).

\(^2\) The order is sometimes hardly what we should expect, e.g. the Xenophontic Socrates comes after Plato and before Antisthenes.

\(^3\) This is especially remarkable in a writer like Philodemus, who, as we know from the anonymous treatise published by Comparetti, Tarin 1875, had touched on these later Stoics in other writings.
the Stoics in a later page, and that Cicero wrote in too great a hurry either to foresee this, or to correct what he had already written. Perhaps this is going too far. It is plain that Cicero felt the necessity for compressing very much the historical review, and a simple means of doing this was to omit repetitions. He was also about to speak of Prodicus in Cotta's reply (V. D. 1 118), and he alludes to Heraclitus as the forerunner of the Stoics in III 35, stating that, as he chose to be unintelligible, it was useless to discuss his opinions.

So far there appears to be no improbability in Cicero's having borrowed directly from Philodemus, but it becomes more difficult to suppose this, when we compare the two writings more minutely. Thus, while both criticize Anaximenes, Ph. has nothing in common with C., but merely speaks of air as without sensation; while there is a fair agreement as to the doctrines of Anaxagoras, there is no criticism in Ph.; on Pythagoras and Democritus Ph. is too fragmentary to allow of comparison; on Parmenides there is hardly any agreement; on Diogenes they agree to a certain extent, but Ph. is much fuller; on Xenophon Ph. quotes correctly, as far as the fragment is legible, but gives no criticism, while C. is wrong throughout; on Antisthenes they agree, but Ph. has no criticism; on Aristotle there is nothing legible in Ph. beyond the actual reference; on Theophrastus Ph. has merely a reference to a treatise not mentioned by C.; on Persicus there is substantial agreement, but Ph. is much fuller, he does not however give anything of the criticism we find in C.; between Theophrastus and Persicus C. has some 32 lines on Strato, Zeno, and Cleanthes, to which there was probably something corresponding in pp. 73—75 of Ph., where we can trace broken allusions to the universal reason and the power that holds all things together, but the names are lost; while there is general agreement on Chrysippus (see my n. on V. D. 1 39), Ph. is much fuller, except where C. dilates on the Stoic idea of the Divine Law; so on Diogenes of Babylon.

This slight sketch will show that, if C. has borrowed from Ph. he has used him with the utmost freedom, omitting without scruple, and, if we may weigh the evidence of the fragments according to the ordinary law of chances, one would say, adding not infrequently from other sources. It is true that the absence of criticism after each name in Philodemus, may be explained by the fact that he reserves it all for the end (pp. 84—89). But then when we examine this later criticism, we find nothing in common between it and that
in C., as will be seen from the following summary of Ph.'s remarks.

'The Stoics in general are far more opposed to the established religion than we Epicureans; if they grant the existence of a deity, which they do not all do, they at any rate acknowledge no more than one God, while they impose on the multitude with their names and allegories. They are worse atheists, with their ethers and elements, than Diogoras, who confessed the existence and power of the Gods. By asserting that God cannot be the author of evil they do away with religious sanctions, which we retain; they call the Gods mortal, we assert their eternity. Even if they allowed punishment in word, who could fear these senseless elements? None would regard Gods incapable of motion or of sense; or pay any heed to the moral teaching of those who are in doubt whether there are Gods or what is their nature, or who plainly deny them: men might even be encouraged to sin by those who speak of endless strife among the Gods. Thus the philosophers are reducing men to the state of brutes, for they remove the check of religion and also of public opinion, which are the best helps for restraining injustice.' It is plain that there is more of serious thought and of a real interest in religion and morality here, than there is in the flippant sarcasms put into the mouth of Velleius.

We go on to the other sections of Philodemus. The first, dealing with the popular mythology, is made by C. a mere appendix to the section we have just been considering; and while it occupies some 60 pp. in Ph. it is condensed into a dozen lines by C. It will be seen from my nn. on §§ 42, 43 that most of the points touched by C. are fully treated by Ph., but there is no allusion to the Magians in the extant fragments of the latter. In the 3rd section, as far as we can judge from broken phrases (see n. on § 49 docet eam esse vim), Ph. seems to have treated of the divine nature in a manner not unlike C.; he speaks of the Gods as free from anger and favour and absolutely perfect and blessed, and he is equally strong against superstitious fears; but he makes religion a much more practical thing (see the passages quoted on § 44 quod beatum esset). Thus 'piety is productive of innocence and harmlessness (p. 95); by innocence man may imitate the blessedness of the Gods (p. 148); Epicurus honoured his parents, loved his brothers, observed all religious duties (p. 118), and charged his disciples to do the same in obedience to the laws (p. 126), but not for that reason only, but also because prayer is natural when we think of beings surpassing in power and excellence (p. 128); while
other philosophers have dissemed their views as to the immorality of parts of the popular religion, Epicurus laid down the plain rule that we must conform except where impiety is commanded (p. 120); God is friendly to the good, estranged from the bad (124); if Epicurus had been a hypocrite he would never have taken such pains in writing on the subject of religion (p. 134). Hirzel p. 15 foll. calls attention to the fact that certain points e.g. the *isoropía* and the *quasi corpus* mentioned by C. are not referred to Epicurus by Diog. L. and may probably be considered later developments of Epicurean doctrine.

There is still the first section of Cicero to consider, which has nothing corresponding to it in the fragments of Philodemos. It is a preliminary criticism of the Platonic and Stoic theories of the origin of the world, turning chiefly on the difficulties involved in the idea of creation at any given moment. The argument is similar to that contained in Lucr. v. 110—234, and Plut. *Pl. Phil.* p. 881, but given more fully than in either. We find no allusion to it in the following sections of the *N. D.* To this is joined an argument (repeated in the later sections) against a mundane deity, as inconsistent with the divine attributes of rationality and blessedness. Such a preliminary criticism comes naturally enough to prepare the way for the positive statements of the Epicurean theology, as there was no body of belief which could be upheld against the latter, except such as was derived either from Plato or the Stoics.

When we try to determine the connexion between this and the historical section which follows, there is much to suggest the conclusion of Krische (p. 23) and Hirzel, that the latter section was inserted as an afterthought. Thus in § 36 we find *ut jam ad vestros Balba veniam*, though the Stoics, whom Balbus represents, had been already treated of in the earlier section; similarly in regard to Plato (§ 30 compared with § 18); and the inconsistency is still more manifest in § 25, if we insert *alia* with most editors, reading *haec quidem vestra, qualia vero alia sint ab ultimo repetam* (see my notes on these passages). It is further objected that there are no subsequent allusions to the historical section either by Cotta or Balbus; but Cotta does allude to it three times, §§ 63, 91, 94, and, even if he had not done so, there would be nothing surprising in it, since Cicero, as Schwemcke remarks p. 56, is not likely to have had any Greek treatise at hand in which the historical errors of the Epicureans were pointed out: and there was no occasion for Balbus to recur to an
exposition which had been already dealt with by Cotta. His allusions to the remainder of the speech of Velleius are very scanty (II 47 and 73). On the whole I think the framework of the book requires some such review of previous philosophers to justify the frequent references to the diversity of opinion on the subject of theology, e.g. in § 1 and § 13 poneam in medio sententias philosophorum, and then si consenserint omnes, in § 14 doctissimorum hominum tanta dissensio; in § 42 exposui non philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia, compared with § 94; expressions which would, I think, be less appropriate, if Cicero confined himself strictly to the three schools represented by the disputants. The repetitions complained of are scarcely to be called repetitions, for they leave out the main point in the previous argument against Plato and the Stoics, viz. the question as to a creation in time; but as far as they are such, they may be explained by the haste and carelessness which characterize the whole treatise, and of which we shall see instances in the latter half of the 1st book; the special difficulty of § 25 is, I think, removed by the explanation given in my note.

There is one other point which is likely to strike the reader, and which calls for a few remarks, and that is the inferiority of the historical section to the other two. In the 1st section there is the usual Epicurean arrogance of manner, but the objections stated are in themselves of interest and importance; and so as regards the arguments of the 3rd section; but in the 2nd section we meet with little besides misrepresentation and abuse. Is this a mark of a different authority having been used, or has C. wished to give us a sample of the way in which Epicureans, such as Colotes, composed their histories of philosophy, and at the same time to illustrate the charge he has himself brought against the Epicureans, vestra solum legitis, ceteros causa ineognita condemnatis, N. D. II 7311

What then is the general conclusion to which we are led by this comparison of the two treatises? The impression left upon my own mind is that as far as the historical section extends certainly, and possibly for the expository section also, both have copied a common original, most likely Zeno, the teacher of both Philodemus and Cicero; whom Cotta calls the spokesman (coryphaeus) of the school, and of whom he makes the suggestive remark, that he attended his lectures at the request of Philo the Academician, in order that he might the better understand how well the latter had succeeded in refuting him, while he also compares his style of arguing to
that of Velleius (§ 59). It would further seem that Cicero has preserved Zeno's sharp sayings, which were softened down by the gentler Philodemus, who may also have added a good deal of his own in the later section. But then why does the historical review stop at the middle of the 2nd century B.C.? It seems as if we must go back a step further and trace Zeno's criticisms to Apollodorus ᾠ κριτοροισκοί, the predecessor of Zeno in the chair of Epicurus, who flourished towards the end of the 2nd century B.C. and is said to have written more than 400 books (Zeller Stoics tr. p. 389).

With regard to the sources of the other two sections I do not think we are yet able to arrive at any positive conclusion. It is possible that Zeno wrote a treatise περὶ τεκνών in four books, the 1st disproving what might be considered the orthodox theology of Plato and the Stoics, the 2nd giving a history of the traditional beliefs, the 3rd a history of philosophical speculation on the same subject, the 4th containing the views of the most advanced Epicureans; but it is equally possible that Phaedrus (as suggested by the letter to Atticus) may have been the authority copied by Cicero for his first and last sections; on the other hand it is quite possible that C. may have found his treatise unsuited to his purpose.

We proceed now to inquire what is the original source of the criticism of Epicurus which is put in the mouth of Cotta. It is natural at first sight to suppose that this, as well as the criticism of the Stoical doctrines assigned to Cotta in the third book, is derived from Clitomachus, the editor of the writings of the great Academic critic, Carneades. But further consideration shows that there are many difficulties in the way of this identification. Carneades is quoted by name in bk. III 29, 41, but never in bk. I, where, on the contrary, we find Posidonius referred to as the authority from whom a part of the argument is borrowed (§ 123); and Schwemke has pointed out the strong vein of Stoicism which runs through the speeches. Compare for instance the jest at the expense of the Academy in § 80, the definitions of sanctitas and pietas in § 115, the view of wisdom as a bond of union not only between man and man, but between man and God § 121, the idea of virtue as an active principle.

1 Hirzel assigns the historical section to Philodemus, as the author, and the earlier and later sections to Zeno. Schwemke would give all to Zeno (pp. 56, 57). Diels (p. 125) is inclined to make Philodemus copy from Phaedrus, which does not seem to me probable.
§ 110, the approving mention, slightly veiled it is true under an Academic form, of the Stoic doctrine of the divinity of the universe § 95, and of the teleological argument § 100. Schwencke carries the argument further than this. He notices certain marks which indicate a more or less close following of his authority on the part of Cicero, such as the introduction of quotations from Latin authors, allusions to Roman customs, to other writings of his own, &c.; and in reference to this particular section, which professes to be a reply to what has gone before, he remarks that it is very unlikely that C. could have met with an independent treatise, whether Academic or Epicurean, which should just meet and refute the arguments in the Epicurean treatise used by him for the earlier sections; that precise references therefore to the preceding argument are probably additions by C.; and from this he draws the conclusion that the last part of Cotta's speech, from § 115 to the end, has undergone least manipulation and most faithfully represents the original authority; and it is precisely here that we find the largest amount of Stoic matter. Again, noticing the remarkable break after § 105, where Cicero after proposing to consider the question of the abode and manner of life of the gods in § 103, suddenly recurs to their nature, leaving the previous question altogether unanswered, he suggests that we have here a fragment of the original, which C. began to translate, but found to be unsuited to his purpose of meeting the speech of Velleius and forgot afterwards to cancel. Here again there are marked indications of a Stoic origin, as I have pointed out in my notes on the bestiae quae igne nasci putentur, and on naturae accommodatum.

There are however some arguments which need consideration in favour of the Academic origin of the section. Thus Hirzel has pointed out the close resemblance between parts of this and the sceptical argument in Sext. Emp. ix; also the inconsistency between Cotta's statement as to the superstition of Epicurus § 85, and that which is quoted from Posidonius in § 123; and lastly the anti-Stoic sentiments which we find interspersed, e.g. the repeated profession of agnosticism § 57, 66, 84, 91, 94, the contempt for the consensus gentium § 62, the objection to the rationalizing and allegorizing of the myths § 119. Swencke replies with considerable force that Sextus has himself borrowed from a Stoic original in such passages as ix 123 and 131; that we find the opposing views as to the sincerity of Epicurus' religious belief stated in Sext. Emp. ix 58 and
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64, and may suppose both to have been similarly stated by Posidonius, though he expressed his own assent to the latter; that C.'s motive for maintaining the other view in § 85 was probably the wish to give his own experience on the subject; lastly that the anti-Stoic remarks are no more than were required in order to give the proper colouring to a speech put in the mouth of an Academic; that they occur sometimes in purely Stoic passages; that in general the Stoic writers form the store-house from which C. borrows his arguments against Epicurus, whilst he attacks the Stoics themselves with weapons forged by the Academy, as in the De Finibus; that in the present treatise this is foreshadowed by the language used of the Epicurean doctrines in § 3, of the Stoic in § 4; that Euhemerism is not the same as Stoicism, and that the observations about the mysteries are an interpolation of Cicero's (see my nn. on § 119). See further, as to the difference between the undoubted criticism of Carneades and that contained in this section, my note on § 92 under habebit igitur.

§ 5. TEXT AND ORTHOGRAPHY.

The text which I have given agrees in the main with that of the latest editor, C. F. W. Müller, Teubner, 1878, but I have endeavoured throughout to weigh the evidence, internal and external, for each reading to the best of my ability; and I have in some instances retained the reading of the MSS, where it had been altered by Müller in common with all the recent editors. Thus I have thought it unnecessary to insert a second eadem before requiro in § 21, and I have three times ejected a non which they had inserted, before potest in § 21, before nihil in § 93, before pudcat in § 111. Elsewhere I have ventured on transposition of sentences as in §§ 5, 30 and 97; and on emendations of words, as in §§ 26, 49, 71. In the critical notes my object has been to put the reader in possession of the requisite data for forming an independent judgment on the text. As a foundation I have given the more important of the readings contained in the 2d ed. of Orelli, brought out under Kaitter's supervision in 1861; but, though the MSS (ABCEP)¹ there cited supply the principal material for determining the text of the 1st book of the N.D., they do not seem to me to

¹ For a description of the MSS see the note prefixed to the text.
possess such a transcendent superiority, either in point of accuracy or of age, as to make it unnecessary to weigh carefully the evidence furnished by other MSS. I have therefore thought it my duty to examine, as far as was in my power to do so, all evidence which could throw a light on the condition of the text up to the end of the 15th century. Thus, besides the critical editions of Orelli, Heindorf and Creuzer, I have had in constant use the Ascensian ed. of 1511, and two MSS (U and Y) most kindly lent to me by S. Allen Esq. of Dublin, whose father's name will be familiar to students of Cicero under the Latinized form 'Alanus.' I am further indebted to J. H. Swainson, Esq., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the use of his very careful collation of eight MSS. seven belonging to the British Museum, and one to the Cambridge University Library, as well as of the two earliest printed texts. This collation is given in an abridged form at the end of the volume, Another MS (O), recently purchased by the Trustees of the British Museum, has been collated for me by a member of the staff of the MSS department there: but in this, as in the other cases, I have myself compared the collation with the MS, wherever special importance attached to a particular reading. In like manner the readings of four Oxford MSS given at the end of the Oxford 4to edition of 1783 have been tested for me, ε ο u by H. P. Richards, Esq., and ψ by J. S. Reid, Esq.². Beside the MS readings, I have also mentioned the differences between my text and those of Schömann, Müller and Baiter, both in his earlier and later editions.

In order to show that the record preserved to us in Orelli's MSS is at any rate not so complete as to dispense either with emendations or with a careful comparison of other MSS, I have given below, 1st, a list of passages, in which the text is supported exclusively by what are considered the inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli's MSS: in many of these cases the true reading had been independently restored by conjecture, and it is of course open to question how far the MSS themselves are to be considered as witnessing to a traditional reading or merely giving the scribe's emendation; 2nd, a list of passages in which the received text is supported by one only of Orelli's MSS; and 3rd a list of passages in which the

² I may mention as an illustration of the danger of trusting to negative evidence in the case of MS readings, that scarcely one in ten of the inferences which I had drawn ex silentio on the part of the Oxford collator of 1783 was verified on examination of the MS themselves.
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received text rests solely on conjecture unsupported by any existing MS. Under each head I have mentioned only those readings which are accepted (except where otherwise stated) by Baiter, Schömann, and Müller in common with myself.

1. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all Orelli's MSS.

§ 1. inscientiam for scientiam, El.
§ 2. in primis for imprimisque, CΨ
§ 16. haec for hor, Asc. U.
§ 18. oculis (om. animi), Asc. V (Schömann dissents).
§ 26. continentem for incontinentem, Asc. UCHMRV.
§ 28. commenticium for conventicium, Asc. INOV.
§ 29. earumque for corumque, Asc. CMV.
scientiam for sententiam, Asc. CHMV.
§ 31. dicitus for dicimus, M of Moser.
§ 36. omnem for omnium, G. Red. Asc. V.
vix divina for ut div., G.
§ 37. ipsum mundum deum for i.d.m., M.
§ 38. dicit esse for esse, UH Asc.
§ 39. fatalem vim for f. umbram, El. (Baiter dissents).
§ 41. dicerat for dixerit, UYLO.
§ 49. docet for doccat, C.
§ 53. negatis for negitis, El. GU.
§ 60. res for spes, UHM Asc. Red.
ceteroqui for ceteroque, Oxf. u Moser's E and M.
§ 61. consensu for consensu, Asc. RΨ.
§ 68. quod enim for quia enim, El. Reg. UO.
§ 70. esse verum for esset v., UYL.
§ 71. quod ess for quam v., CMNR Asc.
§ 72. nihil ex for nihil ne ex, UHO.
§ 77. quasi sui for quam sui, I of Moser.
§ 81. defendes for defendens, UYL.
§ 82. Aegyptio for Aegypo, Asc.
§ 83. landannus Athenis for l. esse Ath., I of Moser.
§ 86. aliquid esse for aliquid iste, El. Oxf. c.
§ 87. lustrationem for illustrationem, GC El.² Reg.² Herv.
§ 88. diceretur for dicerentur, UYC Asc.
§ 89. quid for quod, YHLMOR.
§ 96. umquamne for numquamne, R.
§ 97. at figura for ad figuram, UCHLO. (Baiter dissents).
§ 99. ad speciem nec ad usum for speciem nec usum, G. (Baiter and Müller read by conjecture specie nec usu.)
§ 103. oportet et for oportet, CN of Moser.
§ 104. ratione for rationis, UYOC El. attigeris for attigerit, C.
§ 106. tu for tum, Asc.
§ 108. fuerunt for fuerant, UYOC Asc.
§ 109. faciet for facient, G. Red.
§ 110. ex individuis for ex divinis, V, Herv. se ipsa for se ipse, Asc. CR.
§ 111. Vellei for velle, UMRV.
§ 113. nam etiam for nam enim, G.
§ 116. allicere for elicere, GHRV.
voluptate for voluntate, ULMNORV.
§ 123. homunculi for homunculis, MR Herv.

2. True reading preserved by inferior MSS in opposition to all but one of Orelli’s MSS.  
§ 18. descendisset for descendis (or descendens) sed, B Asc. CNMR.
§ 25. si di for sic di, EUCV.
§ 26. animal for anima, BM Asc.
§ 28. reprehenditur for reprehenderetur, E (and by correction in B) CLMN.
§ 34. de natura for in natura, BUCV.
§ 37. sententia est qui for sententias qui, A²UCM Asc.
§ 56. metuimus for metuemus, B²UCMV.
§ 58. anteferret et for anteferret, Asc. PBH.
§ 65. doce for doceas, PCHL Asc. punctis for cunctis, B Asc. U.
§ 71. corpus aut quasi, om. all but BUYO.
§ 72. olet for floret, BLO.
§ 78. corpori for corpore, CU Asc.
§ 79. exorientem for exoriente, BUM.
at erat for aderat, CK.

1 I have not thought it necessary here to distinguish, as I have done in the critical notes, between positive evidence and ex silentio inference, as regards the readings of Orelli’s MSS.

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§ 81. quid si for quod si, E Asc.  
sic occurrit for si a, BG C.

§ 85. offensionem for offensione EUY Asc. CH.

§ 86. religionis for religiones, B'UCHLO.

§ 108. potuerunt for potuerant A'UY Asc. CO.

§ 114. pulchre for pulcher, C'CHLO Asc.

§ 120. soleant EN of Moser.

§ 122. nulla re for in n. r. CUY Asc. HO.

3. True reading restored by conjecture in opposition to all MSS.

Greek for Latin in πρόωνας § 18, στέφανων § 28, ασώματον § 30, ειμαρρένην § 55, μαντικῇ § 55, &c.
iis for his repeatedly.

§ 13. omnium repeated.

§ 19. officiendum for officiendum.

§ 20. palmaria for palmaris. (Schömann dissents.)

§ 27. qua for quae.

§ 28. continentem ardore for continentem ardorem.

cingat for cingit.

revocet for revocat.

§ 33. a magistro non dissentientes. Other conjectures are given by Sch., Ba. and Mu., but all alike change the MS reading.

modo deus moveri for modo mundus moveri. (Sch. gives a different conjecture.)

§ 39. universitatemque for universam atque.

§ 45. vitae actionem mentisque agitationem for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitationem.

§ 49. ad nos for ad deos. Ba. gives a different conjecture.

§ 64. om. aut before Neptuni.

§ 70. fieret for fieri.

nimis callide for nisi callide.

§ 72. equidem for quidem.

§ 73. inane for inanes.

§ 74. liceat for liceat.

§ 76. quod quoniam for ut quoniam.

§ 77. omnino for omnium.

§ 81. a parvis enim for apparuisse.

§ 82. add alia nobis.

§ 85. add visu after humano.

venerantes for numerantes.
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§ 86. om. *id esse mortale.*

§ 87. *deorum numero* for *d. natura.*

§ 89. transpose *sumpisses tuo jure.*

§ 96. *deorum* for *deo* (Sch. dissent).

§ 103. *superior aerii aetherii* (MSS vary, other conjectures by Ba. and Sch.)

§ 104. *porro* for *postremo.*

§ 107. *num* for *nunc.*

*ea forma* for *ex forma.*

*Cercopis,* MSS vary.


§ 111. *quarundam,* MSS vary.

§ 122. *in imbecillitate* for *imbecillitatem.*

Any one who will take the trouble to compare the text of the *N. D.* as it now stands, with the text of the earlier editions from the *Ed. Pr.* of 1471 to the *Variorum Ed.* of 1818 will be astonished at the improvement which has been effected, owing in great part to judicious emendations by successive generations of scholars. The value and even the necessity of conjecture, as a means of restoring the text of this, as of other ancient writings, is sufficiently shown by the readings cited under the last head, but it may be proved even more conclusively by reference to other passages, which did not admit of the same brevity and simplicity of statement, such as § 24 *quodque in deo,* § 25 *si di possunt,* § 65 *nihil est enim,* in which it is confessed that the present text is wrong, though editors are not agreed on the right mode of restoring the true text. Whilst I am upon this subject, it may be well to give a few illustrations from the present book, of the commoner sources of corruption in MSS, so as to assist my younger readers in judging of the admissibility of any proposed emendation. The illustrations are taken from the various readings in Orelli’s edition as well as from my own. I make no attempt at an exhaustive analysis, but simply group together examples of similar confusion.

Addition or omission of final *m:* see critical notes on *speciem* ¹


¹ An asterisk is prefixed wherever the reading is doubtful.
INTRODUCTION.

Interchange of $t$ and $d$: see on quot § 81, *inquit § 109, relinquit § 123, id § 113, aliquid § 57 and § 104, apud § 62, sed § 61; so at for ad in § 14, *§ 97; ad for at § 79 (twice), § 82, § 84, § 90, § 109, § 115, § 116, § 122.

Interchange of final is and es; see on *intelligens § 23, *religionis § 86, mares § 95, voque § 113, *mentis § 120.

Interchange of final of $i$ and $e$: see on cogitari § 24, *atqui § 16 and § 57, *familiaris § 58, corporis § 78, liberari § 17.

Interchange of $e$ and $a$: see on *cur aquae § 25, quae *§ 89, § 92, § 97, § 110, ipsum § 110, terrena § 103, illae § 101, egressa § 77, aequilibritatem § 109.

Omission or addition of prefix in: see on *inscientiam § 1, incontinentem § 26, lustrationem § 87, individuis, § 110.

Omission or addition of initial $H$: see on orarum § 119, omnium § 108, and his below.

Confusion between is, iis, his: see on § 2, § 3, § 7, § 10, § 11, § 12, § 31, § 50, § 55, § 61, § 66, § 103, § 113, § 116, § 122, § 123.

Interchange of quid and quod: see on § 10, § 81, § 87.

Confusion between est, sit, sint, sunt: see on disputatum est § 15, pulcherrima est § 48, aestimanda est § 55, aliquando est § 68, ausa est § 93, dicerent est § 95, natura est § 96, variae sunt § 1, *vero sunt § 25, caelo sunt § 34, quidem sunt § 41, innumerabilia sunt § 50, animis sunt § 103, sunt quae § 109.

Interchange of parts of verbs generally,


(2) of Singular and Plural: see on diceretur § 88, vident § 101, faciet § 109.

(3) of Second and Third Person: see on inquit § 100 and *§ 109, attigeris § 104.

Mistakes in the division of words: see notes on § 14 addubitare, § 18 descendisset, § 25 cur aquae, § 37 sententia est, qui aether, § 39 *universitatemque, § 63 posteaque, aperte, § 66 similiora, § 79 exorientem, at erat, § 81 *a parvis enim, § 89 *argumentis sententiam, § 103 homunculi similis, § 76 informatum.
Omission of repeated words or syllables, and of words interposed between repeated words or syllables: see on § 13 omnium omnium, § 26 in infinito, *omnino in eo, § 25 *aquae adjunxit—quam ad- junxit, § 66 *hamata, § 71 quasi corpus aut quasi, § 78 formica formicae, § 81 apud eos—apud nos, § 82 *alia nobis, § 71 *in ceris diceretur, § 58 anteferret et, § 103 oportet et, § 49 *neque eadem aut, § 98 nisi in eo—nisi in eo, § 103 *superior aeri aetheris, § 98 *moribus paribus, § 2 *natura trahimur.

Construction altered through the influence of a nearer word: see on § 2 continet—in primis changed to continet est—in primis, § 25 *mentem changed to et mente, § 36 vi divina, changed to ut divinam, § 49 docet changed to doceat after ut, § 70 esse changed to esset after utrum, fieret changed to fieri to suit following esse, § 71 quam for quod after mirabilius, § 73 inane for inanes to suit imaginines, § 104 rationis for ratione to suit mentis.

Substitution of synonyms: see on § 68 quia for quod, so igitur for ergo constantly in C.

Interpolation,

(1) by unintentional repetition: see on § 63 *aut before Neptuni suggested by aut Carbo, § 35 *immittendique after minuendi.

(2) to complete construction: see on § 86 id esse mortale added after si quid sit, § 107 *quam inserted after minus probari possit.

(3) owing to explanatory gloss: see on § 33 *Platone added to explain magistro, § 13 *Terentius, &c. added before Synephebis, § 34 *tum to explain modo, § 58 *L. Crasso to explain familixvi, § 112 *nectar ambrosiamque to explain opulas, § 1 *id est principium philosophiæ to explain the allusion to the Academics, § 28 *praeterea added to correct omne, § 25 *alia added to escape apparent inconsistency.

(4) owing to controversial gloss: see on § 19 *animi added as an answer to the question quibus oculis, on § 21 *quod ne—tempus esset possibly an answer to the preceding intellegi potest.

I proceed now to discuss the question of spelling. This has caused me some difficulty, as I am aware that my own feeling, or perhaps I should rather call it my prejudice, is opposed to the theory and practice of the most eminent both amongst our own and foreign scholars. I think however it is not mere obstinacy which prompts me to follow my own course in this matter, even
against the advice of friends for whose judgement I have the highest respect, and who have studied the subject far more deeply than I can pretend to have done.

It appears to me that this apparently unimportant question is not obscurely connected with the larger question whether the Classics are still to form the staple of higher education amongst us. If their claim to do so is to be allowed, they must show good reasons for it, and they must at the same time leave room for other more immediately pressing studies. I believe that this claim will be allowed in so far as the study of the Classics supplies the necessary instrument for entering into the life and thought of the ancient world, and one of the best instruments for learning the laws which regulate the expression of thought. But the Universities will have to see to it that this is done far more thoroughly than it has yet been done; and for this purpose it will be necessary to drop some of the impedimenta which now occupy the time of the learner without tending, in any corresponding degree, to discipline and feed the mind. Yet, of late years, it seems to me that the burden of the impedimenta has been added to rather than reduced by the new importance which has been given to questions of etymology and orthography. No doubt a wonderful advance has been made in these departments, and, as special subjects for investigation, they naturally and rightly attract to themselves the attention of leisured scholars, but I cannot think they should be made so prominent as they have been in College and University examinations. Viewed in relation to the main ends of a classical education, I hold that spelling is simply a necessary evil, and that, for practical purposes, the best spelling is that which obtrudes itself least, and least diverts the attention of the reader from the thought of the writer. In books therefore which are printed for ordinary reading, we should not seek to reproduce the spelling of a particular age or of a particular author, except where, as in Chaucer, it may be needed to show the scansion of a line, but we should endeavour to give the normal spelling of the language after it assumed a fixed and stationary form; just as we do not in our common Shakespares reproduce the inconsistent spelling of the early folios and quartos, though for the purpose of studying the history of the language we rightly print facsimiles of these

1 See on this subject the very sensible remarks of Ritschl. *Opusc.* ii. pp. 722 foll. and 728. I can but echo his final words. spoken with reference to the
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language attained its highest formal development in the period which may be named after Quintilian, between Nero and Hadrian, according to Brambach (Hülfsbüchlein f. Lat. Rechtschreibung, p. vii), between the death of Augustus and that of Trajan, according to L. Meyer (Orthographiae Latinae Summariun p. 5). The latter lays down the following rules for our modern spelling of Latin: ne inaequalitate scribendi aut oculi offendantur legentium aut in errorem inducantur animi; scriptura nostra reddi oportet ad certae usum ac morem aetatis, et quidem ejus, qua ipsa lingua scriptorum pariter ingeniis et studiis grammaticorum ad summam est adducta perfectionem; and in p. 6, praeterea ut in sermone, ita in scriptura tamquam scopulum nos fugere oportet quaevis inusitata.

Adopting these rules, it will follow first, that we need not trouble ourselves to frame a conjectural text, such as Cicero might have written, but should use the undoubted spelling of the latter half of the first century A.D.; and secondly, that where this spelling itself was variable, as in the u or i of the superlative terminations, and the i or e of the accusative plural of i-nouns, we should select one mode and adhere steadily to that. In making the selection I should myself wish to apply to our own case the principle suggested by Meyer’s second rule, that, of two allowable spellings, that should be preferred which is usitatius, least of a novelty to ordinary English readers.

Turning now to Müller’s text I find there several examples of inconsistent, and some of unusual and, as I believe, incorrect spelling. This is the more to be wondered at, because in his excellent review of Baiter and Halm’s ed. in the Jahrb. f. Cl. Philol. for 1864, vol. 89, p. 261 foll. he condemns a similar inconsistency in them.

The following are the points in which the spelling in my edition will be found to differ from that in Müller’s:

(1) I have always given the superlative termination in -imus; Müller at times has the form in -umus. Thus we find facillum § 9, but facillimum § 61; turpissime § 29, but turpissine § 93; similimus § 49, but simillimus § 98; praestantissimus § 47, but praestantissimus § 96; also levissumus § 13, levissimus § 39.

attempt to expel the old German forms ‘genitiv’, ‘Virgil’: möge doch nicht deutscher Pedantismus einen Schatten auf deutsche Wissenschaft werfen, der gegen diese selbst den Spott des weiten Kreises der Gebildeten herausfordern muss!
INTRODUCTION.

(2) I have always written \( v \) after \( v \); Müller generally does so, e.g. \textit{vult} in § 13, 33, 34, 69; \textit{vultis} in §§ 89, 103, 107; \textit{Vulcanus} § 81; but \( v o l t \) in § 41; \textit{vollis} § 93; \textit{Vulcanus} §§ 83 and 84.

(3) I have always written \textit{es} in the Ace. Pl. of the \( i \)-declension; Müller usually has \textit{is}, but we find \textit{utiles}, \textit{salutares}, § 38, \textit{inmortales} § 45, \textit{leves} § 59, \textit{similes} §§ 90, 91, \textit{venerantes} § 85, \textit{noctes} § 54 though \textit{partis} comes just before. Baiter consistently gives \textit{-is} in all cases.

(4) I have regularly assimilated, where it was allowable, because there is no doubt that assimilation was the tendency of the Latin language, and was practised in speaking even in the exceptional cases where it was necessary to preserve the spelling unaltered for the purpose of distinctness or to show the etymology, as in \textit{adsum} (Roby, Vol. I. p. 49 n.); Müller as a rule does not assimilate, but we find exceptions, as in regard to the assimilation of \textit{in} before labials:

\begin{itemize}
  \item before \textit{b}; \textit{inbecillus} § 122, but \textit{imbecillus} § 45.
  \item \textit{p}; \textit{inpurus} § 63, \textit{inpadenter} § 69 &c., but \textit{impius} § 63, \textit{impendo} § 45. (Baiter in both cases keeps \textit{in}.). So \textit{comprehensio} § 94, but \textit{comprehendo} § 30.
  \item \textit{m}; \textit{immensus} § 22, and \textit{inmortalis} frequently.
  \item \textit{in} before linguals:
    \begin{itemize}
      \item \textit{l. industris} § 12; so \textit{conligatus} § 9, but \textit{colligo} § 4, \textit{comparo} § 16 (where Baiter has \textit{conligo} and \textit{comparo}).
      \item \textit{r. invigo} § 120, \textit{inrideo} § 101.
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

Assimilation of \( d \):

\begin{itemize}
  \item before \textit{p. adpetto} § 104, but \textit{appeto} immediately after; so \textit{adpulsus}, \textit{adprehendo}, but \textit{apparo} § 37, \textit{apparat} § 20, \textit{appello} § 36.
  \item \textit{f. adfluo} § 49, but \textit{affluo} § 114 and \textit{affluentia} § 51, \textit{adfectus} § 36, but \textit{ufficio} § 19; so \textit{adfero}, \textit{adfirmo} &c.
  \item \textit{r. adrideo} § 17 and § 97, but \textit{arripio} § 77.
  \item \textit{l. allicio} § 116.
  \item \textit{s. adsentior} § 12, \textit{adsequor} § 23, \textit{adsidue} § 114.
  \item \textit{t. attinet} § 84.
  \item \textit{n. adluo} § 113.
  \item \textit{c. accurate} § 15.
  \item \textit{g. adprelior} § 57.
\end{itemize}

(5) I have always preserved an \textit{s} following \textit{x} in composition; Müller varies, giving \textit{exsistent} § 97, \textit{existat} § 49, \textit{exstitit} § 12 and § 21, \textit{exstitit} § 55 and § 91, \textit{extingui} § 29.
(6) In regard to nouns borrowed from the Greek I have followed Madvig's rule (Gram. § 33 ob. 3), 'Where both forms are in use, it is better to adhere to the Latin'; in accordance with the principles laid down by Quintilian i 5 § 63 and Cicero Att. vi 9, (see the quotations in Roby §§ 471, 482). Thus I have always used the termination -em for the Acc. of Greek nouns in -es, whereas Müller writes, at one time, Socraten (i 93), Timocraten (i 93), Simoniden (i 60), Nausiphanen (i 93), Cleanthen (iii 5), but more generally Socratem (i 31), Timocratem (i 113), Simonidem (Div. i 56), Eumpe-
doclem, Aristotelem, Ganymedem, Archimedem, Euphratem, Xeno-
phanem &c. So I have written ibim, Apim in i 82, where Müller has Apim but ibin: I have uniformly written Zeno, but in § 70 Müller gives Zenon.

(7) I have always written di in the Nom. and dis in the Abl.; Müller uses di or dei, dis or dei indiscriminately.

(8) I have written Lyceo in § 72 where Müller has Lycio, but in Div. i. 8 and 22 he gives the spellings Lyceum, Lyceo. Where he writes oportune § 15, opportunitas § 92, benivolentia § 58, Xerses § 115, Aryia § 82, I have written with Baiter oppor
tune, opportunitas, benevolentia, Xerxes, Aryia. In one instance, inchoo, I have preferred the less usual spelling to the ordinary inchoo (which Müller keeps) not merely on the ground that it has most authority in its favour, but because it is the more rational, as showing better the etymology and probably also the pronunciation.

Thus far I have not departed much from the prevalent usage in the latest editions. I have now to plead guilty to two heresies. The first is that I have used the character J for the consonantal I. My reasons for doing so are as follows: (1) the use of J, to distinguish the consonant from the vowel I, seems to me to stand on the same footing with the use of V to distinguish the consonant from the vowel U. Neither use was known to the ancients, but convenience has led most editors to preserve the distinctive V, indeed Madvig, who had dropped it in his first edition of the De Finibus, returned to it in the later editions; and all who write on the phonetics of Latin are compelled to mend the unscientific orthography of the Romans by treating the J and V as distinct letters known by distinctive characters. (2) It might perhaps be

1 See his own remarks on the untrustworthiness of MSS in their spelling of double letters, l. c. p. 138.
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somewhat bold for us in the nineteenth century to commence a reform of the alphabet which Cicero used, but in the first place we do not commence the reform, we merely keep the spelling which the common sense of preceding centuries has handed down to us; and in the next place we know from Quintilian i 4 § 11, that Cicero himself felt the need of distinctive marks for the consonantal and the vowel I, and that it was his practice to double the I in writing such a word as Ajax. Though this symbol did not pass into general use, yet it was felt by others that some sort of distinctive mark was needed, and a tall I was occasionally employed in the imperial times to denote the consonantal sound of I. If the intervening generations have provided us with a more convenient character, I do not see why we are to throw away this advantage, any more than we do those of punctuation or of the discriminating types, which were equally unknown to the Romans. I may be allowed by the way to express my regret that Baiter, in common with many German editors, has ceased to mark the beginning of the sentence by a capital letter, thus making it more difficult to glance rapidly over a page and catch the general sense. What was the motive for this beyond a mere love of change in trivial details I am unable to conjecture.

If I may hope that my use of the letter J, as above explained, may be conceded, as at worst a venial error, I fear that the particular use of it, which I am about to confess, can only be viewed in the light of a mortal sin by philologists of the modern school. I refer to my retention of the old-fashioned spelling of the compounds of jacio, conjicio rejicio disjicio for conicio vicio dissicio. As there can be no doubt that the latter was the usual spelling of the Quintilian age, how am I to defend the infringement of the rule, which I have myself laid down above? My answer is that rules must give way to principles, and the principle of good spelling is that it should represent correctly the etymology and the pronunciation of the word, neither of which is done by the spellings in question. Another inconvenience arising from the omission of the J is that the laws of prosody will thus be broken in almost all the cases in which the compounds of jacio appear in Latin verse. In urging these objections I do no more than repeat what was said by the ancients themselves. Gallius has a chapter on this very subject (N. A. iv 17) in which he finds fault with the omission of the consonantal i in the compounds of jaceio, as confusing versification
APPENDIX ON DAVIES' MSS.

and giving rise to a wrong pronunciation. He quotes hexameter lines containing the words obiciebat, conicere, subicit, and says many readers lengthen the first vowel in order to make the lines scan, but ob, con and sub are essentially short syllables and only lengthened by the consonant which follows, secunda eam litera in his verbis per duo i, non per unum scribenda est; nam verbum ipsum non est 'icio' sed 'iacio' et praeteritum non 'icit' facit, sed 'icit'. Id ubi compositum est, 'a' litera in 'i' mutatur, sicuti fit in verbis 'insilio', et 'incipio', utque ita1 vim consonantis capit, et idcirco ea syllaba productius latiusque paulo pronuntiata priorem syllabam brevem esse non patitur. Then he goes on to say that quod apud Vergilium positum invenimus 'inice', sic esse 'iniicet', ut supra dixi, et scribendum et legendum scianus. I should wish therefore to keep the spelling with j in all except the rare cases in which the consonantal i ceases to exercise any influence on the quantity of the preceding syllable, as in reice Verg. Ecl. iii 96, adicit Mart. x 82 1. In such exceptional cases the spelling would be changed as in other cases of syncope or diaeresis.

APPENDIX ON DAVIES' MSS.

It is a curious fact that, of the six MSS used by Davies for his edition of the Natura Deorum, viz. the Codex Regius, Bp. Moore's copy of the Stephanus edition containing two marginal collations (styled by Davies Codices Elienses), the ms lent to him by Dr Richard Mead (Med.) and those belonging to the Cambridge University Library (Cant.) and to the Library of Lincoln College, Oxford (Lin.), all but the two last have disappeared. In order to save trouble to others who may be interested in the text of Cicero, and also in the hope that possibly some one among my readers may be able to supplement my account with further information, I print here all that I have been able to ascertain about the history of the lost MSS.

In the Preface to the 1st edition of the N.D. 1718, Davies describes the Codd. El. as follows: usum editionis Stephanicæ cum duobus optimis MSS collatae dedit summus mei, dum in vivis erat, patronus, Joannes Morus, nuper Eliensis Episcopus. Ten years later, in the Preface to his edition of the De Legibus, he speaks more

1 Fortassiis legendum 'itaque prima i vim': 'ita' videtur enatnum ex more librariorum exarantium I pro 'prima'. Otho's note in loc.
slightingly of the value of these readings: 'Eliens. variis lectiones significat, quas ex ms quodam vir doctus editioni Roberti Stephani A.D. MDXXXIX adlevit. Iste codex, quantum judicare datur, non magnam prae se tulit vetustatem. It will be seen that Davies here employs the Sing. Codex, as he also does in the list of ms used by him for the Academia I, A.D. 1725 (collationem ms factum in exemplari editionis Stephanicae) while for Academia II he mentions on the same page variis lectiones ex duobus mss excerptas et additas orae editionis Stephanicae. Yet again, after having stated in the Preface to the 1st ed. of the Tusculans 1708, that Bp. Moore had lent him his Stephanus cum duobus optimis mss collatum, he adds in the 2nd ed. 1723 hos Eliensem primum ac secundum nominavi: iiis nunc accessit ab eodem manum tertius in pergamina scriptus, and cites all three together in his notes as Elienses tres, e.g. on nisi haeretur I § 27. From this it would appear that the collations of the two codices were in the same handwriting, and that Davies, after he had brought out his 1st ed., discovered in Bp. Moore's Library a complete text of the Tusculans copied out by the writer of the collations. No mention is made of these mss in the Preface to either of the editions of the De Divinatione and De Fato 1721 and 1730, nor have I come across any reference to them in the notes to the De Divinatione, but Cod. El. appears frequently in the notes to the De Fato.

Bentley's Life and Letters furnish some additional information on the earlier history of the Codices. In July 1692 Bentley, writing to Graevius, who was then engaged on a new edition of his Cicero, informs him that Moore, at that time Bishop of Norwich, is prepared to send him lectiones variantes in Libris Philosophicis Ciceronis, quas ex vetusto codice descripsaret quidam in ora ed. Rob. Stephanus. Graevius, in his reply (Sept. 1692), accepts with thanks the Bishop's offer, but says that he must finish the orations before he can proceed to the Philosophical works. In Jan. 1693 Bentley writes again to say that the Bishop will send the volume itself, and remarks in reference to the value of the readings quantiris esse pretii re ipsa comperies. Graevius, writing in the following December, acknowledges the receipt of the volume, which, he says, he will guard nigris diligentius ucis; all posterity shall know how grateful he is to the lender. Frequent allusions to the book appear in the subsequent correspondence, but Graevius is still too busy to make use of it, until at last the Bishop becomes impatient, and Bentley writes in Aug. 1702 sape mihi aurum vellit celeberrimus Praesid Norvicensis de
Codice suo, quem jam per decennium, opinor, apud te detines. Optimum esset si velles tibi describere, et codicum huc remittere; dolet enim tam bonum librum tam diu bibliothecae suae locupletissimae deesse. To this Graevius replies Nov. 1702, describendas varias mandari juventi, ne longius justo retineatur hic liber. Proximo vere ut salvus Viro Summo reddatur mihi erit curae; and again in December Cicero in quo nunc describendo sudat adolescens redibit ad vos proxima cum hirundine. The correspondence closes with a letter from Burmann in the following month, Jan. 15 1703, announcing Graevius' death.

It would be interesting to know whether the collation made by the adolescens was ever completed, and whether it is still in existence at Utrecht or elsewhere. The volume itself must have been returned to its owner, as it was lent by him to Davies for his 1st ed. of the Tusculans, which appeared in 1709, and seems to have been used by the latter until his death in 1732. As Bp. Moore's Library was purchased by Geo. I and presented to the University of Cambridge in 1715, the Stephanus ought to have found its way to the University Library, and to be now safely locked up in one of the cases there, but Mr Bradshaw, the present learned Librarian, informs me that he can discover no trace of it, nor is there anything to be heard of it at Queens' College, of which Davies was President.

I turn now to the Codex Regius which is described as follows in Davies' preface to the N.D., mss Elienses excipit Codex membranaeus in Bibliotheca Regia Londini servatus, cujus mihi copiam fecit Richardus Bentleius. The same MS is described in the Preface to the De Legibus as belonging to the Royal Library at St James'; mutlius est, nec ultra medium partem libri secundii progreditur. Est annorum, ut videtur, cccc. It was also used for the Academica Bk. II and for the De Divinatione and De Fato, but apparently not for the Tusculans, where Reg. stands for a Paris Codex. Bentley who succeeded Justell as "Library Keeper to His Majesty at St James" in April 1694, wrote in May to Graevius, offering to send him variantes lectiones ex duobus vetustissimis Codd. ex Bibliotheca Regia Sancti Jacobi, but it does not appear whether they were ever sent. As the King's Library was removed in 1752 to the British Museum, these two codices ought now to be there, but by a strange fatality these also have disappeared. Is it possible that they were among the 200 volumes 'destroyed or greatly injured' by the fire at Abingdon House in 1731, on which see Monk's Life of Bentley, II 308.
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Of 'Med.' I know nothing beyond the fact that it was used by Davies for the Tusculumns, De Legibus and De Dicinatione as well as for the Natura Deorum, and that in the preface to the De Legibus he describes it as a ms of about 300 years old.

As regards the value of these mss, Madvig in his Preface to the De Finibus makes a broad distinction between Cod. El. 1 and Cod. El. 2, considering the latter to belong either to the better or to the mixed class of mss, while he has no hesitation in classing the former with the inferior mss. He finds fault with Davies for so frequently confounding the two. In the 1st book of the N. D. I notice three generally accepted readings, which rest either wholly or chiefly on the authority of Cod. El., inscientiam § 1, vim § 39, esse § 86; and two in the 2nd Bk. resting on Cod. Reg., nuptiam dieunt § 66, hic quaerat quaspiam § 133. It is evident from these facts that it would be of great service to Ciceronian criticism, if the mss could be recovered and carefully collated.

EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS.

A. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 84, written in the xivth century (C in Moser's ed.).
B. Codex Leidensis (Vossianus) no. 86, written in the xivth century (B in Moser).
C. Codex Leidensis (Heinsianus) no. 118, written in the xivth century (A in Moser, H in Bailer).
E. Codex Erlangensis no. 38, written in the xvth century (N of Moser).
P. Codex Palatinus no. 1519, a defective but very ancient ms, containing §§ 1 27-75, II 16-68, 111 156, 162-168, III 6-95.
V. Codex Vindobonensis no. 189, written in the xivth century. Defective, wants the whole of Bk i, and Bk II §§ 1-16, and 86-92.
U. Codex Uffenbachianus, formerly in the possession of Creuzer, now the property of Samuel Allen, Esq., written in the xvth century, collated by Mr J. S. Reid and myself (G in Moser).
T. Another xivth century codex belonging to Mr Allen; small 4to. parchment; injured by late corrections, which often make it impossible to decipher the original reading; collated by myself.

1 The account of the first six mss is taken from the 2nd ed. of Orelli as revised by Bailer 1871.
2 Müller says of this N. Jahrb. x 144 'A is an arbitrary text, inferior to both B and V. The writer omits what he could not make sense of.'
3 'B is taken directly from the archetype of the existing ms, according to Hahn, but the writer mistakes the abbreviations &c.' Müller l.c. From the description in Orelli it would seem as if §§ 64-29 of Bk i were wanting, but it is often cited in the critical notes on these §§, and it is evident from Bailer's ed. of the De Legibus p. 105, that these pages are simply misplaced in the Codex.
4 'C is carelessly written, but without deliberate alteration of the older ms.' Müller l.c.
5 V is the nearest approach to the archetype. Its marginal readings of the first hand are corrections from the archetype.' Müller l.c.
EXPLANATIONS OF SYMBOLS.

Oxf. e. o. u. ψ. Four Oxford codices, e in the Bodleian bears date 1459, o at Merton stated in Coxe's Catalogue of MSS to belong to the 12th century, u at Lincoln (Line. of Davies) assigned to the 15th century, ψ at Balliol also of the 15th century. These are collated in the Oxford edition of 1783.

G. Codex Glogavensis, used by Heindorf, 'contains certissimas emendationes,' Baiter pref. to De Finibus.

Red. Codex Rehdigerianus, used by Heindorf.


Reg. Codex Regius belonging to the Royal Library of St James', used by Davies, now lost.


The letters BHILMNOC in thick type denote the MSS (all but C contained in the British Museum), and RVV, the editions collated by Mr Swainson. See his description of these prefixed to the collations given at the end of this volume. B and K are the most important of these MSS. Sometimes readings will be found in my critical notes, which are not given in Mr Swainson's collation. These have been added by myself from personal examination of the MSS.

X. denotes the consensus of Orelli's MSS.

Mus. denotes the consensus of the Museum MSS, so far as the contrary is not stated.

[] The present editor, thinking it more satisfactory that the evidence for each reading should be given in a positive form, has made use of square brackets to signify that the MSS denoted by the inclosed letters are presumed, ex silentio on the part of previous editors, to show a certain reading.

+ denotes that the same reading occurs in other MSS besides those cited.

Or. The revised Orelli, 1861.
Ba. Stereotype ed. of Baiter, 1864.
Sch. Schömann's 4th ed. 1876.
Mu. C. F. W. Müller's ed. 1878.

edd. denotes the consensus of the four editions. It is always stated when the reading in one of these differs from that of the text.

Ed. denotes that the present editor is responsible for a reading.
M. TULLII CICERONIS

DE NATURA DEORUM.

LIBER PRIMUS.

I. Cum multae res in philosophia nequaquam satis adhuc explicatae sint, tum perdifficilis, Brute, quod tu minime ignoras, et perobscura queasio est de natura deorum, quae et ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima est et ad moderandam religionem necessaria. De qua tam variae sunt doctissimorum hominum tamque discrepantes sententiae, ut magnus argumento esse debeat causam [id est, principium philosophiae] esse inscientiam, prudenterque Academicos a rebus incertis assensionem cohississe. Quid est enim temeritate turpius, aut quid tam temerarium tamque indignum sapientis gravitate atque constantia quam aut falsum sentire aut, quod non satis explorate perceptum it et cognitum, sine ulla dubitatione defendere? Velut in hac 2
quaestione plerique, quod maxime veri simile est, et quo omnes duce natura trahimur, deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. - Qui vero deos esse dixerunt, tanta sunt in varietate et dissensione, ut eorum molestum sit dinumerare sententias. Nam et de figuris deorum et de locis atque sedibus et actione vitae multa dicuntur, deque his summa philosophorum dissensione certatur; quod vero maxime rem causamque continet, utrum nihil agant, nihil moliantur, omni curatione et administratione rerum vacant, an contra ab iis et a principio omnia facta et constituta sint et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur, in primis magna dissension est, caque nisi judicatur, in summo errore necesse est homines atque in maximam rerum ignoracione versari.- II. Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas, quae sanctitas, quae religio? Hac enim omnia pure atque caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt, si animadverturn tur ab iis et si est aliquid a dis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem di neque possunt nos juvare nec volunt nec omnino curant nec quid agamus animadverterunt nec est quod ab iis ad hominum vitam permanare possit, quid est quod ullos dis immortalibus cultus, honoros, preces adhibeamus? In specie autem fictae simulationis, sient reliqua virtutes, item pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est, quibus sublatis perturbatio vitae sequitur et magna confusion; atque hand scio an pietate adversus deos sublata fides etiam et societas generis humani et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur. Sunt autem aliis philosophi, et i quidem magni atque nobiles, qui deorum mente atque ratione omnem mundum administrari et

regi censeant, neque vero id solum, sed etiam ab isdem hominum vitae consuli et provideri; nam et fruges et reliqua, quae terra pariat, et tempestatibus ac temporibus varietates caelique mutationes, quibus omnia, quae terra gignat, maturata pubescant, a dis immortalibus tribui generi humano putant multaque, quae dicentur in his libros, colligunt, quae talia sunt, ut ea ipsa di immortales ad huminum fabricati paene videantur.

Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non societes ad veri investigandii cupiditatem. Res enim nulla est, de qua tanto opere non solum indociti, sed etiam docti dissentiant; quorum opiniones cum tam variae sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum fieri profecto potest, ut earum nulla, alterum certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit.

III. Multum autem fluxisse video de libris nostris, quos complures brevi tempore edidimus, variumque sermonem, partim admirantium unde hoc philosophandi nobis subito studium exstitisset, partim quid quaque de re certi haberemus scire cupientium. Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offundere, desertaeque disciplinae et jam pridem relictue patrocinium necopinatum a nobis esse susceptum. Qua quidem in causa et benevolos objurgatores placare et invidos vituperatores confutare possimus, ut alteros reprehendisse paeniteat, alteri didicisse se gaudeant; nam qui admonent amice, docendi sunt, qui inimice insectantur, repellendi. Nos autem nec subito coepimus philosophari nec mediocrem a primo tempore actatis in eo studio operam curamque consumpsimus, et, cum minime videbamur, tum maxime philosophabamur, quod et orationes declarant refertae philosophorum sententiis et doctissimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus semper domus nostra floruit, et principes illi, Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. Et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse, quae ratio et 35 doctrina praescipserit. IV. Sin autem quis requirit, quae causa...
nos impulerit, ut hacc tam serio litteris mandaremus, nihil est, quod expedire tam facile possimus. Nam cum otio langueremus, et is esset rei publicae status, ut cam unius consilio atque cura gubernari necesse esset, primum ipsius rei publicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tam graves tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri; eoque me minus instituti mei pacitot, quod facile sentio, quam multorum non modo discendi, sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. Complures enim Graecis institutionibus eruditi ea, quae didicerant, cum civibus suis communicare non poterant, quod illa, quae a Graecis accepissent, Latine dici posses diffiderent. Quo in genere tantum profecisse videbamus, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur. Hortata etiam est, ut me ad hac conferrem, animi ac grutudo fortunae magna et gravi commota injuria; cujus si majorem aliquam levationem reperire potuissem, non ad hanc potissimum confugisse; ea vero ipsa nulla ratione melius frui potui, quam si me non modo ad legendos libros, sed etiam ad totam philosophiam pertractandum dedisset. Omnes autem ejus partes atque omnia membra tum facillime noscuntur, cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaerendos seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae colligataeque videantur. V. Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est; non enim tam auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas corum, qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, id habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum videat. Nec vero probare soleo id, quod de Pythagoricis accepiimus, quos ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaerentur, quare ita esset, respondere solitos: 'Ipse dixit'. 'Ipse' autem est Pythagoras. Tantum opinio praebjicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. Qui autem admirantur nos hanc potissimum disciplinam securos, iis quattuor Academ...
micis libris satis responsum videtur. Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepmus; non enim hominum interitu sententiae quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant; ut hae in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte judicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem; quam nunc prope modum orbam esse in ipsa Graecia intellego. Quod non Academiae vitio, sed tarditate hominum arbitror contigisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas per-cipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est veri reperiendi causa et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. Cujus rei tantae tamque difficilis facultatem consecutum esse me non profiteor, secutum esse praetereor. Nec tamen fieri potest ut, qui hac ratione philosophentur, ii nihil habeant quod sequantur. Dictum est omnino de hac re alio loco diligentius, sed, quia nimirum quidam tardique sunt, admonendi videntur sapientes. Non enim sumus ii, quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii, qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adjuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine, ut in iis nulla certa judicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia quae, quamquam non percipierunt, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et illustrem, iis sapientis vita regeretur.

VI. Sed jam, ut omni me invidia liberem, ponam in medio sententias philosophorum de natura deorum. Quo quidem loco convocandi omnes videntur, qui, quae sit earum vera, judicent. Tum demum mihi procax Academia videbitur, si aut consensunt omnes, aut erit inventus aliquis, qui, quid verum sit, inven-nerit. Itaque mihi libet exclamare, ut est in Synephebis:

Pro deum, popularium omnium, omnium adulescentium Clamo, postulo, obsecro, oro, ploro atque imploro fidem,
non levissima de re, ut queritur ille in civitate fieri facinora capitalia,
ab amico amante argentum accipere meretrix non vult; 14
sed ut adsint, cognoscent, animadvertant, quid de religione, pietate, sanctitate, eacernoniis, fide, jure jurando, quid de templis, delubris sacrificiisque sollemnibus, quid de ipsis auspiciis, quibus nos praesumus, existimandum sit; haec enim omnia ad hanc de dis immortalibus quaestionem referenda sunt. Profecto eos ipsos, qui se aliud certi habere arbitrantur, addubitare coget doctissimorum hominum de maxima re tanta dissensio. 15
Quod cum saepe alias, tum maxime animadverti, cum apud C. Cottam, familiarem meum, accurate et diligenter de dis immortalibus disputatum est. Nam cum feris Latinis ad cum ipsius rogatu arcessituque venissem, offendi eum sedentem in exedra et cum C. Velleio senatore disputantem, ad quem tum Epicurei primas ex nostris hominibus deferebant. Aderat etiam Q. Lucilius Balbus, qui tantos progressus habebat in Stoicis, ut cum excellentibus in eo genere Graecis compararetur. Tum, ut me Cotta vidit, Peropportune, inquit, venis; oritur enim mihi magna de re altercatio cum Velleio, cui pro tuo studio non est alienum te interesse. VII. Atque mihi quoque videor, inquam, venisse, ut dicis, opportune. Tres enim trium disciplinarum principes convenistis. M. Piso si adesset, nullius philosophiae, carum quidem quae in honore sunt, vacaret locus. Tum Cotta: Si, inquit, liber Antiochi nostri, qui ab eo nuper ad luce Balbium missus est, vera loquitur, nihil est, quod Pisonem, familiarem tuum, desideres; Antiocho enim Stoici cum Peripateticis re concinere videntur, verbis discrepare; quo de libro, Balbe, veloc sciens quid sentias. Egone? inquit ille: miror Antiochum, hominem in primis acutum, non vidisse interesse plurimum inter Stoicos, qui honesta a commodis non nomine sed genere
toto disjungere, et Peripateticos, qui honesta commiserent cum commodis, ut ea inter se magnitudine et quasi gradibus non genere different: haec enim est non verborum parva, sed rerum permagna dissensio. Verum hoc alias; nunc, quod coepi-

mus, si videtur. Mihi vero, inquit Cotta, videtur; sed ut hic, qui intervenit (me intuens), ne ignoret, quae res agatur, de natura agebamus deorum, quae cum mihi videretur perobscura, ut semper videri solet, Epicuri ex Velleio sciscitabar sententiam. Quam ob rem, inquit, Vellei, nisi molestum est, repetes, quae repetam vero, quamquam non mihi, sed tibi hic venit adjutor; ambo enim, inquit arridens, ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis. Turn ego: Quid didicerimus, Cotta vide-ris, tu autem nolo existimes me adjutorem huic venisse, sed auditorem, et quidem aequum, libero judicio, nulla ejus modi adstrictum necessitate, ut mihi, velim nolim, sit certa quaedam tuenda sententia.

VIII. Turn Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam ve-

rens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intern mundiis descendisset, Audite, inquit, non putides commenticiasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi, Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam, Stoicorum πρόβοιας, quam Latine licet providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum, rotundum, ardentem, volubilem deum, portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum, sed somniantium. Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua construi a deo atque aedificari mundum facit? Quae molitio, quae ferramenta, qui vectes, quae machinæ, qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt? Quem ad modum autem obo-

dire et parere voluntati architecti aër, ignis, aqua, terra potue-runt? Unde vero ortae illæ quinque formae, e quibus reliqua formantur, apte cadentes ad animum afficiendum pariendoque sensus? Longum est ad omnia, quae talia sunt, ut optata magis
20 quam inventa videantur; sed illa palmaria, quod, qui non modo natum mundum introduxerit, sed etiam manu paene factum, is eum dixerit fore sempiternum. Hunc censes primis, ut dicitur, labris gustasse physiologiam, id est naturae rationem, qui quicquam, quod ortum sit, putet aeternum esse posse? Quae est enim coagmentatio non dissolubilis? aut quid est, cujus principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum? Πρόνοια vero si vestra est, Lucili, cadem, requiro, quae paulo ante, ministros, machinas, omnem totius operis designationem atque apparatum; sin alia est, cur mortalem fecerit mundum, non, quem ad modum Plato-

21 nicus deus, sempiternum. IX. Ab utroque autem scisicitor, cur mundi acificatores repente exstiterint, innumerabilia saeca dormierint; non enim, si mundus nullus erat, saeca non erant. Saecula nunc dico non ca, quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ca sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur; spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit, intelleghi potest. [Quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliud, nullum cum tempus esset.] Isto igitur tam immenso spatio quaevo, Balbe, cur Πρόνοια vestra cessaverit. Laboremne fugiebat? At iste nec attingit deum nec erat ullus, eum omnes naturae numini divino, caelum, ignes, terrae, maria, parerent. Quid autem erat, quod concupisce ret deus mundum signis et luminibus tamquam aedilis ornare? Si, ut deus ipse melius habitaret, antea videlicet tempore infinito in tenebris tamquam in gurgustio habitaverat. Post autem varietatene cum delectari putamus, qua caelum et terras exornatas videmus? Quae ista potest esse oblectatio deo? Quae si esset, non ca tam diu carere potuisset.

1 illa palmaria Dav. ed. 1, illud palmare Dav. ed. 2, illa palmaris MSS Sch. 2 dixerit MSS, dixit Mu. (Adn. Cr.) 7 πρόνοια Manutius, pronoea MSS Sch. Mu. vero si vestra est Lucili cadem requiro ABC Mus., si vero vestra est lucili cadem requiro E, vero si vestra est Lucili cadem, cadem requiro Ilcind., vero vestra si cadem est, Lucili, cadem requiro Sch. alter Lambinus, vero vestra si, Lucili, cadem est, cadem requiro Madv., vero vestra, Lucili, si est cadem, cadem requiro Or. Da. Mu. 9 designationem CE + dissignationem ADBK Mu. 18 intelleugi potest XBEKLO, intelleugi non potest Asc. UCIMNV + Sch. Or. Ba. Mu. (who also suggests qui potest). quod ne—esset transposed by Wyttenbach before sed fuit l. 16 (perhaps better before spatio), see Comm. 21 πρόνοια see above.
An haec, ut fere dicitis, hominum causa a deo constituta sunt? Sapientiumne? Propter paucos igitur tanta est facta rerum molitio. An stultorum? At primum causa non fuit, cur de improbis bene meretur; deinde quid est assecutus? cum omnes stulti sint sine dubio miserrimi, maxime quod stulti sunt; miserius enim stultitia quid possimus dicere? deinde quod ita multa sunt incommoda in vita, ut ea sapientes commodorum compensatione leniant, stulti nec vitare venientia possint nec ferre praesentia. X. Qui vero mundum ipsum animantem sapientemque dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt, animi natura intellegentis in quam figuram cadere posset; de quo dicam quidem Paulo post; nunc autem haecentus admirabor eorum tarditatem, qui animantem immortalem et eundem beatum rotundum esse velget, quod ea forma neget ullam esse pulchriorem Plato. At mini vel cylindri vel coni vel pyramidis videtur esse formosior. Quae vero vita tribuitur isti rotundo deo? Nempe ut ea celeritate contorquatur, cui par nulla ne cogitari quidem possit; in qua non video ubinam mens constans et vita beatae possit insistere. Quodque in nostro cor-
pori si minima ex parte significet, molestum sit, cur hoc idem non habetur molestum in deo? Terra enim profecto, quoniam mundi pars est, pars est etiam dei. Atqui terrae maximas regiones inhabitabiles atque incultas videmus, quod pars earum appulsu solis exarserit, pars obriguerit nive pruinaque longinquosola abscessu; quae, si mundus est deus, quoniam mundi partes sunt, dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt.

di possunt esse sine sensu, mentem cur aquae adjunxit? Menti autem cur aquam adjunxit, si ipsa mens constare potest vacans corpore? Anaximandri autem opinio est nativos esse deos longis intervallis orientes occidentesque, cosque innumerabiles esse mundos. Sed nos deum nisi sempiternum intellegere qui possamus? Post Anaximenes aëra deum statuit, eumque gigni esseque immensum et infinitum et semper in motu; quasi aut aër sine ulla forma deus esse possit, cum praeceperim deum non modo aliqua, sed pulcherrima specie deceat esse, aut non omne, quod ortum sit, mortalitas consequatur. XI. Inde Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus omnium rerum discriptionem et modum mentis infinitae vi ae ratione designari et confici voluit; in quo non vidit neque motum sensui junctum et continentem in infinito ullam esse posse, neque sensum omnino in eo quod non ipsa natura pulsa sentiret. Deinde si mentem istam quasi animal aliquod voluit esse, erit aliquid interius, ex quo illud animal nominetur; quid autem interius mente? cingatur igitur corpore externo. Quod quoniam non placeat, aperta simplexque mens nulla re adjuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intellegentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur. Crotoniates autem Alemae, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque præterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus immortalitatem dare. Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intendum et commucentem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari deum et, cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingere, tum dei

partem esse miseram; quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quicquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset deus? quo modo porro deus iste, si nihil esset nisi animus, aut infulsus esset in mundo? Tum Xenophanes, qui mente ad-juncta omne [praeterea, quod esset] infinitum, deum voluit esse, de ipsa mente item reprehenditur ut ceteri, de infinitate autem vehementius, in qua nihil neque sentiens neque conjunctum potest esse. Nam Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam coronae simile efficit (στεφάνην appellat) continentente ardore lucis orbem, qui cingat caelum, quem appellat deum: in quo neque figuram divinam neque sensum quisquam suspiari potest. Multaque ejusdem monstra, qui belli, qui discordiam, qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis ejusdem ad deum revocet, quae vel morbo vel somno vel oblivione vel vetustate delentur; eademque de sideribus, quae reprehensa in alio jam in hoc omittantur. XII. Empedocles autem multa alia peccans in deorum opinione turpissime labitur. Quattuor enim naturas, ex quibus omnia constare censet, divinas esse vult; quas et nasci et extingui perspicuum est et sensu omni carere. Nec vero Protagoras, qui sese negat omnino de dis habere quod liqueat, sint, non sint qualesve sint, quicquam videtur de natura deorum suspicari. Quid? Democritus, qui tum imagines carumque circuitus in deorum numero refert, tum illam naturam, quae imagines fundat ac mittat, tum scientiam intellegentiamque nostram, nonne in maximo errore versatur? Cum idem omnino, quia nihil semper suo statu maneat, neget esse quicquam sempiternum, nonne deum omnino ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat? Quid? aër, quo Diogenes Apolloniates utitur deo, quem sensum
habere potest aut quam formam dei? Jam de Platonis

constantia longum est dicere, qui in Timaeo patrem huius

mundi nominari neget posse, in Legum autem libris, quid sit

omnino deus, anquiiri oportere non censeat. Idem et in Timaeo
dicit et in Legibus et mundum deum esse et caelum et astra

et terram et animos et eos, quos majorum institutis acceperimis;
quae et per se sunt falsa perspicue et inter se vehementer

repugnantia. Quod vero sine corpore ullo deum vult esse, ut

Gracci dicunt, αὐτῷματον, id quale esse possit, interlegi non

potest; carat enim sensu necessae est, carat etiam prudentia,
careat voluptate; quae omnia una cum deorum notionem com-
prehendimus. Atque etiam Xenophon paurioribus verbis cadem
fere peccat; facto enim in iis, quae a Socrate dicta retulit,
Socratem disputantem formam dei quaeri non oportere,
eundemque et solem et animum deum dicere, et modo unum, tum
autem plures deos; quae sunt isdem in erratis fere, quibus ea,
quae de Platone diximus. XIII. Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo
libro, qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem
unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum. Nec multo
secus Speusippus, Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam
dicens qua omnia regantur, camque animalem, evellere ex animis
conatur cognitionem deorum. Aristotelesque in
tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro non [Platone]
dissentiens; modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinatatem, modo
mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit
mundo cique eas partes tribuit, ut replicatione quadam mundi
motum regat atque tucatur, tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse
non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse
designarit deum. Quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus
in celeritate tanta conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot di, si
numeramus etiam caelum deum? Cum autem sine corpore
idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. Quo porro modo deus moveri carens corpore aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest? Nec vero ejus condiscipulus Xenocrates in hoc genere prudentior, 5 cujus in libris, qui sunt de natura decorum, nulla species divina describitur; deos enim octo esse dicit, quinque eos, qui in stellis vagis nominantur, unum, qui ex omnibus sideribus, quae infixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus deus, septimum solem adjungit octavamque lunam; qui quo 10 sensu beati esse possint, intellegi non potest. Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et modo mundum, tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit, sensuque deum privat et ejus formam mutabilem esse vult eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos. Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus. Nec audiendus ejus auditor Strato, is qui physicus appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse censet, quae causas gignendi, augendi, minuendi habeat, sed careat omni sensu et figura. XIV. Zeno autem, ut jam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, camque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria. Quam legem quo modo efficiat animantem, intellegere non possumus; deum autem ani- 25 mantem certe volumus esse. Atque hic idem alicio loco aethera deum dicit, si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis; aliis autem libris rationem quandam per omnem naturam

rerum pertinentem vi divina esse affectam putat. Idem aetris hoc idem tribuit, tum annis, mensibus annorumque mutationibus. Cum vero Hesiodi \textit{theogonia}, id est originem deorum, interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatatas perceptasque cognitiones deorum; neque enim Jovem neque Junonem neque Vestam neque quemquam, qui ita appelleetur, in deorum habet numero, sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significationem hanc docet tributa nomina. Cujus discipuli Aristonis non minus magno in errore sententia est, qui neque formam dei intelligi posse censeat neque in deis esse, sed dubitetque omnino, deus animans necne sit. Cleanthes autem, qui Zenonem audivit una cum eo, quem proxime nominavi, turn ipsum mundum deum dicit esse, turn totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc nomen, turn ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexura ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum judicat; idemque quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripsit contra voluptatem, turn fingit formam quandam et speciem deorum, turn divinitatem omnem tribuit aetris, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinius. Ita fit, ut deus ille, quem mente nosceimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere, nusquam prorsus appareat. XV. At Persacus ejusdem Zenonis auditor, eos dicit esse habitos deos, a quibus magna utilitas ad vitae cultum esset inventa, ipsasque res utiles et salutares deorum esse vocabulis nuncupatas, ut ne hoc quidem dicere, illa inventa esse deorum, sed ipsa divina. Quo quid absurdus, quam aut res sordidas atque deformes deorum honore afficere aut homines iam morte deletos reponere in deos, quorum onmis cultus esset futurus in luctu? Jam vero Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vafferrimus habetur...
interpres, magnam turbam congregat ignotorum deorum, atque ita ignotorum, ut eos ne conjectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. Ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et ejus animi fusionem universam, tum ejus ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universitatemque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum, quem ante dixi, aethera, tum ea, quae natura fluent atque manarent, ut et aquam et terram et aëra; somel, lunam, sidera, et aëra, ut eos ne conjectura quidem informare possimus, cum mens nostra quidvis videatur cogitatione posse depingere. Ait enim vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et ejus animi fusionem universam, tum ejus ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universitatemque omnia continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum, ignem praeterea et eum, quem aethera esse eum, quem homines Jovem appellarent, quiue aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque disputationem aethera esse eum, quern homines Jovem appellarent, quiue aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque disputationem aethera esse eum, quern homines Jovem appellarent, quiue aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum. Idemque disputationem aethera esse eum, quern homines Jovem appellarent, quiue aër per maria manaret, eum esse Neptunum, terramque eam esse quae Ceres diceretur, similique ratione persequitur vocabula reliquorum deorum.

XVI. Exposui fere non philosophorum judicia, sed delirantum somnia. Nec enim multo absurdiora sunt ea, quae poëtarum vocibus fusa ipsa suavitate nocuerunt, qui et ira inflammatos et libidine furentos deos feceruntque, ut eorum bella, proelia, pugnas, vulnera videremus, odia praeterea,
discidia, discordias, ortus, interitus, querellas, lamentationes, effusas in omni intemperantia libidines, adulteria, vincula, cum humano genere concubitus mortalesque ex immortalis procreatam.

Cum poëtarum autem errore conjungere licet portenta magorum, Aegyptiorumque in eodem genere dementia, tum etiam vulgi opiniones, quae in maxima inconstantia veritatis ignoratione versantur.

Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero, de quibus haec quaestio est, habere debet. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum? quam appellat προληψιν Epicurus, id est antecptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quiequam nec quacri nec disputatur potest. Cujus rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo cælesti Epicuri de regula et judicio volumine accepimus. XVII. Quod igitur fundamentum hujus quaestionis est, id praecclare jactum videtis. Cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta mancatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intellegi necesse est esse deos; quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus, de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necessse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnem non philosophos solum, sed etiam indoctos, fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praecotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse προληψιν appellavit, quam antea nemo co verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et immortales putemus. Quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, cadem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eos aeternos et beatos habercmus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum

3 immortalis MSS generally, immortalibus CNO Dav. Heind. 14 προληψιν  

aeternumque sit, id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod, quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia. Si nihil aliud quae-reremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione libe-
5 raremur, satis erat dictum; nam et praestans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et aeterna esset et beatissima (habet enim venerationem justam, quicquid excellit), et metus omnis a vi atque ira deorum pulsus esset; intellegitur enim a beata immortalique natura et iram et gratiam segregari; 10 quibus remotis nullos a superis impedere metus. Sed ad hanc confirmandam opinionem anquirit animus et formam et vitae actionem mentisque agitacionem in deo.

XVIII. Ac de forma quidem partim natura nos admonet, 46 partim ratio docet. Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium 
15 gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam deorum; quae 

enim forma alia occurrit unquam aut vigilanti cuquam aut 
dormienti? Sed ne omnia revocentur ad primas notiones: ratio 

hoc idem ipsa declarat. Nam cum praestantissimam naturam, 47 vel quia beata est vel quia sempiterna, convenire videatur ean-
20 dem esse pulcherrimam, quae compositio membrorum, quae con-

formatio linamentorum, quae figura, quae species humana potest 
esse pulchrior? Vos quidem, Lucili, soletis (nam Cotta meus 

modo hoc, modo illud), cum artificium effingitis fabricamque 
divinam, quam sint omnia in hominis figura non modo ad 

25 usum, verum etiam ad venustatem apta, describere. Quodsi 48 omnium animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem 

animans est, ea figura profecto est, quae pulcherrima est om-
nium; quoniamque deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem 
esse sine virtute nemo potest nec virtus sine ratione constare 
30 nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse 
specie deos confitendum est. Nec tamen ea species corpus est, 49 sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem. 

XIX. Haec quamquam et inventa sunt acutius et dicta sub-
tiliius ab Epicuro, quam ut quivis ea possit agnoscre, tamen

11 anquirit [X]BK¹, inquiret Mus. vitae actionem mentisque agitacionem Beier (Off. i 17), vitam et actionem mentis atque agitacionem xss. 27 pul-

cherrima est Madv. see Comm., pulcherrima sit xss. Mu. 30 nisi in [B]UT +, nisi ACEPBK, sine others.

M. C. 2
fretus intelligentia vestra dissero brevius, quam causa desiderat. Epicurus autem, qui res occultas et penitus abditas non modo viderit animo, sed etiam sic tracert, ut manu, docet eam esse vim et naturam deorum, ut primum non sensu, sed mente cernatur, nec soliditate quadam neque eadem ad numerum sit, ut ea, quae ille propter firmatatem στερεόμαι appellat; sed, imaginibus similitudine et transitione percepistis, cum infinita simillimarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis exsistat et ad nos afflueat, cum maximis voluptatibus in cas imaginis mentem inteatam infixamque nostram intelle-

50 gentiam capere, quae sit et beata natura et aeterna. Summa vero vis infinitatis et magna ad diligentis contemplatione dignissima est, in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam, ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant. Hanc ισονομίαν appellat Epicurus, id est equa bablem tribunonem. Ex hac 15 igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse immortalium non minorem, et si, quae interimant, innumerabilia sint, etiam ea, quae conservent, infinita esse debere.

Et quaeque a nobis, Balbe, soletis, qua vita deorum sit, 51 quaque ab iis degatur actas. Ea videlicet, qua nihil beatius, nihil omnibus bonis affluentius cogitari potest. Nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus, nulla opera molitur, sua sapientia et virtute gaudet, habet exploratum fore se semper 52 cum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus. XX. Hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum. 25 Sive enim ipsa mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quie-
tum quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso versari circum axem caeli admirabili celeritate? (nisi quietum autem nihil beatum est); sive in ipso mundo deus inest aliquis, qui regat,

qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans terras et maria contemplans, ne illae est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis! Nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. Docuit enim nos idem, qui cetera, natura effectum esse mundum, nihil opus fuisse fabrica, tamque eam rem esse facilem, quam vos effici negatis sine divina posse sollertia, ut innumerabiles natura mundos effectura sit, efficiat, effecerrit. Quod quia quem ad modum natura efficere sine aliqua mente possit non videtis, ut tragici poetae, cum explicare argumenti exitum non potestis, confugitis ad deum; cujus operam profecto non desideraretis, si immensam et interminatam in omnes partes magnitudinem regionum videritis, in quam se injiciens animus et intendens curiosum et plenum negotii deum? Hinc vobis exstitit primum illa fatalis necessitas, quam eis namque dicitis, ut, quicquid accidat, id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatis. Quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est, cui tamquam aniculis, et ipsis quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia? Sequitur ματρικη vestra, quae Latine divinationem dicitur, qua tanta imbueremur superstitione, si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, ἀριστογείοι, vates, conjectores nobis estens colendi. His terroribus ab Epicuro soluti et in liber-tatem vindicati nec metuimus eos, quos intellegimus nec sibi fingere ullam molestiam nec alteri quaerere, et pie sanctequae
colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem. Sed elatus studio vereor ne longior fuerim. Erat autem difficile rem tantam tamque praeclaram incohaham relinquere; quamquam non tam dicendi ratio mihi habenda fuit quam audiendi.

57 XXI. Tum Cotta comitque, ut solebat: Atqui, inquit, Vellei, nisi tu alicuii dixisses, nihil sane ex me quidem audire potuisse.

Mibi enim non tam facile in mentem venire solet, quare verum sit alicuii, quam quare falsum; idque cum saecum, tum, cum te audirem, paulo ante contigit. Roges me, qualem naturam deorum esse duceam, nihil fortasse respondeam. Quae ras, pateonne talem esse, qualis modo a te sit exposita, nihil dicam mihi videri minus. Sed ante quam aggregi ad ea, quae a te disputata sunt, de ipso dicam quid sentiam. Saepe enim de familiaris illi tuo video audisse, cum te togatis omnibus sine dubio antecorret et paucos tecum Epicureos e Gracia comparare, sed, quod ab eo te mirifici diligi intellegebam, arbitrabar illum propter benevolentiam uberiis id dicere. Ego autem, etsi vereor laudare praesentem, judico tamen de re obscura atque difficili a te dictum esse dilucide, neque sententias solum copiose, sed verbis etiam ornatus, quam solemus vestri. Zeno, 58 nem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat, cum Athenis essem, audiebam frequenter, et quidem ipso auctore Philone, credo, ut facilius judicarem, quoniam illa bene refellentur, cum a principe Epicureorum accepiisse, quem ad modum dicerentur. Non igtur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate. Sed quod in illo mihi usu saecpe venit, idem modo, cum te audirem, accidisset, ut moleste ferrem tantum ingenium (bona venia me audies) in tam loves, ne dicam in tam ineptas sententias incidisse. Nec ego nunc ipse alicuii afferam melius. Ut enim modo dixi, omnibus fere in rebus, sed maxime in physicis, quid non sit, citius, quam quid sit, dicerim. 59 XXII. Roges me, quid aut

Quale sit deus, auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi sibi unum diem postulavit; cum idem ex eo postridie quaseret, biduum petivit; cum saepius duplicaret numerum dierum admiransque Hiero 5 requiret, cur ita faceret, ‘Quia, quanto diutius considero, inquit, ‘tanto mihi res videtur obscurior’. Sed Simonidem arbitror (non enim poëta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus sapiensque traditur), quia multa venirent in mentem acuta atque subtilia, dubitantem, quid eorum 10 esset verissimum, desperasse omnem veritatem. Epicurus vero 61 tuus (nam cum illo malo disserere quam tecum) quid dicit, quod non modo philosophia dignum esset, sed mediocri prudentia?

Quaeritur primum in ea quaestione, quae est de natura deorum, sintne necne sint. Difficile est negare. Credo, si in contione quaeratur, sed in hujusmodi sermone et consessu facillimum. Itaque ego ipsa pontifex, qui caerimonas religionesque publicas sanctissime tuendas arbitror, is hoc, quod primum est, esse deos, persuaderi mihi non opinione solum, sed 20 etiam ad veritatem plane velim. Multa enim occurrunt, quae conturbent, ut interdum nulli esse videantur. Sed vide, quam tecum agam liberaliter; quae communia sunt vobis cum ceteris philosophis, non attingam, ut hoc ipsum; placet enim omnibus fere milique ipsi in primis deos esse. Itaque non pugno; rationem tamen cam, quae a te affertur, non satis firmam puto. XXIII. Quod enim omnium gentium generumque hominibus ita videretur, id satis magnum argumentum esse dixisti, cur esse deos confiteremur. Quod cum leve per se, tum etiam falsum est. Primum enim unde tibi notae sunt opiniones natiorum? Equidem arbitror multas esse gentes sic immanitate efferatas, ut apud eas nulla suspicio deorum sit. Quid? Dia- 63 goras ἄθεος qui dictus est, posteaque Theodorus, nonne aperte

deorum naturam sustulerunt? Nam Abderites quidem Protagoras, eujus a te modo mentio facta est, sophistes temporibus illis vel maximus, cum in principio libri sic posuisse: 'De divis, neque ut sint neque ut non sint, habeo dicere', Atheniensium jussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus, librique eujis in contiono combusti. Ex quo equidem existimor tardiores ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum poenam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset. Quid de sacrilegis, quid de impius perjurisque dicemus?

Tubulus si Lucius unquam, 10 Si Lupus aut Carbo, Neptuni filius, ut ait Lucilius, putasset esse deos, tam perjurus aut tam impius fuisset? Non est igitur tam explorata ratio ad id, quod vultis, confirmandum, quam videtur. Sed quia commune hoc est argumentum aliorum etiam philosophorum, omittam hoc tempore; ad vestra propria venire malo.

Concedo esse deos; doce me igitur, unde sint, ubi sint, quales sint corpore, animo, vita; haec enim scire desidero. Abuteris ad omnia atomorum regno et licentia; hinc, quodemque in solum venit, ut dieitur, effingis atque effugis. Quae primum nullae sunt. Nihil est enim quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem omnis obsidetur locus; ita nullum inane, nihil esse individuum potest. XXIV. Haec ego nune physicorum oracula fundo, vera an falsa necio, sed vera tamen similiora quam vestra. Ista enim flagitia Democriti, sive etiam ante Leucippi, esse corpuscula quaedam levia, alia aspera, rotunda alia, partim autem angulata et pyramidata, hamata quaedam et

quasi adunca, ex his effectum esse caelum atque terram nulla co-
gente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito,—hanc tu opinionem, 
C. Vellei, usque ad hanc actatem perduxisti, priusque te quis de 
omen vitae statu quam de ista auctoritate dejeecerit; ante enim 
5 judicasti Epicureum te esse oportere, quam ista cognovisti. Ita 
necesse fuit aut haec flagitia concipere animo aut susceptae 
philosophiae nomen amittere. Quid enim mereas, ut Epicureus 67 
esse desinas? ‘Nihil equidem’, inquis, ‘ut rationem vitae beatae 
verbatimque deseram’. Ista igitur est veritas? Nam de vita 
10 beata nihil repugno, quam tu ne in deo quidem esse censes, 
nisi plane otio langueat. Sed ubi est veritas? In mundis, 
credo, innumerabilibus, omnibus minimis tempore punctis aliiis 
ascentibus, alii cadentibus. An in individuis corpusculis tam 
praeclera opera nulla moderante natura, nulla ratione fingenti-
15bus? Sed oblitus liberalitatis meae, qua tecum paulo ante uti 
coeperam, plura complector. Concedam igitur ex individuis 
constare omnia. Quid ad rem? deorum enim natura quaeritur. 
Sint sane ex atomis; non igitur aeterni. Quod enim ex atomis, 68 
id natum aliquando est; si natum, nulli dei ante quam nati; et 
20 si ortus est deorum, interitus sit necesse est, ut tu paulo ante de 
Platonis mundo disputabas. Ubi igitur illud vestrum beatum 
et aeternum, quibus duobus verbis significatis deum? quod 
cum efficere vultis, in dumeta correpitis. Ita enim dicebas, 
non corpus esse in deo, sed quasi corpus, nec sanguinem, sed 
25 tamquam sanguinem.

XXV. Hoc persaepe facitis, ut, cum aliquid non veri simile 69

M, curvata quaedam BT, curva quaedam H, et pyramidata quaedam, curvata quae-
dam Asc. V, et pyramidata quaedam, quaedam curvata, quaedam Than., et quaedam 
pyramidata, curvata quaedam Herv., quaedam pyramidata, quaedam curvata V, 
et pyramidata, curvata quaedam UL, pyramidata quaedam C, pyramidata quaedam 
imparamata quaedam Reg., et pyramidata, quaedam curvata et quaedam Ursinus, 
sinuata quaedam G La of Moser, alia rotunda, alia autem partim hamata, 
curvata quaedam Mars., alia pyramidata et angulata, tum sinus hamata et 
quaest hamata Heind., angulata forma hamata quaedam Madv. From this general 
view of the evidence it appears to me probable that the reading of the archetype 
was piramata omata. 12 punctis [B] Asc. U, cunctis ACEPKLO. 13 in 
[AEPK], om. BC Mus. 18 quod enim El. Reg. UO + , quod autem Asc. Than. 
Herv. Mars. H + , quid autem Red., quia enim XBEL +, quia enim quod C, quic-
quid Lamb. 19 aliquando est Lamb., aliquando sit ms ; see Madv. Fin. p. 448.
decatis et effugere reprehensionem velitis, afferatis aliquid, quod omnino ne fieri quidem possit; ut satius fuerit illud ipsum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere, quam tam impudenter resistere. Velut Epicurus cum videret, si atomi ferrentur in locum inferior-rem suopte pondere, nihil fore in nostra potestate, quod esset carum motus certus et necessarius, invenit, quo modo necessita-tem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat; ait atomum, cum pondere et gravitate directo dorsus feratur, declinare pau-

70 lulum. Hoc dicere turpius est quam illud, quod vult, non posse defendere. Idem facit contra dialecticos; a quibus cum tradi-
tum sit in omnibus disjunctionibus, in quibus ‘aut etiam aut
non’ poneretur, alterum utrum esse verum, pertimuit, ne, si
concessum esset hujus modi aliquid, ‘Aut vivet eras aut non
vivet Epicurus’, alterutrum fieret necessarium: totum hoc
‘aut etiam aut non’ negavit esse necessarium; quo quid dici
potuit obitusus? Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa
omnia dicret, quae sensibus viderentur, Zeno autem non nulla
visa esse falsa, non omnia; timuit Epicurus, ne, si unum visum
esset falsum, nullum esse verum: omnes sensus veri nuntios
dixit esse. Nihil horum nimis callide; graviorem enim plagam

71 accipiebat, ut leviorem repelleret. Idem facit in natura deorum;
dum individuorum corporum concretionem fugit, ne interitus
dissipatio consequatur, negat esse corpus deorum, sed tam-
quam corpus, nec sanguinem, sed tamquam sanguinem. XXVI.
Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haruspex, cum haruspicem
viderit; hoc mirabilius, quod vos inter vos risum tenere possitis.
‘Non est corpus, sed quasi corpus’. Hoc intellegerem quale
esset, si in ceris diceretur aut fictilibus figuris; in deo quid sit
‘quasi corpus’ aut ‘quasi sanguis’, intellegere non possum; ne tu
quidem, Vellei, sed non vis fateri. Ista enim a vobis quasi 72
dictata redduntur, quae Epicurus oscitans halucinatus est, cum 5
quidem gloriam, ut videmus in scriptis, se magistrum habui-
isse nullum. Quod et non praedicant tam faciliter equidem 10
credimus, sicut mali aedificii domino glorianti se architectum
non habuisse; nihil enim olet ex Academia, nihil ex Lyceo,
 nihil ne e puerilibus quidem disciplinis. Xenocraten audire
potuit, quem virum, di immortales! et sunt qui putent audisse;
ipse non vult; credo plus nemi. Pamphilum quendam, Pla-
tonis auditorem, ait a se Sami auditum; ibi enim adulescens
habitabat cum patre et fratribus, quod in eam pater ejus Neocles
agripeta venerat; sed cum agelli us, cum non satis aleret, ut
opinor, ludi magistri fuit. Sed hunc Platonicum mirifico cen-
temit Epicurus; ita metuit, ne quid umquam didicisse videatur. 15
In Nausiphane Democriteo tenetur; quem cum a se non neget
auditum, vexat tamn omnibus contumeliis. Atqui si haec
Democritea non audisset, quid audierat? quid est in physici
Epicuri non a Democrito? Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut
quod Paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamn pleraque
dicit eadem, atomos, inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innum-
merabilitatemque mundorum, corum ortus, interitus, omnia fere,
quibus naturae ratio continetur. Nunc istuc quasi corpus et
quasi sanguinem quid intellectueg? Ego enim te scire ista 74
melius quam me non fatior solum, sed etiam facile potior; cum
quidem semel dicta sunt, quid est, quod Velleius intellegere
possit, Cotta non possit? Itaque corpus quid sit, sanguis quid
sit, intellego; quasi corpus et quasi sanguis, quid sit, nullo pror-
sus modo intellego. Neque tu me celas, ut Pythagoras soleat
alienos, nec consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus, sed
(quad inter nos liceat) ne tu quidem intellegis. XXVII. Illud 75

4 et MSS, ei Klots, Or. Ba. Mu. equidem LAMB., quidem MSS. 5 cre-
derem A3B3ETOL, credem A1B1, credemus CBE, credem HMC+., credatur U.
6 olet BLO, floret ACEP et MSS generally, ei olet Kl. nihil ex OÜH, nihil ne
ex XBE+. Lyceo SCH., Lycio UR Or. Ba. Mu. (but all read Lycce Div. 1 22),
levio XTEKH+. 17 quid est X, quid enim El. UV, quid est enim O.
20 inane edd., inanes MSS. 23 quid intellectueg MSS generally, quid sit
intellegis El. V Asc. Red. Heind. 29 consulto (CE), consulta ABFU Mus.
30 liceat edd., liqueat MSS (so A has Quotta for Cotta in l. 20).
video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat, nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentis, sitque pura, levis, perficida. Dicemus igitur idem, quod in Venere Coa: corpus illud non est, sed simile corporis, nec ille fusus et cuncte mixtus rubor sanguis est, sed quaedam sanguinis similitudo; sic in Epicureo deo non res, sed similitudines rerum esse. Fac id, quod ne intellegi quidem potest, mihi esse persuasum; cedo mihi istorum adumbratorum deorum linamenta atque formas.

Non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis humanas esse formas deorum; primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris, ut homini, cum de deo cogitaret, forma occurret humana; deinde quoniam rebus omnibus excellat natura divina, forma quoque esse pulcherrima debet, nec esse humana ullam pulchriorem; tertiam rationem affertis, quod nullae aliae figura domicilium mentis esse possit. Primum igitur quicque considera quale sit; arripere enim mihi videmini quasi vestro jure rem nullo modo probablem. Omnino quis tam caecus in contemplandis rebus unquam fuit, ut non videret species istas hominum collatas in deos aut consilio quodam sapientium, quo facilius animos imperitorum ad deorum cultum a vitae pravitate converterent, aut superstitione, ut essent simulacra, quae venerantes deos ipsos se adire crederent? Auxerunt autem haec cetera poëtæ, pictores, opifices; erat enim non facile agentes aliquid et molientes deos in aliarum formarum imitatione servare. Accessit etiam ista opinio fortasse, quod homini homine pulchrius nihil videatur. Sed tu hoc, priscie, non vides, quam blanda conciliatrix et quasi sui sit luna natura? An putas ullam esse terra marique belum, quae non sui generis belua maxime delectetur? Quod mi ita esset, cur non gestiret 30

6 res Asc. V, rem mss Or. Ba. 11 sit—mentibus om. B. informatum
16 quod—possit [B], possit quod ACEUBK+. nulla alia mss generally, nulla in alia B+. 17 quicque [B]H, quicquid mss generally. considera BE, consideras AC Mus., consideremus L Klotz. 18 omnino add., omnium mss, etenim Heind. 27 videatur mss see Comm., videatur Or. Ba., videbatur Sch. Mu. 28 quasi sui I of Moser; quam sui mss Klotz, quam sollicita sui V.

Huic deo pulchrior; at erat, sicuti hodie est, perversissimis oculis.

Quid refert, si hoc ipsum salsum illi et venustum videbatur?
80 Redeo ad deos. XXIX. Ecquos, si non tam strabones, at pactulos esse arbitramur? ecquos naevum habere? ecquos silos, flaccos, frontones, capitones, quaec sunt in nobis? an omnia emendata in illis? Detur id vobis; num etiam una est omnium facies? nam si plures, aliam esse alia pulchriorem ncesse est. Igitur aliquis non pulcherrimus deus. Si una omnium facies est, florec in caelo Academiam ncesse est; si enim nihil inter deum et deum differre, nulla est apud deos cognitio, nulla percepsion. Quid, si etiam, Vellei, falsum illud omnino est, nullam aliam nobis de deo cogitantibus speciem nisi hominis occurrere? 10 tamemnna ista tam absurdia defendes? Nobis fortasse sic occurrit, ut dicis; a parvis enim Jovem, Junonem, Minervam, Neptunum, Vulcanum, Apollinem reliquisque deos ea facie novimus, quae pictores fictoresque voluerunt, neque solum facie, sed etiam ornatu, actate, vestitu; at non Aegyptii nec Syri nec fere cuncta barbaria; firmiores enim videas apud cos opiniones esse de bestiis quibusdam quam apud nos de sanctissimis templis et simulacris deorum. Etenim fana multa spoliata et simulacra deorum de locis sanctissimis ablata videmus a nostris; at vero ne fando quidem auditum est crocodilum aut ibin aut facem violatum ab Aegyptio. Quid igitur censes? Apim illum, sanctum Aegyptiorum bovem, nonne deum videri Aegyptiis? Tam herele quam tibi illam vestram Sospitam, quam tu numquam ne in sonmis quidem videis nisi cum pelle caprina, cum hasta, cum scutulo, cum calecolis repandis. At non est talis Argiva nec Romana Juno. Ergo alia species Junonis Argivis, alia Lanuvinis, alia nobis. Et quidem alia nobis Capitolini, alia

1 ecquos corr. from etquos B, et quos ACEBHK +, et quasi Asc. 2 ecquos—
cequos AB, etquos—etquos B’CEUBK +. 9 quid si E Ase., quod si ACU +,
quo si B. 11 defendes TUL, defendens XBK +, defenderes V Ase. sic BGC,
si ACEUTB Ase. +. 12 a parvis enim Klotz (who compares a similar corruption in Leg. ii 9), appara risse (or operuisse) MSS, om. Mars. Dav. Heind. Junonem MSS generally, om. CB. 13 religiosque AB +, religiosus CEBK.

Atheniensium caderet, verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. Itaque in illis selectis ejus brevibusque sententiis, quas appellationis κυπίας δόξας, haec, ut opinor, prima sententia est: 'Quod beatum et immortale est, id nec habet nec exhibet cuiquam negotium'. XXXI. In hac ita exposita sententia sunt qui existimant, quod ille inscitia plane loquendi fecerat, fecisse consulto; de homine minime vafro male existimant. Dubium est enim, utrum dicat aliquid esse beatum et immortale an, si quid sit. Non animadvertunt hic eum ambiguae locutum esse, sed multis aliis locis et illum et Metrodorum tam aperte quam paulo ante te. Ille vero deos esse putat, nec quemquam vidi, qui magis ea, quae timenda esse negaret, timeret, mortem dico et deos. Quibus mediocres homines non ita valde moventur, his ille clamat omnium mortalium mentes esse perterritas. Tot milia latrocinantur morte proposita, alii omnia, quae possunt, fana compilant. Credo, aut illos mortis timor terret aut hos religionis.

Sed quoniam non audes (jam enim cum ipso Epicuro loquar) negare esse deos, quid est, quod te impediat aut solem aut mundum aut mentem aliquam sempiternam in deorum numero ponere? 'Numquam vidi', inquit, 'animam rationis consiliique participem in ulla alia nisi humana figura'. Quid? solis numquidnam aut lunae aut quinque errantium siderum simile vidisti? Sol duabus unius orbis ultimis partibus definient motum cursus annuus conficit; hujus hanc lustrationem ejusdem incensa radii monstru spatio luna complet; quinque autem stellae eundem orbem tenentes, aliae propius a terris, aliae remotius, ab isdem principiis disparibus tempore eadem spatia consequi. Num quid tale, Epicure, vidisti? Ne sit
igitur sol, ne luna, ne stellae, quoniam nihil esse potest, nisi quod attigimus aut vidimus. Quid? deum ipsum numne vidisti? Cur igitur credis esse? Omnia tollamus ergo, quae aut historia nobis aut ratio nova affert. Ita fit, ut mediterranei

5 mare esse non credant. Quae sunt tantae animi angustiae?

Ut, si Seriphi natus esses nec umquam egressus ex insula, in qua lepusculus vulpeculasque saepe vidisses, non crederes leones et pantheras esse, cum tibi, quales essent, diceretur; si vero de elephanto quis diceret, ctiam rideri te putares. An quiquam (97)

10 tam puerile dici potest (ut eundem locum diutius urgeam), quam si ea genera belharum, quae in rubro mari Indiave gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquiere audire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa, quae terra, mari, paludibus, fluminibus exististunt; quae

15 negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus.

Et tu quidem, Vellei, non vestro more, sed dialecticorum, quae funditus gens vestra non novit, argumentis sententiam conclusi: beatos esse deos sumpsisti. Concedimus. Beatum autem sine virtute neminem esse posse. XXXII. Id quoque


25 gradatim? Nam a beatis ad virtutem, a virtute ad rationem

5 angustiae? ut cdd. after Madv., angustiae, ut mss. 10 diceretur CUT

Asc. +, dicerentur XBHK +. 11 rideri mss generally, irrideri ONV Asc. Red. Heind. an quicquam—vidimus follows virtus quam figura § 96 in all mss and cdd. Bake transp. see Comm. 8 diceretur CUT


video te venisse gradibus; a ratione ad humanam figuram quo modo accedilis? Praccipitare istuc quidem est, non des-
90 cendere. Nce vero intellego, cur maluerit Epicurus deos hominum similes dicere quam homines deorum. Quaeres, quid
intersit; si enim hoc illi simile sit, esse illud huic. Video; 5 sed hoc dico, non ab hominibus formae figuram venisse ad
deos; di enim semper fuerunt, nati numquam sunt, siquidem
acterni sunt futuri; at homines nati; ante igitur humana
forma quam homines ea, qua erant forma di immortalis. Non
erogo illorum humana forma, sed nostra divina dicenda est.
Verum hoc quidem, ut voletis; illud quaero, quae fuerit tanta
fortuna (nihil enim ratione in rerum natura factum esse vultis),
sed tamen quis iste tantus casus? unde tam felix concursus
atomorum, ut repente homines deorum forma nasciatur?
91 Seminane deorum decidisse de caelo putamus in terras, et sic 15
homines patrum similes exstitisse? Vellcm dicercetis; deorum
cognitionem agnoscerem non invitus. Nihil tale dicitis, sed
casu esse factum, ut essemus similes deorum. Et nunc argu-
menta quaerenda sunt, quibus hoc refellatur! Utinam tam
facile vera invenire possim quam falsa convincere!

XXXIII. Etenim enumerasti memoriter et copiose, ut
mili quidem admirari liberet in homine esse Romano tantam
sicentiam, usque a Thale Milesio de deorum natura philosopho-
92 rum sententias. Omnesne tibi illi delirare visi sunt, qui sine
manibus et pedibus constare deum posse decreverint? Ne hoc 25
quidem vos movet considerantes, quae sit utilitas quaque
opportunitas in homine membrorum, ut judicetis membris
humanis deos non egere? Quid enim pedibus opus est sine
ingressu? quid manibus, si nihil comprehendendum est? quid
reliqua discriptione omnium corporis partium? in qua nihil 30
inane, nihil sine causa, nihil supervacaneum est [; itaque nulla
ars imitari sollertiam naturae potest]. Habebit igitur linguam
deus et non loquetur, dentes, palatum, fauces nullum ad usum,
quaeque procreationis causa natura corpori affinxit, ea frustra habebit deus, nec externa magis quam interna, cor, pulmones, jecur, cetera, quae detracta utilitatem quid habent venustatis? quandoquidem haec esse in deo propter pulchritudinem vultis.

5 Istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram, Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausa est? seito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen. Tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae. Et soletis queri; Zeno quidem etiam litigabat. Quid dicam Albucium? Nam Phaedro nihil elegantius, nihil humanius; sed stomachabatur senex, si quid asperius dixeram, cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phaedoni Socratico turpissime male dixerit, Metrodori, sodalibus suis, fratrem, Timocrates, quia nescio quid in philosophia dissentiret, totis voluminibus concluderit, in Democritum ipsum, quem secutus est, fuerit ingratus, Nausiphanem, magistrum suum, a quo nihil didicerat, tam male acceperit. XXXIV. Zeno quidem non eos solum, qui tum erant, Apollodorum, Silum, ceteros, figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum, parentem philosophiae, Latino verbo utens scurrum Atticum fuisset dicebat, Chrysippum numquam nisi Chrysippam vocabant. Tu ipse paulo ante, cum tamquam senatum philosophorum recitares, summus viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas. Quorum si nemo verum vidit de natura deorum, verendum est, ne nulla sit omnino.

25 Nam ista, quae vos dicitis, sunt tota commenticia, vix digna lucubratione anicularem; non enim sentitis, quam multa vobis suscipla sint, si impetraritis, ut concedamus eandem hominum esse et deorum figuram. Omnis cultus et curatio corporis erit eadem adhibenda deo, quae adhibetur homini, ingressus, cursus, accubitio, inclinatio, sessio, comprehensio, ad extremum etiam sermo et oratio. Nam quod et mares deos et feminas esse dicitis, quid sequatur, videtis. Equidem mirari satis non pos-

8 est BC, sit AB\(^E\)EK +. 17 nihil MSS generally, non nihil N Red. edd. after Pearce. 19 Silum CBK, Sillum UHRM +, sillim A, Sylsum Asc. + Sch., sive BE. 21 Chrisippam AUG, Chrisippam BH\(^E\)K\(^2\), crisippam CECO, chrysippum BB\(^E\)K\(^1\), cesippum V Asc., Chesippum Dav. Heind. 

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qui adoleverit, nisi in eo, qui didicerit, nisi in eo, qui ex animo constet et corpore caduco et infirmo, postremo nisi in homine atque mortali. Quodsi in omnibus his rebus obsistis, quid est, quod te forma una conturbet? His enim omnibus, quae pro-

5 posui, adjunctis in homine rationem esse et mentem videbas; quibus detractis deum tamen nosse te dicis, modo linimenta maneant. Hoc est non considerare, sed quasi sortiri, quid loquare. Nisi forte non hoc attendis, non modo in homine, sed etiam in arbore, quicquid supervacaneum sit aut usum non habeat, obstare. Quam molestum est uno digito plus habere! Quid ita? Quia nec ad speciem nec ad usum alium quinque desiderant. Tuus autem deus non digito uno redundat, sed capite, collo, cervicibus, lateribus, alvo, tergo, poplitibus, manibus, pedibus, feminibus, cruribus. Si, ut im-

10 mortalis sit, quid haec ad vitam membra pertinent? quid ipsa facies? Magis illa, cerebrum, cor, pulmones, jeceur; haec enim sunt domicilia vitae; oris quidem habitus ad vitae firmatatem nihil pertinet.

XXXVI. Et eos vituperabas, qui ex operibus magnificis atque praeclaris, cum ipsum mundum, cum ejus membra, caelum, terras, maria, cumque horum insignia, solem, lunam stellasque, vidissent, cumque temporum maturitates, mutationes vicissitudinesque cognovissent, suspicitati essent aliquam excellentem esse praestantemque naturam, quae haec effecisset, moveret, regeret, gubernaret. Qui etiamsi aberrant a conjectura, video tamen, quid sequantur; tu quod opus tandem magnum et egregium habes, quod effectum divina mente videatur, ex quo esse deos susciper? Habebam, inquis, in animo insitam informationem quandam dei. Et barbari quidem Jovis, galeatae Minervae; num igitur esse tales putas? Quanto melius haec vulgus imperitorum, qui non membra solum hominis, sed etiam membrorum. Dant enim


3—2
arcum, sagittas, hastam, elipeum, fusciam, fulmen, et si, actiones quae sint deorum, non vident, nihil agentem tamen deum non queunt cogitare. Ipsi, qui irridentur, Aegyptii nullam beluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem, quam ex ea caperent, consecraverunt; velut ibes maximam vim serpentinum conficiunt, cum sint aves excelsae, cruribus rigidis, corneo procreroque rostro; avertunt pestem ab Aegypto, cum volucres angues ex vastitate Libyae vento Africo invectas interficiunt atque consumunt; ex quo fit, ut illae nec morsu vivae nocent nec odore mortuae. Possum de ichneumonum utilitate, de crocodilorum, de faelium dicere, sed nolo esse longus. Ita concludam, tamen beluas a barbaris propter beneficium consecratas, vestrorum deorum non modo beneficium nullum exstare, sed ne factum quidem omnino. Nihil habet, inquit, negotii. Profecto Epicurus quasi pueri delicati nihilo cessatione melius existimat. XXXVII. At ipsi tamen pueri, etiam cum cessant, exercitatione aliqua ludicra delectantur; deum sic feriatum volumnus cessatione torpere, ut, si se commoverit, vereamur, ne beatus esse non possit? Hace oratio non modo deos spoliat motu et actione divina, sed etiam homines inertes efficit, siquidem agens aliquid ne deus quidem esse beatus potest.

Verum sit sane, ut vultis, deus effigies hominis et imago; quod ejus est domicilium? quae sedes? qui locus? quae deinde actio vitae? quibus rebus, id quod vultis, beatus est? utatur enim suis bonis oportet et fruatur, qui beatus futurus est. Nam locus quidem iis etiam naturis, quae sine animis sunt, suus est cuique proprius, ut terra infimum teneat, hanc inundet aqua, superior æri, aetheris ignibus altissima ora reddatur. Bestiarum autem terrenae sunt aliae, partim aquatiles, aliae quasi ancipites in utraque sede viventes; sunt quaedam etiam, quae igne nasci poterunt appareantque in ardentibus fornicibus saepe volitantes. Quaero igitur, vester deus primum ubi habi-
tet, deinde quae causa eum loco moveat, si modo movetur aliquando, porro, cum hoc proprium sit animantium, ut aliquid appetat, quod sit naturae accommodatum, deus quid appetat, ad quam denique rem motu mentu ratione utatur, postremo quo modo beatus sit, quo modo aeternus. Quicquid enim horum attigeris, ulcus est. Ita male instituta ratio exitum reperire non potest. Sic enim dicebas, speciem dei percipii cogitatione, non sensu, nec esse in ea ullam soliditatem, neque eandem ad numerum permanere, eamque esse ejus visionem, ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, neque desicipiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similiun accessio, ex eoque fieri, ut in haec intenta mens nostra beatam illum naturam et sempiternam putet. XXXVIII. Hoc, per ipsos deos, de quibus loquimur, quale tandem est? Nam si tantum modo ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest, utrum de Hippocentauro an de deo cogitemus? Omnem enim talem conformationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis. Ut igitur Ti. Gracchum cum videor contentionem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam, tum eum motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem et Gracchi et Octavii imagines remanere, quae, in Capitolium cum pervenerint, tum ad animum meum referantur; hoc idem fieri in deo, cujus cerebra facie pellantur animi, ex quo esse beati atque aeterni intelle- gantur. Fac imagines esse, quibus pulsatur animi; species dumtaxat objectur quaedam; num etiam, cur ea beata sit, cur aeterna? Quae autem istae imaginum vestrae aut unde? A Democrito omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est, nec vos exitum reperitis, totaque res vacillat et claudicat. Nam quid est, quod minus probari possit? Omnium
in me incidere imagines, Homeri, Archilochi, Romuli, Numae, Pythagorae, Platonis, nec ea forma, qua illi fuerunt! Quo modo illi ergo? et quorum imagines? Orpheum poëtâm docet Aristoteles numquam fuisset, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt eujusdam fuisset Cercopis. At Orpheus, id est imago ejus, ut vos multit, in animum meum saepe incurrît.

108 Quid, quod eujusdem hominis in meum alia, alia in tum? quid, quod earum rerum, quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, ut Scyllae, ut Chimaeræ? quid, quod hominem, locorum, urbium earum, quis numquam vidimus? quid, quod, simul ac nihil collibitum est, praesto est imago? quid, quod etiam ad dormientem veniunt invocatae? Tota res, Vellei, nugatoria est. Vos autem non modo oculis imagines, sed etiam animis inculcatis. Tanta est impunitas garriendi. XXXIX. At quam licenter! 'Fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum, ut e multitua videatur.' Puderet me dicere non intellexere, si vos ipsi intellexeritis, qui ista defenditis. Quo modo enim probas continentem imagines ferri? aut, si continenter, quo modo acernae? 'Innumerableitas', inquit, 'suppeditat atomorum.' Num cadem ergo ista faciet, ut sint omnia sempiterna? Con- fugis ad aequilibritatem (sic enim sòvòµiαν, si placet, appellemus) et ais, quoniam sit natura mortalibus, immortales etiam esse oportere. Isto modo, quoniam homines mortales sunt, sint aliqui immortales, et quoniam nascentur in terra, nascantur in aqua. 'Et quia sunt quae interimant, sunt quae conservent'. Sint sane, sed ea conservent, quae sunt; deos istos esse non sentio.

Omnis tamen ista rerum effigies ex individuis quo modo corporibus oritur? quae etiamsi essent (quae nulla sunt), pellere se ipsa et agitari inter se concursu fortasse possent, formare, figurarare, colorare, animare non possent. Nullo igitur modo immortalalem deum efficitis. XL. Videamus nunc de beato. Sine virtute certe nullo modo; virtus autem actuosa, et deus vester nihil agens; expers virtutis igitur; ita ne beatus quidem. Quae ergo vita? ‘Suppeditatio’, inquis, ‘bonorum nullo malorum interventu’. Quorum tandem bonorum? Voluptatum, credo; nempe ad corpus pertinientium; nullam enim novistis nisi profectam a corpore et redeuntem ad corpus animi voluptatem. Non arbitror te, Vellei, similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus ille testatur se ne intellegere quidem ulla bonum, quod sit sejunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnes nominatim. Quem cibum igitur aut quas potiones aut quas vocum aut florum varietates aut quos tactus, quos odores adhibebis ad deos, ut eos perfundas voluptatibus? ut poëtæ quidem [nectar ambrosiam] epulas comparant et aut Juventatem aut Ganymedem pœcula ministrantem; tu autem, Epicure, quid facies? Neque enim, unde habeat ista deus tuus, video, nec quo modo utatur. Locupletior igiitur hominum natura ad beate vivendum est quam deorum, quod pluribus generibus fruitor voluptatum. At has leviores ducis voluptates, quibus quasi titillatio (Epicuri enim hoc verbum est) adhibetur sensibus. Quousque ludis? Nam etiam Philo noster ferre non poterat asperrnari Epicureos molles et delicatas voluptates;
DE NATURA DEORUM.

summa enim memoria pronuntiabat plurimas Epicuri sententias iis ipsis verbis, quibus erant scriptae; Metrodori vero, qui est Epicuri collega sapientiae, multa impudentiora recitabat; accusat enim Timocretam, fratrem sumum, Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia, quae ad beatam vitam pertineant, ventre metiri, neque id semel dicit, sed saepius. Annuere te video; nota enim tibi sunt; proferrem libros, si negares. Neque nunc reprehendo, quod ad voluptatem omnia referantur (alia est ea quaestio), sed doceo deos esse voluptatis experites, ita vestro judicio ne beatos quidem. XLI. At dolore vacant. Satin est id ad illam abundantem bonis vitam beatissimam? Cogitat, inquiunt, assidue beatum esse se; habet enim nihil aliud, quod agitet in mente. Comprehende igitur anirno et propone ante oculos deum nihil aliud in omni aeternitate nisi Mihi pulchre est et Ego beatus sum cogitantem. Nee tamen video, quo modo non vereatur iste deus beatus, ne intereat, cum sine ulla intermissione pulsetur agiteturque atomorum incursione sempiterna, eumque ex ipso imagines semper affluant. Ita nec beatus est vester deus nec acternus.

115 At etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Ti. Coruncanum aut P. Sceavolam, pontifices maximos, te audire dicas, non cum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem, nec manibus, ut Xerxes, sed rationibus deorum immortalium templum et aras evertet. Quid est enim, cur deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum di non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam allicere sapientem. An quicquam eximum potest esse in ea natura, quae sua voluptate laetans nihil nec actura sit umquam neque

2 iis ER, his MSS generally. 10 at A, CBK +, a ABEOHC. 14 pulchre Asc. C^HLCO, pulchro XBKM. 15 cogitantem here K ends. 16 non vereatur ABHILO Sch. Mu., non moveatur CEB, videatur MRCVU Asc., non pereat Or. Ba., non conteratur Madv. ne intereat B Sch. Mu., om. AEC Mus. Or. Ba., Heind. suggests quomodo videatur sibi iste deus beatus, aut quomodo non vereatur, ne intereat, Allen quo modo sibi videatur i. d. b. nec, ne intereat, vereatur. 21 Ti. edd. after Heind., om. MSS. 28 allicere GHRV, allicere U, elicere XOB +. 30 voluptate UOLMNVR, voluptate XBHC +.
agat neque egerit? Quae porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei debere potest? Est enim pietas justitia adversum deos; cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla cum deo sit communitas? Sanctitas autem est scientia coledorum deorum; qui quam ob rem colendi sint, non intellego, nullo nec accepto ab iis nec sperato bono.

XLII. Quid est autem, quod deos veneremur propter ad mirationem ejus naturae, in qua egregium nihil videmus? Nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis, facile est liberari, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum, qui omnino deos esse negabant, censes superstitiosos esse potuisse. Ego ne Protagoram quidem, cui neutrum licuerit, nec esse deos nec non esse. Horum enim sententiae omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis deorum, sed etiam religionem, quae deorum cultu pio continetur. Quid? ii, qui dixerunt totam de dis immortalibus opinionem factam esse ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? Quid? Prodicus Cius, qui ea, quae prodessent hominum vitae, deorum in numero habita esse dixit, quam tandem religionem reliquit? Quid? qui aut fortes aut claros aut potentes viros tradunt post mortem ad deos pervenisse, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari venerarique solemus, nonne expertes sunt religionum omnium? quae ratio maxime tractata ab Euhemero est, quem noster et interpretatus et secutus est praeter ceteros Ennius. Ab Euhemero autem mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hie confirmaesse videtur religionem an penitus totam sustulisse?

Omitto Eleusinem sanctam illam et augustam,

Ubi initiandur gentes orarum ultimae,
praetereo Samothraciam caque, quae Lemni
Nocturno aditu occulto coluntur,
Silvestribus saepibus densa.

Quibus explicatis ad rationemque revocatis rerum magis natura
cognoscitur quam deorum.

120 XLIII. Mihi quidem etiam Democritus, vir magnus in pri-
mis, cujus fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos irrigavit, nutare
videtur in natura deorum. Tum enim censet imagines divini-
tate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia men-
tis, quae sint in codem universon, deos esse dicit, tum animantes
imagines, quae vel prodesse nobis soleant vel nocere, tum ingen-
tes quasdam imagines tantasque, ut universum mundum com-
pletantur extrinsecus; quae quidem omnia sunt patria Demo-
criti quam Democrito digniora. Quis enim istas imagines com-
prehendere animo potest? quis admirari? quis aut cultu aut
religione dignas judicare? Epicurus vero ex animis hominum
extraxit radicitus religionem, cum dis immortalibus et opem et
gratiam sustulit. Cum enim optimam et praestantissimam
naturam dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in deo gratiam; tollit
id, quod maxime proprium est optimae praestantissimaeque
naturae. Quid enim melius aut quid praestantius bonitate et
beneficentia? Qua cum carere deum vultis, neminem deo nec
dem nec hominem carum, nenimem ab eo amari, nenimem
diligi vultis. Ita fit, ut non modo homines a dis, sed ipsi di
inter se ab aliis alii neglegantur. XLIV. Quanto Stoici melius,
qui a vobis reprehenduntur! Censent autem sapientes sapien-
tibus etiam ignotis esse amicos. Nihil est enim virtute amabi-
lius; quam qui adeptus erit, ubicunque erit gentium, a nobis
diligetur. Vos autem quid malis datis, cum in imbecillitate
gratificationem et benevolentiam ponitis! Ut enim omittam
vim et naturam deorum, ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbe-

menteisque quae Asc. TBMRV Allen. 10 sint ead. after Heind., sunt MSS.
23 adeptus erit MSS generally, adeptus fuerit El. Leg. Dav. 29 in imbecilli-
titate Lamb., inbecillitate G Moser’s MN, inbecillitate ABUT, inbecillitatem CE
Mss.
cilli essent, futuros beneficos et benignos fuisse? Nulla est caritas naturalis inter bonos? Carum ipsum verbum est amoris, ex quo amicitiae nomen est ductum; quam si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda, quem diligemus, non erit ista amicitia, sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum. Prata et arva et pecudum greges diligentur isto modo, quod fructus ex iis capiuntur; hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est. Quanto igitur magis deorum, qui nulla re egentes et inter se diligent et hominibus consulunt! Quod ni ita sit, quid veneramur, quid precamur deos? cur sacris pontifices, cur auspiciis augures praesunt? quid optamus a dis immortalibus? quid voevmus?

At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quae enim potest esse sanctitas, si di humana non curant? quae autem animans natura nihil curans? Verius est igitur nimimum illud, quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de dis immortalibus dixerit, invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse. Neque enim tam desipiens fuisset, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, liniamentis duntaxat extremis, non habitu solido, membris hominis praeeditum omnibus, usu membrorum ne minimo quidem, exilem quemdam atque perlucidum, nihil cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem. Quae natura primum nulla esse potest, idque videns Epicurus re tollit, oratione relinquit deos. Deinde, si maxime talis est deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat; quid enim dicam ‘propitius sit’? Esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in imbecillitate est et gratia et caritas.

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4 diligemus AB Sch. Mu., diligimus CT [CE] Or. Da. 8 qui nulla re UTOH Asc. [C+], qui in nulla re ABEMCR El.1,2+. egentes [XB]+, egentes sunt (cf. ii 21 sunt carentia) MRC El.1,2 Reg. U Asc. 13 liber est Epicuri MSS generally, Epicuri liber exstat OUT+. 20 homunculi MR Oxf. e Herv.+, homunculis XBH+ Heind. Allen. 24 gratificantem, omnino nihil CB Asc. Sch. Mu., gratificantem omnino, nihil Or. Da., gratificantem, nihil omnino C Red. Heind.
PREFACE TO THE COLLATIONS.

The following is Mr Swainson’s account of the MSS and editions collated by him.

B. Burney MS No. 148, small quarto, parchment, probably belongs to the 13th century, but appears from the handwriting to be copied from a MS of the 11th. This is the best of the British Museum MSS. It agrees closely with Orelli’s Cod. C. (the Leyden MS 118), which belongs to the 12th century; thus in i 25 both omit adiunxit, i 26 for discriptionem both have discrepationem, i 36 for pertinentem, pertingentem, i 95 for bipes, impes, ii 37 quoque... expletumque sit om., ii 147 spicuarem for disputarem, iii 86 protulissem for P. Rutilii sim. [Add i § 17 fretum for aequum, § 18 descendens sed for descendisset, § 23 naturam intelligens, § 25 curaque for cur aquae, § 37 sentias qui for sententia est qui, § 43 nec intelligi quicquam om., § 63 a parte for aperte, § 66 foranata for pyramidata, § 81 Junonem om., § 82 censes apud nullum for censes Apim illum, § 85 GR. added after sententiis, § 93 Silum, § 102 ratio for oratio, § 115 exeres for Xerxes. Ed.] The De Legibus which follows is styled “De iure civili et naturali iusticia.” (Written in Italy.)

H. Harleian MS 2465, late 15th cent. Parchment for the first 21 folios, the rest paper written in a different and later hand commencing with -pites of ancipites in i 103. Followed by “ulbellus de mondi essentia,” i.e. Timaeus. A parchment leaf at the end (part of a legal instrument) gives the date 1418. The first part agrees mainly with Cod. G. of Moser; thus both give causarum for rerum in i 9, Jouem ignem for Jouem in i 40, insert immittendique after minuendi in i 35. It has also much in common with Cod. Red. of Heindorf. Where it is corrected it is often impossible to decipher the original reading, and, as many of the corrections are
wrong, this is to be regretted. The paper part of the MS. agrees most closely with Cod. Fa. of Moser and Cod. Glog. of Heindorf, e.g. in 1106 *dissersentem for dehersentem sitellam.* (Written in Italy.)

I. Harleian ms 2511, 15th cent. Parchment quarto very clearly written. Followed by the *De Divinatione* of which Book II is styled "De Fato," at the end of this is *Finis, 1401;* then comes "De Essentia Mundi," at the end TEOC. This is a very worthless MS with constant omissions and blank spaces and seems to have been written by a scribe ignorant of Latin. After Ch. 10 of Book I, I have only noted the more extraordinary readings. It agrees mainly with Moser's Codd G. and K. (Written in Italy.)

K. Harleian ms 2622, end of the 11th cent., parchment, medium quarto; unfortunately ends with the word "Nec" in 1114. Preceded by "Paradoxa Stoicorum See." Though the transcriber is careless and the MS. is full of his corrections, yet this is the best of the Harleian MSS, often closely agreeing with B. and Cod. C. of Orelli. (Written in Flanders or Germany.) The united testimony of B and K is almost always decisive as to orthography.

L. Harleian ms 4662, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment. The present chapters are marked in the margin by a later hand. Followed by the *De Divinatione* (which is full of lacunae) and the *Paradoxa.* It abounds with transpositions and mainly agrees with I. [Notwithstanding its eccentricities, it contains some valuable readings. Ed.] (Italy.)

M. Harleian ms 5114, latter part of the 15th cent., parchment folio, very clearly written. Contains *De Legibus, De Academicius, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Officiis.* The MS comes nearest to C. below and Oxf. e. In many places it agrees with the readings of Thanner's edition of 1520. (Italy.)

N. Additional mss 11932, middle of 15th cent. Paper, small folio, from the library of Bishop Butler. Followed by the *De Divinatione, De Fato, De Creatione Mundi (Timaeus).* This agrees most closely with Cod. Red. of Heindorf and Cod. O. of Moser. [The scribe is more intelligent than the writer of I, but very unconscientious. Ed.] (South Germany or North Italy. I am indebted to Mr E. M. Thompson for this information, and for the correction of the dates in the Catalogue.)
[O. Additional mss 19586, end of 14th cent. Finely written on vellum, folio; is closely allied to L and I but less eccentric than either. It also agrees frequently with H and U; has been a good deal altered by the corrector. Contains De Inventione, Rhetoricorum Lib. IV., De Oratore, Oratoris ad M. Brutum liber, De Optimo genere Oratorum, De partitione Artis Oratoriæ, De Officiis, De Amicitia, De Senectute, Tusculanae Disputationes, De Creatione Celi, De Divinationibus, De Natura Deorum, Orationes. Collated by Mr Bickley of the British Museum, and compared by myself. Ed.] The preceding eight mss are all in the British Museum.

C. ms 790 Dd. xiii. 2, in the Cambridge University Library, 15th cent. Finely written on parchment, folio. See the Catalogue of the mss preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge, i 507. The ms was written "per manus Theodorici Nycolai Werken de Abbenbroeck (in S. Holland): liber explicit anno domini mcccxliv alias 1444." It is the Cod. Cantabrigiensis of Davies, who says of it on i 20, "codex est perparvi pretii," but it has some excellent and unique readings. [A remarkable feature of this ms is the frequency of small alterations, either in the order of the words, or in the words themselves, as igitur for ergo &c. Ed.] It is divided into chapters, Book i into the prologue (which absurdly ends with the word repellendi in ch. 3 § 5) and 62 chapters; Book ii into 68, and Book iii into 77 chapters. The collation given by Davies is imperfect and often wrong.

R. The Roman edition of 1471 of the Opera Philosophica. Vol. i contains the N. D.; there are two copies of it in the British Museum, in one of which (N. 720, l. 6) a folio, containing i 25 § 69 effugeret to i 27 § 77 codem modo, is wanting, but the other (C. i. c. 11) is perfect. It was printed by Sweynheym and Pannartz, as the lines declare at the end of the Cato Maior; "Hoc Conradius opus Sweynheym ordine Miro Arnoldusque simul Pannartz una aede colendi Gento Theotonica: Rome expediere sodales." Then follows the date "Anno Xbn MCCCLXXI die vero xxvii mensis Aprilis Rome in domo magnifici viri Petri de Maximo." The text is generally very good, many of the best readings in the edition of Hervag (Basle, 1534), praised by Moser and Creuzer, seem taken from it, and many of the conjectures attributed to Lambinus may be already found there. It was probably printed from the ms in the
Vatican called La. by Moser, or from some MS from which La. was derived, hence the reading Antenulus for a nonnullis in III § 53, &c.

V. The Venice edition of 1471 printed by Vindellinus de Spyra. There is a copy of this in the Grylls Collection in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge. The volume contains a life taken from Plutarch, then the lives of Cornelius Severus which are found in M. Ann. Seneca, Suasor. vii (given by Orelli, Ecl. Poet. Lat. p. 261, Anthol. Lat. 2. 155), “Oraque magnanimum... sub umbris,” with the date at the foot A.D. M.CCCC.LXXI. The volume ends with a treatise “de disciplina militari,” which is found in several of the older editions. [Generally agrees with the edition of Ascensius. Ed.]

V₁. By this I denote the MS corrections in the Grylls copy of V which are often of great value.

Z denotes the consensus of all the above MSS.

There is a copy of the Bologna edition of 1494, in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, bound up with the edition by Victor Pisanus of the Orator, &c., printed at Venice, in 1492. This copy belonged to R. Laughton, and is the one used by Davies who frequently gives its readings. It is noticeable for the reading in III 63 “et Orbonae ad,” but otherwise generally agrees with V.

[I have printed Mr Swainson’s collations in full for all the MSS as far as § 12, but after that only for B and K, giving selected readings of the others, except in doubtful and disputed passages, where all the readings are given. I have also occasionally added authorities for the reading in the Text, where Mr Swainson had only noticed the variants. Ed.]
COLLABORATION OF ENGLISH MSS.


BOOK I.


M. C.


sermonem B, variosque sermones C. sermonem partim] p. s. I. admirantium
ammirantur B. philosophandi[ prophetandi L. nobis subito studium]
stud. n. sub. HIL, subito om. C. qua de] qua de N, de quaque C, quaque
sensi C. potissimum] potissimum [I, potissime R. eriperet] eripiet B.
ofunderet] eff. IKLNCO. desertaeque] desertae etiamque N. et iam] iam
om. BL, etiam IN. necopinatum a nobis] ne opinatum a nobis I, nec a nobis
opinatum V, text V1, susceptum] suspectum LN. coepimus] cepimus M.
philosophari] philosophiae N. in eo] meae I. studio] studii HKL MV.
tum] tun O, tamen C. philosophabamur] praeliabamur O. orationes
oratres I. refertac] referetac IM. sententiis] sententiam N. Dios-
dotus] Diodorus INO, didoctus L. Philo] phile L, pilio N, filio C.
Antiochos] Anth. HN, Antianus I. Posidonius[ Posidonius BHIMNC.
institutii] instructi O. philosophiae praecepta] pr. ph. V. referuntur

f. exp. C. possimus] possimus HINOC. cum otio] otio cum IL, cum
oracione MC. is essel] is esse B, esset is H. rei publicae] rei B.
unius] minus V, text V1, atque cura...nostris marg. only of H. primum
praemiiis N. causa philosophiam] cum I, eam N. magni] et m. N.
V1, etiam litteris] I. etiam H, et l. N. Evoque...commoverim] om. I. me 8
minus] me om. HL (the latter placing minus after mei), minus N. multorum
...studia...multos...studio NR. commoverim] commoveri LN. complures
cum plures HN. enim] etiam L, cum O. Graccis] gravis C. inst.
eruditio] constitutionibus instituti N. cum civibus] concivibus CR.
tantam but u above a B, tum N. profecisse] proficist N. ne verborum
quident] nec xverb. quidem H, nec (ne N) quidem verborum ILN. etiam est] 9
est etiam HIL. haec] hoc LN. conferre] conferre I, conferem L, con-
hae C. melius frui] frui m. C. pertractandum] tractandum LN. omnes
omnis B. tum] tam II, tune MC. facillime] difficillime O. cum
quom H, tum L. seriesque] atque series N. rerum] causarum HILOV.
alia ex alia nexe] alia ex alia noxa I, aliae ex alis nexe MNC.
After nexa HV
insert ratione. aptae] actae H, aperte O. videantur I. uidentur N.

de re] de quaque re HILN. ipsi] om. L. quam necesse] quan quod
necesse V, text V1, rationis] rationes K. quaerenda] requirenda N.
profecturum] proficium L. id] id quod HN. enim] ei I. habent
Pythagoreis] Pith. B, pythagoricis HIV, pythagorics K, pictagorics LN, pit-
gorics C. eis L, his BC, his V. qua re] quia N. dixit] áuros

4—2
13 VI. Only a selection of the readings is given from this point.


infixa caelo] infixa quasi c. \( \text{HN} \), fixa c. \( \text{LO} \), infra caelois \( \text{M} \), infra infixa caelo \( \text{C} \).

sunt\( [\text{sint BKLM.}\) octavamque] octauamque \( \text{HMN} \).

qui quo...non potest\( \) om. \( \text{LO.}\) possint\( [\text{possunt HMN.}\) Ieracldites\( \) Er. \( \text{BMC} \), Eraclitus \( \text{N} \), Heraclites \( \text{R.}\) modo\( [\text{tum modo BKNCV, tamen modo KMR, inde modo L.}\)

tum\( [\text{dum II, tam N. etiam om. LO. in libro} \) in om. \( \text{LNRV, rest. V.} \)

divinum\( [\text{divinae H.}\) tum\( [\text{tum modo K.}\) Strato 35

is\( [\text{is Strato his E. Stratoris LV, text V.}\)

minuendi\( [\text{minuendique NR, immittendique add HV.}\)

XIV. obtinere\( [\text{opt. HLV, retinere N. intelligere...animantem} \) om. \( \text{c. 36}\)

ial\( [\text{in alio V.}\) si\( [\text{sed N. potest qui potest N. omnem naturam}\)

V, naturam omnium \( \text{H}, omnium naturam all others.}\) pertinentem\( [\text{pertinentem BKX, continentem O.}\)

\( \text{XVI.}\)

ut Z, except et N.\( [\text{divina diiunum KMNC RV, text V.}\)

esse\( [\text{sit ILV, om. O. affectam} \) affectum E, effecta V.\)

theogoniam id est originem deorum\( [\text{Z (but id est originem is only in marg.}\)

of L.}\)

usitatas\( [\text{usitas HV}, usititas V.}\)

appellatur\( [\text{HKKMCV, appellaturo BLO.}\)

sententia\( [\text{sententia est sentias B, sentencias K.}\)

Cleanthes\( \) Cleantesc\( 37\)

IIKCR, Cloantes I.\( [\text{mundum deum M, d. m. BHK. undique...atque}\)

om. C.\( [\text{udique unde} \) undeque V.\)

cingentem B, agentem\( [\text{L. qui aether\) quaia ether B. nominetur}\)

nominatur L.\( [\text{deliri\)us ans K.}\)

issis\( [\text{his BV.}\)

voluptatem\( [\text{volutatem}\) voluntatem HILMOV.\)

divinius\( [\text{divinitus K, divinum LO, divinum V.}\)

animi\( [\text{animus K.}\)

notione rationem\( [\text{H, ratione LNO, nacione C.}\)

XV. at Persaeus\( [\text{atque persedius N, at Perses O.}\)

dicit\( [\text{HMNCV, 38}\)

om. BIKL, vult O.\( [\text{a quibus}\) e quibus K.\)

quo quid quicquid K.\( [\text{morte\) leto K.\)}

Chrysippus\( [\text{chrisippus E.}\)

vaferimus B.\( [\text{vaferimus}\) eterinus HMN, 39\)

außerimus O.\( [\text{ura referinus L, etererimus MC,}\)

"vaferimus al."

C, referi-

num E.\( [\text{eos ne}\) eos nec HLMCV, nec eos N.}\)

cognitione\( [\text{cognitione O.}\)

possit\( [\text{posset K.}\)

universitate\( [\text{universitate}\) universam atque Z, except universa atque R.\)

fatalem\( [\text{faciem K.}\)

vin et necessitate\( [\text{umbrae et nec Z.}\)

ut et aquam\( [\text{et om. HCOV.}\)

et terram et\( [\text{et terram N.}\)

solem et\( [\text{et solem}\) et LO.}\)

continenter\( [\text{continenter}\) continenter H, continenter N.\)

eum\( [\text{eum}\) eum H, deum\( [\text{ipsam N, deum V.}\)

appellarent\( [\text{appellant M, appellant R.}\)

manaret\( [\text{B.}\)

Neptunum\( [\text{Neptunum B (Corssen t. 435).}\)

reliquorum\( [\text{eatererim O.}\)

etiam om. C.\( [\text{O.}\)

et aeterna\) et om. B.\)

Orphei\( \) Orfei BK.\)

Musei\( [\text{Musaei K.}\)

Musi\( [\text{K.}\)

dixerat\( [\text{LO, dixerit all others.}\)

sunt IC, sint all others.\( [\text{eo om. LO.}\)

de om. C.\( [\text{partum...ortuamque}\)

partu\( [\text{ortuque BK.}\)

trahend\( [\text{trahend}\) traducens\( [\text{transducens R, deducens LOC.}\)

deiungit\( [\text{deiungit}\) traungit H (diuungit marg.), disiusungit V.\)

a om. O.\)

XVI.\( [\text{delirantium} \) deliverantium K.\)

multo\( [\text{k multa K.}\)

inducerunt\( [\text{42}\)

deos\( [\text{inducerint d. O, d. introduxerunt N.}\)

fecerunt [fecerint O.\)

quere-las\( [\text{K, quarelas M, quarelas B and others.}\)

concubitus\( [\text{concubitus B.}\)

immortalibus\( [\text{NCO, immortal others.}\)

in maxima inconstantia m. in constantia H.\)

veritat\( [\text{is veritas}\) veritatiq\)ue V.\)

ignorantiae\( [\text{ignoratione}\) ignorantiae K, 43\)

ignorantiae LO.\( [\text{versantur}\) versamur B.\)

Epicurum\( [\text{Epicurum H.}\)

et\( [\text{ut HMN, habere}\) habere HMKCV, text V,\)

bene L.\( [\text{παλαιφω} \) pro plebs in B, problem\) K, problem\) L, problem\) M\)

MC, problebim B,\( [\text{proplebim K, proplebim RV.}\)

id\( [\text{id est anteceptam}\) id est ante coceptam BK, om. L.\)

in-
COLLATIONS

[Display of a page with Latin text]

inquirit HMKLCNCRV, vitae] vitam et Z, mentisque] mentis et HV, mentis atque all others, agitamentam] agitamentum O.


53 nee HV, text V, fabricam tamque eam] fabricamque eam HN, fabricatam eam L, fabricamque eam V, text V, facile] facile HO, negatis]

COLLATIONS

58

COLLATIONS


COLLATIONS OF ENGLISH MSS.


fece rerat fest except fecerun B. dicat aliquid esse beatum] dic. al. 86

CHO, religiones BK, religio MR. Epicuro] Epicureo B. loquar
num] auct BK. attigimus] attingimus HKC. aut uel K. numne

XXXII. quem tibi] que tibi B, om. lacuna I. istue pervenire...gradatim] om. B. After peruenire, Quod autem est istuc gradatim HILMNKR, Quod autem est gradatim istud K. Quid autem enim istue gradatim N, Quod est autem istue gradatim C, Quod autem est istuc: gradatim V. sumpsisses tuo iure] om. H. a beatiss habeatis BL. ad rationem...gradibus] om. B. a ratione quid O. maluerit] mali erit B, voluerit N. Epicurus] before 90

hic marcus N, Hemarucus C, Simachus V. Leontium] Leonticum O, leno-

collation B. Theophrastum. est sit BK MO CR. illa quidem illo L. illa O. quidem illa CRV. Attico attice I. sed tamen tamentum BHKL 

MR. sed tamen unde I. sed tamen cur tamentum N. sed tamentum C. sed cur tamentum V. hortus] ortus KOV. text V. quieri quari M. quaerere NV. 


quia Timocrates quia BC. Timocratemenque H. conderit consideret HN. considerent O. nihil] non nihil N. 

XXXIV. Silum] BK. sillum H. MR. sollum (but second l marked as spurious) H2. sine ILO. lillum C. Syllum V. Sylhum V. 


94 ne] om. B. impetratis] interpretaturis H. impetraturis K MNCRV. 

candem hominem esse] esse candem hom. H. esse hom. candem C. adhibitum] 


uidentis H.igitur non] autem non K. non igitur RV. seccento] sec- 
centu BKMCRV. centum LO. cetera L. sex N. ratio] ratio inquis C. 

evque] ea quae MV. divina natura] in div. nat. O. divinias naturae HM 

certis O. decorum] deo Z. 

97 XXXV. ut] et B. urget] BK MO. urget] others. in rubro] in- 

ait CO. elephanto] elephante R. at figura] LHOC. ad figuram BK. 

98 moribus paribus] par. om. BKLMCRV. qui natus] quantus B. omnibus 

hic] hominibus his B. his om. H. forma una] CR. uma f. others. rationem. 


nee ad speciem ncc ad usum alium] nce speciem nce ad usum alium B. nce speciem nce usum alium HKLMNORV. nce usum alium 
nce speciem C. popilitus] pobl. K. pollicibus LN. feminibus] femoribus 

HNO. pulmones] pulmo VO. 

100 XXXVI. et] at HCRV. horum] corum L0. vicissitudinesque] que 

om. L. efficisset] BK. fecisset others. aberrant] aberrant BHN. aber- 

rant L0. a conciectura] Z. esse deos] deos esse H. habebam 

babemus H2. habebi L0. iniquis] iniquid B. humi] non L. esse tales] 

101 tale esse C. esse om. MRV. rest. V. tribuant] BKHCMOV. tribuant L0. 

viden] uident BK. ibes] ibides H2. ibes quae C. Libya] Libiae BK. 

possum] possem O. ichuncumor] ichuncumor B. ichuncumor H. croco- 
dilorum] crocodilorum BV. crocodilorum HOV. crocodilorum C. crocodilorum E. 

faelium] HKMN. felium others. longus] longior V. concludam] con-
112 CMRV. persequitur?] prosequitur H. aut quas potiones om. H. ut
potiac] Z. ambrosium ambrosiae H. epulas] epulis ILON. Inven-
tutem] BK, inuentutem MV (with neil inuenem written above) H, text V. est]
113 om. R. ducis] dicitis H, dicens NR. quibus...roluptates] om. I.
titillatio] titillatio B, titillatio CV. nam etiam] nam enim BHKMN, nam
LORV, non enim (omitting non below) C. iis] B, his others. vero] autem
H. sapientiac sapientior MCRV. multa] muito C. impudentiora
imprud. LNO. Timocrates] timotheum H. ad beatam] abeatam B.
alia est ca quaedam] om. C.

114 XLI. at] BK, a HNCO. at dolore vacant] dolore vacat L. sativ
est] sat injust K. cet id] est idem O, enim H, est MCR. abundantem
habendantem EBIK. cogitat] cognitam LO. pulchro] CHLO. pulcher
BKMVR, text V. non nereatur] ILO, rideatur MCRV, non moveatur B,

115 efluent IC. Ti] om. Z. Coruncanum] Coruncanum B, Coruncanum
HC, corum comam I, Coruncanum MCRV. P. Secoralum H, Pseuclam B,
Secoralum VO. Xerxes] exerxes B. evcrterit] evcrterit LMC, avertit V,
text V. est] om. B. allicere] HRV, cllicere BMNOCV, cligeri I,
dicere L. voluptate] LMRVO, voluptate BHC. deberi] debebe B.
adversum] adversus CR. sint] sunt MO.

117 XLII. liberari] C, liberare BMNO. ne] nec B. Pragoram]
protulerim HN. licuerit] licuerit MCRV. religionem catur] religionem-
que C. quid ii] hi uero HN, qui duo ILO, quid ii duo V. Prodii-
cus] Prodigus BNC, prodigiis HI. Cius] V, chiis BLO, chius HIMCRV.

Euhemer] heuhemero B, heu hemor 01, Homeru HINO2, Euheno L, Euchenero
MV, text V, Euenero R. Ennius] Aenius V, so II. 18. 49. demonstra-
trut] monstratur M. Eleusinum] BMR, Eleusinam HLNV, Eleusina V1,
oraram] horarum BH. quae Lenui] quadem ni H, quae leni N.

120 XLIII. irrigavit] rigavit L. naturae] nature H, natura N. in
universitate] om. H, universitate MCRV. tum] tamen (thrice) C. prin-
cipia] principio L. mentis] mentesque BMRV, mentes HLCO. sint]
sunt Z. codem universo] codem universus B. solvant] solunt Z.

121 potria] poria BN, paria with nel puero written above H. ideum] is idem
MNRV, iis idem C. quid enim] quid est O. praestantius] pr. est H.

122 XLIIV. autem] enim C, etiam V. qui] quicumque C. in imbec-
ilitate] inbecillitatem BHC, inbecillitatem INNOEV. benevolentiam] beni-
dictum BMR. referencia] referamus O. iis] B, his B. qui nullo
regentes] HO, qui in n. re gentes B, qui in n. re eg. sunt MR, quid in n. re
eg. sunt C. auspicis] aut epicis B, auguriis H. voremus] vornemus

123 B. monenur LO. liber est EP.] Epicuri liber ut tat O. tam] ita M.
homunculis BHLOCV, homunculus N. omnino nihil] nihil om. LC. re-
linquit] relinquit B, relinquit MCRV. in imbecilitate] in om. EI, ex imb. H.
est] om. MR. et gratia et om. H.
NOTES.

A. INTRODUCTION. I. i—vii. 17.

a. Dedication to Brutus. The importance and difficulty of the subject; variety of opinions; some asserting the existence of the gods, some doubting, some denying it. Those who believe in their existence differ as to their nature; the Epicureans denying that they pay any regard to human affairs, the Stoics affirming that the universe is ordered by them for the good of man, while the Academy holds that man has no right to dogmatise, and confines itself to the criticism of the other schools. §§ 1—5.

Cum sint—tum est. Heindorf with some of the less important mss reads sunt, 'sermonis legi convenienter'; but both constructions are allowable, see Madv. Fin. 1 10, Roby Gr. §§ 1734, 1735. The Ind. which is found in the very similar passage Divin. 1 7 cum omnibus in rebus temeritas turpis est, tum in eo loco maxime which concerns religion, is more naturally used in comparing particular cases ('as—so' 'both—and'); the Subj. views the particular case in relation to the general principle, as in Off. III 5 cum tota philosophia frugifera sit, tum nullus feracior in ea loco est quam de officiis, and Lact. 23 with Seyffert's note. Translate, 'while there are many questions in philosophy which are far from having been fully cleared up, there is one of special difficulty, I mean the inquiry into the nature of the gods'. ['I think that in nearly all the passages where cum—tum is used by C. there is a contrast between a general statement and a particular case, whether the clause with cum contains an Ind. or a Subj. If the cum clause introduces a fact viewed as a concession made by the speaker, then the Subj. is necessary; otherwise not.' J. S. R.]

ad agnitionem animi pulcherrima: 'ennobling as regards our recognition of the soul's nature'. For construction cf. 1 98 ad figuram quae vastior? II 87 ad speciem pulchriores, 155 nulla species ad rationem praestantior. The thought is that expressed by Minucius Felix 17 nisi divinitatis rationem diligenter excussersis, nescias humanitatis, and by C. himself in the Tusculans, written a few months before the N. D. animus divinus est...si deus aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis i 65; ut deum agnoscis ex...
operibus ejus, sic ex memoria vin dicinam mentis agnoscat 1 70; ut ipsa se mens agnoscat, conjunctameque cum divina mente se sentiat v 70; also N. D. i 91, Div. i 64 and the striking passage in Leg. i 8 24, 25. See too the fragment of the Consolatio quoted on § 9, and Somn. Scip. 24 demum te scito esse: ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipsa deus aeternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternae mort. If the soul is divine, either as being in itself divinum particula aurae (the Stoic view) or as of kindred nature (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γίνομεν ἄτροφος, πατήρ ἄνδραν τε θεόν τε) or as capable of being made like to God (Plato's ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ), it is evident that the inquiry into the divine nature will throw light upon our own, and will at the same time raise our ideas as to the dignity of man. See on the general subject the introductory Sketch of Greek Philosophy and Krische Die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker p. 7. The word agnito is not used elsewhere by C. On the distinction between it and cognitio (read by Wolf and others) see Schömann's Opusc. iii 291, Heidtmann zur Krit. d. N. D. Neustettin 1858.

pulcher: for spelling, see Orator 160 cum seirem ita maiores locutos esse ut nasquam nisi in vocali aspiratione utentur, loquebar sic ut pulcros, Cetegos, triumphos, Kartaginem dicere: aliquando, idque sero, convicio aurium cum extorta mihi veritas esset, usum loquendi populo concessi, scientiam mihi reservavi. Rothe Gr. § 132. [That the e passed into ch in pulcere and not in ludt-ee-r is no doubt due to the l as sepulchreem'. J. S. R., who refers to Corssen n² 150, Ribbeck Very. Prol. p. 424, and quotes Roscher in Curtius' Studien ii 145, scriptaram 'pulcher' non probant Varro (cf. Charis. p. 73, 17 k) et Scuarius (p. 2256 Pa.), probaverunt Probus (cath. 14, 38 k) Suntra (ap. Scuarius l. l.) qui vocabulum a Graeco πολύχρωσ deri-vandum esse censet, Velius Longus (2230 Pa.), Marius Victorinus (2466 Pa.)].

ad moderandam religionem: 'for regulating religious observances.' These will vary according to the idea we have of God: contrast the worship of a Bacchus and an Apollo, still more of Juggernant and of Christ. The same idea is expressed in the words 'God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.' Cf. Dicin. ii 149 ut religio propaganda est quae est juncta cum cognitione naturae, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendae. C. lays down rules for religious rites in Leg. ii 19—22, and Seneca in Epp. 41 and 95 (primus est deorum cultus deos cerere, satis illos coluit quisque imitatus est, &c.) and other passages cited by Zeller Stoic, p. 326 Eng. tr. See for Epicurean view Luer. v 1198 nec pietas ullo, &c.

de qua: the relative refers to the remoter antecedent quaestio. Heidtmann, who would himself omit quaе—necessaria, quotes exx. from Laud. 76, 97, 100. Cf. Dietesch ad Sall. Cat. 48.

tam variæ—inscientiam. The mss are very corrupt here: A and B³ read sint for sunt; ut is omitted in most; A and C¹ omit ten lines from esse debeat to sententias; Ursinus tells us that the words causam—scientiam and the que after prudenter did not exist in a ms used by him; B³ E have
causa principium, B causa et principium, C causam id est principium; lastantly all but one appear to have scientiam for inscientiam. Wytenbach followed by Heindorf and Creuzer omits the clause id est principium philosophiae, which is usually explained by a reference to Arist. Met. 1 2 10 διὰ τὸ φείγειν τὴν ἀγνοιαν ἐφιλοσοφήσαν, 'the great discrepancy of opinions is an evidence that the cause or starting-point of philosophy was the painful consciousness of ignorance, and that the Academics are justified in refusing to make any affirmation on points where certainty is unattainable'. (See Krische p. 7.) But this explanation is unsatisfactory on several grounds; (1) there is no reason for making any reference to the origin of philosophy, (2) the present discrepancy of opinions is no argument as to what may have been the origin of philosophy, (3) the origin of philosophy is in no way connected with the Academic principle (itself the result of a long history of philosophy) that man must be content with probability, (4) bare ignorance is very far from being the cause of philosophy, and it would be an altogether wrong use of words to make inscientia=τὸ φείγειν τὴν ἀγνοαν, (5) principium philosophandi would have been a more appropriate expression for the supposed sense. Nor is it much more satisfactory to interpret the clause as affirming that the Socratic confession of ignorance is the starting-point of philosophy in the individual (cf. Ac. 1 44). If we retain the ordinary reading, I think it is best to take it as giving the sceptical view, 'the cause and origin of this whole windbag of philosophy is ignorance', cf. Sext. Emp. Math. ix 29 τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀποφάσεως (παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφοις) τὴν ἀγνωσίαν τοῦ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστημονίας. But though such language may have been used by Hortensius and others (Fin. 1 2), it is hardly conceivable that C. should have adopted it as his own. I should prefer therefore to follow Ursinus (if one only knew what his ms. was?) or Heind., whose reading gives an excellent sense though somewhat clumsily expressed: 'the discrepancy of opinions proves that they all sprang from ignorance, and that the Academics are right in refusing to make any positive assertion'. The interpolation of the clause omitted by him would be easily accounted for by the supposition that id principium philosophiae was a gloss on the words Academicos assensionem cohibuisse, meaning that this was the leading principle of their philosophy. The variety of opinions was the 10th of the common-places used by the Sceptics to prove that knowledge was unattainable, see Sext. Emp. Hyp. 1 14 145. Baiter, in order to keep the sīnt of the majority of ms's, inserts cum, reading debent for debeat in apodosi, but this is awkward after cum multae; and it is also more natural to introduce the discrepancy of opinion as a distinct statement to be proved by what follows, etsit in hac quaestione, rather than to refer to it as already known. Orelli follows Ernesti in inserting id before magno, an

1 'Magna est suspicion cum virum quae sibi placere finxisse', Moser, Præf. ad Tusc. p. xviii; 'Ursini codices, qui ubicunque haeserat praesto erant, commenora nihil attinet', Madv. Præf. ad Fin. p. xxxix.
alteration which Sch. also (Opusc. iii 294) thinks required unless *debeat* is substituted for *debeat* of mss. Might not the subject of the verb be supplied from the preceding clause (*tam varias esse*)? [I take the words *causam—inscribatur* to mean that the true theory of philosophy is that which denies *exspectationem*, in other words that which the Academics oppose to the Stoics'. J. S. R.]


assensionem: quam Graeci *σννκατάθεσιν* vocant Cie. Ac. ii 12 27. Carneades is said ex animis extraxisse assensionem ut faram et immanem belum. Ac. ii 108.

ass. cohib. the *ἐτροφή* of the Sceptics and Academics, Ac. ii 59.

turpium: most mss have fortius from which Manutius conjectured *foedius*, but Sch. (Opusc. iii 358) points out that this word, which implies something shocking or disgusting, would be far too strong for the occasion. Turpium is used in similar passages, e.g. i 70 hoc dicere turpium est, Ac. i 45 (Arcaeaus negebant) quipqualium esse turpium quan cognitioni et perceptioni adsensionem approbationemque praecurrere, Diein. i 7 omnibus in rebus temeritas in deseciendo erroque turpium est.

perceptum et cognitionem: the two verbs serve to translate the single Gr. *να*καλαμβάνεσθαι. See Reid on Acad. ii 34 peréip' atque comprehendi, 'C. proceeds as usual on the principle described *Fin. iii 14* crit notiius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus'. The Academica are occupied with the discussion whether our knowledge amounts to a *perc. et cog.*, i.e. whether we can arrive at real certainty both by sense-impressions and by reasoning, as the Stoics affirmed, or must be satisfied with a greater or less amount of probability, according to the Academic view. The word *expolrat* has a half-technical force: *Quid habeant in rebus bonus et malis explorati*? is the exclamation of the Academic (Ac. ii 129).


§ 2. velut: 'for instance', introducing an example of a general principle already stated, cf. § 101 *velut ibes*, ii 124 *relati errorediti*.

quod—trahirumur: relative clause explained by the following deos esse.

quo=ad quod. The argument from universal consent is urged § 33, ii 12, Leg. i 24, Tusc. i 30.

plerique deos esse dixerunt, dubitare se Protagoras, nullos esse Dioporas: 'While the majority have maintained the existence of the Gods, Prot. (see Introduction) doubted, &c.' On the asyndeton see § 20 *ejus principium*; on Diaig. and Theod. § 63. All three names are referred to by Min. F. c. 8.
sunt in varietate: § 31 sunt isdem in erratis, § 37 magno in errore sententia est, § 29 in maximo errore versatur, so § 43.

ut molestum sit: 'that it would be troublesome'. The Subj. belongs to the clause independently of its consecutive subordination, unless we include (as we probably should do) molestum est in the class of cases, such as longum est, in which the Latin idiom has the Ind. where we use the Subj. See n. on § 19.

dinumerare: 'to reckon up in groups', see Sch. Opusc. III 359.

figuris: e.g. round or in human shape, § 46; locis 'regions', e.g. the intermundia; sedes implies a closer connexion, as of Neptune with the sea, of Juno with Argos, see § 103.

actio vitae: verbal from agere vitam; see §§ 17, 45, 103, Div. II 89, actio rerum Ac. II 62, with Reid's n. [and cf. actio vitae Off. I 17; actio rerum Off. I 83, 127, 153; agitatio rerum De Or. III 88; actus rerum Suet. Claud. 15, 23, Nero 17, Aug. 32. J. S. R.]

quod—continet: relative clause explained by following substantival clause utrum—moveantur 'as to that which'. The proper antecedent is de eo omitted after dissensio est.

rem causamque: 'the matter in dispute'.


moliantur: 'attempt', used of a laborious undertaking.

curatione: less common in this sense than procuratio, but found in II 158.

facta: not creation out of nothing—no philosophy had broached this idea, see Mosheim in Cudworth III 140 foll.—but the bringing of order out of Chaos.

errore: 'uncertainty', see Fin. v 6 15, Liv. I 21 in re tam clara nominum error manet, utrius populi Horatii, utrius Curiatii fuerint, with Seeley's note, Ox. Fast. iv 669; and the exx. in Sch.'s note here. [As error is coupled here with ignorantio, so with inscientia in Sull. 40. J. S. R.]

Ch. II. § 3. fuerunt qui censerent: the proper Perf. is strictly followed by the Pres. or Perf. Subj. but the fact that the same form stands for Perf. and Aor. in Latin often leads to a confusion in the construction; cf. § 8 tantum profecisse videmur ut vinciremur, 54 imposuistis quem timeremus, II 153 satis docuisset videor quanto anteiret, and exx. in P. S. Gr. § 229, where this is stated to be the prevailing idiom in C. (we have the Perf. however in § 7 proescripserit). See also Roby p. 194 n. and § 1510. [Cf. Hugo Lieven Die Consecutio Temporum des Ciceron Riga 1872 esp. exx. in p. 45 (2). J. S. R.]

pietas: duteous affection towards those to whom we are in any way bound, our relations, benefactors, our country, the Gods; sanctitas purity, uprightness, dignity of character, the disposition which seeks to fulfill all righteousness; religio (in its subjective meaning) a sense of obligation, not necessarily accompanied by personal attachment. The definitions given by C. himself elsewhere do not seem very applicable, e.g.
§ 116 quae pictas ei debetur a quo nihil acceptis?...est enim pictas justitia adversum deos.....sanctitas autem est scientia coelorum deorum where see nn.; and Top. 23: 90 sanctitas = aequitas erga manes.

pure atque caste: a phrase properly used of the white garments and ceremonial washings of the sacrificer, but also of the mind, as in Die. 1 121 costus animus purusque, Leg. 11 24 caste jubet lex adire ad deos, animo videlicet in quo sunt omnia.

tribuenda: not a very appropriate word in reference to what precedes (sanctitas, &c.) but the antithesis requires that the same word should be used of man and of God; see the following tributum and cf. III 24.

ita—si: with a limiting force, 'it is our duty to render these only on the supposition &c.' See Holden on Off. 11 13 cetera ita legere si ea virtutis non repugnarent, Mayor's Second Philippic p. 128, and Alanus (Allen) on Die. 1 10 ita expramum si causs animo. Also cf. n. on ita ut § 54.

permanare: strictly 'to percolate', to find its way from some Epicurean internumdia to the earth.

quid est quod: 'what ground is there for', lit. 'what is there in respect of which'. Cf. § 22 quid erat quod concupisceret? and 74, 117; so nihil est quod § 16, quid est cur § 115, III 7. The answer of the Epicureans is given § 45: we naturally adore the divine perfections without thought of any advantage, see Ovid ex Pont. 11 9 23, fidel.

in specie fictae simulationis: 'in a mere empty profession', lit. 'the outside show of a made-up pretence'. The epithet ficta adds emphasis without introducing any new conception, as in Off. III 39 ficta et commenticia fabula. The reference is to the Epicureans (see §§ 56, 115 seq. III 3, Plut. non posse suar. p. 1102 n), but the remark applies also to C.'s friends, the Academics, see § 61, III 5, and the polemic of Cotta throughout.

sicut—item non potest: 'there is no room for piety any more than for the other virtues'. For ut—item see Madv. Fin. III 48, Acad. II 110. For the negative understood in the first clause from the second, see X. D. III 68 hauc ut seuclcs, sic no ratio quidem defuit.

quibus sublatis—confusio: this would come more naturally at the end of the sentence after tollatur, as Wytenbach remarks; but Laetantius quotes it (De Ira e. 8) in relation to religion, Epicurus religionem funditum debit, qua sublatuta confusio ac perturbatio vitae sequitur. We must consider therefore the following clause to be added by an afterthought, atque having its strong force, 'and indeed'. On the general phrase, cf. Ac. II 99 with Reid's n.

§ 4. hand scio an: with its usual positive force 'it may be that', Roby Gr. § 2256.

fides—tollatur: much the same is said of parental affection, Att. VII 2 lecto probabili tibi quaeque esse την προς τα τέκνα. Etenim haec si non est, nulla potest esse hominum ad hominum naturae adjunctio, qua sublata vitae societas tollatur. On the relation of religion to morality, see II 153, Leg. I 43, Fin. III 73, Off. III 23, quae (i.e. justice and the social virtues) qui
tollunt etiam adversus deos impii sunt. Ab his enim constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt. In Fin. iv 11, the knowledge of the Deity gained through the observation of nature is said to produce moderation, magnanimity and justice; in Leg. ii 15 seq. the moral influence of religion is based more on the sanctity of oaths, and the fear of divine vengeance; elsewhere it is the aspiration to imitate the divine life which is morally influential, Tusc. i 72, v 70: in Rep. vi 13 seq. we read that nothing is more pleasing to God than a life devoted to the good of our fellow men, that it is the path of justice and piety which leads to heaven. If such sentiments as these were in any degree fostered by the ancient religions, —and what reader of Herodotus can doubt that this was the case even before they had undergone the rationalizing and purifying influence of philosophy? —I think it must be allowed that Bp. Lightfoot (note on Galatians iv 11) has taken too narrow a view in confining their propedantic influence to their ritual. There is of course another side which is well shown in Tholuck’s tract on the Moral Influence of Heathenism, but in judging of this we must not forget the crimes and the immoralities which have resulted from the antinomian and the ecclesiastical spirit in Christianity itself, in spite of the stress which it has always laid on good works as the test and fruit of religious faith.

una excellentissima: ‘the most preeminent of all’, see Mayor Sec. Phil. p. 127. So Aristotle Eth. v 1 15 justice in the wide sense ἀρετή μὲν ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον καὶ διὰ τούτο πολλάκις κρατήσῃ τῶν ἀρετῶν δοκεί ἡ δυκαστήρια, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Off. i 20 justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximum, ex qua vivi boni nominantur; iii 25 omnium est domina et regina virtutem.

nobiles: i.e. the Stoics, as taking an exalted view of human nature, in opposition to the Epicureans whom he calls plebei, Tusc. i 55.

ab isdem vitae consul: as an intransitive verb, consulo has to be used impersonally in the passive, like noceo, persuadeo, &c., see Roby § 1422.


tempestates: ‘changes of weather’. Like the Germ. wetter, temp. has a neutral as well as a bad sense.

temporum varietates: ‘the alternations of the seasons’.

caeli mutationes: ‘the varying phenomena of the heavens’, cf. Tusc. i 68.

maturata pubescant: ‘ripened by which all that the earth produces bursts into leaf’.

1 See more on this subject in Nägelsbach Nach-Homerische Theologie pp. 191—318, Plut. M. 1125.
colligunt: ‘adduce’; so *Dec. ii 33 multa Stoici colligunt.

his libris: see ii 151—168.

fabricati paene: ‘one might almost say, to have constructed these precise things for the good of man’. The word is used with a sneer at any thing which implies personal agency on the part of the Creator in § 19, where see n., and *Acad. ii 87 (see too §§ 30 and 119) *natura quae finixerit, et ut tuo verbo utar, quae fabricata sit, hominem. Cf. *N. D. i 20 mundum manu paene factum.

ita: to be taken with *disserruit, not with *multa, ‘alleged many arguments so as to stimulate men’s inquiry after truth’, see *Off. ii 8. This was the proper use of the Socratic elenchus (see the admirable chapter on Socrates in *Grote’s Greece, also his *Plato i 241 foll.) but it had been misapplied by the later Academics. For the collocation *ita multa, see *ita late § 54, and Sch. here. [So in *Senect. 12 *ita cupidit where *ita refers to quasi below. *J. S. R.]


alterum fieri—vera sit: We find the same thought, *Acad. ii 115, 147, *Plut. Pl. Q. p. 1000. It is an Academic common-place, inconsistent with C.’s own belief, cf. *Leg. i 47 *perturbat nos opinionum varietas, *hominumque dissenso, et quia non idem contingit in sensibus, hos *natura certos putamus, illa, quae aliis sic, aliis securis nos isdem semper uno modo ridentur, *fitu esse dicimus. *Quod est longe alter. Though none of the theories propounded were perfect, yet any one of them was better either than blank ignorance and indifference, or than a dilettantist scepticism. A fairer view of the varieties of belief is taken by *Aristotle, *Metaph. i 992 b, and even by the Epicurean Philodemus *peri εινεβεσις p. 109 Gomp. ‘those who have written about the Gods deserve admiration for their intention, καὶ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀνόσιας *νοησεθαλα πάντας δὲ ἀνθρώπους μορία λέγειν ἀνόσιον, *επιδήπερ οὐδὲς ἐκνομήνως περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπάρχει ἐν ηῶν ἀποδείξεις...δῆμος δὲ σέβονται πάντες καὶ μὴ παράκοποι τινες’. Similarly the Christian *Lactantius, vii 7 *Facié est docere paene universam veritatem per philosophorum sectas esse divisam. *Non enim *sac philosophiam nos ecriminus ut Academici solent, quibus ad omnia respondere propositum est, quod est potius calumniari et illudere...*Quod si exitisset aliquis qui veritatem sparsam per singulos, per sectas diffusam colligeret in unum, is profecto non dissentiret a nobis, as he then proceeds to show in detail.

b. Cicero’s defence against his critics. He had always been a student of philosophy, but had only lately begun to write upon it, partly by way of useful employment in his enforced absence from public life, partly as a solace under his heavy loss. *His manner of expounding the different tenets of each school, without stating his own opinion, was intentionally adopted in order to provoke thought. The Academic
school to which he belonged was unfairly branded as sceptical. It simply maintained the doctrine of Probability in opposition to Stoic dogmatism. III § 5—v § 12.


*brevi tempore:* C.’s purely philosophical works all belong to the interval between the death of his daughter Tullia, Feb. 45 B.C., and the end of 44 B.C. Teuffel arranges them chronologically as follows: *de consolatione,* Hortensius, *de finibus,* Academica, Tusculanæ disputationes, Titus, *de natura deorum,* Cato, *de divinatione,* *de fato,* Laelius, *de gloria,* *de officiis,* *de virtutibus*.† It must further be remembered that Caesar’s death occurred about the time of the publication of the present work, March, 44 B.C., and that C. was much occupied with politics from that time until his death, at the age of 65, on Dec. 7, 43 B.C.

*quid certi haberemus:* ‘what positive belief I held’. So *aliquid certi haber* § 14. Livy seems to make *certi* predicative (complement) in v 33 *si quiequam humanorum certi est, capi Roma non poterat*; cf. the use of *pensum haber.* I do not know of any similar case in C. He generally uses *habere certum* or *pro certo* to express ‘I am positive of a thing’. The word formed a battle-ground between the Stoics, who maintained *sapiem non nihil opinari,* nulla in re fuli (Mur. 61), and the Academics, *qui nihil affirmant et, quasi desperata cognitione certi, id sequi volunt quodcumque verissimile videatur* Fin. ii 43, cf. *De Orat.* iii 67. [C. is exceedingly fond of the Gen. after *quid,* cf. Ac. ii 25 *quid offici sui sit* ‘what belongs to one’s duty’. J. S. R.]

*eam potissimum:* ‘that rather than any other’, ‘precisely that’. Cf. hanc potiss. § 9 and 11.

*quae lucem eriperet:* ‘which in their view &c.’ The charge is one continually made against the Academy: see *Acad.* ii 16 *Arcesilas conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebros obducere*; § 61 *eam philosophiam sequere quae confundit vera cum falsis, spoliat nos judicio:* ... *tantis offusis tenebris ne scintillulam quidem ullam nobis ad disipiciendum reliquerunt; 26 si ista vera sunt, ratio omnis tollitur quasi quaedam lux lumeneque vitae 30.

*desertae et relictae:* so Ac. i 13 *relictam a te veterem, tractari novam,* ii 11 *prope dimissa revocatur.* Cf. § 11 and Ac. ii 129 *omito illa quae relicta jam videntur, ut Herillum. Des.* refers to desertion by an adherent, such as Antiochus; *rel.* to general neglect.

*qua quidem in causa:* Heindorf and Schömann have in vain done their best to find some reference for these words in their ordinary position at the beginning of the chapter; and the sentence beginning *multum autem*

† Reid (Introd. to Laelius p. 9) more correctly puts Hortensius first, B.C. 46, then the Consolatio and next to that the Academica.
comes in equally abruptly after repellendi. It appears to me that the natural connexion may be restored by transposing them, so as to make quae quidem—repellendi follow esse susceptam (cf. § 30): mutatum autem then becomes the commencement of a new paragraph in which C. leaves the general subject and proceeds to defend himself against attacks made upon him; causa will refer to the criticism passed upon his philosophical studies, while objurgatores and vituperatores are two classes of critics. [I have always taken these words to mean ‘now in dealing with the case at issue between the dogmatists and Academics, I have an opportunity of soothing my kind reprovers, &c.’ One object C. has in view is to set himself right with the public, cf. § 13 ut omni me invidia liberem. J. S. R.]

benevolos objurgatores placare: ‘pacify friendly critics’.

invidos vituperatores placare: ‘malicious fault-finders’. We find C. defending himself against the same charges in Fin. i 1, Div. ii 4, Acad. ii 5—9, Off. ii 2—8, Tusc. iv 4 which should be compared for the whole passage.

referterae ... sententiis: so Brut. 65 (of Cato the Censor) referterae sunt orationes et verba et rebus illustribus. In his rhetorical treatises C. recommends the study of philosophy as necessary to the orator (De Orat. i 83, iii 85 seq.) and takes credit in a letter written to Cato, B.C. 50, for introducing in forum atque in rem publicam atque in ipsum actum that philosophy quae quibusdam utii esse ac desidiae videtur, Fam. xv 4 ad fin., cf. Quintil. xii 2 § 5 foll. Weidner remarks on the philosophical tone of his youthful treatise De Inventione in contrast with that of Cornificius on the same subject. Cicero was one of those who led the way in bringing about that transfusion of Roman technicalities by the spirit of Greek philosophy which made Roman law so important a factor in our modern civilization. [Probably C. alludes to such passages as Sest. 3, Balb. 3, Pis. 37, Post red. 14, Pro domo 47, Cael. 39—42, Mar. 63, Phil. xi 28, Deiot. 37, Marvell. 19. J. S. R.]

floruit: ‘has been honoured’, Nägels. Stil. § 128, 3.

Diodotus the Stoic lived with C. from the year 84 B.C. till his death in 59 B.C. He is spoken of in high terms Ac. ii 115 D. a puero amari; necum vivit tot annos; cum et admiror et diligo; Tusc. v 113 D. Stoicus eaecus multis annis nostrae domi vixit; is vero, cum in philosophia multo etiam magis assidue quam antea versaretur, et cum fidibus Pythagorcorum more ueterem, cumque in libris noctes et dies legerentur; tum, quod sine oculis fieri posse vix videtur, geometricae munus tubatur, verbis praecipiens decentibus, unde, quo, quamque lineam scriberent. On his death he left C. III fortasse centies, Att. ii 20. On the other names cf. Introduction and Diet. of Biog.

§. referuntur ad vitam: ‘if, as we are agreed, all philosophy has a practical aim (cf. Fin. iii 4 ars est philosophia vitae, i 42 Madv., Tusc. iv 5, v 5), I can point to my life as a proof of my philosophy’. The interest in pure speculation hardly survived the death of Aristotle.

praestitisse: ‘to have carried out’, ‘made good’. In praesc. we have
an example of the Perf. Subj. after proper Perf. praestitisse, see n. on cens-erent § 3.

Ch. iv. *otio langueremus*: so § 67 'Epicurus denies happiness to God, nisi plane otio langueat', Off. iii 1 duae res quae languorem afferant etiam illum (Scipionem) acuebant, otium et solitudo. C. elsewhere pleads otium, his forced inaction under the autocracy of Caesar, as an excuse for turning to literature, e.g. in a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 6 quis non dederit ut, cum opera nostra patria uti nolit, ad eam vitam revertamur quam multi ctiam rei publicae proponendum putaverunt?

*necesse esset*: evidently written before the Ides of March.

*ipsius rei publicae causa*: cf. Div. ii 1 seq. quacrenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possent prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermit-
terem consulere rei publicae, nulla major occurrebat quam si optimarum artium
vias traderem meis civibus; and a letter to Varro, Fam. ix 2 nobis stet illud,
una vivere in studiis nostris... et si minus in curia atque in foro, at in litteris
et liberis gubernare rem publicam et de moribus ac legibus quaerere; [Phil. ii
20. J. S. R.], also the opinion of Athenodorus, a friend of C.'s, quoted by
Seneca Tranq. 3.

§ 8. *multorum—scribendi studia*: repeated in Off. ii 2, but, as Sch.
says, we have no certain information of any to whom it would apply.
Lucretius, Varro, and the Pythagorean Figulus wrote without waiting for
any impulse from C. The prose expounders of the Epicurean phil-
osophy, Amafinius, Rabirius and Catius, are always mentioned in terms of
contempt, as in Acad. i 5, Fam. xv 16 and 19, Tusc. iv 6 (where the
popularity of the first is said to have produced a crowd of imitators).
Probably Brutus, to whom the N. D. is addressed, may be one of those
referred to, cf. Ac. i 12. [Mr Reid doubts this, as it appears from Fin. i 8
that Brutus had the start of C. in writing, and is rather disposed to think
that Varro is alluded to, as in the Acad. he is said to have only made a
beginning of philosophy, philosophiam incohasti i 9, so that C. may have
here claimed credit for inducing V. to bring out some of those philosophical
treatises which are included in the list of his works.]

*instituti*: 'resolution', *institutionibus*: 'trained under Greek teachers',
lit. 'by 'Greek methods'. C. elsewhere speaks of them as men *qui se
Gracces magis quam nostros haberi voluit* Fin. iii 5.

*quod—diffierent*: 'because, as they said'. Roby § 1744.

*profecisse—vinceremur*: the tense of a Subj. after Perf. Inf. is deter-
bined by the Inf. not by the principal verb; see P. S. Gr. § 229 8 and
Draeger Himal. Synt. § 126, also n. on § 3 qui censent. [The cxx. of
this sequence quoted by Lieven from N. D. are i 6, 8, 10, 16, 58, 60, 63, 85, 90,
i 8, 72, 96, 150, 153, 157, iii 12, 20, 50, 54, 70, 84, 88. J. S. R.] On
the general subject of translation from Greek into Latin, and the comparative
merits of the two languages at this time, see Munro's Lucretius (Introducti-
on p. 100 seq.) 'in his day the living Latin for all the higher forms
of composition both prose and verse, was a far nobler language than the
living Greek.... When Cicero deigns to translate any of their sentences (Epicurus, Chrysippus, &c.) see what grace and life he instils into their clumsily expressed thoughts! How satisfactory to the ear and taste are the periods of Livy when he is putting into Latin the heavy and un melodious clauses of Polybius!... Whatever Greek writer Cicero wishes to explain, he can find adequate terms to express the Greek: is it a new sense given to a word in common use? he can always meet λόγος or εἴδος with ratio or species: is it a newly coined word? his qualitas is quite as good as Plato's ποιότης. C. makes the same boast of the superiority of Latin in Fin. i 10 and elsewhere; Lucretius on the contrary bewails the patrii sermonis ejus; see Orelli, lib. vi. 32, and so Seneca Ep. 58.

§ 9. fortuna—injuria: his daughter's death, [so Ac. i 11 fortuna gravisissimo perclusa vulnere. J. S. R.]. See the letters written in the following months, Att. xii 14 (March 45 B.C.) omnem consolationem vicit dolor; xii 20 (same month) quod me hortaris ut dissimulam me tum gravior dolere, possunne magis quam quod toto dies consumo in litteris?; xii 40 (May 45 B.C.) quod scribis te vereri ne et gratia et auctoritas nostra minoratur, ego quid homines aut reprehendant aut postulent nescio: ne dolcam? qui potest? ne juvecem? quis unquam minus? Leyere isti laeti qui me reprehendunt tum multa non possunt quam ego scripsit; xiii 26 (same month) credibile non est quantum scribam, qui cito nonstibus, nihil enim somni; cf. too Fins. iv 5, 6, v 15. Some of the fragments of the Consolatio preserved by Lactantius illustrate C.'s language in this treatise, e.g. fr. 5 Orelli, 'if we are right in believing that human beings have been exalted to heaven and in raising shrines to their memory, the same honour is assuredly due to my Tullia, quod quidem faciam, teque omnium optimam doctrissimamque approbatibus dis immortalibus ipsis in corum coetum locatum ad opiniorem omnium mortalium successorbo'; and in fr. 6 he declares that the good lex quidam ac facili lapsu ad deos, id est ad naturam sui similem, pervolare.

animi aegritudo commota injuria: Allen notices the carelessness of construction by which the adj. is made to agree with the governing case instead of the governed. See his n. on Dir. i 62 falsa habet inflationem tranquillitati mentis quae recta vera contrarium. It may be explained as an extension of the use of abstract for concrete which we find in such passages as Off. iii 36 error homineum arripuit, for errantes homines, Hor. Ep. ii 119 trahitur manus regum fortunae retortis. [Cf. Leg. i 8 occupata opera for occupatus, Pat. 42 assequi non possit fieri nisi commota viso = nisi is qui adsentiat communiss fuerit. The best collection of exx. of hypallage adjectivi which I know is in Kühner Ausf. Gramm. vol. ii p. 1682. J. S. R.]

[quam si me dedissem: quam fruiturus fui si dedissem. Dedissem is a completed future (fuere si dedero) from a past point of view; and subjunctive because protasis to a future participle understood. R.]

totam philosophiam: cf. Dir. ii 4 ut nullum philosophiam locum esse
pateremur qui non Latinis litteris illustratus pateret; Tusc. II 1 difficile est in philosophia paucâ esse ei nota cui non sint aut pleraque aut omnia. C. accepted the tripartite division, of post-Aristotelian philosophy, into ῥήτωρ (under which may be grouped the De Finibus, De Officiis, Tuscanae Disputationes, De Legibus, De Republica, Laelius, Cato, Paradoxa), διάλεκτική (discussed in the Academia, with which may be connected the rhetorical treatises, see Ac. I 32), φυσική (to which belong the present treatise and its adjuncts the De Divinatione and De Fato): see Fin. iv 3, v 4, Ac. I 19, De Orat. I 62, Leg. I 23.

membra: so De Orat. II 79 quinque faciunt quasi membra eloquentiae.

alia ex alia: 'mutually', so § 51 aliae aliae apprehendentes.

aptae: the proper passive force, as in Tusc. v 62 gladium suæ æquæ aptum, N. D. III 4 apta inter esse et cohaerentia, Leg. I 56, Tusc. v 40.

Ch. v. § 10. qui requirunt...curiosius faciunt: 'those who wish to know my own private opinion on each point, show themselves more inquisitive than there is any need for'. See Madv. Fin. I 3.

auctores: Heind. reads auctoritates with B, quoting III 10 tu auctoritates contemnis, ratione pugnas, Leg. Man. 51 and Leg. I 36 et sicelcit tua libertas disserendi amissa est, aut tu is es qui in disputando non tuum judicium sequare, sed auctoritati aliorum paræas. We find the same sentiment in Min. F. 16 and in Jerome as there quoted by the editors.

momenta: 'weight of argument', lit. 'what turns the scale'. Cf. Ac. I 45 cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum inventur, facilius ab utraque parte assensio sustineretur.

ipse dixit = aîròs ἐφα, 'the master said it'. So Socrates is referred to as aîròs by his disciples in the Nubes 196, cf. Diog. L. viii. 1, 46. Both the Greek and Latin pronouns are used colloquially by slaves of their masters. Bentham coined the word ipse-dixitism to express excessive deference to authority. It was the boast of the Academics to be nullius addici jurare in verba magistri, see Tusc. v 83, Ac. II 8, 120, Grote's Plato I 238 foll.

§ 11. quattuor Academicis: see Reid's Introduction to the Academica p. xxxi foll. There were two editions, the first appeared in two books, entitled Catulus and Lucullus, in the spring of 45 B.C., the second, which was divided into four books and dedicated to Varro, was published in the following August. We possess only the Lucullus and chapters 1—12 of the first book of the second edition.

lucem desiderant: 'the doctrines do not perish though they want the light that might be thrown upon them by a living expositor'. Auctorii: subjective genitive, like lucem ingenii prorigentem et tendentem, De Orat. I 184. For the meaning of auctor here cf. Of. II 8, where C. says of his son then studying the tenets of the Peripatetics under Cratippus at Athens, in antiquissima philosophia Cratippo auctore versarís. The expositor, no less than the founder, may add weight to the doctrine by the authority of his name.
aperte judicandi: i.e. of speaking one’s opinion frankly, not imitating the Socratic *epoieia*. See Augustin Ac. III 43 ait Cícero Academicius morum fuisse occultandi sententiam suam nec cum cujusam nisi quem ad sententiam usque vicisset operire consuesse. So we read (De Orat. 1.83) of Charmadas who spoke *non quo aperiret sententiam suam* for negative criticism is the *mos patrius Academicius*; and Ac. II 139 of Clitomachus who confessed his ignorance of the real opinions of his master Carneades. [ Cf. Ac. II 60 quae sunt tandem ista mysteria? seq., Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIV 8 of the *ἀπόρρητα* of Carn., also XIV 6, Sext. Emp. P. II. I. 234, Diog. L. IV 33, August. Ep. 118 § 16. This notion of Academic mysteries was no doubt fostered by Plato’s half jocular use of the words *ἀπόρρητα* (*Phaedo* 62 b), *ἀμύντων, μυστήρια* (*Theaet.* 155 e). J. S. R. See also Lobeck *Agr.* p. 127 foll.] According to Augustine (Ac. III 41) Metrodorus of Stratonice asserted that the Academics used their negative doctrine (*nihil percipi*) merely as a weapon against the Stoics, and Aug. believes that they still held, as an esoteric doctrine, all that Plato had taught about the ideal world, in which exists the real truth of which the shadow alone, the *veri simile*, is to be found on earth (Ac. III 37 seq.). Though C. professes here to practise the same reserve, he states his views plainly in his Aristotelian dialogues; and even in the Heraclean dialogues like the present (see n. on Heraclides § 34) he lets it be seen to which side he thinks the probability inclines (see III 95). However it must be owned that he succeeded in mystifying Alp. Whately in regard to his belief on such an important matter as the immortality of the soul, (see W.’s *Essays on Peculiarities of the Christian Religion*, App. B. on Cicero).

orbam: after Philo’s death. Cf. Ac. II 17 Philo me vivo patrocinium Academicae non defuit; and for the metaphor, Brutas 330 post Hortensii mortem orbce eloquentiae quasi tutores relieti sumus, Plato Theat. 164 e (of the doctrines of Protagoras) ἐπερ ὁ πατήρ του μύθου ἔζη, πολλὰ ἀν ἡμεις ἐν δὲ όρθον αὐτῶν ημεῖς προτηλιακέομεν.

singulas disciplinas percipere: ‘to master each system separately’.


§ 12 nihil—sequantur: ‘nothing to guide them’. The word occurs constantly in the *Academicæ* (alluded to just below as *alia loca*) in this sense, e.g. II 8, 24, 33, 36, 90, &c. The Academics maintained in opposition to the Stoics that we can do very well without absolute certainty, in Bp Butler’s words that ‘probability is the (only and the sufficient) guide of life.’ In the previous sentence we have *secutum* used in another sense ‘aimed at’. For similar careless repetitions see § 13 *inventus—inecumerit*, and Allen on Dir. I c. 35.

non enim sumus—nota. The Stoics held that we could distinguish true from false sensations (phantasia, visa) by an infallible criterion (σημεῖον, nota, also translated signum and insigne Ac. II 34, 36) termed by Chrysippus καταληπτικῆς phantasia, visum comprehensibile, a sensation in which the soul grasps reality: this is followed by συγκατάδεικνύει, assensio, a declaration to ourselves that the sensation is true. See Ac. I 41, II 17, 18. The Academics denied the existence of such a criterion, but allowed that some sensations were probably true, others the contrary, id autem non esse satis cur alia posse percipi dicas, alia non posse, propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse (Ac. II 103, and 32—36); the wise man will be guided by what seems most probable, Ac. II 98. Carneades distinguished three degrees of probability, that which was plausible ϕαντασία πιθανή (1), that which was also uncontradicted ἀπεριπατητός (2), that which being both of these was further thoroughly examined διεξόδευμένη (3), Sext. Emp. Math. vii 166—189.

veris falsa adjuncta: see Ac. II 42.

ex quo existit—regeretur: 'from which fact (viz. the close resemblance between true and false sensations) follows the conclusion stated in the Academia, that there were many things of a probable nature, such that though not amounting to a full perception, they could nevertheless, since they had a marked and distinct appearance, serve to direct the conduct of a wise man'. Heind., who is followed by Or. and Da., proposed to omit this sentence as unsuited to the context, and un-Ciceronian in language. The first difficulty of construction arises from the change of case in the relative clause (quaes—ius) which may probably be explained by the wish to substitute the weaker Pass. for the personifying Act. (regeretur for regerent). It may be said, Why not then begin the clause with the Abl. quibus instead of quaes, omitting ius and understanding ea before perci pererentur? The answer is that in these complex relative clauses, in which the verbs require different cases, we commonly find the relative attracted to the subordinate clause (as quaes here to perci pererentur for quibus), see Madv. § 445, Zumpt § 804, where this passage is quoted. The case of the second verb is sometimes expressed by the demonstrative as Fin. II 1, qui mos cum a posterioribus non esset retentus, Arcesilas cum revocavit, sometimes understood from the relative, as N. D. III 35 Heraclitum non omnes interpretandum uno modo, qui quoniam intel legi noluit, omittamus (sc. cum), Sall. J. 102 qui quanquam acciti ibant, tamen placuit (sc. ius) verba facere; see Dietscb on Sall. J. 93, Nägelsbach Stil. § 164. The second difficulty is the Subj. regerentur: if we take quaes to be merely connective = et ea, and suppose the clause in orat. rect. to be multa sunt probabilia, quaes...perci periment... habet...regitur, we should have expected regi in orat. obl., cf. Roby § 1781. But the Inf. construction is not always used in these cases, see § 106 tu autem (dieis) imagines remanere quaes cum pervenerint tum refererunt for eas referri, II 44 contingert, Div. I 46 (Heraclides describes a dream) Mercurium e putera sanguinem visum esse fundere, qui cum terram attigisset refervescere
videretur, where we should have expected quem referrecessere; Tac. Agric. 15
the Britons complained that they had now two kings over them e quibus
legatus in sanguinem, procurator in bona sacris vest instead of legatum sacris,
see also quotations in Draeger § 447, 2, Reid on Lact. 45 capti esse ad beat:
reconditum securitatem quae frui non possit si quasi parturitam frui non posse;
Madv. Fin. 1 19 and 30, Ac. 1 28 and 41. In the present sentence however
there was a Subj. previous to subordination ( multa sunt probabilitia quae ha-
beunt), the relative having a definitive, and not merely a connective force. It
is only a certain kind of probabilitia, of a very distinct appearance and there-
fore leaving on the mind a distinct impression, which can afford practical
guidance. Again there is a third difficulty if we read existit with the
majority of ass. I think Klotz (Ann. Crit. iv 5) is right in saying
that the pronoun (illud) may carry back the thought to a past time (in
this case to the writing of the Academica alluded to just before in
the words alio loco) and so justify the following Imperf., cf. Ac. ii 86 jam illa
præceder quanto artificio esset sensus fabricata natura, De Orat. i 63 illud
est probabilitias (quod Socrates dicere solebat) omnes in eo quod seivert satis
esse cognosces, cf. Draeger § 152, Madv. Fin. iii 67, also Fin. ii 21, 34, 42,
iv 29, Dict. ii 96. [The phrase hinc velis existitit occurs also § 55 where it
is followed by Pres. Subj. ut quicquid accidat ad luxisse dicatis, which how-
ever is probably to be explained as an attraction to the parenthesis Pres.
(quam dicitis).] Heind. found another stumbling-block in the form visus
instead of visum, C.'s regular equivalent for favarria: Wolf met the objec-
tion by instancing similar double forms, but the fact is that we want here
a distinct word for a distinct thing. Visum is a particular effect of the
abstract visus, which has both the active and passive force of our word
'look'. Habeo could only be used with the latter (cf. hab. venerationem
§ 45) not with the n. visum. Of course visus has here a wide sense given
to it corresponding to the use of visum for sensation in general. Lastly
H. alleges that the clause is superfluous and too technical. Kl. rightly
answers that without it the thought would be left incomplete. It is not
easy to say that true and false impressions are almost indistinguishable:
that by itself would confirm the opponent's charge that the Academics
leave themselves no grounds for action; you must go on to affirm the
existence of probable impressions marked out from others by their clear-
ness, so as to afford sufficient practical guidance to the wise. Compare
with the whole the very similar passage Ac. ii 99 quicquid acciderit specie
(visus in V. D.) probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitatii illi
contrarium, utetur co sapiens ac sic omnis ratio vitæ gubernabilitur.

insignem: 'marked', lit. 'bearing a stamp'. Cf. Ac. ii 101, the Aca-
demic sage movetur mente, movetur sensibus, ut ei multa vera videantur,
neque tamen habere insignem illum et proprium perceptuini notam, i.e.
though they do not answer to the Stoic criterion.

illustrem: 'clear' = perspicuus, Ac. ii 34. Cf. Ac. ii 94 etiam a certis
et illustrioribus colibis ascensionem. Fin. ii 15 Epicurus nec de se obscura, ut
physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili loquitur. It corresponds to the Gr. έναργής, as in Sext. Emp. vii 161, ή αυτής πως παθόνσα, κατά τήν τών έναργών ύπότασιν ενδεικτεν τά πράγματα. εν ἀρά τό από έναργειας πάθει τής ψυχής ζητητόν ἐστι τό κριτήριον, and § 171 where he distinguishes between the αμυδρά φαντασία and that which σφόδρων έξουσα τό φαινομένα αυτών δήλη πληκτικοσέραν (ίνσημεν) τίχει φαντασίαν, also § 257. Similarly Descartes (Meditation 4) made the clearness and distinctness of the idea his criterion of certainty, see Locke bk ii ch. 29.

c. Preamble to the dialogue itself. In order that the reader may be enabled to form his own judgment on the matter, Cicero reports a conversation held at the house of the pontifax C. Aurelius Cotta in which the Epicureans were represented by C. Velleius, the Stoics by Q. Lucilius Balbus, and the Academics by Cotta, Cicero forming the audience. vi. §§ 13—17.

Ch. vi. § 13. invidia liberem: ‘to free myself from the odium of maintaining the Academic or negative position that we can know nothing about the Gods, I will lay before my readers the positive views of various schools’. On the invidia attaching to the Academics see Ac. ii 105 sunt falsa sane, invidiosa certe non sunt: non enim tuerem eripimus; Augustine Ac. ii 12 hic iis invidia magna conflatà est: videbatur enim esse consequens ut nihil ageret qui nihil approbarat; on the contrary they affirmed nullo modo cessare sapientem ab officiis cum haberet quid sequeretur; Lact. iii 6 if Arcesilas had confined his scepticism to physics et se ipsum columniae invidia liberasset et nobis certe dedisset aliquid quod sequeremur.

quo loco: ‘and in this matter’. On the omission of in see Madvig § 273 b.

qui judicent: ‘I invite all the world to listen and decide which of them is true’; not as Sch. ‘die Dogmatiker, alle Solche die ein bestimmtes Urtheil aussprechen’.

tum demum procax: ‘then only shall I allow that the Academy is too saucy (wanting in respect for the other schools) if someone shall have been found to have discovered the truth’. So in Leg. i 13 the Academy is said to be perturbatrix omnium rerum. Cf. Div. ii 53 at impudentes sumus qui, cum tam perspicuum sit, non concedamus, Rep. iii 9 Carneades saepe optimas causas ingenii calumnia ludificari solet: Augustine however makes Arcesilaus the chief offender, Ac. iii 39 Carneades illam velut calumniandi impudentiam qua videbat Arcesilam non mediocrer infamatum depositus, ne contra omnia velle dicere quasi ostentationis causa videretur. [I suspect pervicax is the true reading. The obstinacy of the Academics in refusing to see the truth is the point insisted on by the dogmatists, cf. Ac. ii 65, Fin. i 2, August. Ac. ii 1. J. S. R.]

ut est in Synephebis: ‘as we read in the Comrades’, a fabula palliata

M. C.
of Caccilius Statius translated from Menander. Other quotations are given
N. D. iii 72, Senect. 25. C. blames his style (Brut. 74) but still places
him first of Latin comic poets (Opt. Gen. Or. 2). Like Terence he was a
foreigner (an Insubrian Gaul) and a slave: he died B.C. 168, cf. Teuffel
R. L. § 95. The metre of the lines quoted is trocha. tetr. cat. As regards
the reading I have preferred to insert est after ut, as in Tusc. iii 21 ut est in
Melanippo, rather than adopt the ille of Ursinus, which seems to me less
suited to the following ut queritur ille. [Ut est may also be the true read-
ing in Tusc. i 31 ut ait in Synephebo, where edd. supply ille. J. S. R.]

fidem: 'protection', lit. 'good faith'. He who forgets the common
bond of fellowship which unites men together is guilty of a breach of
faith: even the Gods would be 'unrighteous' if they neglected the sup-
pliant.

in civitate—non vult: the lines may be reduced to metre by a slight
alteration, e.g.

hic in civitate fiant favinora capitilia:
abs amico amante merctrix accipere argentum non vult.

Ribbeck Com. Fr. p. 70 reads nám ab amico amante argentum acciper
merctrix nobis vult.

§ 14. religione, pietate, sanctitate: see n. on § 3 and on § 116.

delubris: 'shrines'. The word is commonly used in connexion with
the image, whether of a God or hero, which was placed there. Acc. to its
etymology (tuo cf. lustrum, pollubrum) it must originally have meant a
place of expiation. See Dict. of Ant. under Templem.

auspicis quibus praesumus. C. was elected a member of the college
of Augurs B.C. 53 in place of the younger Crassus killed at Carrhae. How
highly he appreciated the dignity of the office may be seen from Leg. ii 31
maximum et praestantissimum in re publica jus est augurum.

addubito: 'to be inclined to doubt' (towards doubt), cf. adubescere, ad-
dormio.

aliquid certi: see n. § 6 quid certi, and Dir. ii 8 si aliquid certi
haberem.

§ 15. accurate et diligenter: 'with careful attention to each point'.

feriis Latinis: the annual festival of Jupiter Latiaris on
the Alban Mount lasted for four days. It was one of the class of f. con-
ceptivae, the time for its celebration being determined by agreement be-
tween the two consuls, who regularly presided at it, see Dict. of Ant. and
Preller Röm. Myth. p. 186. Besides the N. D., C. represents the dialogue
De Republica as having been held on occasion of a Latin holiday.

ad eum: 'to his house.' So just above apud Cotta 'at his house'.

arcessitu: found only in the Abl. like many similar verbals, e.g.

1 Since writing the above I find that this is the reading adopted in the text
of C. F. W. Müller.
injussu, coactu, concessu. On its relation to accersitū see Wilkins in Journal of Philology, no. xii. p. 278.

offendi: 'found', lit. 'stumbled across'.
exedra: 'saloon', lit. 'a sitting out', used not so much, I think, of 'out-of-door seats' (D. of Ant.) as of bays or projections from a central hall or court (περιστύλιον), which were sometimes very small (Guhl and K. § 80) but more frequently of considerable size with semicircular apses and stone seats along the walls. Vitruvius in his description of the palaestra or gymnasium, such as were attached to Roman villas of the higher class (Att. I 4, Fam. VII 23, De Orat. I 98, Divin. I 8) recommends that in three of the cloisters surrounding the court there should be exedrae spatiosae in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur sedentes disputare possint v 11. (Readers of Plato will remember that he places the scene of several of his Dialogues in the Palaestra.) For the use of the word in ecclesiastical writers cf. Bingham Bk. VIII c. V. § 4, and c. VI. § 9, c. VII. § 1. C. uses the word De Orat. III 17, Fin. v 4, and the diminutive exedrium Fam. VII 23. For the spelling (exedra or exedhra) see Sch.'s n. with the ref.

ad quem: C. often uses ad after deferō, otherwise the Dat. would have seemed more appropriate to express honour done to a person, cf. Draeg. § 156, 3.

primas: sc. partes, προταγωνοτεῖν, a metaphor from the stage frequently used with agere, ferre, dare, concedere, tenere, &c. Secundas is similarly used by Seneca.

progressus habebat: so progressus facere Tusc. iv 44.

Ch. VII § 16. Piso: M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus consul in B.C. 61. We learn from Asconius that C. in his youth was taken to him by his father to receive instruction in oratory. His style of eloquence is described in the Brutus § 236, where he is said to have been maxime omnium qui ante fuerunt Graecis litteris eruditus. He was instructed in the Peripatetic philosophy by Staseas (De Orat. I 104) and is introduced as the spokesman of that school, as modified by Antiochus, in the 5th bk. of the De Finibus. As consul he deeply offended C. by favouring Clodius. In the letters written to Atticus about that time he is spoken of as one a quo nihil spores boni rei publicae quia non vult; nihil metuas mali quia non audet, Att. I 13; uno vitio minus vitiosus quod iners, quod somni plenus, I 14. He died before the writing of the N. D. as is shown by Att. XIII 19. Krische p. 19 thinks that C.'s reason for omitting the Peripatetic school was the obscurity of Aristotle's teaching on the points which are here discussed. A more probable reason is that on these points he accepted Antiochus' identification of the Stoic with the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (§ 33) and thought it unnecessary to treat separately of the latter.

nullius philosophiae—locus: on the supremacy of the four great schools see R. and P. § 2 n., Lucian Hermot. 16, Ciris I. 14 si me jam summa Sapientia pangeret arce | quattuor antiquis quae hereditis est data consors,
De Oratore III 16. Professorships of these four schools were established at Athens by M. Antoninus. Besides these there was the Pythagorean school which was ably represented at Rome by P. Nigidius Figulus (Tim. 1 1) but had few adherents among the public. A little later we read of the Cynics and the Sextii (R. and P. §§ 469, 473). Sch. thinks that the Academy, which has been just spoken of as orba and relicta, cannot be included in the schools quae in honore sunt; to which Heidtmann replies (p. 28 foll.) that different times are referred to: at the supposed date of the conversation, while Cotta and perhaps Philo were living, the Academy was still flourishing: the case had altered when C. wrote twenty or thirty years later. Perhaps this is pressing C.'s language too far, especially in a hasty composition like the present. Speaking generally, every one living at that time would have counted the Academy among the great schools, though it might be declining in comparison with its former glory. About one hundred years later Seneca (Nat. Quaest. vii 32), deploring that tot familiae philosophorum sine successore deficiant, mentions that the Academy in particular had been overtaken by the usual fate of merely negative schools, Academici et veteres et minores nullum antistitem reliquerunt.

missus est: 'addressed to', cf. Senec. 3, Dir. ii 3, Reid on Lael. 4.
nihil est quod desideres: 'you have no reason for regretting the absence of'. See n. on § 3 quid est quod.
re—verbis: 'really—nominally', § 124 re tollit, oratione relinquuit deos. Cf. § 85 verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse. So Fin. iv 2 Cato is made to say non verbis Stoicos a Peripateticis, sed universa re et tota sententia dissentire. The relation of the Stoics to the Peripatetics and the old Academy is discussed in the 3rd and 4th books of the De Finibus and Leg. i 54 foll. On the eclecticism of Antiochus see Introduction. For the musical metaphor contained in concinere and discrepare cf. Off. i 145, iii 53 (of honestas and utilitas) verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare, and Fin. iv 60. [So συνάδευσε Phat. Phaed. 92 c, τὰ ἀνάδοντα Sext. Emp. P. H. i 200. J. S. R.]
egone: cf. iii 8. Sch. quotes Leg. i 14, Fin. iii 11.
magnitudine et quasi gradibus. The distinction between degree and kind not being yet familiar to the Romans C. employs this periphrasis for the former, [similar periphrases occur Fin. iii 45—50. J. S. R.]
§ 17. verum hoc alias: se. tractemus, Roby § 1441, Draeger § 116, Nügelsb. § 183, Madv. Fin. i 9, iv 26. Exx. of similar elliptical constructions are found in §§ 19, 47, Lael. 1 with Reid's n.
mihī vero: 'to be sure it do s', so repetam vero just below, 'to be sure I will', cf. iii. 65, Dir. 1100, Furt. 3, Lael. 16, Ac. i 4 &c.
ut hic—ne ignorēt: depends not upon the principal verb agebamus, but upon the unexpressed 'I will explain', Zumpt § 772, Roby § 1660. When a negative is added to ut final (ίνα), ne is used; when to ut consecutive (ως) non. Later writers use ne by itself for the earlier ut ne. C. uses either form, the fuller where he wishes to separate the connective and negative force of the conjunction: this is seen most clearly when several
words intervene between *ut* and *ne*, as in this instance. Cf. Zumpt § 347, Madvig § 456 and *Fin.* II 15 n.

me intuens: 'with a glance at me'. Sch. refers to *Brut.* 253.

nihil scire: referring to the Academic doctrine of human nescience, *ἀκαραντήσια*. So *Fin.* v 76, 'would you send a youth to receive instruction in doctrines *quaæ cum plane perdidicerit nihil sciat?*

Cotta viderit: 'that is Cotta's business', lit. 'he will have looked (must look) to that', i.e. I leave it to him to show whether we have learnt anything or not. Cf. *III* 9 *quam simile istud sit tu videris*, *Fin.* I 35 *quaæ fuerit causa mox videor*, Liberius in Gell. *xiv* 7 *duas uxores? hoc hercle plus negoti est, inquit cicio; sed aediles viderint, 'it is their look-out'. Some scholars, as Seyffert ad *Lael.* 10, have maintained that the mood is Ind. in the 1st and Subj. in the 2nd and 3rd persons, but see Madv. *Opusc.* II pp. 92, 96, Roby §§ 1593 and 1595 (where exx. of the simple Fut. similarly used are given) and *Pref.* cv. foll., cf. also Mayor *Sec. Phil.* p. 158.

nolo—auditorum. Both the Romans and Greeks preferred to negative the principal verb where we should join the negative particle with the Inf. as in the well-known instances of *neco*, *οὐ φησίν* : so here nolo—adjutorem instead of *volo—non adjutorem*. If the subordinate sentence is composed of two members, one negative, the other affirmative, the negative verb is still retained, the corresponding affirmative being suggested in thought before the second clause, as here nolo suggests *volo* before auditorum (sc. existimes me venisse). See Heind. here and on *Hor. Sat.* i 1 3, and Madv. § 462.


et quidem = *καὶ ρᾶτα 'and that too', see § 78 n.


velim nolim: 'will I nill I', 'should I wish it or should I not'. On the omission of the conjunction in short antithetical phrases see Zumpt § 782.

B. Epicurean Argument. VIII 18—XX 56. (C. commences with the easiest to deal with, so as to leave the ground clear for the more serious struggle between the Porch
and the Academy. Cf. Fin. i 3 ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniet in medium Epicuri ratio.)

a. Polemic of Velleius against the Platonic and Stoic views of Creation. §§ 18—24.

fidenter ut solent: cf. Diog. L. x 121, (Epicurus affirmed that the sage δογματεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἀπορθουεῖν.) Self-confidence is the natural characteristic of the materialistic or anti-spiritualist philosophers, a Hobbes, a Bentham, a Comte, who see clearly because their field of view is limited. Those who have had a deeper feeling of the littleness of man in contrast with the vastness of the universe have been fain to take refuge in a docta ignorantia, professing with Socrates that they know nothing, or with Plato seeking to find the best of human reasonings and use it as a raft for the voyage of life, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατον ἀρκετἀτερον καὶ ἀκαθόντερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερον ἀχύματος, λόγον θείον τινός, διαπορευθηναι (Phaedo 85). Compare the manner in which the latter enters upon the discussion of this subject in the Timaeus as translated by C. (c. 3) si forte de deorum natura ortuque mundi disseras minus ut quod avemus consequamur, hanc sive crit miram, contentique esse debebis si probabilis diceatur. Aequum est quia mentis esse et non qui disseram hominum esse et vos qui judicetis. It is probable that in his representation of Velleius C. had in his eye the sophists of the Platonic Dialogues, such as Thrasymachus, and intended to exhibit him rather as the butt of the company; but the arrogant, bantering tone, and the misrepresentation of opponents, are quite in accordance with what we are told elsewhere of the Epicureans: cf. what is said of Zeno and others § 93, and Hirzel p. 28 foll. On C.’s own position with regard to Epicureanism see Introduction.

ex deorum concilio: see n. on § 43 venerari Epicurum. It is curious that C. was attacked for using the same phrase of himself, probably in his poem on his Consulship, see Quintil. xi 1 24 Iucem illum a quo in concilium deorum advocatur foll.

intermundia = μετακόσμια, the empty spaces between the innumerable worlds of Ep. (§ 53) where he supposed the Gods to have their habitation, apart from all cares and dangers (Diog. L. x 89). It is the Homeric Olympus, rationalized by Aristotle, and adapted, or rather forced into the Epicurean scheme, cf. Arist. Cat. ι 1. The word occurs again Fin. ι 75, and is referred to Diæ. ι 40 deos ipsos juvandi causa indicavit Epicurus perluxidos et perflabiles et habitantes, tamquam inter duos locos (the famous asylum of Romulus), sic inter duos mundos proper metum rainorum. Compare an interesting passage of Seneca, Benef. iv 19 tu denique, Epicure, deum inernam facis: omnia illi tela, omnem detraxisti potentiam, et ne cuiquam metaeulum esset, projevisti illum extra mundum. Hunc igitur inceptum ingenti quodam et inexplicabili muro, diecumque a contactu et a conspectu mortalium, nullus illi nec tribuendi nec novendi materia est. In medio intercellula hujus et alterius
caeli desertus, sine animali, sine homine, sine re, ruinas mundorum supra se circuque se cadentium evitat, non exaudientis vota, non nostri curious. It is to these Lucretius alludes III 18 apparet dierum numen sedesque quiccae, v 147 illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis. | Tenuis enim natura deum longeque remota | sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur, where see Munro.

futiles (fundus χεροί) ‘baseless’, without solidity or substance; hence effutio ‘to babble’, § 84; 119, see Vaníček Etym. Wört., Roby § 878.


opifex: a less dignified word than artifex by which C. (Tim. 2) translates the Platonic δημονηγός. Ambrose (Hex. I 1) states plainly the difference between the Christian and Platonic ideas of creation. Plato held deum non tanguam creatorem materiae sed tanguam artificem ad exemplar fecisset mundum de materia, thus assuming three First Principles, God, Matter, the Ideas, instead of one. [There is the same contemptuous use of opifex Ac. II 144 and in the well-known description of Zeno as ignobilis verborum opifex. J. S. R.]

de Timaeo. Heind. following Walker, reads in for de as in Tusc. I 63. Sch. understands Timaeo of the Locrian philosopher who is said to have instructed Plato in the tenets of Pythagoras (Cic. Rep. I 16). But the particular doctrine here referred to is not especially Pythagorean: we find it attributed to Socrates by Xenophon (Mem. I 47) πάντα ἐσθένει ταῦτα σωφρόν τινος δημονηγόν καὶ φιλοσόφου τεχνηματι. And there is no objection to taking de simply as a reference to the Platonic dialogue, cf. Tusc. III 53 hi poterant omnes illa de Andromacha deplorare, ‘haec omnia vidi’ (those lines from the Andromache), Off. III 82 in ore semper Graecos versus de Iphoenissi habebat, Rep. I 130 in ore semper erant illa de Iphigenia, Leg. I 1 de Mario with Dumesnil’s n.

anus fatidica = χρησμολογος γραφ, Plut. de Nob. c. 13 (with an allusion to the Stoic belief in divination, cf. Div. II 19 anile fort nomen ἱσχύμ); elsewhere sneered at as ἐμπονοια ἡ ποιη ναὐτηριώτες καὶ τραγική, Plut. Mor. 1101 ν. Balbus in his reply (Π 73) explains that πρόνοια is not a person but an attribute of the Deity. C. sometimes translates it by prudentia, N. D. II 58, Ac. II 29 Reid.

neque vero: ‘no, nor yet the world itself’, see Madv. Fin. I 25.

mundum—praeditum: a doctrine common to both Plato and the Stoics, cf. Tim. 30 ν, δεὶ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἐμψυχον ἐνομιν τε τῇ ἄληθεια διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.

rotundum. See Tim. 33 ν and, for the Stoics, N. D. II 46, 47, where reference is made to this passage.

ardentem. This was not Platonic, but borrowed from Heraclitus by the Stoics, see II 23 ν.

volubilem. According to the general belief of antiquity it was the heaven that revolved, the earth being fixed in the centre. For exceptions to this belief cf. Ac. II 123 and n. on celeritate § 24.

§ 19. quibus enim oculis. The reading animi after oculis is doubtless a gloss intended to be an answer to the question in the text; Sch., who retains it, translates 'mit was für Geistesaugen', but such a guarded complex phrase would be inconsistent with the form of the question, quibus implying, like the Gr. ποίος, a palpable absurdity. It could only have been used if an objector in reply to the simple question 'with what eyes could he have seen it?' had already answered 'the eyes of the mind'. Then the latter phrase might have been attacked as itself incongruous, ποίος ψεύδος ὀμμάσιν; but Vell. is made far too simple-minded to guard himself beforehand against any such answer. On the correctness of the phrase oculis animi instead of oc. mentis, see Sch. and Heidtmann p. 31, Klotz Adn. Cr. ii 3, Wytt. on Plut. Vnum. Vind. p. 94. In Rep. i 56 we read that the Stoics tænquam oculis illa videant, quae nos viæ audiendo cognoscius.

vester Plato: addressed not only to the Academics C. and Cotta, but to Balbus the Stoic, who speaks of Plato as deus philosophorum, ii 32.

fabricam tanti operis qua construi mundum faciat: 'the construction of so vast a work, I mean the putting together and building up of the world in the ways which he describes'. The relative clause serves rather awkwardly to explain what is meant by tanti operis. The construction fabrica qua constructur, instead of f. construendi, may be illustrated by the sentence in which Vitruvius defines the term (i 1), Fabrica est continutam et trita usu meditatio, qua manus perficetur e materia unius cujusque generis opus, et ad propositum deformationis. The word fabrica is used in the N. D. (a) for the workshop or forge (iii 55), Valerius Lanus fabrica traditur præfuisse; (b) for the working or art itself, ii 150 the fingers are useful ad omnem fabricam aeris et ferrè 'for every kind of working in iron or brass', ii 35 ut pictura et fabrica ceteraque artes habent quandum abso- luti operis effectum; 'as in painting and architecture we look to the general effect', (so more generally ii 138 incredibilis fabrica naturae and Div. i 116 fabrica conceptionis 'the art of cleaving wood', used much as it is here); (c) for the completed work, ii 121 subtilis discriptio partium, admirabilis fabrica membrorum 'structure'. In this passage it has a sneering force (like H. Spencer's 'carpenter-theory of creation' First Principles p. 120) as in § 53 natura effectum esse mundum, nihil operis fuisse fabrica, and Ac. ii 87 Quaalis ista fabrica? ubi adhibitā? quando? cur? quo modo? cf. n. on § 4 fabricati. If the elaborate constructive processes of the Timaeus had been meant to be taken literally, the Epicureans would have had some ground for objecting to their anthropomorphic character, but there can be little doubt that they are figurative like the myths in the Gorgias and
Phaedrus, cf. Grote’s Plato Vol. III ch. 36 p. 282 foll. Ambrose objecting from the Christian side, says (Hez. i 3) ‘the Creator had no need of art qui momento sua voluntas majestatem tantae operationis inplevit, ut ea quae non erant esse faceret tam velociter, ut neque voluntas operationi prae-
curreret neque operatio voluntatii’.

quae molitio—fuerunt. The objection is ‘if we take the term δημονυρ-
γός literally and look on the Creator as a gigantic builder, where was the
needful machinery to be found? or if we accept Plato’s view that the
δημονυργός was incorporeal, and therefore incapable himself of touching or
being touched, whom did he employ as his agents? If on the other hand
we think of a divine fiat, how could senseless act in obedience to
this, and what was the origin of those four elements themselves?’ See the
answer to this, together with a fragment from N. D. III, in Lact. Inst.
Div. II 8.

mol. ferr. vect. mach. ‘His mode of building, tools, levers, scaffold-
ing’.

muneris: used of a public spectacle or a building made over to public
use. So in C.’s translation of the Timaeus (c. 2), is qui aliquod munus
efficere molitur—δ δημονυργός (Pl. Tim. 28 A). It is joined with opus in
reference to the creation, N. D. II 90 architectum tanti operis tantique
muneris, and Tusc. I 70. Cf. Vell. Pat. II 48 and 130. [Mr Roby suggests
that munus in this sense may be etymologically connected with munio and
menio.]

illae quinque formae: Plato represents the Demiurgus as educing the
eighteen from among the primaeval chaos (materia prima, ἡλι, χώρα, τὸ
δεξάμενον) by stamping upon it certain geometrical forms, the combination
of which gave rise to the five regular solids. The material particles which
received the form of the cube constituted earth, those which were in the
form of a pyramid constituted fire, the octahedron was the basis of air, the
icosahedron of water, while the dodecahedron was the basis of the universe
§§ 269, 270, Phaedo 110 B δωδεκάσωμα σφαίρα with Wytt.’s n., Plut.
Def. Or. 34 p. 428, Qu. Conv. VIII 2, 3. This theory was borrowed from
the Pythagoreans (Plut. de Pl. Ph. II 6). In the Epinomis 981 c aether
appears as a fifth element, quinta essentia, corresponding to the dodeca-
hedron, and this agrees with the statement of Xenocrates preserved in the
Scholia to Arist. Phys. p. 427 Brandis. It is strange that none of the editors
before Sch. saw the right meaning of the present passage. The reference to
the five solids is unmistakable by any reader of the Timaeus, if it is once
recognized that reliqua can only be the four elements just spoken of.
Davies however seems to have been thinking more of the latter part of the
sentence where the MSS have απειρενετοι ἀδιάνυνμενον eficientum, and
puzzled himself to find five constituents of mind (Plato Tim. 35 A having
mentioned only three—the indivisible essence of ideas ταύτα, the divisible
essence of bodies ἰάτερον, the mixture of both), instead of constituents of
matter. Sch.'s emendation *efficiendum* is generally accepted and gives the required sense. Thus we read, with regard to the origin of sensation and the manner in which it affects the reason, *Tim.* 64—65 "such parts of the body as are composed of the finer particles of air and fire readily propagate the impulses from without μέχρι περ ἀν ἐπὶ τὸ φρονιμόν ἐλθοντα εὔγειεῖν τοῦ πνεύματος τίν δύναμην: cf. also *Tim.* 42 c speaking of the irrational accretions which gather round the soul from fire and water and air and earth. The only defence for *efficiendum* would be that it is a simple misunderstanding of Plato, which would be natural enough on the part of an Epicurean, as we shall see when we come to the historical section, but C. had just been translating the *Timaeus* and he could scarcely have inserted a palpable blunder without correction or notice. Add that the phrase *aptē cadere ad* is not only more appropriate for a continuous influence than for a single creative act, but that it appears to refer to the correspondence between the organs of sense and the external cause of sensation, according to the principle 'like is known by like'; see *Tim.* 68 of the sense of sight, and p. 37 of the soul's power of cognizing various kinds of objects in virtue of its own constitution from corresponding elements.

*apte cadere*: lit. 'to fall into its niche', here 'nicely adapted to affect the soul'. *Cado* by itself has nearly the same force, e.g. § 95 cfr. *istā beatitudō in solem cadere non potest*, 'why is that blessedness unsuited to, incongruous with, our idea of the sun?' So just below in *figuram cadere*. We are now in a position to reply to the off-hand *Unde* of Velleius. The five solids are all generated according to Plato (*Tim.* 53) out of two sorts of right-angled triangles, τὰς ὀ' ἐτί τούτων ἄρχας ἀνωθεν θεόν οἴδε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄν ἐκεῖνο φίλος ἡ, that is, they belong to the ideal, supersensual world, from which the Deity took his pattern for making the sensible world, and of which the rational soul is cognizant, unless it has been so much steeped in sense as to have lost its original faculties.

*longum est*. The Ind. is generally used where we might have expected the Subj. with verbs or phrases expressing duty, necessity, possibility, &c., especially when *sum* is employed with the Fut. Part. or Gerundive, the predication being made absolutely and not in reference to a particular hypothetical action; see Roby §§ 1535, 1566, 1570, Key § 1214 foll., Draeger § 145, Krueger's *Untersuchungen* (of Ind. in past tenses) Vol. 11 pp. 333—388. Other examples of *longum est* are found *Av. D.* 1 30, 11 159, of *possunt* 1 101, 11 121, 126, 131, so *bellum erat* 1 84, *opus erat* 89. For the similar Greek use of the past tense of the Ind. without ἄν in such words as ἕθει, ἐξφην, ἐξῆν, δικαιον ἕν, see Madv. *Gr. Gr.* § 118, Jelf § 558.

*ad omnia*: sc. *dīvere* 'it would take long (to speak in reference to) to comment on all his theories'. Cf. *Laed.* 32 nisi quid ad habe forte vultis with Reid's n., and my n. on § 17 alius.

*optata*: 'castles in the air' 'dreams', so *Rall. 1 utrum cogitata sapientium et optata forisororum videntur? Ac. 11 121 somnia censet habe esse
Democriti non docentis sed optantis; Fat. 46 optare hoc quidem est non disputare, Tusc. ii 30, Loc. 18. Cf. the use of  ευχή as in the phrase εὐχαί  ὑποῦ Plato Rep. vi 499.

§ 20. sed illa palmaria: 'but the prize for absurdity is due to what we have still to notice'. Phil. has the same ironical force in the only other passage in which it is used by C. sed illa statua palmaris, Phil. vi 15. It has been vainly sought to defend the ms reading palmaris by a reference to the sententias of § 18. On the use of the plural where only one proposition follows, we may say with Sch. that it may be intended to imply Plato's expression of the same thought under various forms (e.g. Tim. 32 c, 33 a, 41 a), or we may be satisfied with the more general explanation given by Madv. (in Orelli), 'illa Cicero posuit tanquam plura eadem orationis figura enumeraturus. Vid. Opusc. Acad. i 360 not. et illis quae ibi collegi add.' N. D. ii 147 quanta vero illa sunt quod et sensibus...Phil. v 17 an illa non gravissimis ignominios sunt notanda quod...'. See also Ac. ii 86 jam illa praedecr quanto artificio esset sensus nostro fabricata natura, a sarcastic reference to the remarks of Lucullus in § 30. [For omission of sunt cf. N. D. i 25 haec quidem vestra; iii 80 sed haec vetera; Off. ii 19 haec ergo rariora; iii 47 illa praedecra; iii 69 quam illa aurea &c. J. S. R.]

quod qui introdixerit is dixerit: Heind. followed by C. F. Müller Prof. iv objects to the Subj. dixerit which Draeger explains (§ 151 5 b) as an attraction to the preceding introdixerit. I should be disposed to regard it as an instance of the ordinary confusion by which the verb of saying is put in Subj. instead of the thing said (Roby §§ 1742, 1746). Omitting dixerit we should necessarily have had sempiternus futurus sit to show that this was a supposition of Plato's.

manu paene factum: see n. on § 4 fabricati paene.

primis labris gustasse: 'to have the slightest taste of', lit. 'with the surface of the lips', primus being used in a sort of restrictive apposition to express not the first of a number of similar things, but the foremost part of one thing, as Fam. ii 6 prima provincia 'the nearest part of the province', Catull. ii 3 primus digitus 'the tip of the finger'. The more common form in this use is primoris, cf. De Orat. i 87 primoribus labris attingere. Similarly we find imus mons, media urbs, &c. Roby § 1295. Cf. the Gr. ἄκρου χείλους φιλοσοφεῖν.

physiologiam: 'natural philosophy' including theology, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, but distinguished from it by Aristotle. Heind. following Manutius omitted the explanatory clause (nat. rat.) as a gloss, but Klotz (Adn. Crit. iv 5) successfully defends it by a large induction of passages, e.g. the explanation of the same word Dir. i 90, of πράγματες N. D. § 43, of ἕνωσις §§ 50 and 109, of εἰμαρμένων and παρτικῇ § 55, again of the latter Dir. i 1, of φυσικῶς N. D. i 53, of κυρίως διδάσκαλος § 85 and Fin. ii 20.

quod ortum—acesternum. So Tusc. i 79 vult enim, quod nemo negat, qui quid natum sit interire. This principle is often asserted by Plato, as in Rep. viii 546 a, Phaedrus 245 c d (translated by C. Tusc. i 53), where it is
distinctly stated that that alone is eternal which has in itself the principle of self-movement, ἀπικ άπολείπτων έαυτόν, while that which is moved by another (life being regarded as a species of movement) ceases to live when it ceases to be moved, and is therefore in itself mortal. What is compounded is especially liable to this law, see Tim. 41 λόγον δέ έπειν παύς λυτόν, and Phædo 78 c τό μέν έξωθέτω ούτε φύσιν προσήκει τόύτο πάσχειν, διαφερόντο ταύτη άπερ έπνευτήθη εί δέ τι τυχάναι άν άξιοθέτων τόύτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μή πάσχειν τόύτο. How then does the universe being compounded and receiving its principle of movement from without, and therefore essentially mortal, escape dissolution? Because the First-Mover and Compounder eternally wills to keep it together as a living unity, and his will is stronger than any band, Tim. 32 c, 33 λ, 41 λ. R. This Platonic principle is of course the only ground for the Christian belief in the continuance of any created existence. Bishop Butler, it is true, in defending the doctrine of Immortality against the Materialists (Anal. ch. i) makes use of the argument from indiscernibility; but this is only to show that, even supposing the soul material, it need not necessarily perish in death, of which the only known effect is to dissolve what is dissoluble: he is far from maintaining, as some have done, that each individual soul possesses an inherent immortality a priori, so as to render its extinction impossible even to the Almighty. The argument here used by Velleius is taken from Aristotle De Caelo I 10 where he maintains the eternity of the universe in opposition to the Platonic doctrine of creation. [Cf. for the whole passage Ἀρ. ii 119 and Bernays' Die Dial. d. Arist. 99–114. J. S. R.]

*cu~jus principium aliquod sit, nihil sit extremum*: 'such as to have a beginning without having an end'. An example of adversative asyndeton equivalent to the opposition of clauses by the use of μέν and δέ in Greek; see just below sapientes leniant, stulti nec vitare possint. In both instances the first clause is introductory to the second and would be unmeaning without it. For other examples of coordinate propositions, where we should have expected one proposition to be subordinated to the other, see § 23, Roby § 1027, Nagels. § 160, Madv. § 438, and his Gr. Gr. § 189 b, also indices (under Coord.) to Mayor's edd. of Juvenal and the Second Philippic of C. Logically such clauses would come under the head conjunctionum gentium Cic. Top. 57, Pat. 15, cf. Heidt. I c. 34 foll. On the repetition of sit cf. Tusc. i 76 vero nec homini nihil sit non malum alium, certe sit nihil bonum potius, Tusc. iv 50 vero nec fortutudo minime sit rubiosa, sitque irascendi tota levitatis.

*si est eadem*: 'if your Pronoia is the same, then I want to know all I asked about before, the agents, engines, &c.' There does not seem to be any need to insert a second eadem, to be the object of requiro, as most of the recent edd. have done (see Sch. Opera. iii 283). Klotz, on the other hand, retaining the ms reading, makes restra predicative, which gives no meaning, for there has been no allusion to any but the Stoic Pronoia, who is here compared with the Platonic Demiurgus. The difference between
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them is that the Demiurgus is pure spirit and exists apart from the world which he creates, while Pronoea is strictly an attribute of the fiery soul which animates the world, and from which the world grows as a plant from a seed. [This again shows that vestra cannot be predicative, for there is no place for agents and instruments (ministros, machinas) in this natural and necessary growth.] The Stoic Providence therefore is not eadem, but alia, and Vell. asks why, if the universe thus contains in itself its own principle of life, it should fail to be eternal; for the Stoics thought (N. D. ii 118) that it was destined to be destroyed by fire. The answer is that this destruction is merely the cyclical re-absorption of the universe, as it grows old, into its original form of fire, from which it issues forth in renovated strength and beauty.

designationem atque apparatum: 'the planning and arrangement'.

fecerit: indirect question after requiro.

mortalem non sempiternum: adversative asyndeton answering to Gk. ἀλλὰ, Zumpt § 781.


extisterint—dormierint: adversative asyndeton answering to μέν and δὲ. For the argument see Phut. Plac. Phil. i 7, Lucr. v 168 quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos | indicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem? Mansel endeavouring to show that reason cannot judge of the contents of religion, admits the justice of this objection against a creation at any particular moment of time, and quotes an interesting passage from Neander in reference to Origen's opinion on the subject: 'supposing that to create is agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that what is thus conformable to God's nature should at any time have been wanting? Why should not those attributes which belong to the very essence of the Deity, his almighty power and goodness, be always active? a transition from the state of non-creating to the act of creation is inconceivable without a change, which is incompatible with the being of God', Bampton Lect. ii n. 23. The difficulty seems to arise from a failure to recognize that God is omnipresent in time as in space. We go back in thought to the commencement of finite existence, and imagine a boundless solitude anterior to this, but all past, present and future events are at every moment equally before the eye of God, in the same way that all points of space are at all moments equally near to him. Cf. A. Butler Anc. Phil. ii 155, Cudworth iii 490 foll.

saecula: acc. of time. The word means originally 'generation' (sero), then the greatest extent of a life-time, 100 years according to Varro L. L. vi 11, cf. Mayor's Juvenal xiii 28 n.

quaes dierum—conficiuntur: 'which are made up of a number of days and nights by means of the annual revolutions'.

fateor—potuisse. So Celsus ap. Or. vi 60 sneers at the mention in Genesis of the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd day before the creation of
the lights to which the division of night and day is owing. Plato would not have allowed that time existed even as indefinite duration before the universe came into being. ‘With the rotation of the Kosmos began the course of time, days, months and years: anterior to the Kosmos there was no time, no past, present or future, no numerable or measurable motion or change.’ Grote’s Plato III 256. In Plato’s own words η μεν οὐν τοῦ ζῷου φύσις (the ideal) ἐτύγχανον οὖσα αἰώνιον· καὶ τοῦτο μεν δὴ τὸ γενητῷ (the material copy of the ideal world) παντελῶς προσώπετεν οὐκ ἦν δυνατῶν’ εἰκώ δ’ εἶποιει κινήσεων των αἰώνων ποιήσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἀμα οὐρανον ποιεὶ μένοντοι αἰώνων ἐν ἑνι κατ’ ἀμβοῦν οὐδέσποτα αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον ὑν δὴ χρόνων ὁμομάκαμον...καὶ τὸ τ’ ἦν τὸ τ’ ἔσται, χρόνον γεγονότα εἴδη, φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἁδίων οὐσίαν οὐκ ἀρθός, Tim. 37 t, cf. 39 c translated by Cic. 9 neciunt hos siderum errores id ipsum esse quod rite dicitur tempus, cf. Varro L. L. vi 3 tempus esse dicitur intercellum mundi motus; id divitum in partes aliquot maxime ab solis et lunae causae. So also Arist. De Caelo i 9 7 ‘there is neither place nor time outside the circle of the heavens (for time is but the measure of motion) but only a divine unchanging eternity’.

mundi: here used in the narrower sense ‘the heavens’.

spatio tamen—tempus esset. I have followed Davies in omitting non before potest with all the best ms’s, and followed Heidt. p. 36 in regarding the words quod ne—esset as a gloss. The meaning of the passage is then simple and consistent, ‘what was the creator doing during all the ages which preceded the making of the world?’ For though time was not then portioned out by the movements of the heavenly bodies, yet there must have been a boundless eternity which we can conceive as extended. Well, I ask why was your Pronoia idle in all that vast extent of time?’ But with the ordinary reading (defended by Sch. in his note and also in Opusc. III 299) we have a thought introduced which is not only out of place, but totally inconsistent with the argument. It is not for Vell. to dwell upon the difficulty of conceiving the existence of time prior to creation; that is a point for his opponents to press. According to the reading which I have adopted he merely alludes to it to show that it does not invalidate his argument, and proceeds with an igitur which would be very ill-suited to the other reading. The particle tamen just above would be equally inappropriate after quam nulla—metebatur: there is no opposition between the clauses if we read intellegi non potest, and it is harsh to carry back the opposition to the previous sed fuit quaedam. Independently of the inappropriateness of the proposition in the mouth of Vell. the language is too verbose for the short staccato style of the rest of his speech. Yet again, the sentiments in themselves are non-Epicurean. Infinite time and infinite space are not unintelligible to an Epicurean. Lucretius has no hesitation in telling us what was the state of things before the atoms happened on the existing cosmos with its sun and moon and stars. Sch.’s references to Aristotle and Sext. Emp., as proving the inconceivability
of time in itself, are quite beside the mark. No one disputes that this was the view of many philosophers; the question is, what was the Epicurean view? No doubt Vell. just below uses non-Epicurean argu-
ments, but that is where he can turn them to his own purpose, and make his adversary’s case destroy itself. Here it is his own case which is weakened by the insertion of what I hold to be a gloss. As regards the language of the gloss itself, ne in cogitationem quidem cadit is equivalent to no cogitari quidem potest (Ac. II 82) ‘it is impossible even to imagine how there could have been (lit. was) anything of the nature of time before time existed’ (I prefer to take it thus rather than to make ut fuerit=fuisse with Sch. in loco and Draeg. § 407). It only remains to account for the gloss, and this seems, like animi after oculis § 19, to be easily explained as a correction of the Epicurean doctrine in the text, made by a follower of Plato or Aristotle, who inserted a non before potest, and gave as his reason for negating it quod—esset. For the use of intellego=’conceive’ Heidt. quotes Fin. i 17 eunque motum atomorum nullo a principio sed ex aeterno tempore intellegi convenire (where see Madv.’s n.), N. D. i 73 istud quasi corpus et quasi sanguinem quid intellegis? III 38 quadem autem deum intellegere nos possumus nullo virtute praeditum? II 54 hanc igitur in stellis constantiam non possum intellegere sine mente (sc. obser).

§ 22. Isto spatio. Why the Abl. when we have the Acc. of duration just before, (saecla dorm.)? Because in that case the sleeping is viewed as extending right through the ages, while here the action is viewed as con-
fined within this time, not extending over it; so in tempore infinito just below, cf. hoc spatio (in the interval) conclare concidisse (De Orat. II 353), casus autem innumeris paene saeculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis efficit (Div. II 147). The same difference is found in Gr. between the Acc. of duration and the (inclusive) Gen. of time. Practically of course the two very much overlap, see Roby §§ 1182, 1185. Or we might take spatio as the Abl. of Attendant Circumstances, ‘though there was all that time’, Roby § 1248.

at iste—pararent. Heidt. (p. 38) has called attention to the ap-
parent inconsistency of this sentence with the tenets of the speaker. That we cannot connect the idea of toil with our idea of the divine nature is of course of the essence of Epicureanism; but this is bound up with the idea of the divine inactivity, whereas here it is assumed that the work of creation may be accomplished without toil to the creator owing to the willing co-
operation of the elements, a supposition which has been just ridiculed by Vell. § 19. There is however no reason to suppose any corruption of the text, as H. does. The argument throughout is ad hominem as shown by the repeated isto, iste, ista. To this H. opposes the language used by Balbus of the labour of creation II 133 tantarum rerum molitio, tantum laborasse; the answer to which is that B. there speaks rhetorically in a manner opposed to the general spirit of the Stoic philosophy to which Vell. here appeals.

ignes, terrae, maria. The singular is more naturally used of the simple elements, as in § 19; the plural of the lands and seas which constitute our globe. Perhaps the latter is employed here to give a certain inflation to the style suited to the ironical force of the sentence. So in § 100 and Leg. I 61 it may be explained as poetical hyperbole, ‘all lands, all seas’, or are we to consider it only the expression of the naive view which makes our earth the chief member in the universe? Caelum stands for air, ignes for the aetherii ignes (the stars) of § 103. Cf. Draeg. § 4.

quid—quod: see n. on § 3.

signis et luminibus. I think Ernesti right (against Heind.) in supposing a play on words here. It suits the jocular tone of the passage and particularly the reference to the aediles. The constellations (cf. § 35, Lucr. I 2, v 691) and luminaires of heaven are compared to the statues and illuminations with which the aediles adorn the public buildings of Rome on festal days. The custom originated according to Livy (ix 46) with the victory of the Samnites B.C. 307, when the buildings in the forum were decorated with the gilded shields and other spoils; inde natura initium fori ornandi ab aedilibus cum tensae ducentur. So Suetonius tells us (Caes. 10) that Julius Caesar, when aedile, praeter comitium ac forum basilicasque etiam Capitolium ornavit. We learn from Asconius ad Verr. I 22 that statues and ornaments were borrowed from Greece and elsewhere for these decorations, olim cum in foro ludi populo darentur signis ac tabulis pictis partim ab amicis, partim e Graecia commodatis utebantur; cf. Pro Dom. § 111, Verr. iv 3, Orator 131 (explaining the metaphorical use of the word lumen in oratory) reliqua ex collocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina magnam afferunt ornatum oratoris. Non enim similis iis quae in ample ornatu sceneae aut fori appellantur insignia; non quod sola ornant, sed quod excellunt. On the illuminations see Friedländer Sitt. Röm. II 144 ed. I, who refers among other passages to Lucil. Sat. III 23 Romanis ludis forus olim ornatu lucernis. Nocturnal spectacles were not uncommon, especially at the Floralia, the Saccularia, and the Saturnalia, cf. Ov. Fasti v 361, Dio Cass. LVIII 19, Suet. Aug. 31, Stat. Silv. I 6 85. They were much patronized by Caligula (Suet. Cal. 18), Nero (Tac. Ann. xiv 20) and Domitian (Suet. Dom. 4).

si: sc. ornavit. For similar omissions after si cf. § 99 si, ut immortalis sit, III 81 si, quia Drusum ferro sustulerat, Div. II 55 si enim, ut intellegерemus.

gurgustio: ‘a hovel’, ‘den’, ‘cellar’; used of a low tavern, Piso 13 meministine nescio quo et gurgustio te prodire involuto capite, soleatum? et cum isto ore fictio tucterrimam nobis popinam inhalesse...which is referred to again in 18 tu ex tenebriosa popina extractus; of a miser’s dwelling, Apul. Met. I 71 brevitatem gurgustioli nostri ne spernas peto; of the poor cottage in which Valerius Cato ended his days, Suet. Gram. 11; of a close bower or
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arbour, Ambr. *Hex. i* 8 32 *ut si quis in campi medio, quem sol meridianus illuminat, locum aliquem obsaepiat et densis ramorum frondibus tegat:* nonne quo splendidior foris species loci ejus effulgiet, hoc horrenti desuper scena gurgustium ejus intus obscurnibus fit? where gurg. ejus seems to mean the hollow depth of the arbour, agreeably to Vaniclek's account (*Etym. Wort.* p. 50) where he connects it with *gurges, voro,* &c. and supposes it to mean a 'swallow' 'abyss,' 'hole' and then 'a dark mean dwelling'.

**varietate.** C. translates Plato's *πετοικόλικόν* by *varietate distinctum* *Tim.* c. 10. On the position of -*ne* cf. *Leg.* *II* 12 with Dumesnil's *n.*

*quae si esset:* 'had it been a delight, he could not have dispensed with it so long'; cf. Lact. *I* 7 *fortasse quaeat aliquis a nobis idem illud, quod apud Ciceronem quaerit Hortensius: si deus unus est, quae esse beata solitudo quest?* The Epicureans following Aristotle made the happiness of God consist in the contemplation of his own perfection § 51, which is not however inconsistent with a delight in his perfection as reflected in the creation.

§ 23 *ut fere dicitis.* The Stoic belief that the universe was made for man is stated at length *II* 133, 154 foll. where see notes.

**sapientiumne.** The earlier Stoics divided all mankind into the wise or virtuous (for Zeno summed up all virtue in practical wisdom *φρόνησις*) and the fools or wicked, allowing of no mean between these extremes, cf. *Ac. II* 136, *Parad. S, 6, N. D. III* 79, *Fin. IV* 74: the later Stoics confessed that the Sage was merely an ideal not to be found on earth, and introduced an intermediate class of the *προκόπτοντες,* those who were on the way to wisdom.

**propter paucos:** the universal complaint, or boast, of philosophers, see *III* 79 *sapientium nemo assequitur, Div. II 61 si quod raro fit id portentum putandum est,* sapientem esse portentum est, Zeller *Socrates* tr. p. 313, *Stoics* tr. p. 254, Lucian *Hermotimus I* 1, Mayor's *Juvenal XIII* 26 n.

**de improbis bene meretur.** Absence of compassion, contempt for ignorance and weakness, despair of reformation, were characteristic marks of the old aristocratic philosophies, in contrast to the new religion which was to be preached in the first instance to the poor. The Epicurean here thinks it impossible that God should do a kindness to bad men or fools, who in the same breath are spoken of as most miserable: the Gospel recognizes human misery and sin as the strongest claims to the divine compassion. Cf. Orig. c. *Cels. III* 59 and 62.

**deinde quod:** the 2nd *deinde* is opposed to *maxime,* the 1st to *primum.*

*ita multa = tot:* so *Att. VI* 2 8 *inclusum senatum habuerunt ita multos dies ut interierint nonnulli.* Cf. *tam multa—quam multa N. D. I* 97.

*ut ea sapientes—leniant,* *stulti nec vitare possint:* 'there are so many troubles in life that all the wise can do is to alleviate them by a balance of good, the foolish can neither avoid their approach nor endure.

M. C.
their presence: see n. on § 20, eujus principium. The evils of life were often urged in opposition to Stoic optimism, see N. D. iii 65 seq., Ac. ii 120, and the interesting remarks of Pliny N. H. vii praef. Of the two reasons assigned for the misery of fools the 1st, though mainly Stoic, is also in accordance with Epicurean teaching, e.g. Fin. i 57 stulti malorum memoria torquentur: sopientes bona praeterea grata recordatione renovata defunct; 59 nemo stultus est non miser, and the beasts of Lucretius ii 7 &c.: the 2nd is distinctly Epicurean cf. Tusc. v 95 (Epicurus held) haec suntur compensations sopientium ut et voluptatem fugiat si ea majorem dolorem effectura sit; et dolorem suscipiat majorem efficientem voluptatem, and the quotation from a letter of Epicurus written in great pain, Fin. ii 96 compensator tamen cum his omnibus animi lacitutiam quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum (quoted by Heidt. p. 42, see also R. and P. § 388, 389).

Ch. X. qui vero dixerunt. That the world was a rational creature was the doctrine both of Plato and the Stoics, cf. § 18.

animal natura intellegantis. Davies’ objection to the use of intellegens for intellegantiae particeps seems to be answered by the sentence in the Timaeus c. 3 where C. translates otheiv anh{to}v toutov rov vovg e{X}ovtos kallosi e{g}e{q}da by nihil inintellegens intellegantia praestantia. Most ms about naturam, which is very possibly right, the subject of the subordinate clause (posset) being attracted into the object of the principal (viderunt) see Dic. ii 103 videmne Epicurum quem ad modum concluserit with Allen’s n. and Sch. Opusc. iii 301 foll. The latter thinks intellegendes was inserted by way of simplifying this construction; but a distinctive epithet is wanted for animus: otherwise, as it is found apart from rationality in brutes (see Tusc. i 80 bestiae quorum animi sunt rationis expertes) there would be no meaning in the words in quam figuram cadere posset. On the periphrastic use of natura cf. ii 136 alii natura, and Fin. v 33 hoc intellegend, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dice me; nihil enim hoc differt, Niigelsdb. Stil. § 50 4.


§ 24. nunc autem hactenus admirabo: ‘on the present occasion I will content myself with expressing my surprise at their stupidity’. Most of the edd. place a colon after hactenus, to which Heidt. p. 44 rightly objects that, wherever hactenus is used thus abruptly with the verb omitted, it implies a change to a new topic, ‘so much for that, and now to turn to another point’, cf. Tusc. iv 65, Off. i 91, 160, iii 6, Parad. 41, Divin. ii 53. He further points out that nunc must be taken with admirabo, if that is to refer to the immediate present, and not with the ingenious suggestion that hactenus is simply the marginal note of a reader to mark where he had left off. Curiously enough it does appear thus in the margin of one of the Harleian ms. I believe however that hact. adm. is an abbreviated phrase for hactenus dicam ut admiror (Klotz’s explanation is not unlike,
as he refers hactenus to qui velint = quatenus illi volunt, Adn. Cr. II 5) but I am not able to point to a parallel case. For the general form of the sentence Sch. compares Div. I 132 nunc illa testabor following haec habui de divinatione quae dicerem.

qui animantem—velint: (their stupidity) in being ready to predicate roundness of a being who is immortal and blessed into the bargain. I take animans as a Subst.; Vell. had previously stated that the Stoics considered the world to be alive; here he adopts their view and shows its absurd consequences. Velint subj. after qui = quod ii, Roby § 1740; neget subj. as dependent on subjunctival clause.


celeritate. As the earth was generally assumed to be at rest in the centre of the universe it was supposed that the heavens made a complete revolution about it every 24 hours. Aristarchus (280 B.C.) propounded the Copernican or heliocentric hypothesis, and was charged with impiety by Cleanthes as κυιοῦντα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἑστίαν. Hicetas the Pythagorean (about 400 B.C.) and Heraclides of Pontus (350 B.C.) are said to have accounted for the apparent movement of the heavens by attributing rotation to the earth, and this is discussed as a legitimate hypothesis by Aristotle. See Lewis Astronomy of the Ancients pp. 170, 189, 252. The question, already debated by the ancients, whether Plato held the same doctrine, is discussed by Lewis p. 142, and at greater length by Grote in a paper contained in his Minor Works.

contorquematur: used with a Middle force.

mens constans: that a steadfast mind’ is essential to vita beata is asserted §§ 34 and 52. The objection is taken from Arist. Cael. II 1 ‘nor can we suppose that the heaven is kept eternally in its place by the coercive influence of a soul: it is impossible that a soul thus engaged should enjoy happiness, for, if we assume the heaven to have a different natural movement of its own, such coercive movement must necessarily be ἀνχολον καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένης μαχαίρας ἐμφορον to a soul which has no refreshment of sleep, like the souls of mortals, but is for ever spinning round like Ixion on his wheel’.

insistere: ‘find a foot-hold’.

quodque—in deo. The natural way of taking this sentence is certainly to suppose that it continues the argument against a rotatory God. ‘The motion would be destructive of the tranquillity we ascribe to God, and, if we may judge from our own feelings, it would also be very uncomfor-table’. But then how are we to explain the enim of the next sentence? for the earth is supposed to be immovable; it is the mundus which moves. Sch. therefore following Madv. Fin. III 73, understands que as passing on to another point in the argument, and makes the clause refer to the extremes of heat and cold spoken of below. To this Heidt. p. 46 objects that the reference of quod must have been made clear by the addition of
some such clause as molestum autem est in nostro corpore nimio affici aut calore aut frigore. He would therefore omit quodque—etiam dei altogether, considering the first part a gloss on the preceding sentence, and the latter part a gloss to give precision to the argument of the following quoniam mundi partes sunt; (it would also be necessary to change the following atqui into atque). I see no objection to the former clause, if we accept Lachmann's emendation sic incitetur 'if it is carried along so fast' instead of the s's reading significetur, which there is no authority for interpreting (with Wytenbach in loc. and Beier (ff. i 46) to mean 'if there were the slightest hint (faintest trace) of it'. Sch.'s emendation (Opusc. III 234, 303) sic afficiatur only adds an obscurer sic to the obscure quod. Another objection to the s's reading might be that minima ex parte, though true enough if we imagine our body hurried along by itself with the velocity then attributed to the sphere of the fixed stars, would be absurd exaggeration if spoken with reference to our power of enduring tropical heat or arctic cold; but we must remember that the ancients, in their ignorance of geography, really believed that human life was insupportable except in the temperate zones. On the whole I have thought it better to follow the s's, though I am not satisfied that the text is correct.

minima ex parte: 'in the slightest degree'.
appulsu: 'by the sun's rays beating upon them', cf. II 141 frigoris et caloris appulsus.
exarsit. Heind., with whom Müller agrees, says conjunctivi rationem nullam video. Is it not the Subj. in orat. obl. after videmus? Previous to subordination the clause would be incultae sunt quod exarsit. The mood is changed, not because the speaker disclaims responsibility for the statement, but merely to show that quod gives the reason for incultae, not for the principal verb.

si mundus est deus. Probably C. meant to have continued dei membra sunt, but interposed quoniam—sunt to make the argument clearer. Lactantius dwells upon the same point Inst. vii 3. See also Aug. C. D. iv 12.

B. b. Historical Section x 25—xvi 43. See Introduction.
i. Epicurean polemic against the theological tenets of 27 philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon § 25—41.

§ 25. The mode of argument adopted by Vell. is extremely simple. He begins by assuming the truth of the Epicurean definition of God as a perfectly happy eternal being, possessed of reason, and therefore in human shape (cf. the words of Epicurus in Diog. L. x 123 πρώτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶν ἠφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὃς ἦ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μὴδὲν
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

μήτε τὸς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τὴς μακάριότητος πρόσαπτε· πάν δὲ τὸ
φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ ἰδιάμεσον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακάριότητα περὶ αὐτοῦ
δογμάς(ε). All opinions which are inconsistent with this are ridiculed as
absurdities: as we read in Philodemus¹ p. 96 'the Epicureans condemn all
who differ from them ὡς ἀν ὑπεννάτια τῇ προλύθειν δογματιζόντων'. Further
there is no attempt at accuracy in giving the opinions of the earlier
philosophers: rather they are intentionally caricatured in order to make
them more open to attack. C. in fact has put into the mouth of Vell. a
speech suitable to his own description of the Epicurean mode of con-
troversy; fidenter sane, ut solent ēstī, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitate
aliqua de re videretur N. D. I 18, vestra solum legitis, vestra amatis, ceteros
causa incognita condemnatis (spoken by Balbus N. D. II 73). If Cotta
afterwards praises the speech (ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate § 59;
enumerasīt memoriae et copiōse, ut mihi quidem admirari lūberet in hominēs
esse Romano tantam scientiam, usque a Thale philosophorum sententias
§ 91;) this is a part of his well-known courtesy (comiter ut solebat § 57).
How far the inaccuracies of the speech are to be attributed to C. himself
or to his Epicurean authorities is discussed in the Introduction. Minucius
(c. 19) gives a summary of this section to prove an opposite conclusion, viz.
that all philosophers agree in asserting that God exists and that he is a
spirit, cf. § 42 n.

qualia vero—repetam. The text is uncertain, and presents difficulties
whichever reading we adopt. If we insert alia after vero with two of
Orelli’s mss, this is in the first place hardly a suitable term for what
promises to be an exhaustive disquisition on the earlier systems (ab ultimo
repetam); Sch. therefore (Opusc. III 305 and 359) would prefer either to
read eetera for alia, or to transfer superiorum with Döderlein, placing it
before ab ultimo, which would then be taken absolutely as in Invent. I 28
brevis erit, si unde neesses est, inde initium sumetur, et non ab ultimo
repetetur; and, in the second place, all these readings are inconsistent with
the fact that a large part of the subsequent polemic is directed against
the Stoics. I am inclined therefore to retain the old reading, translating
'Such is a general statement of the Stoic doctrines; I will now proceed
to show how they are related to the older philosophies'; more literally
'to show what their character is, I will trace back their history to its
earliest source'. Probably there may have been some Stoic history of
philosophy professing to show that their doctrines were substantially the
same as those held by the most esteemed of the earlier philosophers. The
Epicureans would meet this by endeavouring to prove that such support
could only damage their cause. Fortsch (Quaest. Tull. 1837) explains it
differently, cujus vero generis sint, ita nunc ostendam ut eovirdar ab ultimo
superiorum, i.e. ea ejusdem generis esse, ita nihil esse; but Vell. has been
proving that the Stoic doctrines nihil esse for the last page or more.

¹ The references are to Gomperz’s edition of the Herculaneean treatise πεπ
eπισηφελα, on which see Introduction.
The statement here made as to the two principles assumed by T. is opposed to all the more ancient authorities. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. A. 3) makes him the leader of those who started from one material principle, and contrasts Anaxagoras with all his predecessors as having first felt the need of a separate intelligent principle. It is true that by water T. understood something more than mere lifeless matter moved by mechanical causes, like the atoms of Democritus. Water was a living substance endued with a θεία δύναμις κυνητική (Stob. Ed. i 56) whence Aristotle says (de An. i 5 17) καὶ εῦ τῷ ὄλοι τινὲς ψυχὴν μεικνυάι φαιν, ὃν ὥσος καὶ Θαλής φήδη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι, to which C. alludes Leg. ii 26; but the system was a mere 'hylozoism'. It was therefore by a mere misunderstanding that later compilers such as Stobaeus, I. c. and Plutarch Plac. Phil. i 7 p. 881 E, attributed to T., who left no writings behind him, (Diog. L. i 23) the statement that God was the soul of the world.

C. here departs even further from the truth in his phrase quae ex aqua euneta fingeret, implying a distinct creation out of inert matter by some external force. Elsewhere he gives the usual account, Ac. ii 118 Thales ex aqua dixit constare omnia. [Mr Reid would get rid of the inconsistency in C.'s account of Th. by inserting et between eunm and mentem 'that water was the first principle, and that it (water) was God and the mind which produced all things out of water'. One would be glad to relieve C. from the charge of talking nonsense, but it is a question here whether he would object to put nonsense into the mouth of Vell, and it must be remembered that we have the evidence of Minucius in favour of the existing reading.]

si di possunt—vacans corpore. The reading of most mss, et mente, cur aquæ adjunxit, si ipsa mens &c., teems with difficulties. To what does di allude? According to the preceding sentence T. only attributed divinity to mind, and here we have just the opposite supposition of deities without mind; then we find a transitive verb without an object, and lastly another supposition as to the possibility of mind existing apart from body, this supposition standing alone as a protasis without an apodosis. If, setting aside the grammatical difficulties, we endeavour to establish a general connexion in thought with what precedes, we have to consider whether the argument is direct, or ad hominem, whether corpus is used in its wider sense (= matter), or its narrower (= animated body), lastly how we are to understand the words deus and sensus. It will help to clear the ground if I first give Epicurus' own account of sensation (Diog. L. x 63) καὶ μὴν ὁτι ἐκεῖ ἡ ψυχή τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς πνευματον αἰτίαν δεί κατέκειν, οὐ μὴν εἰλήφης ἢν αὐτήν εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ λοιποῦ άθροίσματος (i.e. the body) ἐστεγά-

1 On the historical section compare throughout Zeller's History (Germ. Vol. i 4th ed. 1877, Vol. ii 3rd ed. pt. 1, 1875, pt. 11, 1879, Vol. iii in two parts, 1869; the parts treating of Socrates, of Plato, and of the Stoics and Epicureans have been translated into English), and my introductory sketch of Greek philosophy. I have thought it worth while to add special references to Krische, as his valuable book is in the most repulsive German form, without headings or index or table of contents.
BOOK I CH. X § 25.

ζετό πως ὅ τε δὲ λοιπὸν ἄφροσμα παρασκεύασαν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην μετείληφε καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον συμπτώματος παρ’ ἐκείνης, οὐ μέντοι πάντων ὡν ἐκεῖνη κέκτηται. διὸ ἀπαλλαγεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἀόρθησιν οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταύτῃ ἐκέκτητο τὴν ἄνθωμαν κ.τ.λ. from which it appears that the fine atoms which form the soul and especially its purest part, the mind or reason, which has its seat in the heart, (l.c. 66) are the true source of sensation, but that they can only act when confined within the body, on leaving which they are immediately dissipated and no longer exist as soul. Body by itself, i.e. the compound of grosser atoms known to us by the name of body, is incapable of sensation, but when united with the finer atoms of mind, it becomes sensitive to a certain degree. On the general subject of the relation of soul and body, cf. Lucr. iii esp. 230—287, where he shows that either by itself is alike incapable of sensation. Taking this as our clue, I think the only satisfactory way of getting over the difficulties of the sentence is to suppose that the apodosis to the 2nd protasis has been lost. This was the view of Lambinus who inserted the clause cur aquam menti before adjunxit, changing et mente into mentem. Most of the modern editors have followed in the same track. The text which I have given is that of Baiter except that I go with Lamb. in omitting et mente, which seems to have arisen simply from a misreading of the abbreviated mente: when this was once taken as an Abl. it would naturally be joined with the preceding sensu by an et. Sch.'s reading runs the first question too much into the second; the first cur must certainly be followed by an adjunxit: and it is also easier to account for the loss of the 2nd clause, if its end was an echo of the 1st. How then will the argument stand? The dogma attacked is, in its most general form, that the first principle is divinely animated water; to which it is objected that we have here an unnecessary combination of two principles: 'if divinity is possible without feeling, why add mind? Why may not simple water stand for the first principle? On the other hand, if mind is capable of existing alone, unconnected with any body, why tie it down to water? It is difficult to deal with the argument from the ambiguity in the use of the word 'god'. If by 'god' is meant the first principle, then the Epicureans would have allowed that this may exist sine sensu. In their view senseless atoms are the first principles, and they could have no a priori objection to senseless water holding the same office. On the other hand, if the name 'god' implies personality, then it is plain that the first principle of Thales was not a god. Divine persons such as those whom the popular religion recognized were as subordinate in his philosophy as they were in that of Epicurus, but they are certainly not more opposed to the former system than to the latter. The point of the objection seems to be that a dynamical principle, like that of the older Ionic philosophers, as opposed to the mechanical principles of Democritus, is an irrational blending of two contrary principles, the materialistic and the idealistic. In this objection Plato and Aristotle would concur, both holding that the universe took shape under the influence of eternal; self-
existential, incorporeal mind, whereas Epicurus of course preferred the other alternative and proclaimed the priority of matter. But the form given to the doctrine of Thales in the preceding sentence would not be inconsistent with a pure idealism; indeed Minucius c. 19, quoting this passage says that T. copied the Mosaic account of the Spirit of God moving upon the face of the waters. We may therefore conclude that this form is due to C. himself, and that the author whom he follows could have said nothing of ‘mind making all things out of water’; but only described in general terms the combination of two principles. The use of the plural δι' after the sing. deus may be intended to heighten the supposed absurdity of the dogma, or it may be an allusion to the words already quoted πάντα θεώς δι' ὀνείρων. Another way of dealing with the sentence is to regard σι' ἵππωσιν τερπόμενοι as an example of repeated protasis; so Heindl, Moser, Krische, Kühner. As the repetition of the protasis was only admissible here, if the 2nd protasis were really a restatement of the 1st, (see Madv. Fln. i 7, who calls this passage graverer moste) we should then have to take mens as explaining δι', and sine corpore as explaining sine sensu, interpreting as follows, ‘if the gods, i.e. pure mind, can exist apart from feeling, i.e. from a human body (we must take corpus thus if it is essential to sensation, for body in the wide sense, including the elements, is sine sensu; see below on Empedocles and Diogenes) why did he add mind to water?’ But it is plain that there is no logical connexion here between protasis and apodosis. Nor is anything gained by reading postu for mente with Moser, Krische, Kühner. Kr. defends the change by a reference to the polemic against Anaxagoras just below, and to a passage in Philodemus p. 88 l. 30, where allusion is made to philosophers who deify τὸν οὐδ' ἔκκεινθόν τινα δυναμένοντι τοῖς ἐμπρᾶγος ἀναφθητος; and explains as follows ‘if it is possible for gods to exist without feeling or movement, i.e. as pure incorporeal spirit, why did he link them to water, if mind can exist apart from body’, an interpretation which is open to the same charge as Heindorf’s.

Lastly it may be worth mention that three of the best MSS read sic for si, on which Davies followed by Allen founds the text, sic δι' possunt esse sine sensu. At mentem cur aquae, &c., and similarly Becker Comm. Crit. p. 14 sic δι'—sensu! sed mentem—corpore? Krische points out the objections to this. See for a discussion of the whole passage his Theol. Lehren pp. 34—42, and Sch. Opusc. iii 359. Other suggestions are given by Förtsch Quaest. Tall. 5—8, and Stamm De libr. de N. D. interpolationibus 16—21.

Anaximander. See Krische pp. 42—52. C. gives the ordinary account of his doctrine in Ac. ποιητῆς naturae dixit esse a qua cuncta gignentur. If there were any consistency in the Epicurean polemic, A’s first principle τὸ ἄτειρον (like the Water of Thales) should

1 Though the latter held at the same time the eternity, not of unformed chaotic matter, as Plato, but of the universe itself, still he constantly affirms that τὸ κτιστὸν (mind) is φέος εἰ πράτερον τοῦ κτιστοῦ (body).
have been identified with God, since we learn from Aristotle (Phys. iii 4) that A. considered this to be τὸ θεῖον and to govern (κυβερνάν) all things. True, the ἀπειρον was impersonal, but so was ὦδωρ; and therefore Augustine (C. D. viii 2) is justified in saying that neither A. nor Thales were theists in the proper sense. It seems however that later writers gave a more mechanical aspect to the physical theory of Anaximander, which they regarded as differing from that of Anaxagoras only in the fact that the latter recognized οὐσί where the former had seen only an ἄδιός κίνητος, cf. Ritter and Preller § 18 foll. with the notes from the Aristotelian commentators. So Plutarch (Plac. Phil. i 3, 4) finds fault with Anaximander, but not with Thales, for making no mention of an efficient cause.

nativos—mundos: so Stob. Ed. i 56 'Αναξ. ἀπεφήσατο τοὺς ἀπειρούς ὑφάναντος θεού, and Plut. Plac. Phil. i 7 τοὺς ἀστήρας ὑφάναντος θεούς, cf. Zeller i 211. The words orientes occidentesque are to be understood of the worlds which are continually being evolved out of the ἀπειρον and again absorbed into it.

denum intelligere: 'we can only conceive of God as eternal', any other supposition being opposed to the Epicurean πρόληψις, cf. § 43, and on this use of intelligere § 21 n.

§ 26. Anaximenes: ἀύρα ἀπειρον ἔφη τὴν ἀρχήν εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ τὰ γινόμενα, τὰ γεγονότα, καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, καὶ θεοῦ καὶ θεία γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῶν τούτων ἀπογόνων, Hippol. i 7. This agrees with Philodemus p. 65, so far as it is legible (see Lengnick Ad em. lib. de N. D. ex Philodemo p. 15) and with Aug. C. D. viii 2 omnes rerum causas infinito aeri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit (in contrast to his predecessors), non tamen ab ipsis aereem factum, sed ipsis ex aere ortos credidit; also Plut. Plac. Phil. i 3 ἐκ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτῶν πᾶλιν ἀναλέεσθαι: οὗν ἡ ζωή ἡ ἡμιτέρα, ἀνρ ὄντα, συγκρατεῖ ἑαυτός, καὶ ἄλον τὸν κόσμον πνεύμα καὶ ἄνθροποι. Stobaeus (Ed. i 56) further tells us that he gave the name of God to Air, and he adds the explanation that when the elements are thus defined we must understand that divinity is attributed to the power which has its seat in the element. How then are we to account for C's extraordinary assertion that the air from which all things proceed and into which they are absorbed is not itself eternal, but had a beginning in time (gigni)? Kr. p. 55 holds that it arises from a confusion between the divine air and the subordinate Gods who are produced from this air: a more probable suggestion might be that it is a misunderstanding of the Greek, ἀνρ πάντα γίνεται 'passes into all forms'. [Mr Reid indeed thinks C. meant gigni to be taken in this sense = ἐν γένεσι εἶναι, but this seems hardly consistent with the following quod ortum sit.] I believe that C. is here giving the view, which is stated more at length by Lucretius v 318, (of the ether) δενίγκε jam tuere hoc, circum supraque quod omnem | continet amplexu terram: si procreat ex se | omnia, quod quidam memorant, recipit- que perempta, | totum nativum mortali corpore constat; | cf. what is said of air L. 279, haud igitur cessat gigni de rebus et in res | reccidere, assidue
quoniam fluere omnia constat. In the Acad. ii 118 the doctrine is correctly stated infinitum aera, s&d en quae ex eo orentur definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omnit. See Krische pp. 52—60.

immensum et infinitum: two words employed to express the single Gr. στερνον cf. n. on § 2 perceptum et cognitum. The former brings into prominence the idea of space itself, the latter the boundaries which we seek in vain. They are often joined, as in Die. ii 91, so immensam et interminatam N.D. i 54. [Et seems to me to introduce the stronger word. To say that a thing has never been measured, is not so strong as to say that it is without end; cf. Ac. ii 127 exigua et minima. J. S. R.]

semper in motu: κίνησιν δὲ καὶ οὗτος διδόν ποιεῖ δὲ ἕν καὶ τὴν μεταβολήν γίνεσθαι, Simpl. in Arist. Phys. 6a (quoted with other passages by Zeller i 2214).

quasi: Heind. adds vero, but Fortsch cites several passages in which quasi by itself has the ironical force, e.g. Verr. v 169, Planc. 62.

cum praesertim: 'as if formless air could be a God, whereas it is fitting that God should be of the most-perfect shape'. Cf. ii 88 praesertim cum sint illa perfecta quam huc simulata sollertius, and see Madv. (Fin. i 25) and Mayor (2 Phil. § 60) on this use. Literally it means 'particularly when we consider that', but this often refers to a thought unexpressed, as here the logical form of the preceding clause would be 'as if we could possibly believe air to be a God'.

The criticism on the doctrine of Anaximenes, like that on Anaximander, is nothing more than an assertion of its irreconcilability with the Epicurean assumption of the eternity and human form of the Gods. In this C. copies Philodemus, who charges the Stoics with denying the Gods whom all worship and whom the Epicureans allow, ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ οὐ νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρας (p. 84). For pulcherrima specie see n. on § 23 in quam figuram; for the arg. that all that is born must die, n. on § 20 quod ortum.

Ch. XI. Anaxagoras: see Krische 60—68, Hirzel 90—97. His fragments are collected and explained by Schaubach and others. There is little probability in the tradition (Diog. L ii 6) which C. here follows, of the connexion between Anaximenes and Anaxagoras. The doctrines of the latter bear a much stronger resemblance to the Sicilian than to the Ionic school.

primus voluit. This is in accordance with the statements of Aristotle and the best authorities, but is in flat contradiction to the account of Thales given above. The doctrine alluded to is summed up in the words ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, νοῦς δι' αὐτὰ διακρίνας διείκοσμησε (Simpl. de cael. f. 145) also in Arist. Met. i 3, νοῦν εἶπεν εἶνα, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν αἰτίων τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης. Apparently C. meant to paraphrase διείκοσμησε by the words discriptionem et modum designari et confici, 'the order and measure of all things was marked out and effected by the power and the wisdom of the infinite mind'. But
though this reading is supported by all the mss, yet most of the later editors have followed Rigalt and Davies in substituting motum for modum, in order to suit the following motum sensui junctum. In confirmation of this emendation they quote Aristotle. Phys. viii 1, φησιν 'Α. όμοι πάσων όντων καὶ ημερούσων κίνησιν εξελούσαι τῶν νον, but as Bouchier, Heind. and Lengnick point out, the original motion by which the cognate particles were brought together was certainly not accompanied by feeling, and therefore cannot be alluded to in C's phrase m. s. j. In the Acad. ii 118 C. goes more into particulars with regard to the ὀμοιομερεία, A. materiam infinitam sed ex ea particulis, similes inter se, minus ut, eas primum confusiones, postea in ordinem adductas esse a mente divina cf. Zeller r¹ 880.

descriptionem. Bücheler has shown (Rh. Mus. n. s. xii 600) that the word formerly written description should be written disorder. whenever it implies distribution or arrangement, as in Senect. 59 where it is equivalent to the διατάσεων of Xenophon.

in quo—sentiret. Epicurean objection: ‘activity and feeling, i.e. rational life, cannot have its seat in what is infinite, nor is feeling possible without’ impact’. This is again an appeal to the Epicurean assumption, that rationality is only possible in a being of human form. The νοῦς of An. is described by himself in the words ἀπειρον ἐστι καί αὐτοκράτες καὶ μέμικται οὐδεν χρήμαι, ἀλλὰ μονὸς αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἐωτός ἐστιν...ἐστι γὰρ λεπτότατον πάσων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρότατον καὶ γράμμαν γε περὶ παντὸς πάσαν ἵπτει καὶ ἵπτει μέγατον (C.'s νι αν ράτινοι) καὶ ὁκοία ἔμελλε ἔσεσθαι, καὶ ὁκοία ἥν, καὶ ὁκοία νῦν ἔστι, καὶ ὁκοία ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νόσος, Simpl. in Phys. l. 336. The last sentence reminds us of one of the fragment of Philodemus p. 66, where we read that ‘mind was, and is, and will be hereafter’, and that ‘it rules and governs all things and superintends their infinite combinations’. Though it is doubtful whether An. himself expressly deified Nous, later writers were certainly justified in regarding it as divine (Sext. Emp. Math. ix 6, Cic. Ac. Ic. c.) as is practically done by Vell. here. On the other hand he is said to have been banished from Athens for impiety in asserting that the sun was a red-hot stone (Schuhbach Anax. frag. pp. 38—52, 139—142), since as Plutarch says (Pericles 23) they could not endure the substitution of irrational causes and blind forces in place of the old divinities.

in quo non vidit: ‘in making which statement he failed to observe’. So non sensis, non vidit, of Alcmaeon and Pythagoras below.

motum sensui junctum: this is the distinctive property of mens (sensifer unde oritur primum per viscore motus, Lucr. iii 272). Thus Aristotle says (Anim. i 2) that the ἐμψυχικον is thought to be distinguished from ἐψυχικον by two marks κυκῆι καὶ τῷ αἰθάνεσθαι.

continentem: here intras, but trans. in § 39. ‘It may be taken with sensui, repeating the notion of junctum, as we find mari aer continens 1117, cf. Ac. ii 105, Fat. 44 where it stands with proximus; or we may take it absolutely in the sense of ‘continuous’, ‘without break’, whether in
time or space. Taking it in the latter sense it will refer to the one all-pervading movement initiated by the Anaxagorean Nous, in contrast to the innumerable disconnected movements of the Epicurean atoms. Hirzel compares Cleomedes Met. t 1 

\[ \text{νέονον γὰρ οὐδὲνος φύσιν εἶναι δυνατὸν δεῖ γὰρ κατακρατεῖν τὴν φύσιν οὖτιν ὡς ἔστιν.} \]

in infinito: 'in an infinite subject', a more general expression for the preceding mens infinita, not, as Hirzel, p. 94, with a distinct reference to the universe considered apart from mind, though when the unintelligible mens infinita had been changed into the abstract infinitum, it could not fail to suggest to an Epicurean the thought of the infinite void as its only legitimate interpretation. To Anaxagoras the infinity of mind meant its unlimited wisdom and power: here it is understood of a mind not bounded in space or inclosed in body, but the Epicureans recognized no immaterial existence except τὸ κενὸν, which can neither affect nor be affected, but merely makes movement possible to bodies, ὡσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσύμματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν (Epic. in Diog. L. x 67). Cf. below on Pythagoras § 28, Plato § 30, Aristotle § 33.

neque sensum—sentiret. The reading of the mss is omnino quo translated by Kühner 'a sensation which the nature of the infinite mind would experience without being itself moved by it', governing quo by pulsa. Sch. makes natura pulsa Abr. Abs. (rightly, as I think) and governs quo by sentiret: he proposes also to substitute ipsius for ipsa. The meaning then would be 'a feeling with which it would feel without its own nature being moved'. Heind. inserts tota from the quotation in August. Ep. 118 and takes sensus of the infinitus ille sensus mentis divinæ which penetrates all things, a quo sensu si pellacetur natura tota ipsa sensum acciperet. Hirzel p. 95 agrees with him in making ipsa natura pulsa Nom. and opposing it to the mens infinita. 'It is denied', he says 'dass es überhaupt eine andere Empfindung als die in der Natur selber lebendig ist, in der Welt giebe'; and to prove that natura may be thus opposed to the divine Mind, he quotes § 53 natura effectum esse mundum. Comparing the objection to the pantheism of Pythagoras § 28, cur autem quicquam igno-raret animus hominis si esset deus?, he considers that the present objection is equivalent to saying dass jedes Wesen nur ein einziges Empfinden, nicht neben dem einigen noch ein fremdes, das göttliche, in sich haben könne. None of these explanations seem to me satisfactory: Sch. and Ku. give a very harsh construction, and the latter's quo (sc. sensu) pulsa makes sensus the cause, not the result of impact. Hirz. agrees with Sch. in retaining the awkward construction quo (sensu) sentiret, and his explanation seems to make the Epicureans attribute feeling to inanimate nature, a conception as abhorrent to them as that of a soul of the universe. Heind. gives a good sense, 'if there were an all-pervading mind then every thing would be sensitive', but if that were what C. meant, he would hardly have expressed it so obscurely. I think a clause is wanted to balance in infinito, and
should propose to insert in eo after omniō and to change quo into quot, translating 'nor did he see that feeling of any kind is impossible unless the feeling subject is of such a nature as to be capable of tangible impression,' lit. 'nor feeling at all in that which did not feel from its very nature receiving a shock'. In eo—sentiret is a general expression for that which is immaterial. [I understand the ordinary reading as follows, 'nor can there be sensation at all, without the sentient creature becoming sentient by an impulse from without', taking quo non=quin, and ipsa as merely emphasizing the subject. J. S. R.]

dinde—videtur: 'in the next place, if he intended the infinite mind to be a separate living creature (α ζωύ αφθαρτον like the Gods of Epicurus, as opposed to an element pervading all matter) it must have an inner and an outer part: but mind itself is the innermost seat of life, so it must be clothed with a body. Since he objects to this, we are left with nothing but bare unclad mind, unprovided with any organs of sense, a notion which it passes the force of our understanding to grasp'. Epicurus speaks to the same effect in Diog. L. x 66 (of disembodied soul) νόθον διαν τε νοεῖν αυτήν αλθεαιομένην μή εν τούτῳ τῷ συνόψμωται καὶ ταῖς κυψέας ταῖς χρωμένης. That 'animal' is a name for the compound of soul and body appears from Arist. Pol. 1 5 το ζωυ πρῶτον συνετήκεν εκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, and C. Tim. 4 intellectum in animo, animum inclusit in corpore... quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri hunc mundum animal esse. In Lucr. 116—144 we read that mens or animus has its seat in the breast, while the rest of the soul (anima) is disseminated throughout the body; in 230 foll. one ingredient in mens is said to be a nameless element, not found in the anima, nam penitus prorsum latet hoc natura subestque | nec magis hoc infra quicquam est in corpore nostro | atque anima est animae proprorno totius ipsa | 273—275

ex quo nominetur: 'to justify the name'. [Cf. 36 animus ex quo animal dicitur, Tusc. 1 21 if animus non est, then frustra animalia appellantur. J. S. R.]

§ 27. quonium: properly gives the reason for aperta mens, but the contemptuous brevity with which the Epicurean argument is stated has compressed two clauses into one, and quonium placet now serves as a protasis to the principal sentence.

qua sentire possit: Bouhier adopted this reading from the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118, in place of the quae of the MSS.

fugere—notionem: 'to transcend the comprehension of man's understanding'. For fug. cf. Tusc. 1 50 tanta est animi tenuitas ut fugiat aciem, Leg. Man. 28 hujus viri scientiam fugere. Vim et notionem is a sort of hendiadys for vim noscendi.

Alcmaeo: a younger contemporary of Pythagoras (Krische pp. 68—78). He held the soul ἄθωρτον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἑκώνα τοῖς ἄθωρτοις, τούτο

1 The two words are constantly confused in the MSS, see C. F. W. Müller Fleck. Jahrb. 1864.
BOOK I CH. XI § 27.

8' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῆς ὃς ἢ ἀεὶ κινομεῖσ' κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς ἢ ἀεὶ, ἐξελίγνη, ἦλιον, τοὺς ἀστήρας καὶ τὸν ὀυρανὸν ὄλον, Arist. An. i 2. 17. As usual the criticism consists merely in the assertion of the irreconcileability of the doctrine criticized with the Epicurean assumptions. Epic. held that the stars and the soul were compounded of atoms and therefore dissoluble; Alc. held that they possessed the property of self-movement and were therefore immortal.

nam Pythagoras. On the elliptical use of nam in passing from one point to another, like autem, quid, jam, see Nägels. Styl. § 196, Dnag. § 348 4. Mayor on Juv. x 204. Here the thought omitted is 'why speak of his friend P. for he is guilty of even greater absurdities'. Cf. nam Permenides just below; nam Abderites § 63, in a list of irrereligious philosophers; nam Phaedro § 93, in a list of Epicureans; nam justitía...nam fortis in recounting the virtues III 38; nam quid ego de Consolatione dícam? in giving a list of his writings Dict. i 3; nam de angue, nam Dionysii epist., nam quod stellos aureas in a list of portents Dict. i 65, 67, 68, nam Strato Ac. i 34. I think it is a mistake in Shilleto (Thuc. i 25) to endeavour to explain this use both in nam and γὰρ by referring to a supposed earlier meaning of the two words—nam, he says, is nearly equivalent to the German nämlich—

animum—carperentur. See Krische 78—86, Zeller i 3554 foll. 412 foll. Heinez Logos 179. This doctrine is also ascribed to P. in Senec. 78 Pythagoras Pythagorícum nonnumquam dubitarunt quin ex universa mente divina deliberatos animos haberenus, and in Sext. Emp. Math. ix 127 'en ὑπάρχειν πνεύμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου δύναμιν ψυχής τρόπον, Diog. L. vii 25 ἀνθρώπους εἰναι πρὸς θεοῦ συγγένειαν κατὰ τὸ μετέχειν ἀνθρώπων θερμοῦ... εἰναι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰδέρος καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ... ἀδιάβαστον τ' εἰναι αὐτὴν ἑπιδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπόσπασται ἀδιάβαστον ἕστω. This is the exoteric side of the Pythagorean doctrine modified, as is probable, by some Stoic commentator who wished to claim the authority of P. for his own pantheistic system. The statement in the Ac. ii 118 Pythagorei ex numeris et mathematicorum initiiis proficiæ volunt omnia is more in accordance with Arist. (Met. i 5, xiv 3, &c.), who also gives a different account of the Pythagorean psychology (An. i 4 compared with Plato Phæd. 85), 'some call the soul a harmony, some say that it consists of the motes in the sunbeam or the cause of their movement'. On the religious ideas of the Pythagoreans see Zeller i 418 foll. and cf. C. Leg. ii 26 bene dictum est ab eo tum maxime et pictatum et religionem versari in animis cum rebus divinis operam darumus. The most complete account of the Pythagoreans is to be found in Chaignet Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne, 1873.

intentum per: 'pervading', lit. 'stretched through, like the warp in the fabric'.
non vidit—mundo. Epicurean polemic: if each soul is a part of the divine soul, then (1) the separate existence of human souls must cause a laceration of the universal soul, (2) when the individual soul is conscious of pain, a part of divinity is in pain, (3) each soul must partake in the infinite knowledge of the universal soul, (4) it is impossible that an incorporeal soul could be united with a material world. For obj. (1) cf. § 24 dei membri ardentia: it is of course merely straining the metaphor of carpenterur. Both this and the following obj. are based on the Epicurean assumption of perfect happiness as essential to divinity. On the Epicurean pessimism (quod pleisque contingert) see § 23 n. Obj. (4) is inapplicable: the writers who attribute to P. the derivation of the human soul from the divine represent him as materializing both under the form of fire or aether.

**distractio**: Ba. adopts Ruhnken's conjecture distractio referring to the separation of each soul from the universal soul; but the ms reading may be defended as expressing the division of the universal soul among a number of human souls: animus distractitur de deo, but deus distractitur in animos.

§ 28. **inficxus** properly of a solid; **infusus**, of a liquid.

** Xenophanes.** Krische 86—97. Elsewhere C. gives a more correct account, cf. Ac. ii 118 Xen. unum esse omnin, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse devem, neque naturum unquam et sempiternum conglobata figura; De Ort. iii 20 veterea illi (soc. Eleatae) omnin habe quae supra et subter, unum esse et una vi atque una consensione naturae constriet esse dixerunt, &c. As to the infinity of the universe Arist. (Met. a. 980 b,) distinctly tells us that while Parmenides made the One πεπερασμένον, regarding it from the ideal side, and Melissus, regarding it from the material side, made it ἀπειρον, Xenophanes oύθεν διεσαφήνεσιν ἀλλ' εἰς τόν ὄλον οὐρανόν ἀποβλέψας τό ἐν εἶναι φησι τοῦ θεον. In the Aristotelian treatise, Melissus, however (c. 4) it is argued that, if God is spherical (as X. affirmed) he must also be finite, σφαερεῖδὴ ὄντα ἀνάγκη πέρας ἔχειν, whence later writers attributed this doctrine to him, e.g. Galen, Hist. Phil. iii 24 εἶναι πάντα ἐν, καὶ τούτο ὑπάρχειν ἄρχειν πεπερασμένοι, λογικόν, ἀμαρτάβλητον. On the other hand we read (Meliss. 2) that X. supposed the earth to extend downwards and the air upwards to infinity which may have given rise to the representation of his doctrine here followed by C. or this may have arisen, as Krische thinks (p. 91) from the confusion between the infinite in time (αἰών) and the infinite in space (ἀπειρον) cf. Meliss. 1, and Zeller p. 494. One might have expected to find some reference here to the noble protest made by Xen. against the debasing ideas connected with the popular religion, but the Epicureans in their allusions to other philosophers only thought of exalting their own master, and Xen.'s ridicule of anthropomorphism would make his writings especially distasteful to them. The fragments of Xen. were collected and explained by Karsten, 1830.

qui mente—voluit esse. Sch. (in loc. and Neue Jahrb. 1875 p. 685 foll.) takes praeterea—infinitum as a separate clause, translating 'he held
the rational universe to be not only infinite but God’; he allows however that he knows no example of praeterea quod used in the sense of praeter quam quod; and if C. had meant this, why should he not have said simply et inf. et d.? I think too the context shows that infinitum must be taken as belonging to the subject; Vell. objects not to τὸ πᾶν being called ἀπειρον, but to τὸ ἀπειρον being called θέου. And the same appears from the quotation in Minucius c. 19. Xen. notum est omne infinitum cum mente deum tradere. I believe that C. is translating some such original as τὸ πᾶν, λογικῶν ὅν καὶ ἀπειρον, θεόν εἶναι, and that he has here turned a quality into an independent substance, as was done above in the case of Thales, and also of Democritus (§ 29). Then praeterea quod esset (or perhaps praeterea alone) seems to me a gloss intended to soften the apparent contradiction in the idea of τὸ πᾶν in which mind is not included. For omne = τὸ πᾶν, cf. Div. II. 103 quod in natura rerum omne esse dicitum, id infinitum esse. [I am inclined to think that X. used ἀπειρον in the sense of ‘indefinite’, and that the true reading here is praoptera, not praeterea; X.’s God was God just because he had no definite organs (οἷλος ὁρᾱ &c.) like the anthropomorphic Gods. J. S. R.]

de ipsa—potest esse. Epicurean polemic: as regards the divinity of mind, Xen. is open to the same criticism as Thales and Anaxagoras (for why did he combine mind with infinity? and if it is unbounded mind, how can that feel?): as regards the divinity of the infinite, he is even more to blame, for vacancy is the only infinite, and in this there can be no feeling and no connexion with any thing external (such as mind) since it includes all things in itself. There seems no ground for Kr.’s supposition that conjunction is used in the Lucretian sense (1 450) of a property; for void, no less than the atoms, has conjunction in this sense; nor again for Hirzel’s view that it is synonymous with continens in § 26. The easiest reference is plainly to the preceding mente adjuncta, and if so, it is an additional argument against the genuineness of the weak addition praeterea quod esset, which would just serve to turn the edge of the criticism.

Parmenides: see Krische 97—116. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (Amsterdam 1835) and Mullach Frag. Phil. vol. i 109—130. As X.’s theology was found in his account of τὸ ὅν, any rational investigation of the development of theological thought would have shown us in what respects his disciple’s view of the τὸ ὅν differed from his; but the Epicurean critic has no eye for anything but names, and finding the word θέος occurring frequently in P.’s popular account of the phenomenal world, he confines his attention to this, regardless of the fact that, whether named or not, the idea of divinity is as much involved in P.’s higher philosophy as in that of many of his predecessors, and also forgetting that the cosmical system of Parmenides is in the main taken from Pythagoras and should have been criticized under his name. The doctrine here alluded to is given by Stob. Eol. i c. 22; Π. στεφάνας εἶναι περιπετειακῶν ἐπιλῆλους, τὴν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ
BOOK I CH. XI § 28. 113

ἄρασιν (the fine element of fire) τὴν δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πυρικοῦ (the gross element, earth,) μικτὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐκ φωτός καὶ σκότους μεταξὺ τούτων καὶ τὸ περίχων δὲ πάσας τέξιους δίκην, στερεῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὑφ᾽ ὧν πυρόδης στεφάνη καὶ τὸ μεσαίτατον πασῶν (is solid also) περὶ ὧν πάλιν πυρόδης τῶν δὲ συμμεγαν τὴν μεσαίτιτην (the fiery ring just mentioned which lies in the middle of all the composite rings) ἀπάσαις τοκεῖα πάσης κυνήσεως καὶ γενέσεως ὑπάρχειν, ἣτεινα καὶ δαίμονα καὶ κυβέρνητιν καὶ κληδούχουν ὅνομαζει, δίκην τε καὶ ἀνίκηρον. From this it is plain that C. is mistaken in ascribing divinity to the orbem qui cingit caelum. It is the innermost fiery circle surrounding the dark globe of the earth which is divine according to P. Probably C. in his haste confused this with the ninth all-embracing sphere of the Somn. Scip. 4 summus ipse deus, arcens et continens ceteros, in quo infiniti sunt illi qui volvuntur stellarum cursus sempiterni. In Ac. π 118 we read that P.'s first principle was ēgnum qui morcat terram quae ab eo formatur, which agrees fairly with Theophrastus quoted in Zeller1 1 p. 522 δύο ποιεῖ τὰς ἀρχάς πύρ καὶ γηρ, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐλημ, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ ποιοῦν. Colotes, one of the leading disciples of Epic., wrote against Parm. as we learn from Plut. M. p. 1113 foll., but there is no resemblance between the criticisms which we find there, and those contained in this passage.

nam : see n. on § 27.

commenticium : see § 18. It suggests the more fanciful character of the tenets here discussed in contrast to the preceding. For efficit we should rather have expected effingit, unless we retain the old reading similitudine (preferred by Sch. Opusc. iii 360) in the sense 'he makes out a fanciful sort of thing by the help of the similitude of a crown'.

continenté—orbem : 'a shining ring of unbroken fire', i.e. not composite.

qui cingat. The later editors have followed Ernesti and Heind. in reading cingat required by the or. obl. instead of the cingit of the mss. Sch. Opusc. iii 307 gives many exx. of the interchange of the moods in mss.

in quo—potest. Epicurean polemic: this offends against our assumption as to the human form of the Gods and the impossibility of sensation except through the medium of bodily senses.

multaque—monstra : modi is inserted after ejusdem by most edd. and no doubt the omission would be easy before monstra, which in that case would be the Acc. governed by efficet. The monstra however which follow (bellum, &c.) are hardly ejusdem generis with the stefânh; and the recurrence of the phrase immediately below inclines me to adhere to the mss. Ejusdem will then refer to P. and form part of a new sentence, of which monstra will be the subject. On portenta cf. § 18 n.

quique qui—delentur. This is distinctly stated with regard to cupiditas by Aristotle Met. 1 4, where he says that some approach to the recognition of a final cause was made by those who assigned as a first principle ἐρωτα ἡ ἐπιδομαίαν, οἵτω καὶ Π. from whose poem περὶ φύσεως he then quotes the line πράτιστον μὲν "Ερωτα βεών μυτίσατο πάσων.

M. C. 8
Though the contrary principle *bellum* did not so play an important part in P.'s system as in that of Empedocles, yet it may easily have been introduced in the description of the mingling of Light and Darkness, Male and Female, of which the following lines are preserved to us (R. & P. § 151, Mullach *Erg. 1* p. 127) εν δε μεσρ τούτων διάμοιν η πάντα κυβερνᾶ. | πάντη γὰρ στυγνοῖο τόκον καὶ μίξιος αρχή | πέμπουσ’ ἄρρεν δηλοὶ μιγῆναι, εναντία δ’ αἰδής | ἀρσεν δηλατέρω. A fragment of Philodemos probably refers to this part of P.'s doctrine, as the name Παρμενείδης occurs just before (p. 65), τόν τε πρῶτον θεόν ἀψευδο ποιεῖν, τούς τε γεννομένους ὑπὸ τούτον τί μεν αὕτα τοῖς πάθεσιν τοῖς περὶ ανθρώποις. From this we may explain the Epicurean polemic in the text: 'if P. deified human passions our experience shows that these are liable to be affected by disease, sleep, old age, &c.'

cetera: e.g. δίκη and ἀνάγκη mentioned in Stob. l.c.

dad emn revocet: 'brings them under the head of deity', i.e. makes them divine, cf. § 119 ad rationem recovatis. *D. ic. 116* 66 ostenta ad conjureturam revocantur. The later ed. have corrected the Ind. of the ησσ in accordance with Ciceronian usage, see Draeger § 401, Sch. *Opusc. 111 308.*

eademque—omittantur. Parm. is said to have written largely περὶ αὐτρων but we are not told elsewhere that he attributed divinity to them. On the omission of *deivit* (with *eadem*) cf. § 17 n. The reference is to *ad demn revocet. In alio* i.e. in the case of Alcmaeon.

ch. xii § 29. Empedocles: see Krische 116—130. The fragments are collected and explained by Karsten (very full notes), Mullach and others. Lucretius 1 716—733 speaks in a very different tone of 'the glory of Sicily whose inspired verses set forth his discoveries in such wise *ut rix humana vindatur stygpe creatus*, but we learn from N. D. 1 93 that Epicurus and some of his disciples wrote against him. *In loc. 117 C. says of him de suspicium rebus iis de quibus loquitur somnum fundere videtur.* The numerous fragments of E.'s poem *pepfi physis* show how capriciously the authority, whom C. follows, selected his facts. In addition to the four elements, deified under the names of Ζεύς or *Hphnatos* (fire), *Hnη* (air), Νηστις (water), Λιδωνεις (earth) E. treats as divine the active principles Νεικος and Φιλότης (also called *Aphrodite*), the all-including *Sphairos* (ὁ ουδαμονεταστατος θεος Arist. *Met. 111 4*), the supreme Law (*Anagyko*), the gods and daemons of the popular religion, the souls of good men. The criticism is equally careless.

peccans: 'among other blunders', cf. § 31.

deurum opinio: obj. gen. 'in his religious belief', so opin. ejus below, *dicinationis opin. 'belief in divination' D. ic. 1 75; but op. de dis N. D. 1 11, cf. Draeg. § 203, Roby § 1318.

naturas: cf. § 22 n.

quas et nasci—perspicuum est. Lucretius, who gives what is on the whole a fair criticism of the system of Empedocles in 1 752—802, urges the same objection, but E. himself distinctly asserts the opposite, *physis oudeos*
BOOK I CH. XII § 29. 115

ἐστιν ἀπάντων | θνητῶν οὐδὲ τις οὐλομένου θανάτου τελευτή | ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξης τε διάλεξις τε μυγώνων | ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ μὴ ἔστω ἀρήχον ἐστὶ γενέσθαι | τὸ τ' ἐδὼ διόλυσθαι ἀνήφυτον καὶ ἀπήκτουν | 98—108 Mullach.

sensu carere: the same argument as before: there can be no sensation without a sensuous organism.

Protagoras: see Krische 130—142. The theological views of P. are stated again in §§ 63 and 117, but without the words qualesve sint, which are also omitted by Diog. L. IX 51 peri μέν θεῶν οὖκ ἐχω εἰδέναι οὐδ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐδ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν: πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλύπτοτα εἰδέναι, ἥ τε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. The first writer who gives the fuller form is Timon the Sillograph (b.c. 279) quoted by Sext. Emp. IX 57 P. θεὸς κατέγραψ' οὖτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι | ὁπποίοι τινές εἰσι καὶ οὕτως ἀθρήσασθαι. It is probable that Philodemus reported the doctrine in this form, for though there is no direct mention of Proi. in the existing fragments, yet in the summary at the end of the controversial portion of his treatise, allusion is made to τοὺς ἄγνωστον εἰ τινὲς εἰσὶ θεοὶ λέγοντας, ἥ ποιοί τινές εἰσιν, p. 89, which can only refer to him.

habere quod liqueat: 'to be able to make up his mind'. Cf. II 3 ei haberem aliquid quod liquearet, Ac. II 94, and the legal N. L. (Cluent. § 76).

quicquam suspicari: 'to have the faintest idea'.

Democritus: see Krische 142—163, and nn. on N. D. 1120 where his theology is more fully discussed. Epic. is charged with ingratitude towards him § 93. Lucretius though often dissenting from him in points of detail always speaks with respect of that Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit.

imagines earumque circuitus = imag. circumventes. On the use of hendiadys cf. Zumpt § 741, Seyffert Lael. pp. 191, 198, Draeger § 311, 9. It is a figure often employed by C. in translating from the Greek, and not unfrequently we find a complex idea misinterpreted by being thus broken up into its component parts, see nn. on § 25 (the mentem et aquam of Thales) § 28 (mentem et omne of Xenophanes). Here it is intended to have a burlesque effect.

in deorum numero refert. Heind. followed by Klotz (Adn. Crit. I 5) reads numerum against the mss, as we have ref. in deos § 34, repono in deos § 38; but the Abl. is the more common construction after repono, e.g. in vestigio reponere § 37, sidera in deorum numero reponere II 54, so III 47, 51, cf. Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeger § 298 c. We might make a distinction between the meanings of refero as it was followed by Acc. or Abl. translating the former ‘to put him on the list of the Gods’, the latter ‘to return his name in the list of the Gods’.

scientiam intellegentiamque nostram: again hendiadys = animum nostrum scientem et intellegentem, Sch.

neget esse quicquam sempiternum: i.e. any compound. Atoms and void are of course eternal to D. as to Epicurus, but the former had not thought of saving his Gods from wasting and disturbing influences by

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placing them in the *intermundia*. They are therefore mortal, διεφθάρτα μὲν, οὐκ αὕφαρτα δὲ (Sext. Emp. ix 558) and cannot pass the Epicurean test.

Diogenes (Krische 163–177) distinctly attributed reason to the air, making it the principle of life and understanding in man, and the sovereign of the universe; in his own words quoted by Simplicius (R. and P. § 63 foll.) ἀνθρώπος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζωὰ αναπνεύσατα ἐξεῖ τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ τούτο αὐτοῖν καὶ ψυχῆ ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις: ...καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὑπὸ τούτων πάντα κυθερώσατο. We also learn from Theophrastus that he attributed sensation to air (R. and P. § 66) ἀσπερ τὸ ἔρυ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀνάπτει, and spoke of ἄ ἐντὸς ἄηρ (the breath or spirit of man) as μερίν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ.

In the Philodemian fragment p. 70 he is referred to in the following terms, Δ. ἑπανεὶ τῶν ὁμηρον ὡς οὐ μυθικῶς ἄλλη ἁλήθεια ὑπὲρ τοῦ θείου διελεγμένων· τῶν ἁρα γὰρ αὐτῶν Δία νομίζεις φησιν ἐπειδὴ πᾶν εἰδέναι τῶν Δίαι λέγει; with which Nauck on Philodemus, in *Melanges Grecos-Romains*, St Petersburg, 1-64, compares the interesting passage in the comic poet Philemon (Meineke p. 391) ὅν οὐδὴ εἰς λέξηθεν οὐδὲ ἐν ποιῶν ὧν ἄν ποιῆσω, οὐδὲ παιδευκώς πίλαι | οὔτε θείος, οὔτ' ἀνθρώπος, οὔτος εἰμ' ἐγώ. | Ἄηρ, ὅν ἄν τις ὀνομάσει καὶ Δία.

quem sensum—dei: reiteration of the old polemic, see under Empedocles, Parmenides, Anaximenes for sensum, under Parmenides and Anaximenes for φίγοραm.

§ 30. jam: a transitional particle like nam, which some read here: lit. 'by this time' 'next' we come to Plato.

Plato: Krische 181–204. The fact that we have, in this 2nd criticism of Plato, no reference to the former contained in §§ 18–24 is one of the arguments alleged to show that this whole section was inserted as an afterthought. The charge against Plato is (1) inconsistency: at one time he denies the possibility of naming God and forbids us to inquire into his nature, at another he tells us that the heaven, the stars, the souls &c. are Gods; (2) these assertions are not only inconsistent but false in themselves; (3) particularly the assertion that God is incorporeal. With the exception of Sch. all the edd. seem content to understand *inconstanza* of the first two assertions, that God cannot be named and that he ought not to be made the subject of investigation; but as these are evidently quite consistent, Sch. holds that the opposition lies between them on the one hand and the assertion of the incorporeal nature of God (*quod vero*—ἀσώματον) on the other. He allows that the grammatical connexion of the two sentences is very different from what we should have expected if they were intended to have this relation to one another, but offers no explanation or suggestion. It seems to me plain that, as the latter stands, it is impossible to suppose them thus related; and no less plain that the sentence beginning with *idem* (a word constantly employed to mark the coexistence of two apparently inconsistent facts) refers back to the *qui in Timaeo* of the first sentence. The opposition between
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the 1st (ms) sentence and the variety of positive assertions as to the Deity in the 3rd (ms) sentence, is much more glaring than the opposition between the 1st sentence and the one negative assertion of the 2nd sentence. Besides the idea of inconsistency runs through the 3rd sentence, whereas it is entirely absent in the 2nd. I think also that the repetition of et is intended to point the contrast, 'after having spoken as he did in the Timaeus and Laws, we find him in both asserting not only that we can name God, but that there are any number of substances which we may call by that name'. Taking it then as certain that the opposition lies between the 1st and the 3rd sentences, I have little doubt that the 2nd and 3rd have got misplaced. Compare the transposition in § 5 of the sentences beginning quaedem and multum autem, that in § 88 and § 97, and many similar instances in Munro’s Lucretius, see his Introduction p. 20 foll. ed. 1, also Müller in N. Jahrb. for 1864, p. 144. In the present case and also in § 5 the transposition may be explained by supposing the misplaced clauses (Sunt vero and Qua quidem) to have been added on revision by C. himself, but wrongly inserted by the scribe. See below on idem in Timaeo.

*longum est*: see § 19 n.

*inconstantia*: Grote (Plato ii 161) applies this censure more generally. The discrepancy between different dialogues is partly to be accounted for by the change in Plato’s own sentiments during the course of a long life, partly by the different aim and style of the particular dialogues, scientific, popular, allegorical.

in Timaeo: p. 28 c. τὸν μὲν ὦν πατὴρ καὶ πατέρα τοῦ τοῦ πατέρα εὑρέων τοῦ ἐργον καὶ εὐρώτα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγεων, translated by C. Tim. 2 atque illum quidem quasi parentem hujus universitatis invenire difficile, et cum invenire indicare in vulgus nefas. The passage was much quoted by the early Christian writers, e.g. Minucius c. 19 Platonis deus est mundi pares, artifex animae, caelestium terrenorumque fabricator, quem et invenire difficile prae nenia et incredibili potestate, et cum invenire in publicum dicere impossibile praefatur. Eadem fere et ista quae nostra sunt. On the other hand Celsus made use of it against the Christian preaching of the Gospel to the poor, to which Origen (vii 42) replies that the Christians not only affirmed with Plato that it was difficult to discover the Creator, but that it was even impossible for man to do this, except for those to whom the Son revealed Him. Clement of Alexandria, commenting on the words of Plato, says that, in using of the Ineffable such names as ἐὰν ἡ τάγαθον ἡ νοῦν ἡ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν ἡ πατέρα ἡ θεόν ἡ δημιουργὸν ἡ κύριον, we do not profess to name Him truly, but employ various terms as a help to the feebleness of our own understanding, Strom. v 12 § 3.

in legum—censeat. As we have had occasion to suspect misrepresentation in cases where it was difficult to arrive at complete certainty in regard to the doctrines referred to, it is a satisfaction to be able here to confront the accused with the accuser, and prove the groundlessness of the
charge. The passage alluded to is vii 821, where ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, speaking the author's sentiments, says 'there is something very surprising in our notions about astronomy, τῶν μὲν γίγνοντων θεῶν καὶ ὠνομάτων τῶν κόσμων φαμέν ὑστερεῖν δεῖν υἱτε πολυτρωγμονεῖν τις αὕτης ἐρευνήσως,' οὐ γὰρ οὗτος ἄτομον εἶναι, but true piety requires just the opposite. We ought to carry our inquiry into the nature of the celestial deities (the Sun, Moon, &c.), at least so far as to enable us to avoid such blasphemy as men are guilty of, when they call them wandering stars, and confound the rates of their movements'. It is plain that the word φαμέν introduces, not a sentiment of Plato's, but that of the Athenian public, who had banished Anaxagoras and put Socrates to death on a similar charge. Plato's own view comes out still more clearly in bk xii 966, where he argues that astronomy rightly studied is the foundation of true piety.

non censeat: negative used as in ὁ φημι, cf. Off. 1 39 Regulus captivos reddendos non consuit.

idem et in Timaeo. Assuming that quod vero—comprehendimus has been misplaced in the mss, we may suppose that the present clause was originally connected with the preceding, (iam de Platonis—censeat) either by a cum which has dropped out between qui and in Tim. so as to make idem dicat the apodosis, or simply by the continuance of the Subj. constr. in dicat. The former would be after the pattern of § 121 cum enim optimum naturam dicat esse, nemo idem &c. the latter of Off. 1 84 incruci multi sunt qui non modo pecuniam sed vitam etiam profundere pro patria parati essent, idem (but yet) gloriae jacturam ne minimum quidem facere vellent. After the dislocation had taken place, the sentences would naturally be altered so far as to enable them to stand alone.

et mundum—accepimus: see § 18 n. These are all subordinate divinities owing their existence to the good pleasure of the one Father and Creator. So we read (Tim. 34) of the plan pursued by the everliving God in forming the God who was to be (i.e. the world), and in p. 92 this created God is called the visible image of the invisible God. The name οὐρανός is sometimes used of the κόσμος, at other times confined to the starry heavens as opposed to the earth. Beside the passages already quoted, showing the divinity of the stars, see Tim. 40, where the Demiurgus is said to have made the earth, our nurse, the guardian of day and night, the first and oldest of the gods ὁσα ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόναι. In the same passage Plato affirms his belief in the deities of the traditional religion (eos quos majorum instituitis accepimus) the children of Heaven and Earth, and tells us that they, like the celestial deities, acted as subordinate agents in the creation of man and the other animals, receiving from the Demiurgus a separate divine particle to be the nucleus of each human soul (41 c. foll.) But when C. says that Plato deified ἄνωμος, he probably alludes to Leg. x. 892 foll. where it is proved that soul, as the self-moving substance, must be prior to body, and then (899 b) the conclusion is drawn that, since soul or souls have been shown to be the cause of all movement, and since they are
ut Graeci dicunt: there seems no reason for doubting the genuineness of these words, as Heind. and Ba. have done; see n. on physiologiam § 20. There is a special reason for adding the Greek here, as the Latin equivalents were not introduced till later, incorporeus appearing first in Seneca, corporeus in Gallius. The doctrine that all that is corporeal is in its own nature mortal, genotypov kai phabrotov, runs through the whole of Plato (see § 20 n.) and we find the unseen, which is eternal, contrasted with things seen and temporal in Tim. 28; but it is only the Demiurgus who is essentially incorporeal; many of the inferior deities are clothed in bodies.

id—intelligi non potest: 'a divine incorporeity is inconceivable', cf. § 27 on Thales. The absence of feeling involved absence of forethought and absence of pleasure, see § 48. C.'s own opinion is given Tusc. 1 50, where speaking of those qui nequeunt qualis animus sit vacans corpore intellegere et cogitatione comprehendere, he says quasi vero intellegant qualsis sit in ipso corpore; and a little further certe et deum ipsum et divinum animum corpore liberatum cogitatione complecti volumus. Again Tusc. 1 71 dubitare non possimus quin nihil sit animis admissum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagamentum, nihil duplex. Quod cum ita sit, certe nec secerni nec dividir nec discerpi nec distrahi potest, ne interire quidem igitur. Plato argues against those who identified matter and existence, auton soma kai ouxian orizomenoi in the Soph. 246 foll. where the term αὐσώματον occurs.

§ 31 Xenophon: see Krische 204—234, Philodemus p. 71 en tois Xenofoñtos απορμημονεύμασιν oux orásthai phsioin tou theou tou morphin alla týrgha. The passage referred to is quoted by Clem. Al. Protr. § 71, Strom. v § 109, and by others among the early Christian writers: it occurs in Mem. iv 3 § 13, where Socrates says that Euthydemus will soon be convinced of the providential government of the world, if he is content to see the Gods in their works without waiting to see them in bodily form, av mev μη ἀναμένης εὼς ἀν τῶν μορφῶν τῶν θεῶν ἑδης, ἀλλ' εξαιρήσας τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὄρων σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς, a very different assertion from that of the Epicurean critic here, who would identify this with the view just before attributed to Plato (deum nominari non posse, anquiri non debere). The next assertion et solem et animatum deum is founded upon the same passage of the Memorabilia, where Socrates illustrates our inability to look upon God by the parallel case of the sun, o πάσι φανερόν δοκῶν εἶναι ἡλιος οὐκ ἐπιστήτη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐσώτερον ἀκριβῶς ὄραν, ἀλλ' εάν τίς αὐτοῦ ἀναδώσῃ ἑξεχερήθη θεάσθαι τῷ ὑπ’ ὑπνοί αἴφαιται, and of the soul ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἡ εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ θεοῦ metéchei, ὅτι μὲν βασιλείει ἐν ἡμῖν φαινότον, ὀράτας δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτή. It is unnecessary to say that in neither case does X. make the assertion attributed to him in the text. Thirdly it is stated that X. speaks of God at one time in the singular, at another time in the plural. This no doubt is true,
not exclusively of X. but of the greater part of the Greek philosophers
(as even of the critic here § 25) both in popular speech (in Plato Epist. 13
p. 363 b it is made the sign to distinguish between the esoteric and exoteric,
τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπονδαίας ἐπιστολῆς θεῶν ἄρχει, θεῶν δὲ τῆς ἡπτον) and in their
more scientific treatises, where they speak, now of the Supreme Deity
himself, now of the subordinate gods who are his agents. This distinction
appears in the same passage of the Memorabilia, οἱ τε γὰρ ἄλλοι ήμῶν
τῆς μᾶλιν διὸ ὑδάτες οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τοῖς μαθηταῖς διδάσκον, καὶ οὐ τῶν ὄλων
κάποιν συντάγματα τε καὶ συνίχων ἀριστῶς ήμῶν ἔστων.
facit Socratem disputantem...eundemque dicere. Either the Inf.
or Part. may follow faciō in the sense of ‘to represent’. Of the former we
have an ex. in III 41 quem Homerus convenit facit ab Ulice, and i 19 con-
stitu mandam facit; of the latter in Brut. 218 colloquentem facit; of the
two combined in this passage and in Tusc. v 115 Polycrènum Homerus
cum ariete colloquentem facit ejusque laudare fortunas quod qua vellet ingredi
posset; cf. Madv. § 372 obs. 5, Draeg. § 442. 2.
sunt isdem in erratis quibus: cf. sunt in varietate § 2 n. For the
emission of the preposition before the relative see Zumpt § 778, Madv.
§ 323 obs. 1, Nägeli. Stil. § 121. 2, Moser ad Tusc. i 94, and Heindorff’s n.
here.
ch. xiii § 32 Antisthenes. Krische 234–246. C. is here translating
from Philodemus p. 72 par’ Αντισθένου δ’ εν μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται το κατὰ
κόσμον εἶναι πολλὰς θεοὺς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν εἶνα (compare Varro’s classification
of theology as fabulosum, naturale, civile Aug. C. D. vi 5). Before the
decipherment of this fragment, C.’s statement was unsupported by any
independent authority, but we have a saying of Ant. reported by Theodoret
(Græc. Ad. 14) which agrees very well with it, θεῶς ἀπ’ εἰκόνος οὐ γνωρι-
μένα, ὀφθαλμοῖς οὐχ ὀράται, οὐδενὶ ἔοικε διόπερ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν εἰς
εἰκόνας ὑπάρξει.
tollit vim—deorum: that is, of the anthropomorphical gods of Epi-
curus and of the popular belief.
Spesippus: cf. Krische 247–258. Spengel and Saupe in their
collections of Philodemus find an allusion to Sp. in the lines just preceding
the account of Aristotle (Gomp. p. 72) but there is nothing there which
could illustrate the account here given, which is in fact unsupported by
any ancient authority. We know hardly anything of Sp. except that he
modified the teaching of his master in the Pythagorean direction. The
criticism here is as reckless as in the case of Antisthenes.

vim quandam dicens: understand the predicate deum as in § 28 on
Pythagoras.

§ 33 Aristoteles: cf. Krische 259–311. The treatise here referred to
is no longer extant. It is also cited by Philodemus p. 72, but unfortu-
nately the fragment gives no more than the words par’ Ἀριστοτέλει δ’ εν
τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Diog. L. v 22 tells us it consisted of three
books; see Zeller3 III p. 58, foll. who shows that Krische is wrong in
identifying it with the books referred to by Arist. An. i 2 in the phrase ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένους. Bernays gives a full account of it in his Die Dialoge d. Aristoteles pp. 95—114. From this it appears that the 1st book was concerned with the praephilosophic speculations of the East and of Greece: the discussion respecting Orpheus N. D. i 107 is supposed to have belonged to this. The 2nd book dealt with the earlier philosophers, including Plato; the quotation in Tusc. iii 68 is probably taken from it. The 3rd book, in which Aristotle gave his own view, is largely quoted from in the speech of Balbus, N. D. ii 42, 44, 95 and without reference in §§ 37, 51, cf. Bywater in Journal of Philology vol. vii pp. 64—87, and the fragments as they are given by Heitz in the Paris, or Rose in the Berlin, edition of Aristotle.

non dissentieers. Colotes is attacked by Plutarch M. 1115 for identifying the doctrines of Plato and the Peripatetics. It was the view of Antiochus and the eclecticS, and is often propounded by C. as his own, cf. Fin. iv 5, Ac. i 17, Leg. i 38.

menti tribuit divinitatem. In Met. xii 6, 7 foll. God is defined as ζωον αἰδιων ἀριστον, pure incorporeal reason, νοήσις νοησίως, ever engaged in contemplation of himself, who himself unmoved has from all eternity moved all other things by a divine attraction (κεὶ οὐς ἐρώμενον, cf. Gen. et Corr. ii 10 ἐν ἀπασιν αἱ τῶν βελτίων ἀρετῶν ἡ φύσις). Noble as this view is, it yet presents some points of contact with the Epicurean theology, which might have been taken advantage of, if the critic had had any other object beyond that of depreciating all who preceded his master.

mundum ipsum deum. Compare Eth. Nει. vii 14 πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείον; Cael. ii 1, where ὁ πᾶς οὐρανός is said to be αὖθανατον καὶ θείον, and just below ‘we shall speak most suitably about it if we regard it as God’; again c. 3, θεοὶ ἐνεργειαὶ ἀνανασαία· ἄστρα ἀνάγκη τῷ θείῳ κηνήσαιν αὐτίων οὐράχων· ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐρανός τοιοῦτος (σῶμα γὰρ τι θείων) δία τούτο...κύκλῳ αἱ κυκλώται; also Met. xii 8 ‘it has been handed down in mythical form from ancient times that the first mover, and the world which it sets in motion, are Gods, and that all nature is encircled with divinity: but this high doctrine was mixed up with anthropomorphic conceptions. Eliminating these, we shall hold that it was a divine inspiration which led our ancestors to the conclusion θεοὶ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας εἶναι’. These expressions however are not to be understood in a Stoic sense as though Aristotle identified the world and God. Transcendence is a distinct feature of the Platonic and Aristotelian theology as opposed to the Stoic Immanence.

alium quendam: Sch. understands this of the quinta natura, the aether of which the heaven itself and the heavenly bodies are composed, but this is the ardor of the next clause: besides, Aristotle never represents it as presiding over the universe or setting it in motion. - Krische is, I believe, right in taking it of the one supreme God, who has been already referred to as mens, but now appears in another character as the First-mover, cf. Arist. Met. xii 6 p. 1071 foll. Phys. viii 5 διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει,
replication: identified with conversion by Sch. but Krische is, I think, again right in regarding it as a translation of the term ἀνείλτης used of the retrograde movement of the planets: see Met. xi 8 where Aristotle explains the apparent irregularity in the planetary movements by assigning to them distinct ‘spheres’ for the forward and retrograde movements, the latter being called σφαῖρα ἀνειλττουσαι ‘the reversing spheres’ (Lewis Astronomy of the Ancients p. 163 foll.). The same word is used by Plato of the counter-rotation of the Kosmos in the Politicus 270 d. ἐνετήμενοι τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνείλτης τότε ὅταν ἡ τῆς νῦν καθεστηκίας ἑναινία γίγνεται προτῇ. Of course it is an absurd blunder in C. or his authority to make the motion of the entire universe depend upon this partial subordinate movement, but we have seen too much of the critic to be surprised at any blunders, and the word replication does not seem to admit of any other interpretation; it means ‘folding back’, ‘rolling back’, ‘inverse rotatory movement’. Freud (Andrews), it is true, translates ‘winding up,’ which to us, familiar with watches, might be suggestive of the action of the First-mover, but could hardly be so to the ancients: moreover a periodical winding up is not consistent with the constant unchanging attraction ascribed to the First-mover by Aristotle. The addition of quaedam is perhaps a sign that C. had no very clear idea of what he was talking about.

cæli ardorem: cf. § 37 omnia eingentem arderem qui aerth nominatur, also ii 41, 64, 91, 92. The proof of its existence is given Arist. Caed. 1 2 (cf. N. D. ii 44) where it is argued that as it is the nature of earth to move towards the centre and of fire to move to the circumference, so there must be a body which has by nature a circular movement, and that this body must be θεωτέρα καὶ πρωτέρα than the others because its motion is more perfect. To this eternal celestial substance the ancients gave the name αἰθήρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄεὶ θεῶν, but Anaxagoras wrongly identified it with fire and derived it from αἴδω. (C’s translation ardor shows that he followed Anax. The dignity of Aether is proclaimed by Euripides in the verses quoted N. D. ii 65. Elsewhere C. speaks of it as a quintum genus e quo essent astra mentoreque Ac. 1 26 and Tusc. 1 65 sin est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele indicata primum, haec et deorum est et animorum; but Aristotle (Gen. Anim. ii 2), while he allows that in the generation of soul there enters in an element akin to that of the stars, finer and more divine than the other four, adds λειτυται τῶν νοῦν μονῶν θεραδεν ἑπετειναι καὶ θείων εἰναι μονῶν οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κανονεῖ σωματικῆ ἐνέργεια. If we take mundus above to represent ὤμων, we may understand ardor cæli here to represent some such original as ὁ τε αἰθήρ καὶ τά ἄνω σώματα, of which Arist. says Eth. vi 7 that ‘there are many things of a diviner
nature than man, as most evidently those ἕξ ὄν ὁ κόσμος σωμάτικες, and in Phys. π. 4 they are called τὰ θεία τοὺς φανερῶν. Taking it thus as a collective expression (simplex ex dispersis membris as is said of Xenocrates) we might find in it an explanation for tot di immediately below, but see n.

CELERITATE: 'like a dancing dervish making himself giddy by his rotations' Lescaloperius in loc. See on § 24.

ubi tot di: Heind. (followed by Sch. Opusc. III 311) thinks that, as tot cannot apply to the four above mentioned (which in reality are only two, the κινοῦν and κινούμενον), something must have been lost from the text; and as Arist. is said non dissentire from his master, he suggests that the lost clause may have corresponded with § 30 quos majorum institutis accipimus. But why may we not give the same meaning to illi tot viz. 'all those many Gods of the popular religion', without supposing an omission? (So Allen.) The Epicurean objection would then be that 'these gods are supposed to exist in heaven, but if heaven itself is God, how can one god live in another'? If we accept Sch.'s conjecture that the lost clause referred to the stars, the objection would merely be a repetition of caelum mundi esse partem: 'they are already included in caelum, how can they be separate and independent Gods'?

NUMERAMUS: similarly III 40, 43.

SEMPER SE MOVENS: these words are in direct opposition to Aristotle's κινεῖ διέμενος, which is further explained (Cael. π. 12) ἔσεσθαι τῷ μὲν ἄριστον ἔχοιτ' ὑπάρξει τὸ εὐ ἄνευ πράξεως ἀπὸ τῷ τὸν ἔνεκα. The Epicurean views of incorporeal substance (sensu privat) have been sufficiently illustrated already.

§ 34 Xenocrates: cf. Krische 311—324 N. D. 172. C. alludes more than once to the compliment paid to Xenocrates by his countrymen in accepting his word in lieu of the customary oath Balb. 12, Att. 1 16; he reports his answer as to the aim of his teaching, ut id eum apontes tractaret quod cogentur facere legisbus Rep. 1 3; and describes his psychology in the words animi figuram et quasi corpus negavit esse, verum numerum dixit esse; cujus vis, ut jam ante Pythagorae visum erat, in natura maxima esset. Tusc. 1 20. This account in the text omits all that is characteristic in his philosophy: see Stob. Eel. I p. 62 Ει. τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν δύναμα θεῶν (ἀπεφηρότου) τὴν μὲν ὡς ἀρρενα ποτρίς ἔχουσαν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσα, ἡνίκα προσαργοφεῖν καὶ Ζήνα καὶ πέρσων καὶ νοῦς, ὡς ἀντίκρο πρῶτος θεῶν τὴν δὲ ὡς θελείαν, μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην (Zeller notices that Philolaus also gave the name of Rhea to the dyad) τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν λήξεως ἤγομενήν (presiding over the middle region or province) θεῶν δὲ εἴθαν καὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυράδες Ὀλυμπίων θεῶν, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποστήριχους, διάμονας ἀφορίτους. Some of these last were of a malignant character, φυτεύειν τῷ περιεχόμενῳ μέγαλον μὲν καὶ ἵππωρας, ἔνωστρότοις δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς (Plut. Is. et Os. ch. 26 p. 361) whose wrath had to be propitiated by sacrifices. Xen. also gave
nulla species divina: 'no divine form' i.e. no anthropomorphic God.
in stellis nominantur: 'which we name in naming the stars.'
qui ex omnibus—deus: 'whom he would have us believe to be a
single uncompounded God made up of all the fixed stars, as of dissembled
limbs.' Zeller suspects an allusion in the original to the Orphic myth
of Zagreus, which was interpreted by later philosophers of the anima mundi
pervading the universe (Plut. M. 389 b). Simplex is an ironical substitution
for concretus, to which it is opposed in III 34; cf. also II 11, where it
is opposed to cum alio juncta atque conexa. The phrase mundi membra
occurs again § 100.

Heraclides: a native of Heraclea in Pontus, pupil of Plato and Speu-
sippus and afterwards of Aristotle (Krische 321—336). In the letters to
Atticus there are many allusions to the Dialogues of Her. which were
distinguished from those of Aristotle by the fact that in the former (as in the
X. D.) the author was made a κωφίν πρώτωνων, while in the latter he
was the principal interlocutor (as in the Tusc. III). C. speaks of him with
respect as vir doctus in primis (Tusc. v. 8), and quotes from him Dic. i 46
and 130. The views here ascribed to him are common to the Platonic
school. We are further told that he held with Epiphantus, the Pythagorean,
that all material objects were compounded of atoms, and that the apparent
movement of the heavens was caused by the rotation of the earth.

pueribus fabulis: Plutarch (Camill. c. 22) describes Her. as μεθώδη
και πλασματικός, and the names of the treatises preserved by Diog. L. v
6, 87 are suggestive of a predilection for the marvellous. Like Empedocles,
he is said to have been ambitious of being worshipped as a god after his
death, Diog. L. v 90.

modo mundum tum mentem: cf. § 31 modo unum tum autem phares,
sensu—vult: a criticism interposed; 'neither pure mind, nor gross
matter, such as the stars are composed of, is separately capable of feeling:
and to suppose that the moon and planets with their changing phases are
divine, is to deny the inamutability of the divine nature', cf. Plato Rep. II
381, St James 1 17 τού πατρός τῶν φωτών, παρ' ὧν ἐνι παραλλαγῇ ἡ τροπῆς
ἀποσκίασμα.

refert in deos: cf. n. on § 29.

§ 35 Theophrasti: see Krische 337—349, Bernays Th. Uber From-
mikeit, Cie. Fin. v 9 foll. He appears to have carried further his master's
investigations upon particular points without diverging from his general
principles. C. charges him with assigning too much weight to fortune as
an element of happiness, Lc. i 34 and elsewhere. Gomperz thinks that
the words ἐγκομιῷ τῶν θεῶν, found in a fragment of Philodemus p. 73, refer
to a treatise of Theoph.'s mentioned by Diog. L. v 47.
inconstantia: the charge previously brought against Plato.
divinum: 'such as belongs to a god'. Heind.'s correction divinae is unnecessary.

signis sideribusque: a pleonastic expression 'star-clusters (sidus) (stella) which constitute a sign', cf. n. on § 22.

Strato: (Krische 349—358, Cudworth i 144—153). He succeeded Th. as head of the Lyceum b.c. 287, and changed the theism of Aristotle into a system variously described as pantheistic or atheistic. Cudworth calls him 'the first asserter of hylozoic atheism'; and says that while 'nature according to Democritus was the fortuitous motion of matter, Strato's nature was an inward plastic life in the several parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage according to their several capabilities without any conscious or reflexive knowledge'; a view which appears closely to resemble the ordinary notion of Evolutionism. Cic. says of him that he is omnino semenvendus from the true Peripatetics, as he abandoned ethics, and departed very widely from his predecessors in physics, to which branch he confined himself; again, Ac. ii 121 Strato negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum. Quaerendumque sint docet omnia effecta esse natura...naturalibus fieri ponderibus et motibus, but notwithstanding he was an opponent of the atomic philosophy. Similar views are advocated by the Academic Cotta N. D. iii 27.

minuendi: some edd. insert after this immutandi, a correction of immittendi which occurs in one or two mss, but it is probable that this is merely due to a careless repetition of the preceding word.

careat—figura: of course from the Epicurean point of view, cf. n. on species § 34; but, as Strato, according to Plutarch ade. Col. c. 14, denied that the world was a living creature, careat sensu is probably correct in this case. Strato's deus seems to have been much the same as Prof. Tyndal's Matter 'containing the promise and the potency of all existence'.

ch. xiv § 36. The absence of any allusion to the previous criticism of the Stoic philosophy in §§ 18—24, just as in the parallel case of the Platonic philosophy § 30, is an instance of the carelessness which characterizes the composition of the whole treatise, and particularly of the present (historical) section.

Zeno: (Krische 358—404, Brandis in Dict. of Biog.). He is quoted N. D. ii 57 (definition of nature), 20 (arguments to prove the rationality of the world), also in i 70, ii 63, iii 18, 22, 63.

naturalem legem. Heraclitus was the first who expressly identified the law of nature with the word and will of God; cf. Fr. 91 Bywater, ξυνῶν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονίειν' ξυν νῶο λέγωντας ἱσχυρίζεσθαι χρῆ τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων, ὅκωστερ νῷοι πόλει καὶ πολὺ ἱσχυρότερος. Τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νῷοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου' κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὅκοσοι έθέλει καὶ έξαρκείς πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. fr. 92 τοῦ λόγου δ' εὕτος ξυνῶ, ξώσων οἱ πολλοὶ ὑ ἠδὲν ἔχουσιν φρόνησιν. fr. 65 ἐν τῷ σοφῶν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔθελει καὶ ἔθελει. Ζηνὸς οὖν οὖν. This view, popularized by the Stoics, was passed on by them to the Roman jurists and so to their modern successors. Thus
C. Leg. 1 18 lex est summa ratio insita in natura quae habet ea quae facienda sint, prohibetque contrariam; also § 42, and more explicitly II 8, "the wisest have held that law is no device of man, but that it is actum quod quidem quod universalum mandatum regeret imperandii prohibendique separienda. Ita principem legem illum et ultimum montem esse dicebant omnia rationem aut cogitatem aut voluntatem dei; and § 110 etiam enim ratio proiecta a rerum natura...quae non tum desineit incipit lex esse cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est; orta autem est simul cum mente divina. Quamobrem lex vera atque principis, opta ad habendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis.

Stobaeus Ed. II 6 p. 204 gives the Greek definition (ο νόμος) λόγος ὅρθος εται προστατικός μήν διν ποιητών, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ δὲν οὖν ποιητών. See Hooker, Ecol. Pol. 1 ch. 2—6, and Wordsworth, Ode to Duty, where God is regarded as the common source of the natural and the moral law. Probably Zeno would not have objected to a definition of God with which we have been made familiar of late, 'a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness'.

eamque vim obtinere = ἐνεργεῖ, 'it (the law of nature) has its force in commanding', 'its function is to command', so vim habere Leg. II 9 (of law, quae vis est aequalis, 'coeval with', illius caelum atque terras tuentis et regentis dei).

animantem. But the Stoic lays it down as the first attribute of Deity ut sit animans X. D. II 45. The use of the abstract name Nomos is no more inconsistent with the idea of a living God, than the similar use of the abstract Logos. Compare the misunderstanding of the term πρόνοια § 18.

aethera: the physical, as Law is the moral manifestation of God, cf. § 33 on Aristotle, and below on Cleantches and Chrysippus, also II 23 foll.

si intellegi potest: see Sch. Opusc. III 311, who compares Fam. IX 17 de lucro prope jam quadrivium vicinum, si aut hoc lucrum est, aut hoc vita. The phrase is properly used when we doubt about the correctness of some expression without questioning the fact stated, as in Juvenal's si rixa est. Its use here is a piece of colloquial carelessness, but there is no need to alter it, as Heind. and others have done. For intell. cf. §§ 25, 27, 30.

qui numquam occurrit: 'never comes across one', cf. §§ 46, 76 foll.

rationem—pertinentem: 'the all-pervading reason' is of course only another name for the lex naturalis. For omnem some edd. have omnium: both forms are found, e.g. II 36 rerum omnium natura, so Leg. I 61 and II 16; on the other hand we have naturam rerum omnem, X. D. I 27; cf. Munro on Lucr. II 646, Sch. Opusc. III 330 and 361. Pertinentem = διηκορτα as in M. Aurel. v 32 ὁ δὲ τῆς αὐγίας διηκόρως λόγος. Virgil gives it a poetical form Geo. IV 220 foll. dum namque ire per omnes terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum, and Aen. VI 724, cf. Heinze Logos p. 85 foll.

vi divina esse affectam. Sch. Opusc. III 313, doubts the correctness of the phrase, thinking such a use of officere unfitted to express a natural
attribute; nor is this disproved by the passages quoted by Klotz Adn. Cr. iv 4, e.g. Tusc. v 81, optima quisque valetudine affectus potest videri natura ad aliquem morbum proelieior. May it not be used here with an intentional impropriety to suggest the impossibility of reason possessing the attribute of divinity?

**astris:** cf. ii 39 foll.

**annis—mutationibus:** see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 121 foll. who mentions, among other extravagant conclusions drawn from the Stoic axiom 'all that exists is material', the statement attributed to Chrysippus that the voice was a body, that qualities are bodies, nay rational creatures (Plut. Comm. Not. 45), that diseases, vices and virtues are bodies (Seneca Epp. 106, 117, and especially 113 animal constat animam esse. Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodam modo se habens: ergo animal est). He quotes also the words of Chrysippus (ap. Plut. l. c.) in which it is distinctly asserted that night and day, the month and the year, summer and autumn, &c., are bodies, adding that 'by these unfortunate expressions Chrys. appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on material conditions, e.g. by summer is meant the air heated by the sun'.

**Θεογιονιαν—interpretatur.** The device of allegorical interpretation is naturally resorted to when it is desired to retain old forms which are felt to be inconsistent with new beliefs. As Philo allegorized the Jewish Scriptures in order to bring them into harmony with his own Platonism, so the Stoics allegorized the Hellenic Scriptures (Homer and Hesiod) with the view of hiding the divergence between their own philosophy and the popular religion, cf. Heraclides All. Hom. proem. "Ουρανός ηκεθήγεται ει μη ἡλληνική ἐκφάντασην, Orig. c. Cels. i 17, iv 48 (where Cels. says the more respectable Jews and Christians take refuge in allegory, being ashamed of the literal sense of their sacred books, to which Or. replies in the following chapters), Lobeck Ael. pp. 133, 155 foll., Zeller Stoics tr. ch. 13, p. 334 foll. Plato alludes to the allegorizing process as already rife in his time, Rep. ii 378, Phaedrus 329. For Stoic exx. see below § 41 seq. ii 63 seq.

**usitatas perpectasque: 'the ordinary well-understood notions of gods' = usu percepts π 91, Fin. v 3. See Sch. Opusc. iii 314 who defends this reading against Lambinus' emendation insitas perpectasque.

**neque enim—appelletur: 'neither (the actual) Jupiter nor any one who is addressed in that way, i.e. as a person', [or 'who bears a name of such a kind, i.e. a proper name'. R.] Davies, followed by Heindorf and Schömann, reads appelletur against the best mss. I understand the Subj. in its 'limiting force', cf. Madv. § 364 obs. 2, Roby § 1692.

**significatio—στοιχεια,** Plato Rep. ii 378, a figure of speech quae plus in suspicione relinquit quam positum est in oratione, Herenn. iv 53, 'where more is meant than meets the ear.'

**quamdam: 'a sort of', Zumpt § 707. [Often used to mark a translation from the Greek. J. S. R.]**
§ 37 Aristo: of Chios (Krische 404—415) represents a Cynic reaction in the Stoic school; he confined himself exclusively to ethics on the ground that logic was a spider’s web, curious but useless, and that physics were beyond our faculties: Stob. Floril. 50, 7 πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν εἶναι τὰ ἱθυκά, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ διαλεκτικά: μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλοντα πρὶς ἐπανύθεσιν βίου ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά αὐτῶνα γὰρ ἐγνώσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν. It is therefore probably correct, though we have no actual confirmation from other sources, that he denied the possibility of our knowing anything about God. The particular form given to the denial is of course due to the Epicurean reporter.

Cleanthes: Krische 415—435. He is referred to N. D. ii 13, iii 16 (the four grounds of religious belief) ii 24 and 40 (all-pervading heat) ii 63, iii 63 (allegorical interpretation). Cleanthes is more distinguished for moral strength and religious earnestness than for any speculative advance; none of the doctrines here mentioned are peculiar to him: one in fact is wrongly ascribed to him. While holding with the rest of his school that the universe was divine in virtue of the aetherial soul by which it was animated, he placed the source and seat of aether in the sun, and not as the others (agreeing with Aristotle) in the furthest heaven, cf. Lc. ii 126 Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis auctor videtur quantum usus, mente proidentes qua omnium regantur; Cleanthes, qui quasi majorum est gentium Stoicarum, solem dominari et rerum potiri putat; Stob. Ed. i 21 Kl. εν ἡλίῳ ἐφησέν εἶναι τὸ ἡμεροκόσμῳ τῶν κύριων.

extremum: to be taken predicatively with cingentem, ‘inclosing on the outside.’

qui—nominetur. Heindl. prefers the Ind. considering that this is an addition of the reporter’s, and not a part of the speech reported; but the Subj. is an exact translation of such a speech as we find Diog. L vii 137 λέγει θάνατον ἀνωτάτῳ μὲν εἶναι τὸ πόρο, ὁ δὲ αἴθερα καλεῖται, ἐν ὁ πρῶτην τὴν τῶν ἀποκόρου σφαίραν γενναῖα, εἰτά τὴν τῶν πλανώμενων. C.’s own view is nearly the same Lep. vi 17 novem tibi orbibus connexa sunt omnia, quorum unus est caelestis, extimus qui reliquis omnes completiturus, summis ipse deus arcus et continuus ceteros.

quasi delirans—voluptatem. The word del. is properly used of dotage, as in Senect. ii 11 ista scellis stultitia quae deliberatio appellari solet: so unus delirah Div. ii 141, Tusc. i 48. For the tropical use see § 42. Voll. waxes vehement as he thinks of the attack made upon the Epicureans in Cle.’s treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς Diog. L vii 37, 175.

fingit formam quandam: this probably refers to the anthropomorphic language used by Cle. in speaking of God, as in the grand hymn to Zeus, τόις ἔλεις ύπόσεργον ἀνικήτως ἐνὶ χερσίν | ἀμφήρηκ, περνήντα, ἀειώνων κερανον. In such words Cle. gives, as it were (quandam, cf. n. on quandum § 33) a human form (cf. nullus species § 31) to Zeus.

divinitatem omnem: ‘complete divinity’; omnis qualitative, not quantitative.
in animi notione—reponere. Here at last we have the open avowal of the principle on which the criticism is founded; all is false which disagrees with our προλήψεις. According to Epicurus repeated impressions (sensations) fix a type (προλήψεις) in the mind, to which we attach a name, and when any new object offers itself, claiming to be called by this name, we must measure it by the type. So Cleanthes said that each perception (φαντασία) made an impression on the soul like that made by a seal on wax; and Cic. notices a theory memoriam esse signatarum rerum in mente vestigia Tusc. i 61: cf. also Orator 10 and 133 (in reference to a speech of Demosthenes) ea oratio in eam formam quae est insita in mentibus nostris includi sita potest, ut major eloquentia non requiratur, and Plato Iep. v 462 Α ἄρα ἂ νῦν διδάσκομεν εἰς τὸ τού γαθοῦ ἱδίον ἥμιν ἀρµότει, quoted in Sch.'s n. On constr. repono in notione see § 29 n.

Ch. xv. § 38. Persaeus: see Krische 436—443. What is here said of his opinions agrees with the account in Philodamus pp. 75, 76 Περσάοι δὲ δῆλος ἑστίν...διανίκησαν τὸ δαμαίνον, ἢ μηθεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γινόσκον, ὦτα ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη φαίνοσαν τὰ περὶ τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ ὀφελοῦντα θεοὺς νεοριστῆκαν καὶ τετυμηθὴκα πρῶτον, κατὰ τὰ ὑπὸ Πραδικὸν γεγραμμεῖν (N.D. I 118), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς εὐρύνας ἢ τροφὰς ἢ σκέπας ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ὡς Δήµιουργά καὶ Διόνυσον. These opinions were common to many of the Stoics, see II 60—62, III 41, Leg. ii 27. C. himself desired to erect a temple to Tullia after her death (Att. xi 36, &c.) and frequently asserts his belief in the divinity of the souls of the good, (Consol. fr. 5,) which was indeed a part of the ordinary Roman belief, and is recognized as such in Leg. ii 22 deorum manium jura sancta sunt. Bonos letos datos divos habent. Sometimes C. puts forward opinions closely approaching those of Euhemerus (§ 119) as in Tusc. i 28 quid t totum prope caelum nonne humano genere completum est?.....ipse illi majorum gentium di, qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in caelum reperientur. Quaeque quorum demonstrantur sepulchra in Graecia; reminiscere quae tradantur mysteriis: tum denique quam hoc late pateat intelleges.

quo quid absurdius quam: Heind. quotes the foll. exx. of a clause with quam added after a comparative to explain a preceding ablative, Fin. i 19 quo nihil turpius physico quam fieri quiuequam sine causa dicere (where see Madv.), Orat. i 169 quid ergo hoc fieri turpius potest quam...ita labi; see also Orat. ii 38 and 302, and Allen's n. here. [Ac. i 45 hoc quiuquam esse turpius, quam praecurrere. Parallels in Greek are common. J. S. R.] We have had similar exx. of quod explained by a succeeding clause, § 2 n.

res sordidas: The Stoics, sensible of the mischiefs which might arise from disturbing the religious beliefs of the vulgar, endeavoured to find a place for these in their philosophy, explaining each divinity as a separate manifestation of the one supreme God, and getting rid, as far as they could, of immoral or degrading superstitions by the free use of allegory. But it was scarcely possible to do this with the mass of the inferior deities, Epona, Cloacina, and others such as Augustine sums up, C. D. vi 9, and to
which Pliny alludes *X. H.* 11 5 gentes vero quaedam animalia et aliqua etiam obscura pro dis habent, ac multa dictu magia pudenda, per fetidas corpas, allia et similia jurantes. A similar charge is made by Clemens Strom. 1 295 c (of Σταυκοί) σώμα ὄντα τὸν Θεόν ὀντὶ τῆς ἀτμοσφάτης ὦλης πεφοιτηκέναι λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς.

hono re afficere: see n. on vi affectam § 33.

reponere in deos: the force of re- is the same as that of ἀπό in ἀπο-δίδωμι, 'to put them among the Gods as their right', cf. revocet § 28.

quorum—esset futurus: 'dead men, whose worship, if they had been raised to the rank of Gods, must have borne exclusively the character of mourning'. Cf. Plut. Is. 70 p. 378 Εὐνομάνης ἥξιωσε τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, εἰ θεοὺς νομίζοιτε, μὴ θρηνεῖ, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦτα, θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν (told with slight variations by Arist. Ithet. ii 23) and the remarks in the *First Philippic* 13 on the *Supplicatio* to Caesar, an me consensit decreturum fuisse ut parentalia cum suppliciationibus miscrecentur? ut ineptuabiles religiones in rur publicam inducentur? ... adducit non posse ut quemquam mortuorum conjungerem cum immortalium religione; ut euis sepulcrum usquam extet, uti parentem, ei publice supplicetur. The use of mourning garments at a suppliatio was entirely forbidden, see *Lation*. 30 foll. During the Feralia and Lemuria the temples of the Gods were closed, *Ov. Fast*. ii 563, v 491. The worship of Zagreus, Adonis, and Osiris might fairly be described as a *cultus in locut.*

§ 39. *Chrysippus*: (Krische 443—481) called the second founder of the Stoic school, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἦν ἄν θυτός. His importance is marked by the emphatic *��αν* vero with which the sentence begins. Philodemus says of him (Gomp. p. 77 foll.) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος [τὸ πώς ἐπὶ Δία ἀναφέρων] εν τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ θεοῦ Δία φησίν εἶναι τὸν ἄπαντα διακουστὰ λόγον καὶ τὴν του ὄλου ψυχήν, καὶ τῇ τούτου μὲν [ξοή πάντα εἰρήν]...καὶ τούς λίθους, διὸ καὶ Ζήνα καλεῖται, Δία δ’ ὑπὲρ πάντων αἰτίος καὶ κύριος: τὸν τε κόσμον ἐμφυχον εἶναι καὶ θεον καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ τὴν ὄλον ψυχήν...τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κωνήν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ αἰνίγερ καὶ τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι καὶ εὐνοιάτην καὶ ἓικην καὶ ὡμοιότητα καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παρασήμων πιῦν καὶ μὴ εἶνα τοὺς ἄρρενας μηδὲ θηλείας, ὦς μηδὲ πόλεις μηδὲ ἀρετάς, ὁμομελέσθαι δε μόνον ἅρρενες καὶ θηλυκὸς ταῦτα ὥστα, καθάπερ σελήνην καὶ μῆρα καὶ τὸν Ἁρχι κατὰ τὸν πολέμου τετάχθαι καὶ τὴς τάξεως ποτ᾽ ἀντιτάξεως Ἡθασίων δὲ πῦρ εἶναι, καὶ Κρίσων μὲν τὸν τοῦ ρεύματος ῥοῦν, 'Ρεῖν δὲ τὴν γῆν, Δία δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα (τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀσπόλλο, καὶ τὴν Δίμητρα γῆν ὥς τὸ ἐν τῇ πνεύμα): καὶ παταιρωδῶς λέγεσθαι καὶ γράφεσθαι καὶ πλάτεσθαι θεοῦ ἀνθρω-ποείεις, ὅν τρόπον καὶ πόλεις καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ τοποὺς καὶ πάθη καὶ Δία μὲν εἶναι τὸν περὶ τὴν γῆν αίει, τὸν δὲ σκοτεινὸν 'Αἰδηρ, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ

1 This is the emendation suggested in the excellent article on the Herene- lance Fragments which appeared in the *Quarterly Review*, Feb. 1810. German writers who have referred to this, have attributed it to Elmsley and others. I am informed by the present Editor of the *Q. R.* that it was really written by that extraordinary man, Dr Thomas Young, and indeed it is so stated by Dean Peacock in his memoir.

2 Sauppe suggests ἐνὴ πάντα δασιεῖθαι, comparing C.'s *fusionem universam.*
BOOK I. CH. XV § 39.

θαλάσσης Ποσειδώ. καὶ τούς ἄλλους δὲ θεοὺς ἀψύχους, ὡς καὶ τῶν τουτοὺς, συνοικεῖοι καὶ τῶν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας θεοὺς οίκεια καὶ τῶν νύμων καὶ ἀνθρώπους εἰς θεοὺς φησὶ μεταβάλλειν. ἐν δὲ τῷ δεύτερῳ τὰ τε εἰς Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαίων ἀναφερόμενα καὶ τὰ πάρ᾽ Ὄμηρο καὶ Ἰσιώδη καὶ Ἐυριπίδη καὶ ποιητὰς ἄλλους, ὡς καὶ Κλέανθησ, πειράται συνοικείους ταῖς δόξαις αὐτῶν ἀπαντά τ᾽ ἐστιν αἰθή, ὃ αὐτὸς ὡς καὶ πατήρ καὶ νάις, ὡς κἀν τῷ πρῶτῳ μᾶ ἑκατέσχετο τῷ τὴν Ἑάν καὶ μητέρα τοῦ Δίος εἰναι καὶ θυγατέρα. τὰς δὲ αὐτὰς ποιεῖται συνοικείωσης καὶ τῷ περὶ Χαρίτων. καὶ τῶν Δια νύμων φησιν εἶναι καὶ τάς Χάριτας τάς ἡμετέρας καταρχαί καὶ τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις τῶν εὐεργεσίων. τὰ παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ φύσεως γράφει, μεθ᾽ ὅν εἰσαμεν καὶ τῶν Ἡράκλειον συνοικείων' [καὶ μὴν 1] καὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ τῆς Νύκτας θεῶν φησιν προτίστην ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν κύσμων ἕνα τῶν φρονίμων, συνολικενόμενοι θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τῶν πάλευμον καὶ τῶν Δια τῶν αὐτῶν εἰναι, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν Ἡράκλειον λέγειν' ἐν δὲ τῷ πέμπτῳ καὶ λόγους ἐπήκτητα πάντας 2 τῶν κύσμων ἐς ἐναι καὶ λογικῶν καὶ φρονικῶν καὶ θεῶν. καὶ τοῖς περὶ προνοίαις μέντοι τὰς αὐτὰς ἐκτίθησιν συνοικείωσε τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὁνόματα ἐφαρμότετε, τῆς δρμήτητος (C. vaffitanni, cf. Wytenbach ad Plut. Rer. Aud. Lat. p. 48) ἀπολαυσάς ὑκοπιάτως. Ι. have given the whole passage as an illustration of the connexion between Philodemus and the N.D. The points of agreement to be marked are (1) the citations. In both, Chrysippus' 1st book, π. θέων, is referred to for the general statement of his theology, and the 2nd book for his explanation of the old poets. (2) As to the subject-matter, all that C. says is contained in the quotation except the contemptuous comments, and the fuller definition of law. On the other hand Phil. goes into greater detail on most points, especially as to the mythical names, e.g. the Charites, the difference of sex among the Gods, and the reference to Euriptides and Heraclitus.

cognitione depingere: 'to imagine'. The same phrase occurs Ας. Π. 48, cf. Ν. D. Π. 47 cognitione fingere.

ejus animi fusionem universam: 'abstr. for concer. = ejus animum ubique fusum', Sch. Eius i.e. mundi, cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus; and for fusio Π. 28. Probably this represents some words which have been lost in Philod. I do not think it can stand for διακείσθαι suggested by Petersen and Sauppe, as that would rather mean 'crumbling away' than 'pervading'. Compare on the 'universal intermingling' κράσει δι' ὀλων, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 131.

principatum = ἕγεμονικὸν Π. 29.

universitatemque: Heind.'s emendation for the universam atque of the ms.

fatalem—futuraram: a rounded phrase for Philod.'s εἰμαρρεῖν καὶ

1 So Sauppe fills the gap left by Gomperz.

2 So I propose to read. Gomperz has λόγους ἐφωτιζε Περὶ τῶν τῶν, Sauppe and Bücheler ἐφωτισαί παῖδών τῶν, but nothing can be plainer than πάντας in the facsimile: ἐπάγεσθαι is used in the sense of 'adduce' with μαρτίρα, Xen. Symp. 8, 34, with μισθοὺς and δόξας, Plut. Π. 975 e. For the use of πάντας cf. πάσας προφάσεις προφασίζει Πελοπ. Rep. ν 475.
dv¹ýýηv. On the reading see Sch. Opusc. III 362; Swainson (Journal of Philology, vol. v p. 152.) follows Heind. in reading veritatem for the umbran of the mss., and would transpose the words so as to assimilate the clause to that in § 40. It is scarcely conceivable that this senseless repetition is due to C. himself, who could surely have found some less clumsy way of ridiculing the verbosity of his original. I should be inclined to omit both taw fatalem...faturaram and universitateque—continenter, if one could suggest any explanation of their insertion. If they are really genuine it is a strong evidence in favour of Müller's thesis Libris de N. D. non extremam manum accessisse, (Bromberg 1839). Creuzer's ingenious emendation libram for umbram (in allusion to the scales of destiny) cannot be maintained, now that we know there was no such allusion in the original. Madv. suggests normam; Allen thinks umbram may have arisen from a misreading of the Greek εἰμαρμενη̈, added as a gloss from § 55; moeram (μοαρα) is nearer than any of these. [I think Sch.'s vim for umbram is right. The scribe probably wrote naturam by error from the line above, then made the correction vim over it, thus umbram would easily arise. J. S. R.]

fluenter atque manarent: when the Present is used in quotations, it may be followed either by the Pres, Subj. as in qui versetur above, or the Imperf. as in appellarent just below: see Madv. § 382 obs. 4, and exx. in n. on § 61. [Many exx. of the Imperf. are given by Motschmann De temporum consequitione ap. Ciceronem, p. 11 (Jena 1875). J. S. R.] The doctrine of the perpetual change or flux of the elements came to the Stoics from Heraclitus, cf. N. D. III 84, Cleomedes Cycl. Th. i 1 (ἡ οὐσία) χειμερινη̈ κατά τὰς φυσικὰς εὐνοίας μεταβολῶς. ἀλλατε μὲν εἰς πῦρ χειμερινη̈, ἀλλαταί δὲ καὶ εἰς κοσμογονίαν ὁμώσα, and Stob. Ed. 10. 10 to de πῦρ κατ' ἐξοχήν στοιχείων λέγεσθαι διὰ τὸ εἰς αὐτοῦ πρῶτον τὰ λοιπὰ συνισταθαι κατὰ μεταβολῆν καὶ εἰς αὐτοῦ ἐξαισθανόμενα πάντα χειμερινή διαλύσεω,··πάλιν ἄπο ταῦτης (ἡς) διαλυμενής καὶ διαχειμενής πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δὲ εἰς ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἑσαράτη εἰς πῦρ. The last clause shows that there is no reason to put terram after sidera (with Heind.) on the ground that the flux was confined to aquam et aera. Krische thinks that C. touches on this point here merely to make the whole theory more ridiculous, but it is possible that it may have been suggested by the µείζων ὤν of the original, which Kr. explains (p. 465) not of water, but of a sort of chaos out of which the elements were developed.

homines—consecuti: see on Persaenius just above, and II 62 n.

§ 40. Neptunum: see II 71, III 64; so Arist. Gen. An. III 11 p. 762 a γίγνεται ὃ' εν γῇ καὶ εν ὕδρῳ τὰ ἔρω καὶ τὰ φυτά διὰ τὸ εν γῇ μὲν ὕδωρ ὑπάρχειν, ὡς τὰ τοῦτο πνεύμα, ἐν δὲ τοῦτο πνεύμα θερμοτητα ψυχικήν, ὥστε τρόπων των πάντα ψυχίς εἶναι πληρός. Pliny (N. H. II 4) speaks of the air as vitalem hunc aera et per eum et verum meabilem totoque consortum, and IX c. 6 he adduces various arguments to prove the existence of air in water, e.g. the spouting of whales (in aquas penetrare vitalem hunc spiritum quis miretur, quia etiam
reddi ab his eum cernat?); the fact that fishes hear and smell (super omnia est, quod esse auditum et odoratum piscibus non erit dubium; ex aeris utrumque materia). In the Times for Sept. 13, 1879 there is a short notice of the investigations made in the Challenger and other expeditions, to determine the amount and composition of the air in sea-water.

terram quae Ceres: cf. II 67, 71.

Legis vim. C. supplements the brief mention of νόμος in the original from his own studies for the De Legibus.

Eademque necessitatem appellat: 'gives to law the name of destiny'. Mr Roby suggests eundem, which seems more appropriate, as Velieus is here dealing with the Stoic misuse of mythological names. [Cf. the parallel passage in Ac. i 29 deum omnisquaque rerum prudentiam...quam eandem necessitatem appellat. J. S. R.]

Sempiternam veritatem: cf. § 55, III 14, Div. i 125 fatum id appare quod Graeci εἰμαρμήνη, id est, ordinem seriemque causarum cum causae causa nesa rem ex se gignat. Era est ex omni actarnitate fluens veritas sempiterna; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 141 foll.


Accommodare: a translation of συνοικείωσαι.

Qui suspicati sint: Sch. Opusc. iii 310 argues against the Subj. here, but qui is characteristic, not merely connective, 'though they never dreamt of such a thing.'


Diogenes: of Seleucia on the Tigris, pupil of Chrysippus, and afterwards head of the Stoic school (Krische 481—491), called magnus et gravis Stoico in Off. III 51. Philodemus proceeds to speak of him immediately after the quotation given above: Διογένης ὁ Βασιλιάτης ἔν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τόν κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διὸ τόν αὐτόν ὑπάρχειν ἢ περίεχειν τῶν Δια καθάπερ ἀνθρώπων ψυχήν: then, after describing how different names were given to different parts of Zeus, he says that the part which was manifested in the aether was called Athene, τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεσθαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, καὶ Ζεῦς ἄρρης Ζεῦς θῆλας: τινὰς δὲ τῶν Στοικῶν φάσκειν ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, φρόνησιν γὰρ εἶναι, διὸ καὶ Μήτις καλέσθαι. Χρύσιππον δὲ ἐν τῷ στῆθει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι κάκει τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς γεγονεία, φρόνησιν ὅσιαν, τῷ δὲ τῆς ψωφίν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκκρίνεσθαι λέγειν ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὅτι δὲ Ἰησοῦν, διότι τέχνη ἐγένετ' ἢ φρόνησις, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν μὲν οἶον Ἀθηνᾶν εἰρήσθαι, Τριτώιδε δὲ καὶ Τριτώιδει διὰ τοῦ τῆς φρόνησιν ἐκ τριῶν συνεστηκέναι λόγω, τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν καὶ τῶν λογικῶν καὶ τὰς ἀλλὰς δ' αὐτῆς προσηγορίας καὶ τὰ φορήματα (e.g. the Aegis) μάλα καταχρύσως τῇ φρονήσει συνοικεῖοι.

Disjungit: this form seems more suited to the metaphorical sense than the dejungit of the MSS. Müller Adn. Crit. p. iv. cites other passages in

1 So in the facsimile, but, as a compliment to Diog, would be quite out of place, I should emend either καταχρυσότατος (employed by Sext. Emp. P. II. 1 191 in treating of the improper uses of words) or κατακρύσως.
which d€- is wrongly read for d1-, e.g. degrediens N. D. ii 103, demetata ii 110, delabi Off. ii 64.

B. b. ii. Erroneous views of the poets and of eastern sages. §§ 42, 43.

Ch. xvi. § 42. The follies of the popular mythology form the subject of the first sixty pages in Comp.'s ed. of Philodemus. We read there of the adulteries (pp. 10-12) and wars (pp. 28, 32, 40, 45) of the Gods, of their frauds, cruelties, weaknesses, sufferings, their enslavements to each other and to men. Compare Plin. N. H. ii 7 super omnem impudentiam est adulteria inter ipsos singi, mox etiam jurgia et odia, utque etiam factorum esse et sectarum numina.

exposui. In similar language, though to very different effect, Minucius begins his 20th ch. (after concluding his summary of the Philodemian section) with the words exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum quibus inductior gloria est, deum unum multis lecti designasse nominibus, ut quies arbitratur aut uoce Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos.


fusa: so § 66 oracula fundo. Sch. quotes Fin. iv 10 poctorum more verba fundere, Div. ii 27 concitatione mentis ed et quasi fundi. [Add Div. ii 110, De Or. iii 175, 194, Tusc. i 64, iii 42. J. S. R.]


ortus: Philod. p. 31 mentions particularly the birth of Athene and of Dionysus; pp. 7 and 13 he notices the death (interitus) of Asclepius; Minucius I.e. speaks of the alternate deaths of Castor and Pollux.

vincula: e.g. Dionysus bound by Pentheus, Prometheus by Zeus (Philod. p. 39). See Iam v 3-0 foll.


§ 43. magorum Aegyptiorumque: there is no allusion to the former and very slight to the latter, in what remains of Philod. The Magi ('great ones'; Sans. magha, Lat. magnus) were the priestly caste of Media.
BOOK I CH. XVI § 43.

Their religious system was the Zoroastrian dualism of the Iranian conquering race, modified to suit the subject Turanian population. The serpent God of the latter was identified with Ahriman, who was then raised to an equality with Ormuzd, both being viewed as emanations from the absolute first principle, Zerwan-Akaran, i.e. eternity. In course of time the Magian religion incorporated many polytheistic elements, as the worship of the Planets, of Mithras, and of Mylitta, also known as the Phrygian mother of the Gods. The religion of the Persians was pure Zoroastrianism and, as such, opposed to Magianism, as is shown in the overthrow of the Magi by Darius Hystaspes; but it was confounded with the latter by Herodotus and other writers. See Lenormant Manual of Ancient History, tr. ii 21—47; Rawlinson's Herodotus I Essay 5, on the Religion of the Ancient Persians; Hardwick, Christ and other Masters, Pt. iv. Medo-Persia. C. speaks of their dislike to inclosing in temples the Gods quorum hic mundus omnis templum esset, Leg. ii 26; and of their skill in interpreting dreams, Div. i 46, 47. His younger contemporary Strabo (xv 3. 13) describes their manner of worship and tells us that they offered sacrifices to Heaven, the Sun (whom they called Mithras), the Moon, Aphrodite, Fire, Earth, Winds and Water. On the Egyptian religion, see § 101, Juvenal Sat. xv, Herodotus ii 37—76 with Rawlinson’s notes and Append. ch. 3, also Hardwick and Lenormant.

veritatis ignorantiae: causal ablative, cf. § 1.

B. c. Epicurean Exposition, xvi § 43—xx § 56.

Universal consent is a sufficient proof of the existence, blessedness and immortality of the Gods. Being such, they must be free from care and passion; and are therefore to be regarded with reverence, not with fear. Testimony and reason both assure us that they are formed like men, but their bodies are of far finer texture than ours. Their life is one of contemplation, not of action.

qui consideret—debeat: ‘whoever (=if any one) should consider this would be bound to pay honour to Ep. and hold him as a God’. On the hypothetical use of qui with Subj. see Madv. § 367, who quotes N. D ii 12 haece qui videat, nonne cogatur confiteri deos esse? (repeated almost in the same words § 44), also Draec. § 493 and Roby § 1558. On the extravagant terms in which the Epicureans spoke of their founder see Tusc. i 48 quae guidem cogitatis soleo saepe mirari nonnullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui naturae cognitionem admirantur, ejusque inventori et principi gratias exsolvantes agent eumque venerantur ut deum, liberatos enim se per eum dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno et diurno ac nocturno metu; Fin. i 14, 32, 71; In Pis. 59; Lacr. v 8 deus ille fuit, deus, include Menmi, | qui princeps vitae rationem inventit eam quae | nunc appellatur sapientia; and III 15 nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari | naturam
terum, divina mento coorta, | diffugiant animi terores; Plut. adv. Colot. 17 (Metrodorus speaks of) τα ἕπικουρον ὁς ἀληθῶς θεόφατα ὁρμά; ἦ. Colotes kneels and adores Epicurus; Epic. himself writes to a disciple πέμπτε οὖν ἀπαρχίας ηµῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἰτροῦ ὁφάμας θεραπείαν. His disciples kept sacred to his memory, not only his birthday, but the 20th day of every month, in accordance with the instructions in his will, Diog. L. x 18, Fīn. ii 101, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 304.

primum esse deos: the 2nd point is given below, ut deos beatos et immortales putamus.

in animis impressisset: this is the usual construction, like insculpfit in mentibus just below, but we find imprim. with Acc. in Ac. ii 58.

quae est enim gens: universal belief was alleged by the Stoics, no less than by the Epicureans, as the strongest proof of the existence of the Gods, see ii 5, 12, Seneca Ep. 117 6 multum darc solenus præsumptioni omnium hominum: quod nos argumentum veritatis est aliquid omnibus vidiri: tamen deos esse inter alia sic colлимamus, quod omnibus de dis opinio insita est, nec ultra gens usquam est adeo extra leges moreisque projeta, ut non aliquos deos credat; and so of the immortality of the soul. It is often urged by C. as in Leg. i 24 nulla gens necque tam mansuetæ, necque tam fera, quae non, eiemmi ignorant quodem habere deum deoat, tamen habendum sciat; Tusc. i 30 mult de dis præva sentiant; id enim vitioso more efficæ solut; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur...omnia autem in rectæ consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est; and by Plut. adv. Colot. 1125 d. The same argument is employed in defence of divination Div. i 11, and met in the following book (ii 39) by a reference to the universality of the desire for pleasure as the chief good, quasi vero quiæquam sit tam valde quem nihil sopere vulgare! Cf. the objections in N. D. i 62, iii 11. Aristotle constantly appeals to the common belief in confirmation of his own reasonings; the justification is given Eth. Eud. i 6 κρατίστον μὲν πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι αὐτομολογούντας τοῖς μήθησισμένοις, εἰ δὲ μη, τρόπον γέ τυν πάντας, ὥστε μεταβαλόµενοι ποιήσονται 'έχει γάρ ἕκαστος οἰκείων τι πρὸς τὴν ἁλθείαν... εκ γάρ τῶν ἁλθειῶν μὲν λεγοµένων, οὐ σαφῆς δὲ, προούσην ἑσταί καὶ τὸ σαφῆς, μεταλαβόµενοιν αὐτὰ γνωριµώτερα τῶν εἰσωθῶν λέγεσθαι συγκεκριµένως. See on the general subject Hamilton's Reid Supplementary Dissertation A (On the philosophy of common sense) esp. § vi (Chronological series of testimonies), II. Spencer First Principles p. 4 foll. (who grants the universality of religious ideas), and the very fair and able discussion in Jellett's Efficacy of Prayer p. 70 foll. and App. on General Consent. The analogous ecclesiastical doctrine formulated by Vincent of Lerins in the words quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus credidit est, or in the more sounding phrase of Augustine secundus judicat orbis terrarum, is of far more doubtful value, as it refers not to the primitive instincts of mankind, but to abstract dogmas, received on authority, and often very little understood by those who profess to hold them.

BOOK I CH. XVI § 43. 137

quoted on § 25; it is defined by Diog. L. x 33 as 'a general conception retained in the mind', 'the memory of what has been often perceived'; 'on uttering the word *man*, the type at once rises up *κατὰ πρόληψιν* (i.e. prior to logical analysis) in accordance with our previous sensations'. Hence *οὖτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἀνεν πρόληψεως* Sext. Emp. Math. i 57 (sine qua... potest), cf. Clem. Al. Strom. ii 157. Chrysippus appears to have borrowed the word from Ep. (see § 54), defining it as *ἐννοια φυσική* τῶν καθόλου Diog. L. vii 54. In an interesting chapter of Epictetus (Diss. i 22) we read that *πρόληψεις*, general principles, are common to all men, and consistent with each other: differences arise when we attempt to apply them, e.g. all allow that *τὸ οὖσον* must be preferred to all things, but it is a question between Jews and Romans whether it is *οὖσον* to eat swine's flesh. Education consists in learning to apply *τὰς φυσικὰς πρόληψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίας καταλλήλως* τῇ φύσει. Prolapseis then, whether as understood by the Epicureans (the permanent image), or with a more ideal colouring by the Stoics, corresponds to the Idea of Plato, the Form of Aristotle, the Innate Idea of later times: by some of the Fathers (e.g. Theod. Gr. Aff. p. 16, 9; Clem. l. c.) it was identified with Faith. Besides the terms *informatio, praenotio* and *anticipatio*, C. uses for it *notio* and *notitia*, which are properly equivalents of the more general *ἐννοια*, cf. Ac. ii 30 *notitiae rerum quas Graeci tum ennoias tum πρόληψεις vocant*; Tusc. i 57 (of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence) nec fieri ullo modo posse ut a peeris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas *ennoias* vocant, habemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viquisset; Top. 31 *notionem appello quod Graeci tum ἐννοιας tum πρόληψιν dicunt*: ea est insita et praecepta cujusque formae cognitionis, enodationis indigens; Madv. Fin. iii 21, v 50; Bake on Leg. i 26, 30, 50, where *inosophatae intellegentiae = πρόληψεις.*

**informatio**: 'shaping', 'outline', then 'conception'.

**caelesti volume**: entitled *περὶ κρητινίων ἢ κανών,* 'the test or standard of truth.' Diog. L. x 27, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 400 foll. We find it referred to as *τοὺς διαστέτεις κανόνας* Plut. *ade. Colot.* 19.

Ch. xvii § 44. **non instituto**: so *Tusc.* i 30 *nec enim id (esse deos) con-locutio hominum effect, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus, i.e. οὐ νόμῳ ἄλλα φύσει.* So Philod. p. 128 (we worship the Gods) οὐ μόνον δια τοὺς νόμους ἄλλα διὰ φυσικὰς αἰτίας, Diog. L. x 123 *θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶν* ἑαυτῶς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ γνώσις.

ad *unum omnium*: 'all without exception'.

**insitas vel potius innatas**: 'implanted or rather inbred'. The two words are often joined to express natural growth as opposed to artificial training, e.g. *Fin.* iv 4 *insitum quandam vel potius innatum cupiditatem scientiae*; *Verr.* iv 48 the belief that Sicily is sacred to Ceres and Libera is so firmly held by the natives *ut animis corum insitum atque innatum esse videatur*, also v 23; in *Top.* 69 the opposite quality is expressed by the phrase *adsumptis atque adventiciis.* It does not seem necessary to suppose
any error on the part of C. as though he ascribed to Epic, the doctrine of 'innate ideas' in the sense in which Locke (certainly not Plato, for with him the idea was latent till developed by *maeuvtiky*; nor Descartes, see Huxley's *Hume* p. 83) understood the term. All that is implied is that our religious ideas are not arbitrarily imposed from without, but grow up within as a natural and necessary result of experience. We must understand *innatum* in the same sense in II 12, cf. Sch. *Opusc.* iv 345, who remarks that *a principio innasèi* is the phrase used (II 34) of what is strictly inborn.

**de quo autem—confitendum est.** [The argument is obscured by the ordinary punctuation. Putting a comma after *habemus* we get the following syllogism: We all have from nature an idea of Gods: what all men's nature agrees about is true: ergo we must admit the existence of Gods. ]

**omnium natura = omnès naturæ**, cf. n. on § 36.

**hanc igitur habemus:** resumès *fateamur habere*. For the resumptive use of *igitur* after parenthesis and for the change from Inf. to Ind. cf. Draeger § 355, Madv. § 480. A close parallel occurs in *Fin.* II 22 *quid enim mereri velis...quid mercaris igitur &c.*

**ut putemus:** explains *hanc*, which has the force of *talem*, cf. § 55 *illa ut.* § 45. *ipsorum:* the existence of the Gods, as opposed to their attributes.

**insculpsit in mentibus:** *so in animo quæi insculptum est esse deos* II 12.

**quod beatum—essent omnia:** quoted from the *κυπίαν δόξαν*, an epitome of the ethical principles of Epicurus, which he intended to be committed to memory by his disciples, see § 85, *Fin.* II 20 *quis enim vestrum non edicit Epicuri κυπίας δόξας*? Diog. L. x 35. It is preserved by Diog. x 139, and commences with the words here translated τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρσιν ὅτε αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἔχει, ὅτε ἄλλο παρέχει, ὅτε ὅτε ἀργαῖς ὅτε χάρισι συνέχεται ἐν ἄσθενει γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, cf. Philod. p. 123 *χωρὶς ἀργῆς καὶ χάριτος ἀσθενοῦσας*, Lucr. II 646 *omnia enim per se divum natura necessæ | immortali aero summa cum pace fruatur | semina ab nostris velbus sejunctaque longe; | nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis | ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiça nostri, | nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tāngitur íra.* The argument in full is: the Gods are happy; happiness consists in the absence of trouble, whether experienced in oneself or inflicted upon another; therefore the Gods neither feel nor cause trouble; hence the motive of anger, which might lead to their infliction of trouble, and the motive of favour, which might lead to their taking trouble for others, are alike manifestations of weakness, and inconsistent with our idea of the Divine majesty. The answer to which is that (1) the word 'trouble' is unmeaning in reference to our idea of God: if we suppose him to be almighty, thought and action are as easy to him as breathing to us: (2) while it is true that passion and caprice are marks of weakness and, as such, inconsistent with our idea of God, yet a righteous government, rewarding virtue and punishing vice, is a natural corollary to the belief in a
good and powerful God. When Seneca says deos nemo sanus tinet (Deoff. 
iv 19) it is not from any notion of the Gods being indifferent to the actions 
of men, but he is simply asserting the Platonic doctrine that God never 
harms any (Rep. ii 379 foll.), that His acting is always for the best both to 
the universe at large and to each individual in it. In Philod. p. 94 we read 
that it was charged against the Epicureans, that their doctrine deprived good 
men of their religious hopes, προσεπιφέροντες δὲ καὶ διώτι τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ 
δικαιῶν παραρούμεθα τὰς καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἃς ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔχουσι, to which it is 
replied p. 97 that the vulgar ideas of reward and punishment are aban-
doned by all philosophers, and that many go so far as to deny them any 
power to hurt, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ὁμολείων καὶ βλάπτειν εἰρηκότων 
ὑποσόφων τοῖς θεοῖς, ὁμοίας τῶν υπάνοιας (the vulgar) ὑπελείπεν τὰς ὁμολείας καὶ 
tὰς βλάξες, πολλοὶ δὲ οὐδὲ βλάπτειν ὁλος ἔφασαν αὐτοῖς, but the true and 
just are rewarded as Polyaeonius has stated in his 1st book: p. 100 ὁμολεῖος 
ἐκ θεῶν τῶν ἁγαθῶν καὶ βλάξες τῶν κακῶν καταλείπτεσθαι (i.e. apparently the 
Epicureans): p. 124 καὶ σωτηρίας ἀνθρώπωσι διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταλείπτεσθαι ἀπο-
γράφει (i.e. Epicurus) διὰ πλειώνων, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ περὶ τῆς ὀικείοτη-
tος ἢν πρὸς τινα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀλλοτρίωτος: p. 125 'with the favour 
of heaven (θεῶν ὀλοκλήρων) we need not fear war, with the favour of 
heaven we shall pass our lives in purity': pp. 86—89 'the Stoics deny that 
the Gods are the authors of evil to men and thus take away all restraint on 
iniquity and degrade men to the level of the brutes (for who would be 
balked of the injustice for which he craves, from the fear of air or aether ?), 
while we say that punishment comes to some from the Gods, and the 
greatest of good to others': also p. 145. It is difficult to see how this 
approach to the common opinion (which goes much beyond what Lucr. 
allows vi 70) can be reconciled with other positive statements of Epicurus 
or with his general principles as given in the text. See the Academic, 
or rather Stoic, criticism in § 121. For the form of expression (nee habere 
ipsum nec exhibere alteri) we may compare St James i 13 ὃ γὰρ θεῖος ἀπε-
ρρατάς ἐστὶ κακοῦ πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα, Plut. Mor. 1102 ε καὶ φαῦλον 
οὐδὲν ποιεῖν αὐτῷ θέμις, ὡς περι οὐδὲ πάσχει, Sen. De Ira ii 27 natura illis 
(dia) mitis et placida est, tam longe remota ab aliena injuria quam a sua. 

sit—essent—essent: the Pres. Subj. is allowable because it is a general 
proposition having no more reference to the past than to the present: the 
Imperf. is afterwards used in order to remind the reader that this is a 
statement made in the past by Epic., not necessarily adopted by the writer; 
see Draeger § 131, and (on the mixed construction) § 124 B c, where it is 
pointed out that when there are two subordinate clauses, standing in 
different degrees of subordination, the more remote subordination is fre-
quently expressed by the Imperf. the less remote by the Pres. Subj. Com-
pare for the corresponding use of the Subj. and Opt. in Greek, Jelf § 809, 
Arnold on Thuc. iii 22, p. 370. 

talia imbecilla: Seneca De Ira i 20 ira muliebre maxime et pucrile 
vitium est, Juv. xii 190 with Mayor's n.
si nihil—erat dictum: ‘if we had had no other aim beyond that of piety in worship and freedom from superstition, we might have ended here’. On the Ind. in apodosis see § 19 longum est, n.

cum aeterna esset: we need not (with Draeg. § 151. 3) explain the Imperf. as attracted to the tense of the principal verb (ceteretur). It expresses a consideration belonging to and contemporaneous with the supposed action (ceteretur) and carefully to be distinguished from the new consideration with which we are now occupied (anquirit animus below).

habet venerationem: Nägels. Stil. § 95 quotes this as an example of the way in which the Romans supplied in the absence of a Pass., and compares Orat. iii 11, Phil. i 7, Marcell. 26. [cf. aizh"anw παρέχεω which is the regular passive of αἰσθάνεσθαι. J. S. R.] Sch. in his note cites other phrases in which habeo has the same force, e.g. laetitiam, sper, timorem habere ‘to inspire’, like the Gr. ἑχειν=παρέχειν. On the grounds of the Epicurean worship cf. §§ 56 and 116, and Philod. 128 προσεχεσθαι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ θεῶν φρασιν, ὥσ ὦ λυτοπήμενων τῶν θεῶν εἶ μὴ ποιήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἑπόμεναν τῶν ὑπερβάλλων (praestans, quœgūid excellit, praestantissima natura § 47, naturam excellentem § 56) δυνάμει καὶ στοιχειώτητι φύσεων. Defective as was the Epicurean conception of God, it was so far right that they could see in Him an ideal perfection worthy of the reverence and imitation of men, see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 439, Philod. p. 148.

metus a vi: cf. § 42 concubitus cum genere. Allen quotes Liv. xxiii 15 metus a praetore, where see Weissenborn, also Madv. § 298. 2, on verbal substantives followed by prepositions. The verbs timor and meteo are used absolutely with ab.

quibus impedere: on the Inf. with relative in Orat. Obl. see n. on § 12 ex quo existit.

vitae actionem mentisque agitacionem: Beier’s correction for vitam et actionem mentis atque agitacionem, see his n. on Off. i 17 and compare actio vitae in § 103, and Div. ii 89; see too Sch. Opusc. iii 315 and 363 and my n. on § 2.

Ch. xviii. § 46. admonet: ‘gives a hint’.

speciem humanam deorum: see Cotta’s criticisms § 77 foll.

occurrît. For exx. of such appearances see Ov. Met. viii 626 foll., Liv. xxi 62, xxiv 10, Dion. Hal. A. R. ii 68, Nägelsb. N. Theol. p. 2, and nn. on Acts xiv 11. Celsus ap. Or. vii 35 says that in the sanctuaries of Amphiaras, Mopsus, and Trophonius ἀνθρωποειδεις θεοειδινθεούς, οὗ ψευδομένων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄναργης, and (iii 24) that there were many living in his time to whom Aselepius had appeared, and granted healing; again (viii 45) ‘all life is full of such divine manifestations’. Cf. also § 36, ii 6 supe voces exigudiae, supe esse formae deorum, 166, and Lucr. v 1161 nunc quae causa deum per magnas numinas gentes perculojurit et aratum complecerit urbes, | ...non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbo, | quippe etiam jam tum divum mortalia suadu | egregias animo facies vigilante videbant | et magis in somnis mirando corporis auctu | fol. This
is an explanation of the belief of the vulgar, the absurdities of which are shortly after pointed out: how far Lucretius himself allowed evidential weight to these visions is not clear. In iv 26 foll. he gives as his reason for discussing the nature of the images (simulacra) the fact that they take the shape of the dead and cause terror by presenting themselves to us both awake and asleep, ne forte animas Achoruntre reamur | effugere aut umbras inter vives volutare |, and in 722 foll. he shows how such simulacra may arise spontaneously in the air. It seems therefore that these images can only be trusted in so far as they are supported by abstract reasoning. Compare also Sext. Emp. Math. ix 25 (quoted by Munro) 'Επίκουρος δὲ έκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ύπνους φαντασίων οἴεται τοὺς άνθρώπους ἐννοιαν ἐσπακέναι θεού· μεγάλων γὰρ εἴδωλων, θεοί, καὶ άνθρωπομορφών κατὰ τοὺς ύπνους προσπαστῶν ύπελαβὸν καὶ τάς ἀληθείας ὑπάρχειν τινάς τοιούτους θεούς άνθρωπομορφούσι. The Stoic Balbus is in agreement with Epic. on this point; and Aristotle (quoted by Sextus l. c.) made these appearances one of the two causes to which he traces the origin of religion, ἀπὸ δυσοίν ἄρχων ἐννοιαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι, ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαίνονταν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων, the former owing to τοὺς εν τοῖς ύπνοις γεγομένους πάντες ἑνούσιασμοι καὶ τάς μαντείας· ὅταν γὰρ, θεοί, ἐν τῷ ύπνων καθ' ἐαυτῷ γένεται ἢ ψυχῆ, τότε τὴν ἰδίαν ἀποκαλαβοῦσα φύσιν it exercises a prophetic power, just as Homer tells us it does at the moment of death; ἐκ τούτων οὖν ὑπενθύσαν οἱ άνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεῶν τὸ καθ' ἐαυτὸν οἰκοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. See H. Spencer Principles of Sociology ch. x and Tyler quoted below.

primas notiones: answering to natura above. We find the corresponding Greek term used of the προλήψεις in Diog. L. x 38 άνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἐκκάστου φθιγγον βλέπεινα καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσθείσθαι (if we are to have any standard of reference).

ne omnia—ad primas notiones. The προλήψεις which arises instinctively from the repeated appearances of Gods is contrasted with the abstract reasonings which follow. The Gods must be of human shape, for the most perfect nature must be also the most beautiful, and the human shape is more beautiful than any other; again, happiness cannot exist without virtue, nor virtue without reason, nor reason except in human shape. The former argument is criticized § 77—86, the latter § 87—89.

§ 47. praestantissimam: 'we are justified in believing that the most exalted of beings, whether we regard his happiness or his eternity, must be also (aendum) the most beautiful'. It would seem that both here and in § 45 we must explain the causal clauses vel quia et cum et aeterna by a reference to praestans.

figura: the mathematical outline, a matter of fact; species, outward appearance as distinguished from the inner nature; forma (§ 48), the form artistically viewed as symbolizing the inner nature.

vos quidem—divinam: 'you Stoics at least are wont, in displaying the skill of the divine artificer', see 11 87 and 134, and for fabr. § 19 n.
modo hoc, modo illud: so (Tusc. v 33) when charged with contradicting what he had said in the De Finibus. C. replies in idem civinis; quodcumque nostros animos percessit, id dicitum, itaque soli sumus liberi, cf. Att. xiii 25 O Academiae volatilam ac sui similim, modo hoc modo illae, also Dir. i 62; and, of the Socratic irony, Luc. 13 qui non tum hoc tum illud, ut in plorlsique, sed idem semper. [Add Ac. ii 121, 134, Tusc. i 40, Att. ii 15, Parad. 14, Dir. i 120, ii 145. J. S. R.] For omission of verb, see § 17 n.

§ 48. pulcherrima est: so Madv. Fin. iii 58 in place of the sit of miss, on the ground that quae means quam pulcherrimam esse possis, humanam, not tali ut sit pulcherrima, cf. Sch. Opusc. iii 310.

ratio—hominis figura: cf. καί εἰ λογισμὸν οὐκ ἐχομεν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ μορφῇ δίχα τῆς ἀνθρώπου, φανερῶν ὡς καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀνθρωπομορφῶν χρή καταλείπειν ἵνα σὺν λογισμῷ τῆς υπόστασιν ἔχη. Vol. Herc. vi pt. 2 p. 21 (conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus). Here as elsewhere the Epicurean refused to go beyond his own experience: *nunquam vidit* (§ 87) thought apart from a human body, or as it would now be worded, *apart from brain*.

hominis esse specie. The Gen. is sometimes substituted for the adjective with the Abl. of Quality; cf. R. P. ii 26 § 45 (tyrannus) quamquam figura est hominis tamen immutabile vincit belaus. Caes. B. G. vi 27 (uri) specie sunt et coloris tauri, and Liv. xxi 62 quoted below under nec soliditate. This arg. is criticized in § 89.

§ 49. quasi corpus: like the εἶδωλα of Homer and the ghosts of later times, cf. the interesting chapters on Animism in Tylor’s Primitive Culture esp. vol. i p. 449. The Epicurean Gods are of course material, but they are composed of the finest ethereal atoms, similar to those which constitute the rational soul, and are therefore capable of acting immediately upon it: see the passages quoted in n. on intermunda § 18, and the criticism by Cotta in §§ 71, 75, by Balbus in ii 59. Hirzel (p. 77 foll.) thinks that C. confounded the images which reveal the Gods to us with the actual Gods; and that the latter had more approach to substance than he allows them, as Philodemus (quoted by Zeller Stöss tr. p. 441) speaks of their taking food, and conversing together probably in Greek, cf. also Sch. Opusc. iv 336—359. The subject is discussed below. For the expression cf. Sen. Contr. ii 12 § 11 quasi dissertus es, quasi formans es, quasi dives es; numm tam-tam es non quasi, vappa (quoted in Roby § 1583), Pl. Stich. 552 foll., Plin. Ep. viii 16 quasi testamenta, quasi civitas, and the legal fictions quasi possesso, quasi pignus &c.

Ch. xix. quivis = ὅς τῶν ἐκείνων, ‘every one’.
agnoscere: ‘to feel their force’, Sch. Opusc. iii 315 and 363.
quiderit: causal relative.
sic tractet ut manu: so R. P. i 115 (of Panactius) qui quae vix conjectura quidia sint possimus suspicari, sic affirmat ut uiditis ea cernere videatur aut tracture plane manu; Brut. 277 cum indicia mortis se conperisse et manu
tenere dicere. Lucretius speaks in equally high terms of his master's speculations, I 74 omne immensum peragavit mente animoque foll.

docet eam esse vim — aeterna. This extremely difficult passage has been discussed by many writers, esp. by Sch. Opusc. III 3151, and Neue Jahrb. for 1875 pp. 687—691, as well as in the notes and app. to his cd.; but the first to give a satisfactory explanation of the whole was Hirzel in his Untersuchungen pp. 46—90. He translates as follows (p. 68): 'Epikur lehrt die Natur der Götter sei der Art, dass sie erstens nicht mit den Sinneu, sondern nur mit dem Geiste erfasst wird, und dass sie ausserdem weder Solidität noch individuelle Identität besitzt, wie die sogenannten στερέματα; vielmehr gelangten wir zur Erkenntnise des Göttlichen (denn das besagen die Worte quae sit et beata natura et aeterna) durch Bilder, die wir wahrnehmen' &c. I had long taken the same view of the construction of capere, and of the needlessness of Sch.'s emendations cernantur, cumque, beatae naturae. The clue to the right interpretation is to be found (1) in § 105, where the account here given is criticized by Cotta, and (2) in Diog. L. x 133 in ἀλλοις δε φρεσι τους θεους λόγω θεωροτους, ους μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ύψεστώτας, ού δὲ καθ’ ὤμοιοιαν ἐκ της συνεχεος ἐπιρροέως των ὠμοιων εἰδώλων ἐπ’ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσμένων ἀνθρωποεἰδῶς. Philodemus seems to have treated of the subject in his περὶ εὐσεβείας, but unfortunately the passages relating to it are too corrupt to afford much help. See p. 110 δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὦμοιότητος (similitudine) ύπάρχουσα (ἰδιότης) διαιόμοιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐπειδὴπερ οὐχ ἢττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὠμοιων στοιχείων ἐνότητες ἀποτελεσθαι δύναται. Gomperz despairs of the passage (see his n. 'dieser mir zum kleinsten Theil verständlichen Columne') but it would appear to be a comparison between our ordinary modes of perception and the mode in which we arrive at a consciousness of deity; just as in the next page it is said 'if opponents charge Epicurus with denying the existence of the Gods, why might they not on the same ground charge him with denying the existence of horses and men, καὶ πάνθ’ ἀπλῶς τὰ κατὰ μέρος αἰσθητά τε καὶ νοητὰ φύσεων εἶδο; λεπ. 1' The same subject is discussed in pp. 132—138, but only occasional phrases are legible, as τὴν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν σύγκρισιν (C.'s aed numerum) in pp. 134 and 138, μὴ γὰρ ἀτόμων νομίζειν τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωμάτικα p. 136, apparently an exhaustive argument to prove the atheism of Ep. 'his Gods are neither atoms nor compounds of atoms, and what other entities are admitted by him?'

non sensu sed mente cernatur: cf. Lucretius quoted on quasi corpus, and § 105 speciem dei percipi cogitatione non sensu. Sch. points out that while L. speaks of the tenuis natura and Cotta of the species, both referring only to the fine ethereal body of the Gods, Vell. speaks more generally of vis et natura. This is because he is about to refer, not merely to the

1 He calls it locum omnium difficilimum enim certum omnibusque numeris absolutam interpretationem vix quisquam, ego certe hoc tempore proponere non possum.
immediate sensuous impression produced on the mind when its fine atoms are struck by the cognate atoms which constitute the divine \textit{imagines}, atoms which pass unperceived through the coarser sieve of the bodily senses, but also to the conception of blessedness and immortality to which the mind attains by reflecting upon the impressions it has received. It is the latter process which is properly expressed by \textit{cogitatio}.

\textit{nec soliditate—appellat.} At first sight it seems natural to take \textit{sol.} as an abl. of cause after \textit{cornatur}; and so Sch. explains it by a reference to the distinction between the \textit{imagines} thrown off from solid bodies (the \textit{stermIA}), which \textit{imagines} are described in Diog. L. x 46 as \textit{απόφθημα τὴν ἐξής θείν καὶ τάξιν διαπρόσωπα, ἕπτερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στερμινίοις εἴγον}, and a finer class of \textit{imagines} which reveal to us the shadowy form of the Gods. The expression would not be quite accurate, for even the finest images must in the end consist of atoms (since all that exists is summed up under atoms and void, according to Epic.) and \textit{soliditas} is essential to atoms of every kind; still in popular language (\textit{quadam = ut ita dicam}) it might be said that the images perceived by the bodily senses were perceived in virtue of a massiveness which was not shared by the images which were perceptible by the mind alone. The objections to this interpretation are (1) that it really adds nothing to what has been already said in the previous clause, though apparently contrasted with it by the word \textit{primum}, (2) that it is difficult to connect it with what follows, (3) that it is inconsistent with the words of § 105 \textit{nec esse in ea (specie) ullam soliditatem, neque candem ad numerum permanere}, in which the absence of \textit{soliditas} is predicated of the divine form itself, not of the image, as distinguished from the form, in virtue of which negative property the image is perceived in a particular way. Accordingly Peter (Commentatio de \textit{N. D.} Saarbrücken 1861) and Hirtel take \textit{soliditate quoadm} as a predicative Abl. of quality, of which the former cites several exx. (\textit{N. D. i} 12 veris fulus adjuncta tanta similitudine, 28 continentse ardore lucis orbem, 81 reliquis deos \textit{ea facie novimus}, 84 his vocabulis esse deos \textit{facimus}, 107 \textit{imagines ea forma}, Liv. \textit{xxi 62} in agro \textit{Anitero multis locis hominum specie procul candida vide visos nec cumullo congressus}, where there is the same accumulation of ablatives as here) and further illustrates by the following parallel in \textit{somnis mihi oblata est imago leonis, ut non oculis sed mente corneceur}, neque \textit{ingenti corporis magnitudine neque densa juba, sed ferocitate ocularum splendore prodita}. Taking \textit{soliditate} thus as referring to the substance of the deity which has \textit{ nihil concreti, nihil solidi} in it (§ 75), it is opposed to the previous clause which referred to the mode in which that substance was perceived. It cannot be denied that there is something very harsh in the construction of such an Abl. with \textit{cornatur}, and I think it possible that \textit{sit} may have been lost after \textit{numerum} before \textit{ut}. The term \textit{stermIA} occurs repeatedly in the fragments of Epic. \textit{περί φύσεως} and in his Epistle to Herodotus preserved in Diog. L. x.

We come now to the more difficult \textit{ad numerum}, which must evidently
be explained from the fuller expression in the parallel passage neque eadem ad numerum permanere, and this again, as Hirzel shows p. 55, is a translation of the Greek ταυτὸν κατ' ἀριθμὸν διαμένει 'remains numerically and identically the same', εὖ or ταυτὸν κατ' ἀριθμὸν being distinguished from ἐν or ταυτὸν κατ' εἰδος 'the same in kind'; see Arist. Met. iv p. 1016 b, π p. 999 b, Categ. i 2 with Waitz's n., Themist. ad Nat. Quaest. iv 9, and Whately's Logic App. (on the ambiguity of the word 'same'). But will κατ' ἀριθμὸν carry this meaning by itself? For proof of this Hirzel refers to Bonitz's Index Aristotelicus s. v. ἀριθμὸς, see particularly Anal. Post. i c. 5, p. 74 where the phrase κατ' ἀριθμὸν is used of argument which applies only to a single individual triangle, as opposed to proper geometrical reasoning which deals with the triangle, qua triangle, universally. Similarly we have κατ' ἀριθμὸν υφεστώρας in the passage already quoted from Diog. L. It is impossible however to suppose that ad numerum standing alone could convey this meaning to a Roman; and though it is conceivable that C. may have put an unmeaning phrase into the mouth of the Epicurean advocate, it seems hardly credible that he should, without remark, have supplied the interpretation afterwards through the mouth of the Academic critic. I believe therefore that eadem has been lost between neque and ad, and that the true reading is neque eadem ad numerum sit. I postpone to the end of the paragraph the question, how we are to conceive of Gods not possessed of personal identity or individual existence. [Soliditate cannot possibly be an abl. of quality. Soliditate quadam might be taken as such with esse or a substantive, but not with a verb like cernatur. Why not treat it as abl. of cause, (cf. § 105 similitudine cernatur) translating 'so that it is not perceived by sense or by mind, nor in consequence of any sort of solidity which it possesses, nor numerically, i.e. individually'? A causal abl. gives indirectly what is wanted, a description of the object which is the source of the cause. R.]

sed—in intelligentiam capere: the construction is made to depend immediately upon docet instead of being subordinated to ut. Sed contrasts the following positive with the previous negative description of the divine nature.

imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: the sense must be ascertained from the parallel passages, § 105 eamque esse ejus visionem ut similitudine et transitione cernatur, § 109 fluentium frequenter transitio fit visionum ut e multis una videatur, and shortly after innumerabilitas suppeditat atomorum; Diog. L. l.c. οὐ δὲ (sc. θεοῦ) καθ' ὀμο- eιδίαν εκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιφρόνεως τῶν ὀμοίων εἰδῶλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτελεσ- μένων ἀνθρωποειδῶς; Lucr. v 1175 (men attributed to the Gods) aeternam vitam guia semper eorum | suppeditabatur facies et forma manebat |. Com-

1 A. Becker (Comm. Crit. 1865) gives a careful analysis of the passage and strongly condemns Sch.'s interpretation. He proposes to add permanere (of which he thinks primum a corruption) after numerum. Few will follow him in this.
pare also the very similar language used of perception and images generally, Diog. L. x 48 μείνας ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάτων τοῦ ἐπιπολῆς συνεχής συμβαίνει οὐκ ἐπιδήλος αἰσθήσει διὰ τὴν ἀνταπασχέον, Lucr. iv 26 foll. esp. 87 'outlines of shapes flit about so exquisitely fine as each by itself to be invisible', 104, 256 'the things themselves are seen, though the images which strike the eye are invisible', 190 'the images succeed one another like the rays of light', suppeditatur enim confestim lumine lumen, 714 (accounting for the movements of shapes seen in dreams) 'so great is the velocity, so great the supply of things', tantaque sensibili quoesit est tempore in uno | copia particularum ut possit suppeditare; and see the passages quoted from Philodemus under docet cum esse vim. From these it would appear that the phrase must mean 'when the images have become perceptible through their mutual similarity and their uninterrupted succession'. Any one image would be too fine to attract the attention, but the repetition of similar images ever streaming onwards, produces on the mind the impression of one unchanging object. A familiar illustration would be the rainbow, or the wheel of fire produced by rapidly whirling round a burning stick. I agree with Hirzel in rejecting Sch.'s explanation of similitudo as referring to the likeness between the images and the mind on which they impinge; on the other hand transitio, lit. 'the passing before the eyes' (as in Ovid Rem. Am. 615 multaque corporibus transitione nectent) appears to me to be a translation of the Gr. φωτις, not (as Hirzel takes it) of ἀνταπασχέον which is rather suppeditatio. There is a slight inaccuracy here in the use of trans., it is applied as though by an ab extra spectator to a stream of images, not passing before, but coming full into the eyes or the mind.

cum infinita—afluat. Hirzel and C. F. Müller have adopted Brieger's emendation series, which certainly reads more easily with infinita. On the other hand species is the technical term to denote the mental impression produced by the imagines (cf. § 107 fæc imagines esse...species dumtaxat objects: Div. ii 137 nulla species cogitari potest nisi pulsu imaginum; Furt. 43 visum objectum imprimit et quasi signat in animo suam speciem) so that I should have been inclined to keep the old reading, translating 'there rises up a never-ending impression of exactly similar images produced from countless atoms', were it not for the following afluat, which is very suitably used of the series imaginum flowing in upon the mind (cf. Div. l. c.), but less suitably of the species which springs up within the mind itself as a result of the inflowing imagines. Still we have fluentium visionum § 109 where see n.

ex individuis: so § 110 effigies ex individuis corporibus oritur. The images were composed either of the surface atoms of the στέρεμα (Lucr. iv 67 preecessum cum sint in summis corpora rebus | multa minuta quae possint ordine codem | quo fuerint et formai servare figuram) or of loose atoms floating about in the air (Lucr. iv 129 foll.). Zeller (Eng. tr. p. 443) strangely translates 'pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals' (göttlichen Individuen in the original).
BOOK I CH. XIX § 49.

ad nos: the mss read ad deos which makes no sense; possibly it is due to a comparison of § 114; nor is Manutius' a deo, though supported by the quotation in Augustine Ep. 118, suitable after ex individuis; we want the terminus ad quem, that a quo being already supplied.

mentem intentam infixamque. The independent action of the mind is needed (1) to distinguish particular images; so Lucretius iv 802, explaining how it is that the mind only perceives a small part of the images which thronc to it from all sides, quia tenuia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acute | cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quaerit | praeterea percutit, nisi si quae ad se ipse paravit; (2) to interpret them by meditation (ἐπιβολή Epic. in Diog. L. x 62, lit. 'throwing oneself upon them', as in § 54 se injiciens animus et intentus, Lucr. ii 740 animi injectus and 1047 with Munro's notes). Hence the expressions already discussed cogitatione percipi, λόγῳ θεωρητοῖς.

intellegentiam capere—aeterna: 'comes to understand what that being is which possesses the divine attributes of blessedness and eternity', cf. § 96 praestantissima natura, eaque beata et aeterna, quae sola divina natura est, § 105 beatam illam naturam et sempiternam putet.

To treat now of the whole passage together, it may be thus translated, 'Epicurus teaches that the essential nature of the Gods is such as, in the first place, to be perceptible by the mind alone, not by the external senses; and in the next place, to be without the solidity, so to call it, and the individuality belonging to those bodies to which he gives the name of στερίμου a on account of their hardness: but (his account is) that through the perception of a long train of similar images, when an endless succession of such images forms itself out of countless atoms and streams towards us, then our mind intent and fastened upon these images apprehends with rapture the idea of a blessed and eternal being'. Comparing this with the parallel passage from Diog. L. we shall see that, supposing the latter to be correct, C. here confines his attention to the second class of Gods there mentioned, i.e. Gods who exist for us in

1 A writer in the Rev. de Philologie for 1877, p. 264 keeps the reading ad deos and explains as follows. The atoms flow together vers le point où ils constituent eux-mêmes par leur passage continue l'existence des dieux...Les images qui se détachent sans cesse des dieux, après avoir formé un instant les dieux eux-mêmes, sont bien celles qui se rendent ensuite vers nous, et qui nous font connaître.'

2 Sch. altogether objects to the supposition of there being two classes of Epicurean gods, and would accordingly change φών μεν, φώς δε, reading φών μεν (Gassendi's unsatisfactory suggestion) κατ' ἀρχήν ύφεστάτας, γνωστοὺς δὲ καθ' ἀμοιβίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχεῖς εὑρόσεως κ.τ.λ. I see no reason for doubting the genuineness of the passage. It simply asserts in definite terms the conclusion which an attentive consideration of C.'s language forces on the reader, viz. that there were two distinct systems of theology recognized in the Epicurean school, one of a more esoteric nature, taken mainly from their great authority Democritus, the other more suited to the popular belief; which two systems have been not unnaturally confounded together by C.
virtue of a continuous stream of images combining to produce in us the impression of a human form. Such a description suits fairly with the account given of Democritus' theology (V. D. i 120) according to which the Gods are nothing more than combinations of ethereal atoms floating about as imaginæ; but it is difficult to see how it could be reconciled with the ordinary account of Epicurus' innumerable Gods of the intermundia, far removed from the sphere of those atomic storms which are ever making and unmaking the surrounding worlds. If the imaginæ which appear to men are composed of atoms thrown off from the Gods of the intermundia, why may not atoms find their way back again from our world to them, as in fact is asserted by Cotta § 114? How can beings which have no soliditas be continually throwing off those myriads of atoms of which the images are formed, especially when we consider the vast distance of the intermundia from the earth, and reflect that, radiation being equal in all directions, there must be the same crowding of divine images at every point of this immense circumference? Again, if the Gods have no separate individuality, how are they capable of conversing together and exhibiting an ideal of the philosophic life, as Philodemus asserted? And how are such Gods in any degree truer to the popular conception than the dépas kai πνεύμα which Philodemus charges the Stoics with worshipping (p. 84 foll.)? See Munro on Lucr. v 152. Assuming then, as we apparently may, that either Epicurus himself or some of his followers acknowledged a divinity of a more spiritual type, distinct from those of the intermundia, there is much in the description which is curiously suggestive of a theology with which we are familiar in the present day. When people understand by the name God 'a stream of tendency which makes for righteousness', or in other words, a predominating character in the events of life and the phenomena of the universe which answers to and calls out in us an ideal of goodness (and why not also which answers to and calls out our ideals of beauty and of wisdom?) they do not at first ascribe to God personality or numerical identity, but as they meditate on the impressions which they receive, they become gradually conscious of a unity, shaping itself, for some at least, ἀνθρωποειδῶς, into a human form, in which they recognize the features of the judge, the ruler, the father. Some such idealistic interpretation of the physical formularies of his school was certainly not more difficult to a religious Epicurean than the spiritualization of the myths was to a Stoic, and however far removed from ordinary Epicurean belief, it is not altogether inconsistent with some of the citations from Philodemus given under quod beatum § 45.

§ 50. summa vis infinitatis: suggested by the use of infinita just before. On the way in which Ep. connected the idea of infinity with the distribution of life, see Lucr. ii 522 foll., where he argues that the deficiency of animals, e.g. elephants, in one country is made up for by their excess in another, and that for the generation of any particular kind of animal it was necessary that there should have been an infinity of the atoms which
were capable of producing it by their union; otherwise they could never have met together in the infinitude of space: and otherwise all infinites are equal according to Ep. (no doubt one of the points alluded to in the phrase magnam contemplatione dignissima) it follows (l. 569 foll.) that the different kinds of atoms are equal in number, and that the elements of production and destruction wage an equal war (Lucr. v 392). Munro finds a further allusion to the law of isovapia in vi 542; see his notes, and Hirzel 85—90.

eam esse naturam—respondeant: 'such is the constitution of the infinite whole that all its parts are exactly balanced one against the other'. On the repetition of words in distributive phrases see Beier Off. 1 53.

aequabilem tributionem: 'equal distribution', a very rare meaning of tribution. [It is meant to be a literal translation of isovapia. R.] See the Academic criticism in § 109, where aequilibritas is used to translate isovapia. C. is the only authority who formally attributes this doctrine to Ep.; the word is used by Plut. Def. Or. 34 επερ εν η φύσις ἀπαντεί τιν ἴσον πάση, and the equilibrium of positive and negative forces is often referred to in the early philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles; cf. too Plato Theact. 176 on the necessary existence of an opposite to good, and Pseudo-Arist. De Mundo c. 5, Heracl. Alleg. 444, Orig. c. Cels. iv 63 (quoted by Sch.) on the necessary equipoise of the four elements.

quae interimant—quae conservent: this is not to be understood of substances or persons, but, as Lucr. ii 569 more accurately expresses it, of movements; nec superare quen motus itaque exitialis | perpetuo neque in aeternum sepeile salutem | nec porro rerum genitalis auxificiique | motus perpetuo possunt servare creata. Since on the whole the destructive and conservative forces are equal, and since the destructive prevail here, there must be elsewhere a region where the conservative forces prevail, and what can this be but the intermundia? And, since mortals and immortals are equally balanced, and here experience shows that all is mortal, where can we find these immortal beings but in the Gods? In ii 1105 foll. Lucr. describes how a world gradually grows up under the shaping blows of the atoms, and then how, when it has once attained maturity, the destructive movements gain the upper hand, the constituent atoms fly apart, the external blows no longer weld the mass together, but break it down in ruin, a process of which, he says, we may already see the beginning in our earth. It is unkind to touch the card-castle of the Epicurean philosophy, or one might be disposed to ask why there might not be sufficient employment for the conservative forces in the constant building up of new worlds as the old ones perish, without finding a special seat for them in the intermundia; and how these auxifici motus are to show themselves in a place sacred from the intrusion of atoms.

et quaerere: proceeding to a new topic 'and then'; so § 100 et eos vituperabas.
Balbe, soletis: 'your school B. are accustomed'. Sch. compares De Orat. i 160 quid est? Cotta, quid tacitis? On the general question of the mixture of Sing. and Pl. see below, deorum and iis followed by agit, and so frequently in speaking of the Gods, e.g., § 101 deorum—habet, 106, 114 (vacant—cogitat), cf. 31 n. Madv. Fin. ii 22: Davies in loc. gives illustrations from the Greek.

quae degatur aetas: 'how they spend their days'.

§ 51. nihil agit. See Cotta's answer to this §§ 110, 114, 116, also Seneca Benef. iv 4 quae maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit, Diog. L. x 97 η θεία φύσις πρὸς ταύτα μηδαμὴ προσαγέσθω ἄλλ' ἀλειτουργητὸς (vacatione munorum below) διατηρεῖσθω καὶ ἐν πάσῃ μακαρίᾳ. That the divine happiness consisted in self-contemplation was asserted by Aristotle Met. xii 1072 b. see n. on § 33. In accordance with this belief the wise man of Epicurus withdrew as far as possible from public life (Zeller Stoics p. 463).

implicatus: so Off. ii 39 negotiis implicatur, Ac. i 11 officiis implicatum.

exploratum habet: cf. § 1 n., Draeger § 143, Roby § 1402.

Ch. xx. § 52. sive enim—celeritate: see § 24 n. and the Stoic answer ii 59.

nisi quietum nihil beatum: Ep. held that happiness consisted mainly in ἀραπαξία. Cf. § 24 mens constantis et vita beata.

in ipso mundo. According to the natural order this clause should have preceded its correlative, sive mundus deus est; it would then certainly not have had the ipso, and the force of ipse in the related clause would have been clearer. As it is, C. has carelessly repeated the emphatic pronoun, which has no meaning here, though there seems no reason for doubting its genuineness, as Sch. has done.

mutationes temporum: cf. § 4 n.

vicissitudines ordinesque: 'hendiadys=vic. ordinatos', Sch.

ne ille est implicatus. Cf. ii 1 ne ego incautus. In Cicero's writings ne is always followed immediately by a pronoun, and it usually occurs in the apodosis of a conditional or quasi conditional sentence. [I think that the rule about the pronoun holds good for Latin prose generally. The two passages of Livy formerly quoted for the absence of the pronoun, xxvi 31, xxxiv 4, have both been altered by Weissenborn. The rule as to the conditional has many exceptions, e.g. Att. iv 4 b ne tu emisti, cf. Fleckeisen in Philol. ii 61—130. J. S. R.]

§ 53. beatam vitam in animi securitate: Fin. v 23 Democriti securiris, quac est animi tamquam tranquillitas, quam appellavit εὐδυμιάν... ea ipsa est beata vita.

natura: not in the Stoic sense, but as used by Strato § 35, of a blind force, cf. Lucr. i 1021 foll.

fabrica: see § 19 n. Off. i 126 principio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem;...hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam
imitata est hominum verocundia. It is what the Stoic means by his periphrasis vim quandam incredibilem artificiosi operis II 138.

innumerables mundos: Diog. x 45 διὰ μὴν καὶ κόσμου ἀπειροὶ εἰσὶν, εἰτ' ὁμοιοί τοῦτο εἰτε ἀνώμοιοι' αἱ τε γὰρ ἄτομοι ἀπειροὶ οὐδένα φέρονται ποιήσων, οὐ γὰρ κατηγοροῦνται αἱ τουμαι ἀτομοὶ εἰς ὁν γένοις κόσμου...οὐτε εἰς ἑνα οὔτε εἰς πεπερασμένους...όστε οὐδέν τὸ εμποδίζουν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν κόσμων.

ut tragici poetae: copied from Plato Crat. 425 D ὁσπερ οἱ πραγματοποιοί, ἐπειδήν τι ἀπορώσσουν, ἐτί τὰς μηχανὰς καταφεύγουσιν, θεοὺς αἰροντες. So Arist. Met. 1 4 p. 985 b 'Ἀναξαγόρας μηχανή χρήσαι τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ἐκατὰ ἀπορίσης διὰ τίνι οἰκίας γένεσθαι ἐστὶ, τότε παρὲλκει αὐτοῖ, cf. Orelli on Hor. A. P. 191 and Erasmus Adag. on deus ex machina. 'This device was so abused by Euripides that, in nine out of his eighteen tragedies, a divinity descends to unravel the complicated knot', Schlegel Dram. Lit.

explicare—exitum: 'to disentangle the issue of the plot' 'bring about the final development', so fabulae exitus, Cad. 63; cf. the δὲρης and λύσις of Aristotle, Poet. c. 18.

potestis: possessit would be more correct, but C. compresses into one the clause of comparison and the principal clause, by the attraction of the verb of the former into the construction of the latter: the converse attraction is more common in Greek, esp. with ὁφτ' ὁσπερ. In this way a simile passes into a metaphor, as in Hor. Ep. 1 10. 42 quoted by Sch.; cf. too Ep. 1 1. 2; 2. 42; 7. 74.

§ 54. non desideraretis: you would not have missed 'felt to be needed'.

se injiciens: see n. on mentem intantam § 49.

ita—ut: restrictive force, 'however far it wanders, is still unable to reach the end.' Cf. Zumpt § 726, Roby § 1704, and my n. on ita si § 3, and ita multa § 4, and the exx. in Sch.'s n. here.

nullam oram ultimi: 'no limit of furthest'; Gen. of Definition, sometimes called Epexegetic. Sch. compares fines montium 'the boundary formed by the mountains': see Mayor's Second Philippic, index s.v. genitive, Roby § 1302, Draeger § 202. For the thought compare Lucr. I 958 foll., esp. 980 oras ubiqueque locaris | extremas, quaeam quid telo denique fiat. | Fiet uti unusquam posit constet finis | effugiumque fugae prolatae copia semper; | also l. 72 and Fin. II 102.


follibus et incidibus: belonging to a fabrica, cf. § 19.

itaque: 'by your notions of a creation'.

imposusistis in cervicibus: see Zumpt § 490 on the compounds of pono, Draeg. § 298 a and c, and my nn. on § 29 in deorum numero referat, and § 45 insculpsit in mentibus.

timeremus: on the Imperf. Subj. used after the true Perf. see Zumpt
§ 514 and my notes on § 3 fuerunt qui censerent, and § 8 profecisse—
vinceremur.

quis non timet?: cf. Acad. II 121 (of Strato who explained the origin of the world from natural causes) ne ille et deum opere magnnam liberat et me timore. Quis enim potest, cum existimet curari se a deo, non et dies et noctes divinum numen hoppere et, si quid adversi acciderit—quod cui non accidit? extimescere ne id jure evenire? To remove this fear was the professed object of the Epicurean philosophy, as Ep. himself says in Diog. L. x 112 ei μηθεν όμια αι περι των μετεώρων ύψωσαν και αι περι βατάνων, ουκ αν προσεδομένα φυσιολογίας. Cf. Lucr. I 62 foll., II 1090, III 15, v 1194, vi 35 foll., Virg. Geo. II 490, Mart. Ep. iv 21.

curiosum et plenum negotio deum: 'a busy praying god'. According to the Epicureans the government of the world was both too small and too great a thing for God, see Lucr. II 1095 foll. quis regere immensum summam, quis habere profundi | indu manu validas potis est moderanter habe
nus, quis pariter caelos omnis convertere? VI 68 quae (i.e. the idea of special providence) nisi resputis ex animo longeque remittis | dis indigna putare alienaque paecis eorum, delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta | saepe obuerunt, and compare Div. II 105 negant id esse alienum majestate deorum. Seilicet casus omnium introspiceret, ut videant quid cuique conduct, and § 129 deosone immortales, rerum omnium praestantia excellentes, concursere circum omnium mortalium non modo lectos, verum etiam grabatos, et cum stertentem aliquem viderint, objicere iis visa quaedam tortuosa et obscura? Plin. N. II. II 5 irritendum vero agere curam rerum humanarum illud quidquid est summum. Anno tam tristi atque multiplici ministerio non pollui credamus dubitansse?

§ 55. hinc vobis exstitit. 'The Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine force, which governs the world, could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of it', Zeller Stoics tr. p. 166. Fate is nothing but the will of God, which reveals itself as the reason and law of the universe, cf. § 40 n.

primum: taken up by sequitur magisteri below.

ut dicatis: depending upon and explaining dicitis 'in the sense that'.

aeterna veritate. That which is fated always has, is, and will be true, see Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv 14 τον δε τούτων (things past, present and future) ἐπιπλοκὴν και ἄκολουθιαν και εἰμαρμένην και ἐπιστήμην και ἀλήθειαν και νόμων ἐκα τῶν δυνα ἀδιάδραστον τινα και ἀφυκτον, Stob. Ecl. i 180, Cic. De Fato 17, 29, 37.

causarum continuatione = εἰρωμὸς αἰρων (as Chrysippus defined εἰμαρ-


aniculis: the stock example of credulity and superstition both among Romans (§ 94, ii 5, Div. ii 36, 141, Tus. i 48; anilis N. D. ii 70, iii 12,
BOOK I CH. XX § 55.

92, Div. i 7, ii 19) and Greeks (Plato Theaet. 176 β ὁ λεγόμενος γραῦν ὑθλος, Gorg. 527, Wetstein on 1 Tim. iv 7 γραῦδες μῆθος). In the treatise De Fato C. gives the academic argument against necessity, agreeing so far with Epic., but he strongly condemns the doctrine of the declinatio atomorum by which the latter endeavoured to disprove necessity, N. D. i 69, 73, Fat. 22.

haec cui videantur: 'such a philosophy as this which holds'.

sequitur: opp. to exstitit primum.

qua tanta—colendi: 'through which, if we had been willing to listen to you, we should have been so infected with superstition that we should have had to pay regard to soothsayers, augurs, fortune-tellers, seers, interpreters of dreams': har. (root ghar. hirae hillae ilia, χόλιξ, cf. Curtius and Vaníček) foretold the future from the appearance of the entrails in sacrifices and from the phenomena of nature; aug. from the appearance and movements of animals, esp. from the flight of birds. These two were regarded as scientific modes of divination, in contradistinction to the unscientific, uttered μανομένοι στόματι, such as the Sibylline prophecies, and hariolorum et vaturn (on this word see Munro Lucret. i 102) furibundas praedictiones, and dreams, cf. Div. i 3, and Marquardt Röm. Staatsv. iii pp. 90, 393 foll. On the meaning and etymology of the word superstitio see ii 72 n.

si vos audire vellemus. The Stoics strongly maintained the truth of divination, and urged the fact of its existence as one proof of the existence of the Gods, quorum enim interpretés sunt, eos ipsos esse certe necesse est. C. argues against them in his treatise on the subject.

§ 56. his terroribus soluti: see n. on § 54 quis non timeat and Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399. Cotta charges Ep. with imputing his own fears to others, § 86.

in libertatem vindicati: 'claimed for freedom'; cf. Liv. iii 45 fin.; hence the verb by itself acquired the meaning 'to liberate', and the liberating rod was called vindicta.

nec sibi fingere: see n. on § 45.

naturam excellentem: so Seneca Benef. iv 19 'Epic. worshipped God propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam'. See n. on § 45 habet venerationem.

incohatam: 'incomplete'. In the Past Part. the verb always has a negative force, 'commenced, but no more than commenced'.

dicendi ratio habenda fuit: 'it was my business to hear rather than to speak'.
C. Academic Criticism of the Epicurean Theology,

Ch. xxi § 57—Ch. xliv § 124.

a. Preface. Cotta, while expressing his belief in the existence of
the Gods, refuses to make any positive assertion as to their nature, but
altogether dissents from the Epicurean view. §§ 57—61.

atqui: 'nay'.
nisi dixisses—potuisses: quoted in P. S. Gr. 4 p. 472 as an ex. of the
Subj. of possum in apodosis where the ability to perform the action is
strictly conditioned, and cannot be viewed absolutely, as in the passages
cited in my n. on § 19 longum est. [There is a good ex. of the Subj. in
Quintil. v 11 § 29. R.]

roges—respondeam: 'should you ask me, I should reply'. On the
use of the hypothetical protasis without relative or conjunction see Roby
§ 1532. So just below quaeras—dicam, rogex—ut

aggrediari ad ea: so in iii 7 agg. ad disputationem.

§ 58. familiari illo tuo. Some mss insert L. Crasso, but Madv. (Fina.
1q) points out that a Roman orator (who in De Orat. iii 77 foll. is made to
disclaim any special knowledge of philosophy) would be out of place here,
and that it would have been unnecessary to qualify one so well known by
the addition fam. i. t. He further mentions that one ms gives the alternative
de Lucilio, de Crasso. There can be little doubt therefore that he is
right in considering L. Crasso a gloss taken from De Orat. iii 78, where
the speaker Crassus alludes to Velleius as meus familiaris. The person
here referred to is, acc. to Madv. Phaedrus, whom C. had heard in Rome,
cum pueri essemus Fam. xiii 1, but the conjecture is chiefly founded on the
supposed fact of Phaedrus being the author of the treatise now attributed
to Philodemus. As the latter appears to have resided in Italy for a longer
time than the former, some might prefer to explain the allusion of him.
I doubt however whether C. would have given such a vague reference to
either, and think it more likely that a name has been lost from the text.
Whoever he was, he must probably have been one who held the same
position in the house of Vell. which Diodotus held for more than 20
years in the house of C., Antiochus in that of Lucullus, Philodemus in that of
Piso.

togatis: does not necessarily imply a Greek speaker (as Madv. l. c.).
In the Rep. i 36 Scipio speaks of himself as unus c togatis.

videor audisse: 'if I am not mistaken I often heard'. On the omis-
sion of mihi after vid. see Zumpt § 380 and Sch. here.

cum te—anteferret=anteferente. For the apparently intransitive use
of audio cf. De Orat. ii 22 ex soero audivi cum dicere, Parad. 45 multi ex
te audierunt cum diceres; for the use of de, Brut. 100 audivi de majoribus,
and Draeg. § 286. 2; for the postponement of the cum-clause, see Roby
§ 1722, and for its use as a secondary predicate § 1724, also Draeger § 498, who says that it is usually preceded by saepe, as in Fin. v 54, De Orat. ii 22, 144, 155. [His exx. are confined to C., add Virg. Aen. III 623 vidi egomet cum frangeret. R.]

sine dubio. On the substantival use of the Neuter Adj. with prep. see Nag. Stil. § 21, Draeg. § 23 foll.

diuilici, copiose. Similar compliments are paid to the speaker in Fin. iv 1, 7, Ac. i 43, ii 63. As Zeno is praised for the same merits below, and is equally censured for asperity in § 93, it has been supposed that C. intended Vell. to represent Zeno.

quam solent vestri: sc. dicere understood from dictum est. Epic. was as contemptuous of the beauties of composition as Bentham, cf. Fin. i 14 orationis ornamenta neglexit; in Brut. 131 Albucius (mentioned below § 93) is said to have turned out perfectus Epicureus, minime aptum ad dicendum genus; in Pis. 70 Philodemus is mentioned as litteris, quod fecer ceteros Epicureos neglegere dicunt, perpolitus; Tusc. ii 7 (of the Latin Epicureans generally) quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos numquam legerim; sed quia profitentur ipsi illi se neque distincte neque distribute neque elegantem neque ornate scribere, lectionem sine ullo deletatione neglego; also Tusc. i 6, iv 6, Fin. i 26, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 385.

§ 59. Zeuxonem: cf. § 93, a native of Sidon born about 150 B.C. Atticus and C. attended his lectures at Athens 78 b.c. (Fin. i 16, Tusc. iii 38). In the latter passage, where he is called acriculus senex istorum acutissimus, C. maintains a particular interpretation of the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure on the strength of his recollection of Z.'s lectures. Philodemus made great use of his writings, see Introduction on the sources of the N. D., and Hirzel p. 27 foll.

coryphaeum. Корυφαίος, from κορυφή (itself used metaphorically like vertex and apex), has the general sense of 'a leader' in Herodotus; but in later writers is commonly employed in the narrower sense of 'leader of the chorus' (the ἐξαρχος of older poetry), cf. Donaldson Theatre of the Greeks pp. 29 and 215. From this special meaning the word again passes to a wider metaphorical sense, and is used of philosophers by Plato Theaet. 173c, of Demosthenes by Dion. Hal. Rhet. i 8 (των τοῦ ἣμεταφόν χοροῦ ἥγεμόνα τε καὶ κορυφαίον), of St Peter and St Paul by the ecclesiastical writers, cf. Erasmus Adag. pp. 485, 1079, 1497, Suicer s.v. Πέτρος. The Latin form does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Classical writers.

cum Athenis essem. Though C. introduces himself to us at the beginning as an impartial auditor (§ 17) and though at the end (iii 93) he says that his sympathies are more with Balbus than with Cotta, yet it is to the latter that he ascribes his personal experiences both here and in §§ 79, 93. So we learn from Att. xiii 19 that he had some thought of transferring to Cotta his own part in the Academica.

audiebam: 'attended lectures'.

et quidem—Philone: 'and in fact on P.'s own recommendation'.
usu venit: cf. Roby § 1238.
bona venia me audies. A wish is here implied by the Fut. Ind. as in the English idiom; cf. Roby §§ 1589, 1590.
§ 60. maxime in physicis. It will be remembered that this includes theology.

quid non sit—dixerim: cf. Lact. Inst. II 3 falsum intellegere est quidem sapientiae sed humanae: verum autem scire divinae est sapientiae. Ita philosophi quod summum fuit humanae sapientiae assecuti sunt, ut intellegerent quid non sit: illud assequi nequiverunt ut dicerent quid sit.

Ch. xxii. Simonides: the lyric poet of Ceos, B.C. 550—470, one of the illustrious circle (including Pindar, Epicarmus, Aeschylus) whom Hiero tyrant of Syracuse (d. 467 B.C.) attracted to his court. In Xenophon’s Hieron Sim. is introduced as conversing with H. on the advantages and disadvantages of tyranny. Some of his gnomic sayings are discussed in Plato’s dialogues, e.g. Protag. 330 B, Rep. i 331 E. Minucius (c. 13) reports the story correctly, but Tertullian carelessly assigns the words to Thales in answer to Croesus (Apol. c. 46, Ad Nat. II 2). On the general subject see Arnob. III 19 quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitae mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transit et corrumpitur sensum... annus est hominis intellectus de Dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi; and the refi. in Church’s n. on the famous passage of Hooker II 2 ‘our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him’; also the catena on Docta Ignorantia in Hamilton’s Discussions p. 634 foll. But this assertion that the Cause of all things passes understanding is not (as II. Spencer, for instance, maintains First Principles p. 101) inconsistent with the further assertion that he is possessed of certain attributes. A cause may be unknown in itself, but if we know its effects we can argue back from their qualities to its qualities, with a confidence proportioned to the number and variety of its ascertained effects. A child may be incapable of forming a general estimate of his father’s character, but he is not thereby precluded from trusting and loving him as faithful and good. The opposite view leaves men helpless victims to any superstition, agnosticism being merely an exceptional and superficial phase, possible in the study or laboratory, impossible to retain and act upon amid the trials and difficulties of real life.


dicit—esse. This apparent exception to the Sequence of Tenses is generally explained on the principle that dicit=dixit, as in § 39 fluentem (where see n.), § 40 appellarent, Fin. III 71 verissime defenditur quidquid aequum esset id honestum fore with Madv.’s n., Draeg. § 152.1, Krueger’s Unters. II 49 foll. Should it not rather be treated as a case of suppressed
protasis, ‘which, if it had been used, would have been unworthy of a man of ordinary understanding’?

**non modo philosophia sed prudentia:** ‘such as would have beseemed, I do not say, a philosopher, but &c.’ See *Div. I* 124 non modo plura sed etiam pauciora with Allen’s n. and Roby § 2240. For exx. of non modo in the 2nd clause cf. Mayor’s *Second Philippic* § 107.

difficile est negare. Compare for a similar objection similarly met *Div. II* 70, where C. the augur, is arguing against auspices ‘difficilis auguris locus ad contra dicendum’. Marso fortasse, sed Romano facillimus.

credo si in contione: ‘I grant you it would be if the question were put in a public assembly, but in a party of friends, such as this, it is easy’. Cf. *Div. II* 23 soli sumus, licet verum inquirere sine invidia, mihi praesertim de plerisque dubitanti, i.e. we may inquire whether divination is a reality without being called impious; also Varro *ap. Aug. C. D. vi* 5, where, after giving the famous division of religion into mythical (of poets), natural (of philosophers), political (of statesmen)—a division which we may compare with Gibbon’s language ‘the various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful’—he goes on to say of the 2nd facilis inter parietes in schola quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures. So Torquatus is challenged to assert the doctrines of Epicurus in conventu aut, *si coronam times,* in senatu *Fin. II* 74.

go ipse pontifex. Besides representing the academic doctrine, Cotta, if we may judge from such passages as *iii* 5, 43, is intended to express the opinions of an older pontifex, Q. Mucius Scaevola, the friend and patron of C. and the author, according to Aug. *C. D. iv* 27, of the triple division of theology given above. While condemning the vulgar (mythical) theology as immoral and degrading, he preferred that the philosophic view should be held as an esoteric truth only, not communicated to the mass for whom stronger stimulants were necessary, which were to be provided in an innocent form by the State-religion. Varro describes it as follows, tertium genus est quod in urbibus cives, maxime sacerdotes, nosse atque administrare debent. In quo est quos deos publice colere, quae sacra et sacrificia facere quemque par sit, Aug. *C. D. vi* 5. But as Augustine shows, it was impossible to purge this of the evils charged against the vulgar belief without entirely altering its character, a task which was beyond the power of any magistrate to effect. In the *De Divinatione* C. has the same rôle as Cotta here, and puts forward political expediency and popular belief as the reasons for upholding religion, retinetur et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates reipublicae mos, religio, disciplina, jus augurium, collegii auctoritas, *Div. II* 70. It was the policy of the Empire, introduced by Augustus on the advice of his minister Maecenas; cf. the speech put into the mouth of the latter by Dion. Cass. *LI* 36, where the maintenance of the national religion and the prohibition of strange rites are recommended as the best protection against political revolution or conspiracy. But the attempt to retain religion simply as an
instrument of police has never succeeded. Without belief it is too weak to be of service; with belief it is too powerful.

**ego—is.** On the use of *is* in reference to the First and Second Persons see Draeg. § 40.

**non opinione sed ad veritatem:** *not as a matter of faith merely* (lit. ‘*in the way of belief*’, Abl. of Manner, Roby § 1236, or possibly Abl. of Instrument ‘*by means of belief*’) but in accordance with the actual truth’, cf. the opposition of κατὰ δόξαν and πρὸς ἀλήθειαν συλλογιζέσθαι Arist. *Anal. Post.* i 19 p. 81 b.

**nulli esse:** *‘not to exist at all’.* So § 65 quae nullae sunt, § 97 nulla esse dicas, cf. Madv. § 455 obs. 5.

§ 62. **placet mihi deos esse.** So we read of the Sceptics ειρθησε- ται ὁ Ἑκτητικὸς κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάτρια ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους λέγοντα εῶν θεούς καὶ πάν τὸ εἰς τὴν τούτων θρησκείαν καὶ εἰσέβειαν συντείνων ποιῶν, τὸ δὲ όσον ἑπί τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ζητήσει μηδὲν προπετενάμενος, Sext. *Emp. Math.* ix § 49. The Academic’s acceptance of the traditional creed ‘on the authority of our ancestors’ *(nουιορίθις nostria etiam nulla ratione reddita credere debeo, N. D. iii 6)* reminds one of Hume’s scoffing patronage of Christianity against ‘those dangerous friends who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason’. *‘Our most holy religion’,* he says, *‘is founded on faith not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure’.* There is a natural affinity between the extremes of scepticism and of authority, as there is between democracy and despotism.

C. b. **Weakness of the argument derived from universal consent:** *negatively, such consent is unproved; positively, many have held a contrary opinion*, ch. xxiii §§ 62—64.

Ch. xxiii. **equidem—deorum sit.** The question whether religious belief is universal, is very fairly considered in Tylor’s *Primitive Culture* vol. i p. 377 foll. He gives the following as the result of his investigations, ‘as far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings (termed by him ‘animism’) appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance’ p. 384. The doubtful nature of the facts alleged by Sir J. Lubbock, in favour of the opposite view, is conclusively shown in Flint’s *Antitheistic Theories* ch. vii. See too Roskoff *Das Religionseessen der rohesten Naturvölker*, and cf. n. on § 43 *quae est enim gens.* Simplicius on Epict. p. 222 and Porphyrius *Abst.* ii 8 quote from Theophrastus περὶ εἰσεβείας (see the fragments collected by Bernays p. 56) an account of a ‘pre-Hellenic Sodom and Gomorrah’, the Thoes of Thrace who were swallowed up by the earth in punishment for their atheism; but Simp. says this is the only exception to the universality of belief. Cotta’s classification of atheists agrees with that given by Clarke *Being and Attributes* ch. i, *‘Atheism arises from stupid ignorance’*, i.e. from
stunted development, moral and intellectual (gentes efferatas of C.); ‘or from gross corruption of manners’, i.e. from abnormal moral development (sacrilegis of C.); ‘or from false philosophy’, i.e. from abnormal intellectual development (Diogoras, &c.): Plato Leg. x 886 A foll. assigns the two latter causes for the educated unbelief of his time, (1) ἀκρατεία ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ἐπὶ τὸν ’σεβη βίον ὀρμᾶσαι τὰς ψυχάς, (2) ἀμαθία τις μᾶλα χαλέπτι, διόκουσα εἶναι μεγάστη φρονίσεις; he further states that though he had known many who had preferred atheism in youth, he had never met with one who retained this opinion in old age.

suspectio deorum: cf. opinio deorum § 29 n.

immanitate efferatas: ‘so utterly barbarous’, lit. ‘run wild in savageliness’. The words are often combined, e.g. II 90 terram immanitate belwarum efferatom, Tusc. iv 32 efferata et immania.

§ 63. Diogoras: cf. §§ 2, 117, III 89. He was a native of Melos (hence the epithet ὁ Μηλαος=atheist, used by Aristophanes of Socrates Nub. 830), a disciple of Democritus, resided in Athens for several years, but fled from it to avoid an action for impiety in 411 B.C.; a price was set on his head for divulging the mysteries, cf. Schol. on Arist. Av. 1073 and Stahr’s Art. in Dict. of Biog. Philodemus p. 85 maintains that he was a better theist than the Stoics, and says that any supposed writings of his which appear to show the contrary are either spurious or mere jeux d’esprit; in proof of this he quotes the following from his genuine poems, θεὸς, θεὸς πρὸ παντὸς ἐργῶν βροτείου νομὰ φρένα ὑπερτάταν and κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τέχαν τὰ πάντα βροτοῖα. Sext. Emp. Math. ix. § 53 says that he lost his faith after this was written, ἀδικηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιρυκήσαντος, see Fabricius in loc.

Theodorus: see Introduction under Aristippus, Zeller’s Socrates tr. pp. 342, 376 foll. and Dict. of Biog. Many striking sayings of his are recorded, as that on his banishment from his native country, κακὸς ποιεῖτε ἄνδρες Κυρηναῖοι ἐκ τῆς Δισβύνης εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα με ἐξορίζοντες Diog. L. II 103, and his answer to Lysimachus who threatened to crucify him, istringstream ministare purpuratis tuis; Theodori quidem nihil interest humine an sublime putrescat (Tusc. i 102). He is said to have been saved through the influence of Demetrius Phalerus from being cited before the Areopagus, cir. 310 B.C.

nam Abderites: cf. § 27 n. Expressed in full the thought would be ‘I need not ask the question about Prot. for he was condemned on that ground by the Athenians’. On Prot. cf. § 29.

neque ut sint neque ut non sint. The Greek is given by Diog. L. iX 51 περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδεύναι οὐδ’ ὡς εἰσών οὐδ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσών. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλῶντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχύς ὄν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, cf. Plato Theaet. 162 b. According to the ordinary use of words, C.’s translation could only mean ‘I am unable to say either how they exist or how they do not exist’, which is of course not the sense of the Greek. Are we to consider it a mistranslation, or a forcing of the usage of the language in order to give a closer representation of the Greek? The latter is the view
taken by Sch. *in loc.* and by Draeg. § 408, who calls it ‘ganz vereinzelt’ but classes it with such essentially different uses as *pugnare ut N. D. i 75*, *retinendum esse ut 95*.

**habeo dicere.** This construction instead of the usual *habeo quod dicam* is said (Draeg. § 413) to be found only in Cic. Suet. and Gell., but Allen quotes Hor. *Epod. xvi* 23 *melius quis habet suadere*, Ov. *Trist. i* 1. 123 *plura mandare habebam*, [to which add *Metam. i* 658 *dare habeabant*, *Pont. iii* 1. 82 *laedere habeat*, *Ludcr. vi* 711 *dixere habebam*. J. S. R.] See *N. D. iii* 93 *haec dicere habuī de natura deorum* (compared with *haec habui quae dicerem*, *Lael. 104*; *Cato* 85), and other exx. in Draeg.

**Atheniensium—combusti.** So Diog. *l. c.* διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη πρὸς Αθηναίων’ καὶ τὰ βιβλία αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, see the nn. in Hübner’s ed. We find the same names mentioned by Sext. *Emp. Math.* i x 51 f. l. in a list of atheistical philosophers, but he adds Prodicus, Euhemerus and Critias, all of whom are introduced, the last without name, by C. in § 117 f. l. where see nn. Fabricius in his note on Sext. *l. c.* mentions several other philosophers against whom the same charge was brought. Clem. *Al. Protr.* 2 p. 7 *Sylb.* gives a similar list, but will not allow the justice of the charge: ‘the true *ātheo* are not those who deny false gods, but those who deny the true and worship the false’. This is a retort upon the heathen, whose name for the Christians was *ātheo*, but Clemens fails to distinguish between the denial of what was false in the heathen religions, and the denial of religion in itself. There can be little doubt that in some cases, e.g. that of Theodorus, the denial was of the latter kind.

§ 64. *quippe cum—potuisset*: ‘seeing that in the case of P. the mere expression of a doubt had been punished’.

**Tubulus**: (L. Hostilius) *cum vnum ex omni memoria sceleratissimum et audacissimum fuisse accepinus*, *Scaur. i 5*; *Cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? Fin. v 62*; *cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperite cepit pecunias ob rem judicandam ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tr. pl. ferret ad plebem vellentem de ea re quaeri. Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Caepioni; profectus in exilium Tubulus statim, nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta, Fin. ii 54*; *N. D. iii 74*; Gell. *ii* 7.

**Lupus**: Horace *(Sat. ii* 1. 68) and Persius *(i* 114) also speak of a Lupus satirized by Lucilius. He is generally supposed to be L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, Aedile *b. c.* 163, Consul 156, Censor 147, but Munro has shown that this can hardly be the case *(Journal of Philology* vol. *viii* p. 217). In the first book of his *Satires* Luc. made the Gods hold a council concerning his death, *Serv. ad Aen. x* 104.

**Carbo**: (C. Papirius) the partisan of the Gracchi who suddenly changed sides after the death of C. Gracchus, and defended his murderer Opimius; cf. *Fam. ix* 21 *is et tribunus plebis seditionis et P. Africano vim attulisse eximintus est*. *Accusante L. Crasso cantharidum sumpsisse dicitur*. In the
same letter C. says that with one exception all the Carbos had shown themselves bad citizens.

Neptuni filius: cf. Gell. xv 21 praestantissimos virtute, prudentia, viribus, Jovis filios poetae appellaverunt, ut Aecum et Minoa et Sarpedona; ferocissimos et immanes et alienos ab omni humanitate, tamquam e mari genitos, Neptuni filios dixerunt, Cyclopa et Cereyona et Scirona et Laestrygones; Serv. ad Aen. III 241 alii dicunt Harpyias Neptuni filias, qui fere prodigiorum omnium pater est,... sic et peregriinos Neptuni filios dicimus quorum ignoramus parentes; Cornutus 22 pateros tois biaios kai megalepiboulous genvomious, ws tov Kiklopa kai tov Daustrugonav kai tov 'Alowiav, Poseidowos emithesin ekagous einai. Welcker Götterlehre II 678 adds the names of Procrustes, Sinis, Amycus, Antaeus, Busiris, and refers to the various sea-monsters of fable: he also cites the phrase Neptuni nepos used of the Miles Gloriosus i. 13, and the reproachful words of Patroclus to Achilles, glauki de se tike thalassa, | petrai d' eilematos, eti toi nivos estin deyphs | II. xvi 34. Mr Gladstone (Juventus Mundi 241—251) connects this with his theory of the Phoenician origin of the worship of Poseidon, and suggests that there may be some allusion to 'the rough manners of a sea-faring and buccaneering people'. For the form of expression we may compare fortunae filius, geosphaii paiides, and the Hebraistic vioi fuvros &c. (Winer's Gram. p. 298 ed. Moulton.)

Lucilius: on the date of his birth see Munro l. c.; the best ed. of his fragments is by L. Müller, 1872, who has also written on his Leben und Werke 1876.

explorata: 'clearly made out,' §§ 1, 51.

C. c. The atomic doctrine is opposed to science: if it were true, it would be inconsistent with the immortality of the Gods. When Epicusurus, by way of evading the difficulty, speaks of quasi-corporeal Gods, he becomes unintelligible. xxiii. 65—xxvii. 75.

§ 65. unde: their origin from atoms; ubi their abode in the intermunda § 103 foll.; quales corpore human shape § 76 foll.; animo perfection of rationality and virtue § 87 foll.; vita a blessed and everlasting repose, § 102, 111. The confused order of the book is shown in the repetition of these queries § 103.

atomorum regno et licentia: 'the lawless rule of the atoms', referring to their capricious and irregular movements, cf. § 69, and Fin. i 20 'if some atoms swerve, while others keep the direct line, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare quae recte quae oblique feruntur', so Fat. 46 num sortientur inter se quae declinet, quae non? For the heniohodys cf. § 29 imagines earumque circuitus n.; for the use of licentia § 107 a Democrito omnis hace licentia, § 109 at quam licenter, Div. ii 127 ista designandi licentia 'arbitrary apportionment', also 150, and Fat. 15.

M. C.
in solum venit: 'turns up', 'is brought on the tapis'. The origin of the phrase is doubtful: Manutius, in his n. on Fam. ix 26 in concivio logor quod in solum, ut dicitur, suggests that it refers to chance-sown weeds, but I think the word solum would be more naturally used in reference to what comes from above than from below; perhaps it may be connected with the legal res soli 'whatever comes on the ground' (comes as real property). [May not the phrase mean literally 'meets the foot', ἐπιποδῶν γίγνεσθαι? Cf. quidquid in buccan, in mentem venit. J. S. R.]

quae primum nullae sunt: 'for in the first place there are no such things as atoms', cf. § 61.

 nihil est enim—corporis. Lambins saw that some words must have been lost between enim and quod, and the gap has been supplied as follows by Sch. (partly from the parallel passage in Ac. i 27) quae primum nullae sunt: nihil est enim 'in rerum natura minimum quod dividii nequeat', to which he adds dictum, ut sint, moverii per inane non possunt, sicutidem id dicis inane quod vacet corpore, thus providing an intelligible meaning for enim and primum, see his Opusc. iii 287. Primum however might correspond to § 68 concilium—quid ad rem? And the autem which follows corporibus (unless with Heind, we read enim instead, according to one of the Codd. Elliers, so as to give a reason for moverii non potent) would suit better with some such context as this, moverii nisi per inane non possunt; inane autem id dicis esse quod vacet corpore; corporibus autem, &c. On the existence and indivisibility of atoms see Lucr. i 483—635; on the existence of void as essential to motion 329—397. For the views of Leucippus and Democritus cf. Introduction and R. and P. §§ 79, 80.

Ch. xxiv § 66. physicorum oracula fundo: 'in this I am merely the mouthpiece of our scientific oracles'. On orac. cf. Orat. i 200, domus juris consulti oraculum, Plin. Nat. Hist. xviii 6, and 8 (of the precepts of Cato and other writers on agriculture), cur non videantur oracula?...ex oraculo soliciet...inde illa reliqua oraculum; Quintil. xi 11 (of the help which a young orator might receive from an experienced pleader) juvenes rerum dicendi viam velut ex oraculo potest; x 1 § 81 (of Plato). On fundo cf. § 42 poetarum vocibus fune. C. gives the same report as to the views of the natural philosophers in Fin. i 20 ne illud quidem physici (est) credere aliquid esse minimum, Pat. 24 physici quibus inane esse nihil plant, Ac. II 125 tace aut inane quinquam pates esse, cum ita completa et conforta sit omnia, ut et quod moveritus corporum velut, et quae quidque cesset alium icalo consequatur? The majority of the ancient physici followed Aristotle in (1) affirming the infinite divisibility of matter, Phys. vi i πάν συνεχείς διαφέρειν εἰς ἐν διαφέρειον, Cael. iii 4 (of Democritus and Leucippus) ἀνάγκη μάκρεσθαι ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἄτομα σώματα λέγοντας, Gen. et Corr.

1 'The Platonists however showed some tendency towards atomism; compare the indivisible triangles of Plato, the ἄτομοι γραμματι of Spensippus, and the δικαίον of Heraclides'. J. S. R.
The Stoics held that the world was a *plenum*, but that outside of it there was an infinite *vacuum* Diog. vii 140, Zeller *Stoics* tr. p. 185—192.

Dr Whewell (Scientific Ideas ii 48—63) while allowing the value of the molecular hypothesis as an instrument of discovery, points out many difficulties which stand in the way of our accepting it as a philosophical truth respecting the constitution of the universe; cf. also Veitch *Lucretius and the Atomic Theory* and Clerk Maxwell’s Art. on ‘Atom’ in the *Encyc. Brit.* As to the existence of *vacuum* the results of modern science are thus stated, ‘the undulatory theory of light supposes the whole of the celestial spaces to be filled with the luminiferous ether. The astronomical argument therefore in favour of absolute vacuum has fallen; but the views of the constitution of matter which have grown with the rise of the molecular sciences of chemistry, light, heat, electricity, &c., have supplied its place with much more effect. The inference to which the modern philosophy would give the greatest probability is that all space is occupied by particles of matter with vacuous interstices, showing all degrees of density’. *English Cyclopaedia* under *Vacuum*.

v. *ana falsa nescio.* In the *Introduction* reasons are given for believing that Cotta’s speech is borrowed from a Stoic source, but C. adds clauses like this to impart to it an Academic colouring.

flagitia: ‘atrocities’; so just below and iii 91, cf. the use of *monstra, portenta, &c.* § 18 n.: one may excuse such scurrilities in the mouth of the Dogmatists, but they are scarcely appropriate for an Academic. The construction is resumed in *hane opinionem*.

sive etiam ante Leucippi. C. expresses himself doubtfully because Epicurus denied that Leucippus had ever existed, Diog. L. x 13, Hirzel p. 184.

corpuscula—adunca. Lucretius ii 333 foll. shows how the qualities of bodies are derived from the various shapes of the constituent atoms, some *levia* and *rotanda*, some *aspera* and *hamata*, *micronibus unca* or *angellis prostantibus*; cf. Theop. *Caus. Plant.* vi 6 (quoted in Mullach’s *Democritus* p. 217) *Dημοκρίτου δὴ αὐχήμα περιτιθείς ἐκάστῳ γλυκνὸν μὲν τὸν στρογγυλὸν καὶ εὐμεγέθη ποιεῖ, στρυφών δὲ τὸν μεγαλόσχημον τραχύν τε καὶ πολυγόνων καὶ ἀπεριφερη, ὀξύν δὲ τὸν ὀξύν τὸ ὀξυκ καὶ γαυνοειδῆ καὶ καμπύλων κ.τ.λ.; Cic. *Ac. ii* 121) fr. 28 (where *uncinatus* answers to *adunus* here), Lactant. *De Ira* x. In Pseudo-Plut. *Plac. Phil.* i 28 p. 877 it is denied that the atoms were *ἀγκιστρωεῖδη μῆτε πραισιεῖδη μῆτε κρικειεῖδη*, ταύτα γὰρ τὰ σχῆματα ἐνθρανατὰ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἄτομα ἅπασεὶς ἐθρανατο; but Aristotle (Frag. 202 p. 1514) distinctly says that, according to Democritus, the atoms were *τὰ μὲν σκαληνά, τὰ δὲ ἀγκιστρωθῆν, τὰ δὲ κολα, τὰ δὲ κυρτά, τὰ δὲ ἄλλας ἀναρίθμουσ*
nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito. This is a correct statement of the theory of Epicurus, but is inapplicable to Democritus, who spoke of change as the fiction of human inconsiderateness (ἀνθρωπος τυχει εἰδωλον ἐπιλάσαντο πρόβασιν ἱδης αἴουλης Mullach p. 167) and said that nothing was made at random (οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίγνεται, ἄλλα πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης Mullach p. 226). So Arist. Ἔν. Ἀν. v 8 Δημάκρατος δὲ, τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα ἀφείς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει εἰς ἀνάγκην οἰς χρήσιν ἢ φώσιν, and II 6; though he elsewhere censures him for naming no cause, Phys. viii 1 ad fin. δλω δὲ τὸ νομίζειν ἄρχην εἶναι ταύτην ἰκανήν, ὅτι ἄει ἡ ἐστιν οὐσίας ἡ γίγνεται, οὐκ ὀρθάς ἐχει ἰπολαξίαν, ἐφ' ὅ Δημ. ἀνάγει τάς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, οὐς οὐτω καὶ τὸ πρότερον γένετο, which (in Phys. ii 4 and 5) he treats as equivalent to making τὸ αὐτόματον the cause. While C. uses the word fortuitus of the atoms of Democritus in Tusc. i 22, 42, l.c. i 6, as well as here; in the De Fato 23 and 30, he more correctly connects the universal perpendicular movement of the atoms with the doctrine of fate, id Democritus accipere maluit, necessitate omnia fieri, quam a corporibus individuidus naturales motus avellere, cf. § 69 below.

hanc tu. So in Div. ii 73 the apodosis commenxes with hoc tu auspicium.

priusque te quis—dejeicerit. The indefinite quis is rarely found except in connexion with conjunctions or relative pronouns or with the verb dixerit, see Zumpt § 708, Draeg. § 44. [It is not easy to say whether dejeicerit should be classed as Subj. or Ind., see Gr. §§ 1540, 1541. I am inclined to take it as Ind. cf. Liv. vii 40 vos prius in me sinistreritis ferrum quam in vos ego, Verr. iv 59 dies me citius dejeicerit quam nominas, Planck. 79 sed me dies fidius multo citius meam salutem pro te dejecero quam Cn. Plancrii salutem tradidero contentioni tue. The comparative adverb is frequent in these sentences. R.]

vitae statu: a common phrase in C., e.g. Verr. ii 10 'the lamentations of the Sicilians made me abandon my rule of never taking part in a prosecution' (de vitae meae statu deducercnt ut ego istum aceruarem). Dejicere de statu (Orator 129) is a metaphor borrowed from the ring 'to knock a man out of his attitude'. 'It would be easier to make you change your whole posture of life than to stop you from following his teaching.'
ante enim—amittere. Cf. n. on § 17 libero judicio, and Zeller Epicureans, tr. p. 394, where many passages are quoted in illustration of the rigid dogmatism of the Epicurean school. Thus the last words of the founder to his disciples were τῶν δογμάτων μεμψήθαι Diog. L. x 16; any divergence from the dogmas was looked upon as παραφωμά, μάλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοσμηθὲν, Euseb. Praep. Ev. xiv 5; and Philodemus (quoted by Hirzel p. 107) says that Epicureans who are guilty of schism ou παίνυ μακρών τῆς τῶν πατραλοίων καταδίκης ἀδειαστήκασιν. Hirzel however has shown (pp. 98—190) that there was more of movement and variety in the Epicurean school than has been generally recognized. Quintilian xii 2 says the same of philosophers in general, haec inter ipsos qui, velut sacramento rogati vel etiam superstitiones constricti, nefas ducant a sucepta semel persuasione dixedere.

§ 67. quid enim mereas: ‘what would tempt you to abandon the system?’ lit. ‘what would you take as pay, what bribe must one offer you?’ Sch. quotes Fin. ii 74 quid merearis ut dicas te omnia voluptatis causa facturum? Verr. iv 135 quid arbitramini Reginos merere velle ut ab iis marmoreae illa Venus aufertur? cf. also Phil. i 34 putasne illum immortalitatem mereri coluisse ut proper armorum habendorum licentiam metueretur, where see var. nn. It is a colloquial phrase and occurs not unfrequently in Plautus.

nihil—deseram: ‘nothing would tempt me to forsake happiness and truth’.

ista—est veritas: for the attraction of istud see §§ 77, 122, and Roby § 106s.

nam de vita—languet: ‘as to happiness I make no objection; your system may be productive of that inactivity which you call happiness’.


sed ubi—ęngentibus: ‘can unchanging truth exist in those ever-changing worlds, or in senseless atoms?’

mundis innumerabilibus: cf. Fin. i 21 innumerables mundi qui et orientatur et interest cotidie and my n. on § 53. Epicurus defines the term in his epistle to Pythocles (Diog. L. x 88) κόσμος ἐστι περιαχή τις οὐρανοῦ ἁστρα τε καὶ πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα περιέχουσα, ἀποστομὴ ἔχουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀσείρου. Worlds are infinite in number, of all shapes and sizes, and perish, not as Democritus said from collision with other worlds, but from their own perishable nature (Diog. 90, cf. Lucr. v 235 foll.).

omnibus minimis: so ii 141 omnes minimos frigoris appulsus, III 86 in regnis omnia minima curant, cf. Madv. on Fin. III 3.

nulla moderante natura: apparently contradictory to § 53, where Vell. says the world is natura effectum: but there natura is opposed to an intelligent here, it is used rather in the Stoic sense and opposed to the capricious movements of the atoms, cf. Sch.’s n. here and my n. on § 65.

liberalitatis: his promise in § 62 to pass over all that was common to
Ep. with other philosophers, including therefore his atomic doctrine so far as it was the same with that of Dem. ; cf. Fin. i 18 sed hoc commune vitium (the general atomic doctrine), illae propriae Epicuri ruinæ (the destinatio).

[tecum uti: ‘employ in my dealings with you’, cf. hoc tecum orro Pl. Bacch. 491, docte atque astu mihi captandum cum illo Most. 1055 with Lorenz’s u. Ussing on Asin. 655, and my Gr. § 1885. R.]

§ 68. sint sane—ante quam nati. For the ellipse of the verb with acterni, nulli dei, and especially in the subordinate clauses quod ex atomic, si natum, see Draeg. § 116, (who compares ut tu Velleius and quot hominum linguae § 84) and Roby § 1413, who cites § 110 sine virtute certe nullo modo foll.

paolo ante—disputabas: see § 20. To avoid this palpable inconsistency, some Epicureans appear to have introduced a third principle, besides atoms and void, in the ὁμοιωτέτες, otherwise called ὁμοιομερεῖαι or στοιχεῖα, Plut. Plac. Phil. p. 882 λ, Stob. Ecl. p. 66; but if we arrived at a right conclusion in our discussion of § 49, this 3rd principle consists only of a subordinate class of atoms composing the divine images which are always streaming in upon the soul. It might be argued that these have nothing concreti about them, but merely produce an impression of a continuous form by their ceaseless repetition; that they have never coalesced into an actual whole, and are therefore in danger of no dissolution. It is doubtful how far such a defence could apply to the images; in any case it is not applicable to the ordinary Epicurean Gods of the intermundia. The considerations which seem to have been urged for the immortality of the latter by the disciples of this school are (1) the equilibrium described in §§ 50, 100, (2) the preservative influence of goodness alluded to in Plut. Def. Orac. p. 420, where the Epicurean argues against the demons of Empedocles on the ground ὡς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐστι φαύλους καὶ ἁμαρτητικῶς ὁντας μακριῶς καὶ μακραίως εἶναι, πολλὴν τυφλότητα τῆς κακίας ἐχώσει καὶ τὸ περιπτωτικὸν τοῖς ἁμαρτητοῖς (‘susceptibility to destructive influences’). To which it is replied that goodness has nothing to do with the duration of the bodily organism, οἶδεν οὐκ εἴ τὸ θεό τῆν ἀιῶνα ἀκούσων ἐκ φυλακῆς καὶ διακρούσεως τῶν ἁμαρτητῶν.

quod cum efficere vultis: ‘for when you would prove this’ (that the divinity is possessed of such attributes).

in dumeta correpitis: ‘you hide yourself in the thickets’. Cf. Ae. ii 112 cum sit cinis campus in quo exsultare posit oratio, cur cam tantas in angustias et in Stoicorum dumeta compellimus? So often spinæ and spinosus with a slightly different force, of the perplexing arguments of the Stoics.

ita: explained by the following infinitival clause, as in Fat. 24 ita dicimus, vella aliquid sine causa, Tusc. i 71 ita diebat, duos esse vias, iii 41 ita—lacitiam esse, see Madv. Fin. ii 13, 17, iii 53, v 77; and compare the use of the epexegetic clause after a demonstrative or relative, Draeg. § 484.
Ch. xxv § 69. hoc persaepe facitis—possit. Three examples follow, (1) the declination of atoms, (2) the denial of the disjunctive judgment (§ 70 idem facit contra dialecticos), (3) the assertion of the infallibility of sensations (§ 70 omnes sensus veri muntios), all preparing the way for (4), with which we are here concerned (§ 71 idem facit in natura deorum). The same points are criticized elsewhere by C. e.g. (1) in Fìn. I 19, Fat. 22, 46; (2) in Ac. II 97, Fat. 18 foll.; (3) Ac. II 79, see the following notes.

ut satius fuerit. Satius est being used in the Ind. like aequis est, melius est, where we might have expected the Subj. (see n. on longum est § 19), satius fuit would mean 'would have been better'. It is here subordinated to ut, like molestem sit in § 2.

si atomi—suopte pondere. This was the only natural and necessary movement of the atoms according to Dem.; but since the larger and heavier atoms overtook the smaller and lighter in their downward descent, by striking against them, they initiated a secondary movement, which might be in any direction, but which resulted finally in the creative vortex. The authorities on which this account rests are given by Zeller, who points out that some of the ancient writers neglected to notice the original movement, and made Dem. assume as his first principle, either the motion of mutual impact, πληγή (as Cic. Fat. 46 aliam quandam vim motus habeant (atomi) a Democrito impulsionis, a te Epicure gravitatis et ponderis), or even the resulting vortex, δίνη (e.g. Diog. L. IX 44 φέρεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑλῷ δινομένας τὰς ἀτόμους).

nihil fore in nostris potestate. Epicurus ap. Diog. L. X 134 speaks of the blessedness of the man who has learnt that necessity, to which others assign a despotic power, is only a name for the results of chance or of man's free will, etpe: κρίτων ἣν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολούθειν ὑ ἡ τῶν φυσικῶν εἰμαρμένη δουλεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παρατίθεσος ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἥ ἔδε ἀπαραίτητον ὅχει τὴν ἀνάγκην. The same reason is assigned for the introduction of the clinamen in Fat. 22 foll. (cf. 46 foll.) Epicurus veritūs est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferratur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus ut atomorum motu cogeretur, to which the Academic disputer replies (1) that the single downward movement does not necessarily involve the doctrine of necessity, and (2) that in any case the supposition of the clinamen would not avert such a consequence. Philodemus, in his treatise περὶ σμηίων (Gomp. p. 44), allows that this movement cannot be proved from the fact of free will, unless it is consistent with our experience on all points, αὐχ ἴκανον εἰς τὸ προσδείξασθαι τὰς ἐπὶ ἐλάχιστον παρεγκλίσεις τῶν ἀτόμων διὰ τὸ τυχῆν τοῦ παρ’ ἡμᾶς (causal use of παρὰ) ἄλλα δεὶ προσπείδειξαι καὶ τὸ μὴ δομοῦς ετέρῳ μάχονται τῶν ἐναργων. Accordingly we find another reason given in Fìn. I 19 viz. that as all atoms move at the same rate in vacuo (οὕτε γὰρ τὰ βαρέα βάττων οἰσθήσεται μικρῶν καὶ κούφων, ὅταν γε δὴ μὴν ἀπαύγαται αὐτοῖς Diog. L. X 61)—a point in which Ep. corrected the erroneous doctrine of his predecessor—there was no possibility of one overtaking the other, but all must move
downwards in parallel lines without any meeting or collision. Both reasons are combined in Lucr. ii 216—293.

 nihil fore—quod esset: in direct speech, nihil erit quod est.


declinare paululum = κατὰ παρέγχλων Stob. Ed. p. 346; cf. Fut. 22 cum declinat atomus intervallo minimo, id appellant διάχυστον. [Similarly Fin. i 19 declinare atomum perpaulum, quo nihil fieri potent minus; Lucr. ii 219 paulum, tantum quod moment mutatum dicere possis. J. S. R.]

§ 70. hoc dicere turpius est: cf. Fin. i 19 ait enim declinare atomum sine causa; quo nihil turpius physico, quam fieri quiesquam sine causa dicere, and Fut. 18.

dialecticos. The word διαλεκτική, used by Plato for philosophical discussion and then for philosophy itself, was restricted by Aristotel ato the Logic of Probabilities, while he gives to Formal Logic the name ἡ ἀναλυτική or ἀποδεικτική ἐπιστήμη. By the later schools (excepting the Stoics who gave a wider meaning to λογική) λογική and διαλεκτική were used indiscriminately for the science of reasoning generally, as in Fin. i 22 in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi et disserendi, quae λογική dicitur, istic vestor (Epicurus) plane inermis ac nudus est; Fut. 1 tota est λογική, quam rationem disserendi voco; De Orat. ii 157 svides Diogenem fuisses qui diceret artem se tradere bene disserendi et vera ac falsa disjudicandi, quam verbo Graeco διαλεκτικήν appellaret? cf. Fin. ii 17 foll., where we find also the term dialectici used of logicians in opposition to rhetores; so in Div. ii 11 it is opposed to physici, see Zeller Stoics tr. p. 69 foll.

disjunctoribus, in quibus aut etiam aut non poneretur. Cf. Ac. ii 95 fundamentum dialecticae est, quidquid enuntietur—id autem appellant διαζωμα—aut verum esse aut falsum; § 97 etiam cum ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et comtemnit et irridet, non impetrent ut verum esse concedat quod ita efficabunt ‘aut vivet eras Hermarchus aut non vivet’, cum dialectici sic statuunt omne quod aut disjunctum sit, quasi aut etiam aut non, non modo verum esse sed etiam necessarium; (vide quam sit catus is quem isti tardum putant. Si enim, inquit, alterutrum concessero necessarium esse, necesse erit eras Hermarchum aut vivere aut non vivere. Nulla autem est in natura verum talis necessitas)—cum hoc igitur dialectici pugnent, id est Antiochus et Stoici; totam enim evertit dialecticam. Nam si e contrariis disjunctio (contraria autem ea dico cum alterum aiat alterum neget) si talis disjunctio falsa potest esse, nulla vera est; Top. 56 dialecticos modi plures sunt qui ex disjunctomibus constant; aut hoc aut illud; hoc autem; non igitur illud. Itemque, aut hoc aut illud; non autem hoc; illud igitur. Quae conclusiones ideoque rationes sunt, quod in disjunctione plus uno verum esse non potest. It is the principle now known as the Law of Excluded Middle (see Hamilton Logic vol. i pp. 83, 90 foll., Ueberweg Log. tr. pp. 235—284, Mansel Prol. Log. p. 208 foll., Arist. Met. iii 7 p. 100, Prantl Gesch. d. Log. i pp. 143, 403, 449 foll.), and upon it is grounded the dichotomic or bifurcate division so
much favoured by Plato (e.g. *Sophist*, p. 282 foll.) and in later times by Bentham. For an account of the Disjunctive Judgment see Mansel *Proliog. Log.* p. 236 foll., Hamilton i 239. The Stoics, who prided themselves on their logical refinements and were especially distinguished by the name *dialectici*, called it *διέξωμα διεξενγμένον*, thus explained by Diog. L. vii 72 *διεξενγμένον εστιν* ὃ ὑπὸ τοῦ "ἦτοι" διαζευκτικὸν συνδέσμου (*disjunctive conjunction*) διείσκεται, οὗν "ἦτοι ἡμέρα εστιν ἡ νῦξ εστιν." ἐπανεξελεγμένον δέ τοῦ συνδέσμου ὄντος τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἀξιωματικῶν *ψεύδος* εἶναι. For *eitām* cf. Madv. *§ 45* (on affirmative and negative answers).

**pertimuit ne—fieret necessarium.** The Stoics held that their principle of Necessity was involved in the Disjunctive judgment applied to future events, as may be seen argued at length in *Fat.* 20 foll., e.g. Since it is absolutely necessary that a man now living must at a given date in the future be either dead or alive, whichever of the two proves eventually to be true must be now a necessary truth though unknown to us; or, more shortly, his existence or non-existence at that date is a necessary truth; which of the two it is, will be made apparent by the event. Aristotle discussed the point in his treatise *De Interpretatione* ch. 9 foll. 'in regard to the present or past, affirmative or negative judgments of existence are necessarily true or false; but it is not so with regard to the future, otherwise all future events would be fixed by necessity (ὡστε εἰ ἐν ἀπαντεὶ χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὡστε τὸ ἔτερον ἀληθενεῖσθαι; ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι) which is contrary to our own experience of deliberation and action.' He then solves the difficulty as follows, τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὅταν ἦν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅτι μὴ εἶναι ὅταν μὴ ἦν, ἀνάγκη; οὐ μὴν οὖσα τὸ ὅτι ἦν ἀπαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὅτι μὴ εἶναι...καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἐσέσθαι γε ἢ μὴ οὐ μέντοι διελώστα γε εἰς τῶν βάτερον ἀναγκαῖων (i.e. the necessity belongs to the compound judgment not to its parts taken separately) ἡ λέγω δὲ οὖσα ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐσόσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἐσόσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἐσέσθαι γε αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαίων οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι. In the *De Fato* 21, C. says that he would rather accept the teaching of Epicurus et nequire omnem quantitatem aut veram esse aut falsam than allow that all things happened by necessity, but he cites Carneades to prove that no such consequence as necessity is really involved in the Disjunctive Judgment. In reality Epicurus seems to have taken much the same view as Arist., see *Fat.* 37 nisi *forte volumus Epicurorum opinionem sequi, qui tales quantitatiarum nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt (i.e. not yet corresponding to fact but only capable of becoming so) aut, cum τὸ pudet, illud tamen dicit, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disjunctionibus, sed quae in his enuntiata essent, eorum neutrum esse verum and cf. Zeller *Stoics* tr. p. 435, and Ueberweg L.C., who points out the qualifications required in applying the Disjunctive Judgment. Johan. Sicelotta, quoted by Prantl p. 360, says that Epicurus instanced the famous riddle ὁρύδα καὶ οὐκ ὁρύδα ἐπὶ ξύλου καὶ οὐ ξύλον καθημένην λίδῳ καὶ οὐ λίδῳ βαλῶν διώλεσεν as contravening the principle of Contradiction.
negavit. For the asyndeton after pertinuit cf. the next sentence urguebat Arcesilas—timuit Epicurus—dicit, and § 106 motum dico esse inanem, tu imaginum remanere quae reverendar—hoc idem fieri, § 121 cum dicat—negat idem esse—tollit id. The effect is to give rapidity and energy to the sentence and to heighten the antithesis.

Arcesilas: the regular Doric and Aecolic contraction for 'Аρκεσίλαος, cf. Ahrens Dial. Dor. p. 199. On the Stoic and Academic theories of perception see § 12 n. Ac. i 40 foll., ii 79 foll.: the controversy between Arc. and Zeno is constantly referred to in the Academicā. [Strictly taken, the text misrepresents A. since he did not say omnia falsa esse, but omnia non magna falsa esse quam vera. But possibly Cic. uses the word falsus in the sense of ‘fallacious’, as often in the Academicā. J. S. R.]

omnes sensus veri nuntios. Cf. Madv. Fin. i 22, Ac. ii 79 eo rem deniitit Epicurus, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitus sit, nulli unquam esse credendum; Zeller Stoics tr. p. 402 foll. ‘to avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always, and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of the senses to shape our belief: the causes of these deceptions not lying in sensation as such, but in our judgment about sensation’. Lucretius iv 463 after instancing a number of optical illusions, says that they seek in vain to shake the credit of the senses quoniam pars horum maxima fallit (propter opinatus animi quos addimus ipse) pro cisis ut sint quae non sunt sensibus visa. Here too Ep. might quote Arist. on his side, cf. De Anima iii 3 § 3 η μεν αισθησις των ιδιων αεi αληθης, διανοιασει δ' ένδεχεται και Ψευδως. To the same effect Augustine (quoted by Lescault in loc.) says sensus non est falsus inter-nuntius sed falsus judex.

nihil horum nimis callide. This is Allen's emendation, put forward in his ed. 1836, for the nisi callide of the MSS. The same emendation was made by Sch. Opusc. iii pp. 317 and 364. For the use we may compare our ‘not over cleverly’. In the comic poets nimis often occurs in the sense of valore, which is substituted for callide in some of the MSS here, but in later writers it can only bear this force when combined with a negative. [For the form of sentence, cf. Orator 82 nihil horum parum audacter. Moser ms.]

plagam accipiebat: so Fat. 21 (of the denial of Disjunctive Judgments) Fam plagam potius accipiam quam fato omnia fieri comprobem.

§ 71. dum individuorum—tanquam sanguinem. This is not quite the same as the reason assigned for the quasi-corpus in § 49. There it was used to explain the fact that the Gods were not objects of bodily sensation, but perceptible only to the mind. In a treatise, conjecturally assigned to Metrodorus, which is contained in vol. vi pt. 2 of the first series of Hereulcanensis, we find both reasons conjoined (p. 35) δια τούτο γάρ ουδὲν αισθητῶν άθωνον, η πνεύματος γάρ άντικόπτει πρώτο τούτο δεχομίη πληγάς ισχυρῶς. Sch. in his n. and also in Opusc. iv 342 maintains that concretio here must be taken in a narrow sense = nihil solidior et crassior atomorum.
condensatio, 'because all the ancient writers (except Lactantius De Ira x 28 who was no doubt misled by the ambiguity of C.'s words in this passage) agree that the Epicurean Gods were corporeal and compounded of atoms'; and he defends his interpretation by the use of concretus in such passages as II 42, 101, Dic. i 130. I do not think we can argue from the use of the Past Part. concretus, which implies the completion of the process, to the verbal, implying the process itself; and besides, the reference is plainly to the sint same ex atomis of § 63, where it was shown that any such compound must be liable to interitus: to avoid this danger Ep. had recourse to his quasi-corpus § 69: then came the parenthesis illustrating hoc persupe facitis, and now in § 71 the subject is resumed in the words ind. corp. concr. fug. 'he tries to escape from the aggregation of indivisible particles (with its consequences as above pointed out)'. The only concretio implied in the Gods of § 49 was that of the images, involving superficial area but not depth, cf. monogrammata II 59. The tamquam sanguis was probably suggested by the Homeric ichor, II. v 340 ὤμερ καὶ ἄμμοιδος ἁμαθεῖον, ἵναιριά, ὁδὸς περὶ τε ἰετοὶ μακάρισσι θεοῖσιν: ὥστε ἐξορκόν, ὥστε ἵππος ἐφόπος οἴνων: τὸ ἀναγόμονες εἰσι καὶ ἀβάναυτοι καλέονται.

sed tamquam corpus: supply dicit esse from the preceding negat, and see n. on nolo § 17.

Ch. xxvi. mirabile videtur—viderit. This saying of Cato the Censor (Div. II 51) was probably inspired by a feeling of contempt for the Tusci ac barbari, as they are styled by the jealousy of a Roman augur N. D. II 11. Cic., who prided himself so much on being a member of the augural college, is indignant when a haruspex is admitted into the Senate, Fam. vi 18. In the De Divinatione II 28 foll. he states the Academic argument against haruspicina, in answer to his brother Q. who, as a Stoic, was bound to defend every kind of divination.

si in ceris fingeretur. If the reading is correct, the sense and construction require that fing. should be taken metaphorically 'if such a body were fancied in the case of waxen figures': otherwise the literal sense is suggested by fictilibus and ceris (used as in Juv. vii 19, where see Mayor's n., and ceris fingendis oblectari Justin xxxvi 4). I am inclined to think however that the true reading is SI IN CER[IS DICER]ETUR 'if the phrase were used in connexion with wax figures', cf. dicemus in Venere Coa just below. The repetition of cer explains the omission of the letters in brackets, and the remaining letters would be taken for si fingeretur, which would be likely to maintain its ground against the true reading, even after the insertion of in ceris from another text. Plin. N. H. xxxv § 4 speaks of the expressi ceris vultus which were used in funerals, and in § 147 of modelling in clay, fingere ex argilla simulitidines.

ne tu quidem: 'no, nor you either'. The phrase occurs in this weaker sense § 110 ne beatus quidem, § 113, II 87, iii 23, 43, 47, 49, 68, 86, see Madv. Fin. Exc. III p. 816.

§ 72. quasi dictata redduntur: 'you repeat your lesson like parrots'.
 Cf. Fin. ii 95 ista restra 'si gracis brevis, si longus levis', dictata sunt; Fin. iv 10 isdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis discedere; Fin. ii 20 quis restrum non edidicit Epicuri copias dogmati. Juv. v 12 2 peragant dictata magistri, with Mayor's n. The letters of Ep. preserved by Diog. L. abound in admonitions to his disciples to commit to memory what they had heard from him, see esp. x 35. [See also Fin. i 27, l.c. ii 8. J. S. R.]

oscitans: cf. Orat. ii 144 istam oscitament et dormitatem sapientiam Scacvolarum et ceterorum beatorum (jurists as opposed to pleaders) otio concedamus.

halucinatus est: (connected with hariolor by Vaniček, but the meaning seems to suit better the old etymology connecting it with ἀλυω), properly used of a mooning dreamy state, as in Col. vii 3 ne for aut bestia halucinament pastorem decipiat; then of idle random talk as here and (without blame) Q. Fr. ii 11 epistulae nostrae debent interdum halucinari 'descend to prattle'; Seneca uses halucinatio of silly abuse, Vit. Beat. 26.

cum quidem gloriarut: 'boasting all the time'. Cf. Fam. x 32, Nep. Thras. 2 ad fin., and see Roby §§ 1722, 1732, Draeg. § 570, also § 497 D 3 on the Ind. with cum quidem.

se magistrum habuisse nullum: cf. Diog. L. x 13 τούτων Ἀπολλάδαρος ἐν Χρονικὲς Ναυσεφαύνους ἀκοῦσαι φησι καὶ Πραξεφαύνους αὐτὸς δὲ εὖ φησιν, ἄλλῃ ἔναυτῳ ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἐφρέδικον ἐπιστολῇ...Δι货币政策 δὲ φησιν ὁ Μάργης καὶ Σεκοφαύνους αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι. Plut. M. 1100 A.

et non praedicanti. Baiter and Müller accept Klotz's emendation of ei for et, in obedience to Valla's dictum that et is never used in the emphatic sense (= etiam) by C., but, if we allow any weight to MSS, we must admit the use not only here, but in § 83 age et his vocabulis, in Tusc. iii 28 et illa laudantur, Leg. i 33 ergo et lex, Fin. iii 27 ergo et probandum, Die. i 34 et auctoritate. See further Draeg. § 312 (some of whose exx. however are more properly explained on the principle of anacoluthon treated of in Madv. Fin. Exc. i), Roby § 2198, Moser on Tusc. l. c., Munro's Lucr. ind. under et, Dumesnil on Leg. i 33, and a copious list of exx. in Kühnast's Liv. Synt. p. 371 foll.

nihil olet ex Academia: 'he has not the slightest flavour of the Academy'. Sch. Opusc. iii 365 defends and illustrates the construction against Klotz. Compare the similar uses of redoleo, sapio, odor (urbanitatis Orat. iii 161, dictaturae Att. iv 11), and Gr ἀρώ.

puerilibus disciplinis: the ordinary school lessons, ἐγκύκλιοι παδείκα, consisting of Reading, Writing, Arithmetic (included under γράμματα) Poetry and Music (included under μουσικῇ), see Becker Charides tr. p. 231 foll. On the view of Ep. cf. Diog. L. x 6 (the words of Epicurus to a disciple) παδείκαν δὲ πάσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε, with the notes in Huebner's ed. and Atheneus xiii 588 there quoted, 'Ep. ἐγκύκλιον παδείκαν ἀμητός ὁν ἵμακαρίζει καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτῷ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφοῖς πιαρχαρχείνον; Fin. i 26 vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisse instructor (est enim non satis politus iis
artibus, quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur) aut ne detrurriisset alias a studiis, with Madv.'s n. and ib. 72 where Torquatus defends his master's neglect of puerile studies; also Zeller Stoics tr. p. 397 foll., and Düning Metrodorus p. 64 foll. on the esteem in which the Epicureans held the poets. Gassendi in his treatise De vita et moribus Epicuri examines at length the charges here made against Ep. and endeavours to show that they are mere slanders of rival philosophers. In dealing with such a question, there are two points which should be borne in mind, (1) that knowledge which has been systematized and authoritatively taught is liable to a sort of ossification in the hands of formalists and pedants, and (2) that, as each fresh advance in knowledge bears more or less the character of a revolt against knowledge established and authoritative, a certain amount of self-confidence and want of appreciation for previous knowledge is not unusual in reformers or discoverers. So Hobbes boasted of the smallness of his acquaintance with preceding writers, declaring that if he had read as much as other men he should have been as dull of wit as they were', Whewell Lect. on Mor. Phil. p. 43. We may therefore excuse Ep. if he condemned too severely the artificial poetry, the frivolous rhetoric, and the hair-splitting logic of his time. If he spoke contemptuously of these as of no use for life, he has done no more than the Stoic Seneca in his 85th epistle, unum studium vere liberale est quod liberalum facit: cetera pusilla et puerilia sunt; and again, quod quod ista liberalium artium consecutatio molestos, verbosos, intempestivos, sibi placentem facit, et ideo non discentes necessaria quia supervacua didicerunt? as he shows in detail in the same epistle. That the 'liberal arts' were not entirely neglected by the followers of Epicurus appears from the large number of treatises on rhetoric, music, poetry and dialectic, which have been found among the Herculanean papyri. But Philodemus, to whom most of them are assigned, shares his master's contempt for a profession of universal knowledge (such as was made by Hippias), comparing the 'polyhistors' of his time to the Homeric Margites, see his De Vitiis x col. 20 Usving p. 55, Rhetorica Gros p. 52. See more under insedita loquendi § 85, dialecticorum—nobilis § 89.


credo plus nemini. On this use of plus (= magis) see Madv. Fin. 1 5.

agripteta: 'settler', one of the κληρονομικτοι sent from Athens after the conquest of Samos by Timotheus 366 B.C. cf. Grote ch. LXXIX vol. x p. 406, Boeckh Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. III ch. 18. The word is apparently peculiar to C., who uses it (Att. xv 29, xvi 1) of the soldiers of Caesar to whom lands were assigned in Epirus after the Civil War.

ludi magister fuit: 'turned schoolmaster'. I do not remember any other instance of this particular use of fuit, but it may be compared with such cases as Att. x 16 commodum ad te dederam litteras, cum ad me bene
mane Dionysius fuit; and the somewhat doubtful esse in potestatem, for which see Roby § 1962 n. Does not Timon’s epithet for Epicurus γραμμο-διδασκαλίδος (Diog. L. x 3) refer to the calling of the father, not of the son only (as the lexicons and translations take it), ‘a pedagogue by descent’? [Weissenborn (Lat. Gr. § 182 n. 2) quotes, for fui=‘ich bin geworden’, Liv. xxxiv 21 locupletior indies provincia fuit, Sall. Cat. 20 § 7 volgens frimius sine gratia, and compares the Fut. Perf. in Fam. xiv 7 fundo Arpinati bene poteris uti si annona carior fuerit. This use of fui has been most commonly discussed in connexion with the past participle. Madvig (Opusc. ii p. 218) denies that latus fui=latus sum except in Plantus, &c. Neue (vol. ii p. 352 ed. 2) has a discussion on the same point; and Brix on Mil. Glor. 102 legatus fuit, quotes exx. where the sense would be naturally expressed by the Eng. ‘became’. But in reality fui merely denotes past time absolutely, and the notions of attainment, continuance, completion, &c. are only developed from the context, cf. my Gr. §§ 1451 and 1454, 2. We may compare the use of ἐβαριλευνά ‘I became king’; I doubt however whether it would be possible to find Marcus consul fuit similarly used. R.]

§ 73. in Nausiphane tenetur: ‘he is convicted (cannot free himself) in the case of N.’ Sch. quotes Cuccin. c. 2 facile homestissimis testibus in re perspicua tenetur: when thus used, ten. is often followed by a Gen. of the crime. Some explained Ep.’s depreciation of education by his dislike for Naus. πολλοὺς γὰρ τῶν νέων σωμαίες, καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων σπουδαίως ἐπεμελείτο, μᾶλθα δὲ ῥητορικής γενόμενος συν τοῦτο μαθῆτής ὁ Ἐπ. υπέρ τοῦ δοκεῖν αὐτοδιδάκτος εἶναι καὶ αὐτοφυῆς φιλόσοφος, ἥρειται ἐκ πιστὸς τρόπου, τὴν τε περὶ αὐτὸν φήμην ἐξελείφειν ἐπενδεῖ, πολὺς τε ἐγκντὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κατήγορος, Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216. It was also asserted that the ‘canon’ of Ep. was copied from the ‘Tripod’ of Naus. Diog. L. x 14.

Democriteo. Elsewhere (Diog. L. ix 64, 69, Sext. Emp. l.c.) he is called a disciple of Pyrrho, who was however himself reckoned among the followers of Dem.

vexat contumeliis: cf. Diog. L. x 8 πλεύρωνα (‘a mollusc’, Plat. Phileb. 21 c) αὐτῶν ἐκάλει καὶ ἀγράμματων καὶ ἀπατεώνα καὶ πόρνων, also § 7 and Sext. Emp. l.c.

si—non audisset, quid audierat: ‘supposing he had not heard these lectures, what other teaching had he received!’ (to make him so well acquainted with the doctrines of Dem.?) The connexion of thought is very much broken. Heind. following Davies proposed to improve this by reading enim after quid. Hermippus, ap. Diog. x 2, says that his philosophical interest was aroused, not by hearing the lectures of Naus. (hace Democritiv), but by reading the actual books of Dem. περιτυχόντα τοῖς Ἀμ. βιβλίοις εἰς φιλοσοφίανἀῤῥ. See below, § 93 n.

quibus—continetur: ‘which form the subject-matter of natural philosophy’ (§ 20).

1 So Hirzel p. 110 n.
istuc quasi corpus—quid intellegis: ‘What do you understand by this phrase?’ For the construction see exx. in n. on spatium tamen § 21; and Fin. Π 50 quid intellegit honestum? Parad. 42 quem intellegimus dictum, quoted in Sch.’s n. here.

§ 74. cum quidem semel dicta sunt. A continuation of the previous abrupt and disjointed style. There seems no reason for Heindorf’s supposition that the text is corrupt.

quid est, quod Velleius intellegere possess, Cotta non possess? ‘Once spoken, what reason is there why one should understand them better than another?’ For the asyndeton cf. § 20 cuius principium n., and for the particular opposition (possit—non possit) Plin. Ep. Π 16 § 1 potestis enim efficeret ut male moriar, ut non moriar non potestis and Corte on Lucan 1 200; for quid quod § 3 n. and § 117; for the thought, Fin. Π 12 hoc frequenti dixerit a vos, non intellegere nos quam dicerat Ep. voluptatem... egone non intellegam quid sit ἐδωρῇ Graeco, Latine ‘voluptas’? utram tandem linguam nescio? Deinde quid fit ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes quicunque Epicurei esse voluerunt? also § 15 and § 21.

 tu me celas, ut Pythagoras: a reference to the mystical and esoteric character of the teaching of P.; see Diog. L. viii 16 with the mn.

consulto tamquam Heraclitus. The same assertion is made Π 33, Fin. Π 15 vide ne, si ego non intellegam quid Ep. loquatur, sit atiquam culpa ejus qui ita loquatur ut non intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Her. cognomento qui σκοτεινός per-hibetur, quia de natura nīmis obscura memoravit, aut, &c., Diog. ΙΧ 1 § 6 επιτηδεύως ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι ὁπως οἱ δυνάμενοι προσθέσων αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημόδους εὐκαταφρόντων ἥξιο, Lobeck Agl. p. 160 foll. The real cause of his obscurity is the difficulty experienced by all early writers in attempting to give an outward form to philosophical language before the formation of a philosophical language, and the special idiosyncrasy of Her., his depth and fulness of thought, his strong imagination, his love of proverbial, enigmatic and metaphorical expressions.

quod inter nos liceat: ‘let us use this freedom towards each other’ cf. Ter. Haut. v 2 20 here licetne? and Liv. vii 13 si licet (for se licet, Madv. emend.); the fuller phrase liceat dicere occurs § 80 and Att. Π 4. Klotz Adn. Crit. Π 8 points out the error of Hand’s interpretation ‘entre nous’, and defends the ms reading liceat, which he explains to mean qua de re inter me et te nulla dubitatio sit. We had a similar apologetic phrase § 59 bona venia me audies. [I incline to liceat as contrasting with the preceding celas and occulte. J. S. R.]

Ch. xxvii § 75. illud pugnare ut: ‘the point you fight for is’, ‘your contention is this’: so Fam. ΙΙΙ 10 illud pugna et enitere, Rose. Am. ΙΙ 3 hoc solum pugnatur ut, and (without an object-clause) N. ΙΙΙ 1 videtur Epicurus de dis immortalibus non magno opere pugnare. In this sense it is used with an Inf. by the poets. We have had it used in an opposite sense
in § 62. Cf. the similar metaphorical use of *vinco* and *repugno*. For the Acc. of Extent (*illud*) see Roby § 1094.


**nihil concreti—eminentis**: "Nothing compact or firm, nothing that stands out in prominent relief", cf. Ofj. III 69 *justitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus: umbra et imaginibus utinmur, Tusc.* III 3 *consec- tatur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. Est enim gloria solidi quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata*. The use of the Gen. *eminentis* is allowable, as it is joined with adjectives of the 2nd declension, see Roby § 1299, Nägelsb. § 21.

**conc.** properly used of that which has grown together, crystallized; so water is said *concrecere pruina* II 26; *expr.* of that which has had a pattern stamped upon it, as opposed to a flat surface; so Quint. *viii Pref.* 19 speaks of *corpora lucertis expressa* (cf. Tennyson 'arms on which the standing muscle sloped, as slopes a wild brook o'er a little stone'); *em.* of any protuberance which breaks an even line, as the circle is said to have *nihil eminens* II 47. [So *eminentia* is used to express the foreground in a picture, as opposed to *umbra*, *Ac.* II 20; cf. the Gr. *εἰκοσάι and ἕκοσάι*. J. S. R.]

**sitque per lucida**: 'but free from gross admixture, volatile, transparent', so in *Dir.* II 40 the Gods are called *per lucidos et perflabiles*. For the adversative force of *que* see Draeg. § 314 10.


**Venere Coa**: the *Ἀφροδίτη ἀμαθομείνη* painted by Apelles for the temple of Aesculapius at Cos, afterwards removed by Augustus to Rome and placed in the temple of Divus Julius. Apelles left unfinished a second Venus Coa, which was intended to surpass the first. Allusion is made to it in Ofj. III 10, where see Beier’s n. The masterpiece of Apelles is mentioned here, of course, only as a typical painting, as in *Dir.* I 23; cf. *in ceris* above.

**non res—esse**: 'nothing real but only a semblance of reality'. The change from the direct to the indirect construction after *dicemus* marks the difference between the actual and the supposed description.

**adumbratorum**: 'shadow-deities': so *σκιαγραφία* 'a silhouette', see Cope on Arist. *Ithet.* III 12 and quotations under *nihil concreti* above.

C. d. **Weakness of the argument in favour of anthropomorphism.** If the Gods only present themselves to our minds in human form, that is because our ancestors, whether from superstition or policy, established that belief amongst us: elsewhere the case is different. If that form
seems to men the most beautiful, that is merely the prejudice of race. If it is said that experience shows rationality to be confined to that form, on the same ground we might attribute all the properties of man to the Gods; but reason shows the danger of drawing negative conclusions from our limited experience, and it shows also that a body which is suitable for man is unsuitable for such a being as God is supposed to be. Ch. xxvii § 76—xxxvii § 102.

§ 76. hoc loco—velitis: 'here you are at no loss for arguments by which you would fain make out', cf. quo loco § 13 n.

primum quod—occurrat humana: cf. § 46. 'Such is the shaping of our minds (i.e. the πράγματα, cf. §§ 43, 45, 100) that in thinking of God a human form presents itself to us'.

 nec esse—pulchriorem: for the loose infinitive after non deest copia rationum cf. res esse after dicemus just above; the infinitive clause here represents a parenthetic clause in the original direct sentence, thus humanae sunt formae, quod ita est innotuit...quod forma esse pulcherrima debet (pulchrior autem humana nulla est). This argument is given § 47.

domicilia mentis: cf. § 48; and, for the phrase, § 99 domicilia vitae.

§ 77. primum quicque: 'each in turn', lit. 'as it comes to the front'; cf. ii 7, Ac. ii 49 with Reid's n., Madv. Fin. ii 105; most mss have the archaic quicquid, which is used by Lucretius in this sense, see Munro's n. on i 389.

arripere—vestro jure rem nullo modo probabilem: 'you act as if none could dispute your right to snatch up an hypothesis which is in no way to be allowed'. Arr. stronger than sumo in § 89: Lucr. uses corripio in the same way ν 247 tridges in his rebus ne corripuisset rearis | ne μικρ quod terram atque ignem mortalia sumper, which Munro illustrates from Sext. Emp. Hyp. i 90 πρω άρμασθαι της θρησεως τα φαινομενα συναρπαζουσιν, έαυτος την θρησιν επιτρεποντες. The phrase suo jure (nearly equivalent to suo arbitrio) means properly 'of his own right', i.e. on his own authority, without asking leave or being liable to be called to account by another, and then, uncontrolled, without hindrance, as in Florus i 17 in subjectos suo jure detonuit, where see var. nn.

species istas—converterent. So Arist. Met. xi 8 p. 1074 b. (of the origin of religion) τα δε λοιπα μνημων την προσηκατι προς την πειδο των πολλων και προς την εις τους νιμους και το συμφερον χρησιν άνθρωποι εις τη γαρ τοιουτος και των άλλων ζωων ομοιος τισι λεγοντι, and Critias quoted on § 118. No one in the present day, theist or atheist, would assign an artificial cause for so primitive and general a phenomenon. The highest personality being involved in the idea of God, it was natural to attribute to him the form in which personality was most clearly shown, more particularly if Mr Herbert Spencer is right in supposing that ancestor-worship was the earliest form of the heathen religions, cf. Sociology, p. 440.

M. C.
ut essent simulacra. The second explanation of anthropomorphism is no better than the first. The images which bring the Gods near need not be in human shape, witness the Gods of Egypt referred to in § 82.

deos ipsos se adire: cf. Leg. ii 26 (religion is felt most strongly in temples) est enim quaedam opinione species deorum in oculis, non solum in mentibus; Sch. compares the complaint of the Sicilians in Verr. Div. 3 see jam ne deos quidem in suis urbis ad quos confessit habeare, quod corum simulacra sanctissima C. Verres e delubris religiosissimis absulisset; Plut. M. p. 379 reprobrates those who thought the images to be not ágáμαρα καὶ τιμᾶς θεῶν ἄλλα θεῶν. See Nügelsb. Nach-Homerische Theol. p. 5.

auxerunt...opifices: cf. Quintil. xii 10 9 (of the Zeus of Phidias) eujus pulchritudo adjovisset aliquum etiam receptae religioni videtur, quoted by Nügelsb. l. c. p. 6. Poets and artists in giving expression to the popular conception of divinity, added to it clearness, elevation and refinement, but they did not change its nature.

erat enim non facile—servare: 'It was not easy to give a consistent representation of divine activity under any other form than that of man.'

accessit...quod...videatur. The Subj., which is found in all the mss, is changed into videtur or videbatur by the later editors. May it not be explained on the same principle as dixerit in § 20? where see n.; 'perhaps too the idea to which you referred (§ 48) may have contributed to this result, I mean man's belief in his own superior beauty.' Videatur would have been more regular after accessit; the Pres. is used in order to denote that the proposition is of general import, not limited to the time of its original utterance. For the pleonasm with opinio cf. Nügelsb. Stil. § 186 2.

physice. So Metrodorus, in the ep. alluded to § 113, addresses his brother as ὁ φυσιολόγε, and Timon (ap. Diog. L. x 3) styles Epic. ύπποτος ἀν φυσικῶν καὶ κύριται. The Epicureans prided themselves on their physice as the Stoics on their dialectics, see § 83, ii 48, Fin. ii 102, i 63 in physice plurimum posuit Ep., Plut. Def. Or. p. 434 ὁ Επικουρεύεις διὰ τὴν καλὰν ὅφε φυσιολογίαν ἐνυβριζοντα, ὡς αὐτῷ λέγοντα, τοῖς τοιούτοις (oracles); Zeller Stoic trav. p. 300, and esp. Hirzel p. 157 foll.

quam blanda—lena: 'What an insinuating go-between, or pander, if I may say so, of her own charms'. Cf. Sest. 21 (alter) era habomin omnipotui nobilitate ipsa, blanda conciliaricula, commendatus; Lael. 37 conciliarix amitiae virtutis opinio; Ox. A. A. iii 315 res est blanda canor, discant Cantare puella, pro facie multis vox sua lena fuit; Acad. fr. 34 quasi lenocinante mercede; N. D. ii 147 corpus lenocinia.

an putas—delectetur? So Epicharmus ap. Diog. L. iii 16 θαυμαστῶν εὐθὺν ἐστὶ με ταῦτ' ὠτω λέγειν, | εὖθ' ἀν̄δρεῖν αὐτοίσιν αὐτῶν καὶ δοκεῖν | καλῶς πεφύκειν καὶ γαρ ἀ κόλον κυῖ | καλίστον ἐλευν φαίνεται, καὶ βοῦς βοῦ' | ὅνος ὃ̄ ὅφε καλλιστόν ἐστιν, ὃς ὃ̄ ὦ. | beluam: apparently used synonymously with bestia, cf. § 78, 97, and esp. 101, and ii 100 (of shellfish).

contrectatione: properly 'stroking' 'caressing'; for its force here cf.
R. P. iv 4 quam contractationes et amores soluti et liberi! so contracto frequently.

eam esse causam—putaremus. Molv. thinks that this clause was added by a reader who misunderstood the construction mirum si (f) and it has accordingly been bracketed by later editors. The objections as stated by Sch. Opusc. III 317 foll. are (1) that it is superfluous in sense; we had already been told that man's self-admiration was one of the grounds of anthropomorphism; (2) that in reading the sentence, we naturally take si as depending on mirum, and it causes an awkward surprise when we find that it is intended for the protasis of the sentence; (3) that the sequence of tenses is violated by putaremus after esse. Kl. (Adn. Crit. III 7) defends the mss reading, and I am inclined to think he is right. The clause may be superfluous in reference to what precedes, but if we look to the following sentence, we shall see that it is needed in order to explain the introduction of si ratio esset. Cicero is seeking to prove that the reason why man attributes his own form to the gods whom he worships, is because he, in common with other animals, loves his own form best; and he proceeds to argue that this common incident of animal nature would, if acted upon by reason, lead the other animals each to glorify (plurimum tributuras) his own nature in like manner, cf. the passage from Xenophanes quoted below. If there is any corruption in the text, one might suggest the loss of a sentence referring to the 3rd reason for anthropomorphism (domicium mentis). At present this is passed over without notice, and C. returns to the first reason in §§ 81—85, only introducing the 3rd in § 87 mixed up there with another argument from experience. As to the 2nd objection, there is no doubt a slight awkwardness in separating si from mirum, but this is certainly not a fatal objection to the correctness of the sentence. Or it might be possible to take si as depending on mirum, and then to suppose the construction broken, eam esse causam being introduced as a sort of epexegetic clause, also dependent on mirum. Such a change of construction might be compared with that after facit § 31 facit Soc. disputantem eundemque dicere, after diciems § 75 illud non est ...sic rem esse, after docere § 76. Thirdly the tense of putaremus is attracted to praescriptit, as in Lael. 2 memini...quanta esset querela, where the tense is attracted to an intermediate Imperf., see Drneg. § 151 5 c, and Roby § 1517. For the attraction of the pronoun (eam for id) see § 67 and Roby § 1068.

Ch. xxviii § 78. quid censes...non tributuras fuisse? An abbreviated expression for quid censes? Nonne censes? cf. § 82 quid igitur censes? Apin &c., Zumpt § 769, Beier on Off. II 25. On the thought cf. Xenophanes (Zeller I p. 490) ἀλλ' εἰται χείρας γ' εἰγὸν βόες ἥ' λέωντες, | ἤ γράφαι χείρεσι καὶ ἐργὰ τελεῖν ἀπερ ἄνδρες, | καὶ κε δεών ἱδέον ἐγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἑποίουν | τοιαύθ' οἶον περ καυτοὶ δέμας εἰγὸν ὄμοιον, | ἵπποι μὲν ἶππουι βόες δὲ τε βουσίν ὄμοιας. In the Herculanean treatise De Sensionibus ascribed to Metrodorus (II. I. vi pt. 2 col. xiii) we find the same objection
referred to, 'a lion has courage, God has courage, therefore God should be in the shape of a lion.' [Quasque is used not quamque, because it is equivalent to quodque genus. R.]

at mehercule: et would be more suitable here; if we retain at it must refer back to the last sentence but one.

taurus—Europam. This was the subject of a statue by Pythagoras the sculptor, see Varro L. L. v 351 and Müller Ancient Art § 351. A painting of the same is described by Achilles Tatius at the beginning of the Leucippe.

ingenii—orationibus: the plural of the concrete is often used for the abstract, see Nägelsb. Stil. § 12, and compare Div. ii 55 conjectura ingenii diducitur 'by man's ingenuity', Arch. 17 celeritatem ingeniorum (of Roscius). I suppose orat. here to mean the faculty of speech, but I cannot cite a parallel. [Mr Roby would prefer to translate it 'by our intellects or modes of articulation'. But the general tenor of the passage requires that the comparison should lie between man, on the one side, and all other animals, on the other; whereas, if we give the ordinary force to the plural, it seems to me that the use of the word nostris here draws our attention to differences existing amongst men themselves. Also the following singulars specie figuraque suggest a singular force for the preceding plurals.]

quodsi—velimus. Quod is connective not adversative, Madv. § 449, 'and then if we choose to (go further and) invent and combine forms for ourselves'.

natantibus invehens beluis. Triton was represented with a human body ending in a fish's tail; sometimes the legs are replaced by two fish-like bodies, between or upon which the man appears to ride, as in the beautiful painting at Herculaneum (Roux Aïné Recueil Général vol. v 36, M. Barb. viii 10). It is to the latter form that C. alludes, and also Apoll. Rh. iv 1608—1614 ἀντὶ ὑπὸ λαγόνων δίκραυρά οἱ ἑνά καὶ ἑνά | κῆτεος ἀλκαία πικίνετο, &c. Cicero would be familiar with the Triton which formed a vane on the top of the horologium of Cyrrheus, 'the tower of the winds', at Athens, cf. Müller Anc. Art § 402. For the intransitive use of the participle cf. R. P. iii 14 invehens alium anguivum curru, Phil. iii 32 (Antonius) in me absentem invehens, Brut. 331 per medios ludente quasi quadrigis equentem (but invehens se Liv. xxx 11, xxxi 35, curru incertus R. P. vi 11); so versus, volvens, rotans, and the Pres. Part. in Deponent. 

nolis esse. I think Sch. is right in taking this interrogatively, so carrying on the argument of the sentence at mehercule, &c. 'I dare not call myself more beautiful than Europa's bull; if you could be metamorphosed into a Triton, would you refuse it.' Otherwise surely the opposition must have been more strongly marked, 'and yet one would object to a change even into the still more beautiful Triton'. As to construction, I think quallīs refers to the preceding formas, and that we must supply tali forma with esse.

difficili—versor: 'I am on ticklish ground, I confess'.
homo nemo: 'no one who is a man', not simply = nemo or nullus homo. § 79. et quidem: 'yes, and ant like ant'. This formula is often used to express an ironical acceptance of an opponent's argument, professing to carry it further but really showing that it is applicable in an opposite sense to that intended by the user; cf. Div. 111 114 (in answer to an argument for divination) nonne ea praedicta quae facta sunt? Ille vero; et ea quidem quae omnes timebamus; N. D. 1 100 (against the argument for anthropomorphism from innate ideas) habebam informationem quandam dei. Et barbari quidem Jovis; Fin. 1 35 (to prove that Torquatus was not forgetful of expediency) torquem detraxit hosti. Et quidem se text, ne interiret, (see Madv. in loc. and Emend. p. 90 foll., Moser on Tusc. 111 48, Draeg. § 311 13). It is used to emphasize without irony in §§ 55, 59, 82 et quidem alia, 83 et quidem laudamus, 89 et libenter quidem. The ironical meaning is also found in quidem alone, as 111 82 at Phalaris, at Apollodorus poenas sustulit. Multi quidem ante necatus et cruciatus; and in et alone, as 111 27 at enim quaerit Xenophon unde animum arripuerimus. Et ego quoque unde orationem; also in scellicit et Lucr. 1 609, vi 574; see Draeg: § 341, Bake and Dumesnil on Leg. 111 24.

formica: allusion is again made to the ant in 111 158, 111 21; similarly Celsus ap. Orig. compares it with man as affording an instance of civil life (iv 77, 81), and of foresight (ib. 83), and argues that in the sight of God the two must be much on a level (ib. 85).

quotus quisque. As tertius q., quartus q. mean 'each third', 'each fourth man', so q. q. means strictly 'each how-many-eth', i.e. 'one out of how large a number', 'what a small fraction'.

Athenis cum essem: probably referring to 79 n. c., when C. attended lectures there in company with Atticus and other friends; so in § 59 and § 93 he ascribes his own experience to Cotta.

e gregibus—singuili: 'scarcce one in each company' (the συντρεμμα numbering about 15 privates, see Durnont Essai sur l'Éphébie Attique), so Tusc. v 77 adulsectentium greges Lacedaemone vidimus ipsi incredibili contentione certantes. An Athenian was strictly ἐφησος from the age of 18 to 20, during which time he had to serve as πειπολος, but the term was loosely used of youths after 16, when they commenced their regular training in the gymasia. Hermann Gr. Alt. 1 § 176 speaks of the increased importance attached to the organization of the Ephebi after the loss of liberty and under the Roman power. The Latinized form is freely used by Varro and the comic poets. Grex here just corresponds to the Cretan ἀγλη: it is technically used of a company of actors.

arriseris: 'you smile at the confession of my weakness'.

concedentibus—delectamur. Compare the partly ironical and playful professions of admiration which abound in the Platonic dialogues, e.g. Charm. p. 154 c, Lysis 204 b; and see Thompson's Phaedrus App. 1, Zeller Socrates tr. p. 75 foll., Tusc. iv 70 foll. philosophi sumus exorti, et avocare quidem nostro Platone, qui amoris auctoritate tribuercus, Fin. 111 68
where Madv. quotes Diog. L. vii 129 καὶ ἐρασθησισθαι τὸν σοφὸν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαινόντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρέτην εὐφυίαν, ὁς φησὶ Ζήρον... καὶ Χρύσιππος...καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος, εἶναι δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιξολὸν φιλοσοφίας διὰ κύλος ἐμφαινόμενον, καὶ μὴ εἶναι συννοσίας, ἀλλὰ φιλίας. [Cf. the very similar passages in Stob. Eðh. §§ 118, 238, Sext. Emp. Math. vii 230 and Sen. Ep. 123 § 15 illos quoque noccere nobis existimo qui nos sub specie Stoicæ sectæ hortantur ad vitæ, seq. J. S. R.]

naeus—Alcaeum. Alc. of Mitylene fl. 600 B.C. canebat Lycum nigris oculis nigroque crine decorum Hor. C. i 328; Cie. says of him fortiss vir in sua re publica cognitius, quae de juvenum amore scribit Alcaeum! Tusc. iv 71. The name Λύκος occurs in one of his fragments (58 B.C.), where Bergk proposes to emend this passage by inserting Lyci before pueri. As it stands, it is a broken hexameter, which might be completed by reading amantem for Alc. Probably C. altered the verse to suit his context, as in § 13.

ill—lumen: 'the mole seemed to him a beauty'; cf. P. red. in Sen. 8 Lentulus hoc lumen consules sui fore putavit, si me rei publicae redditidisset, Q. Fr. ii 10 illorum praediorum seito mili victium Marium lumen esse, 'the neighbourhood of your friend M. gives a new charm to my fields', Senec. 35 lumen civilis with Reid's n.; for its rhetorical use see Piderit's index to the De Oratore s.v. On the general subject see Plato Rep. v 474 d οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς; ὥς μὲν, ὧς τι συμός, ἐπίξορας κληθεὶς ἐπαινεῖται foll., Lucr. iv 1154—1170, Hor. Sat. i 3 38 foll., Od. A. A. ii 657.

Catulus. Both the father, Q. Lutatius Q. F., and the son, Q. Lutatius Q. F. Q. N., were highly respected members of the party of the Optimates and special objects of C.'s admiration. The former was a colleague of Marius in the consulship and joint-commander in the war against the Cimbri B.C. 102. His death in the Marian proscription (B.C. 57) is mentioned N. D. iii 80. His uprightness of character is witnessed to by the saying (Orat. ii 173) hoc verum est, dixit enim Q. Catulus, and C. continually praises his purity and elegance of style both in Greek and Latin (Or. ii 28, Brut. 132). He is one of the speakers in the De Oratore, where some of his witty sayings are reported (Orat. ii 220 and 278). Gellius xviii 9 quotes with extravagant praise a jaw-breaking epigram addressed by him to the beautiful youth Theotimus. The younger Catulus was a warm supporter of C. against Catiline and was the first to salute him as pater patriae. He died B.C. 60. He was one of the interlocutors in the 1st ed. of the Academica, but Atticus persuaded C. that the subject was too technical to suit him, and C. took his part himself in the 2nd ed. See Reid's Introd. to the Acad.

hujus: used of time, not of place, 'now living'. Sch. compares ii 6 avus hujus adolescentis and Off. iii 66 Cato, hujus nostri Catonis pater; so N. D. i 107 hoc Orphicum carmen, 'the hymn which now goes under the name of Orpheus', his moribus, 'in the present state of morality'. [Add De Or. ii 270, Cato M. 50. J. S. R.]

municipem tuum. Vell. and Rusc. were both natives of Lanuvium, an ancient and famous municipium, situated to the south of Alba and often
mentioned by C. Milo was its chief magistrate or 'dictator', and was going there to offer sacrifice and consecrate flames to Juno Sospita when he met and killed Clodius. In his speech for Murena, who was also a Lanuvian (§ 90), C. makes his appeal to the jury, nolite a sacris patriis Junonis Sospitae (for which see below § 82) cui omnes consules facere necesse est, domesticum et suum consulem avellere. It continued in a flourishing condition down to a late period of the Empire, and was the residence of Antoninus Pius and his two successors, see Dict. of Geog. In Div. i 79 and ii 66 we read of the prodigies which announced the future greatness of Roscius, quid? amores ac deliciae tuae, Roscius, num aut ipsa aut pro eo Lanuvium totum monetiebatur? qui cum esset in cunctulis educareturque in Solonio, qui est campus agris Lanuvini, noctu lumine apposito, experrecta nutrix animadvertit puerum dormientem circumктивum serpentis amplectu. Quo aspectu exterius clamorem sustulit. Pater autem Rosci ad haruspices retulit; qui responderunt nihilullo puero clarius, nihil nobilissim fore. Atque hanc speciem Pasiteles caelavit argento, et noster expressis versibus Archias. Cic. received instructions from R. in his youth and always speaks of him in the highest terms, e.g. Orat. i 130 videtisne quam nihil ab eo nisi perfecte, nihil nisi cum summa venustate sit, nisi ita ut deceat, et uti omnes moreat atque delectet? Itaque hoc jam dii est consecutus, ut, in quo quisque artificior excellent, is in suo genere Roscius diceretur. Pro Quint. 78 cum artifex ejus modi sit (Roscius) ut solus dignus videatur esse qui in scena spectetur; tum vir ejus modi est ut solus dignus videatur qui eo non accedat. In 68 B.C. he was engaged in a law suit connected with the profits of his teaching and was defended by C. in the speech which is still extant: he died in the year 62 B.C.

Auroram salutans. On the habit of praying at sunrise see Plato Leg. x 887 e ἀνασταλμόν τοι τῇ ἡλιον καὶ τελήνης καὶ πρὸς δυναὶς ὅπως προκυλλήσει ἀμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις ἀκούσητε τοι καὶ ὅρφωτε Εὔληνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων πάνω εἰς συμφοράς παντοίας ἐχομένων καὶ εἰς ἐυπραγίας, and the account given of Socrates in the Symp. 220 'he remained standing there till sunrise, then ἐξείται ἀπίστων προσευχώμενον τῇ ἡλιόν', Lucian De Sollt. 17 'Ἰονίδει ἐπειδ' ἔσθεν ἀναστάτες προσεύχονται τὸν Ἡλιον, οὐχ ὡσπερ ἤμεις τῆς κείρα κύστος ἐγούμεθα ἐντελῆ εἶναι τὴν εὐχήν,' (while they salute his appearances with dances); Tertull. Apol. 16 plerique vestrum (the heathen) affectatione aliquando et cælestia adorandi ad solis ortum labia vibratis; also the saying of Pompeius to Sulla, 'more worship the rising than the setting sun', Plut. P. 14; but Tacitus speaks of it as a peculiarity of Orientalis, Hist. iii 24 orientem solem (ita in Syria mos est) tertiarii salutavere. We have a survival of this solar worship in the orientation of churches and the practice of turning to the East at the Creed, see Tylor i 260--271. For saluto in the sense of 'worship' cf. Rosc. Am. 56 deos salutatim venerint, Cato R. R. 2 pater familias ubi ad villam venit, ubi larem familiarem salutavit, fundum circumseit, Seneca Ep. 95 § 47 vetemus salutationibus matutinis fungit et foribus assidere templorum: humana ambitio istis officiis capitur.
a laeva exoritur: 'Roscius dawns upon me from the propitious quarter, fairer than the god of day'.

liceat dicere: cf. § 74.

huc—pulchrior: sc. visus est.

perversissimis oculis: 'a villainous squint'.

salsum et venustum: 'piquant and charming'; cf. Att. xvi 12 de Ἡρακλείδιος Varronis negotia salsa; me quidem nihil unquam sic delectavit.

Ch. xxix § 80 ecquos—arbitramur: 'do we actually suppose that there are any of the gods who, if not quite a match for Roscius, have still a slight cast of the eye?'. For the use of the Ind. where we might have expected the Subj. cf. § 83 facimus n., § 91 putamus, Roby §§ 1600, 1611, and Dumesnil on Leg. i 56 quamnam igitur sententiam dicimus? (the Ind. is 'lebhafter als das Fut. oder Conj. d. mit dem Gedanken dass die Entscheidung unzweifelhaft und unverzüglich gefällt werden könne'). [Add Lael. 24, lerr. III 156, and the rare censem Lael. 14. J. S. R.] On the difference between st. and p. cf. Hor. Sat. i 3 44 strabonem appellat pactum pater, Ov. A. A. i 659 si paeta est, Veneri similis (vocatur). Other ref. to the Venus paeta will be found in the lexicons: so used the word implies a side-long, languishing glance, what was called 'pink-eyed' by the older writers. For tum Heins. on Ov. l.c. suggested jam.

silos—capitones: with 'snub noses, flat ears, beetle-brows, big heads'. The anonymous translator, Lond. 1683, is not behind the Latin in his racy vernacular 'shooping-horn-nosed, bangle-eared, jobber-nolled, bittle-browed'. It will be noticed how many Latin names are borrowed from personal defects, cf. Roby § 851 a, b.

quae sunt: '(defects) which are found amongst us men'. Sch. compares ii 21 omnia huc meliora, referring to sapientia &c. involved in the preceding sapientem. For instances of this loose connexion between the relative and antecedent see n. on § 89 quae, Reid on Lael. 14, Madv. § 317. It is more common in Greek than in Latin.

aliam alia pulchriorum: 'there must be degrees of beauty among them'.

una—necesse est. The ground of the Academic scepticism was that every true sensation has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from it. 'One who has mistaken P. for Q. Geminus could have no infallible mode of recognizing Cotta', J.c. ii 83; cf. § 55, where the Academician borrows an argument from the innumerable identical worlds of Democritus, and asks why there may not be as many individuals indistinguishable from each other. Arnobius, who has paraphrased this passage in his 3rd book, has fallen into the same error of supposing that perfection can only be of one kind, and therefore that variety can only arise by way of defect, c. 14.

§ 81. Cic. now reverts to the 1st ground of anthropomorphism mentioned in § 76, and shows that there was no such thing as a general consensus in regard to the appearances or names of the gods.
tamennē: so Flacc. 21, Ac. ii 26 and without ne, Fam. ix 19; see Lewis and Short s.v. II C; for the position Div. in Caece. 21, Att. iv 16.

ea facie novimus: Abl. of Quality, cf. § 49 soliditate quadium cernatur (according to Hirzel's interpretation). In such cases we supply in thought some part of the verb substantive.

at non Aegyptii. So Xenophanes, according to Theodoret III p. 49, τοὺς Ἀθηναίας μέληνας καὶ σιμώδες γράψεις ἔφησε τοὺς οἰκίκους θεούς, ὅπως δὴ καὶ αὐτὸι πεφύκασι τοὺς δὲ γε Θράκας γαλακνοὺς τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν' καὶ μέντοι καὶ Μηδῶν καὶ Πέρσας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἐσκότασα, καὶ Λυγυπτίους ὠσαντῶς. Cf. Tylor Prim. Cult. i p. 278 'the South-African, who believes in a god with a crooked leg, sees him with a crooked leg in dreams and visions' (quoted from Livingstone); 'when the Devil with horns, hoofs and tail had once become a fixed image in the popular mind, of course men saw him in this conventional shape'.

barbaria: 'the uncivilized world', a collective name like our 'Christendom', cf. Fin. II 49 non solum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria.

opiniones de bestiar: 'beliefs in certain brutes', cf. 29 n.

§ 82. fana spoliata: cf. Sall. Cat. v 6 of the evil effects of Sulla's conquests ibi primum insuevit exercitus P. R. delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia miscere, and the 4th Verrine Oration.

fando auditum: 'none have heard tell', cf. Roby § 1239, Pref. LXV.

crocodilum. See more in § 101 and III 47 and compare Tusc. v 78 Aegyptiorum morem quis ignorant? quorum imbutae mentes praecitatis erroribus quanvis carnificinam prius subierint, quam ibim aut aspidem aut fuelam aut canem aut crocodilum violent, quorum etiamsi imprudentes quippiam fecerint, poenam nullam recensit, Herod. ii 65 τὸ δὲ ἅν τίς τῶν θερίων τούτων ἀποκτείη, ἢν μὲν ἐκών, θάνατος ἢ ζῆμι, ἢν δὲ ἄκων, ἀποτίνει ζῆμι τὴν ἄν οἱ ἱρεῖς τάξωνται φόβον ἔν οἱ ἵπποι ζῆμιν ἢ ἱρίκα ἀποκτείη, ἢν τε ἐκών ἢν τε ἄκων, τεθαύναι ἄνγκη. Cambyses is said to have taken advantage of this superstition, and placed dogs, sheep, cats and ibises in the van of his own army, Λυγυπτιοι δὲ βαδλούτες ἐπιαναστο, φόβῳ τοῦ πλήθουτε τι τῶν ιερῶν ζώων, Polyaeus vi c. 9. See also Diod. i 83 and the quotations from the comic poets in Athen. vii 35, esp. that from Timoeces, which is given also in Philodemus p. 86. Different animals were counted sacred in different parts of Egypt as appears from Juvenal Sat. xv; see the very full notes, and reff. on the Egyptian religion generally, contained in Mayor's ed., and for the crocodile, his n. on crocodilum adorat. In Wilkinson's Ancient Egyptians (ch iv. small ed.) there is a list of the sacred animals, mentioning where they were worshipped—with what deity each was associated. The later mythology explained this animal-worship by the transformations which the Gods underwent in their fear of Typhoeus, cf. Ov. Met. v 325 hae quoque (to Egypt) terrigenam venisse Typhoea narrat—et se mentitis superos celassē figuris, Jupiter in the ram, Mercury in the ibis, &e. For the modern views see Tylor P. C. ii 208—224.
ibim aut faelem: see § 101 n.
violatum. Unless C. contravenes usage in making faelem common, we have here an ex. of agreement with the more remote word, as in Leg. 1 1 lucus ille et haec quercus agnositar lectus, where see Dumesnil. For the omission of esse see n. on doctus § 60.

quid censes—nonne deum videri? For the form of sentence cf. § 78 n. For Apis see Dict. of Bieq.

illam vestram Sospitam. The temple of Juno Sospita or Sispita, 'the Saviour', at Lanuvium, was one of peculiar sanctity, being visited annually by the consuls like that of Jupiter Latiaris. Livy often speaks of prodigies occurring there, and C. (Div. 1 99) tells us that the outbreak of the Marsic war was signified by mice gnawing the shields suspended there. It was rebuilt in obedience to a vision B.C. 90 (Div. 1 4). For the special ceremonies belonging to it see Art. on Lanuvium in Dict. of Geog., and Preller Röm. Myth. p. 240. For the attraction quam Sospitam instead of quam Sospita videtur cf. § 86 tam aperte quam te, and Zumpt § 603 b.

cum pelle—repandis. Preller i.e. quotes an inscription relating to a priestess quae in oculo Junonis Sospitae Matris Reginae secutum et clypeum et hastam et calcace rite novavit vota. The Goddess appears in this garb on the coins of the Rosei and other families connected with Lanuvium. See Müller Anc. Art. § 353. The goat-skin, which Preller considers to be a symbol of fertility, and connects with that worn by the Luperci, covered the head and breast; the secutum was oblong as opposed to the round clypeus; an engraving of the shoe with the upturned toe, calcaceus repandus (pandus), is given in Rich's Comp. to Dict. p. 99; I think the diminutive implies a low shoe, not (as Rich) one worn by a female, as we read of calcei muliebres in Varro L. L 19 20 and elsewhere; the hasta marks protection, it was also borne by the Juno Curitis. Moser (ms.) notices the recurrence of the termination-am seven times in ten words.

alia nobis: is added by Ursinus, and seems required if the preceding sentence is right, but Sch. Opusc. III. 287 denies the existence of a Romana Juno distinguished as such by special attributes, and thinks that nec Romana may have been added by some reader who stumbled at the omission of any reference to the Juno Capitoline. On the other hand Klotz Adn. Crit. 16 proposes to insert alia Romanis between Argiris and alia Lanuvinis. It seems to me that ct quidem (on which see § 75 n.) comes in very naturally with a repeated alia nobis, and the fact of the repetition facilitates the omission in the first instance. In speaking of the Juno Argiva C. no doubt had in his mind the famous statue by Polyclitus, the contemporary and fellow-pupil of Phidias. It was made of ivory and gold, and represented the goddess seated on a throne, her head crowned with a garland, on which were worked the Graces and the Hours, the one hand holding the symbolical pomegranate, and the other a sceptre, surmounted by a cuckoo, a bird sacred to Hera, on account of her having been once changed into that form by Zeus (Pausan. II 17 quoted in Dict. of B.). It does not appear that
there was any single type known under the name of *Juno Romana*; C. probably refers to the general difference between the Greek Hera and her Roman counterpart; cf. Müller *A. A.* § 120.

Ch. xxx § 83. **physicum**: see § 77 n. and Wilkins on *Orat.* i 217, where the Gk. form is used.

**venatorem**: cf. the metaphorical use of *θυρείων* in Plato, and especially the ‘view-hollo’ on the discovery of justice, *Rep.* iv 432 c; so Hume ‘there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy’, Huxley’s *Hume* p. 141.

**consuetudine imbutis**: *Bacon’s idola tribus.* See *N. D.* ii 45.

**laudamus Athenis Vulcanum**: ‘yes, and at Athens we admire’ i.e. ‘there is a statue of *V.* at Athens’; cf. Mayor on Juv. v 42 *praeclara illis laudatur iaspis* who quotes *Fin.* iii 63 *illa quae in concha patula pinna dicitur*, and compares (*index s. v.*) the poetical construction with *καλέωθα:* = *eivα,* as in Soph. *Trach.* 639.

**Alcamenes**: a pupil of Phidias and one of the greatest of Greek sculptors. A list of his works is given in Sillig’s *Dictionary of Artists.* Some of these have been lately discovered at Olympia, casts of which may be seen in the Fitzwilliam Museum at Cambridge. The Vulcan is thus described by Val. Max. viii 11 *tenet visentes Athenis Vulcanus Alcamenis manibus fabricatur.* * Praeter cetera enim perfectissimae artis in eo praecurrentia indicia etiam illud miratur, quod stat dissimulatae claudicationis sub veste leviter vestigium repraesentans, ut non exprobans tamquam vitium, ita tamen certam propriamque dei notam decore significans.*

**age et his—facimus**: passing on to the names of the Gods, ‘do we suppose (are we such fools as to suppose? cf. n. on *arbitramur* § 80) that they have also the same names as those by which they are known to us’? The first Abl. is that of Description (Roby § 1232) the second that of Manner (Roby § 1234). On *age* Orelli quotes from Madv. *Op. Ac.* ii 40 ‘de “age” interrogationi praeposito,* cf. ii 120 *Tusc.* iii 49 *Phil.* v 28; see Roby § 1609. On the adverbial use of *et* see § 72 n., and Hand ii 513, 517, Kühner on *Tusc.* iii 28 referred to by Sch. Many exx. are given by Dumesnil on *Leg.* i 33. The argument as to names is added as a sort of corollary to the previous argument on the appearance of the Gods. That was a fair enough criticism on the *prolepsis,* and this, though, at first sight, a mere *reductio ad absurdum,* is to some extent justified by the Epicurean doctrine that names existed *φύει* ou *θέσει.*

§ 84. **quot hominum linguae**: *sc. sunt; ut tu Velleius: sc. eris;* cf. §§ 68, 90, and Dnæg. § 116.

**idem Vulcanus**: ‘you are always Velleius, but Vulcan (i.e. the God of fire) does not bear the same name in Italy as in Africa or Spain’. Four different Vulcans are distinguished in iii 55, one of whom is the Egyptian Phthis, but we have no information as to a Spanish Vulcan, though it is natural to suppose that there may have been a god of mining in a country so rich in metals.
in pontificiis, *se, libris*, cf. the similar ellipse with *annales*. The pontifical records included nine different kinds of books, according to Marquardt *ib. d. Röm. Alt. vi* p. 257: one of these consisted of *indigitamenta*, forms of prayer, of which Augustine says C. D. *iv* 8 *nomina deorum aut deorum, quae illi grandibus voluminibus vis comprehendere potuerunt, singulis rebus propriis dispersit officia numinum*. Sch. quotes Serv. ad *Georg. i* 21 *nomina haec numinum in Indigitamentis inveniuntur, it* est in *libris pontificiis*; *qui et nomina deorum et rationem ipsorum nominum continent* (e.g. Occator, Sarritor, Sterculinii).

innumerabilis: i.e. in the Epicurean view, cf. §§ 49, 50 and 53. So Philod. p. 84 ‘The Epicureans believe that the gods οὐ μόνον ὅσοις φαιν οἱ Πανέλλαπες ἄλλα καὶ παλίνας εἶναι.’

*istud—ita*: Sch. quotes *Div. ii* 21 *quod certe volvis ita dicendum est.* and refers to *Hand. Tars. iii* 485. See also *Madv. Fin. ii* 17 and *quod ita* just below. *Ita* is not merely pleonastic but adds precision; indeed in this place I should prefer to give it a more distinct force ‘that doctrine of yours (una facies § 80) requires such a corollary (sine nominibus), for what is the good of a multitude of names, where there is but one form’? [We sometimes find *eodem modo* used as *ita* is here, e.g. § 77, *Div. i* 29; so *isto modo Tusc. v* 23; cf. Plato *Phileb.* 29 in εἰς εἶναι τούτος ὑπὸ εἰκόνες. J. S. R.]

*quam bellum erat*: ‘how much prettier it would have been’, see n. on *longum est* § 19.

*confiteri nescire*: ‘If the subject in an Acc. with Inf. is a personal or reflexive pronoun referring to the subject of the principal verb, this pronoun is sometimes left out with *verba declarandi et putandi* esp. when one Inf. is dependent upon another having the same subject’ *Madv. § 401, cf. Roby § 1346* Krueger *Unters. iii* 337 foll. who quotes *N. D.* I 109 *pudet me dicere non intellegere*; the same discussion occurs with *confiteror*, *Rosc. Am.* 61.

*nescire, quod nescires*: cf. *Ac. ii* 126 *licet me vos nescire quod nescio?* J. S. R.] *Tusc. i* 60 *nee me pudet, ut istos futeri me nescire quod nesciam.*

*nauseare*: Forcellini and Freund take this to mean ‘to utter’: the former compares *Phil. v* 20 *orationem orre impurissimo evomuit, and Fam. xii* 25 *violentum furorem effundet*. As both passages refer to Antony, (of whom nauseas is also used in its literal sense 2 *Phil. 84*, and *Fam. i.e. quem ego rectantem et nauseantem conjeci in Octaviani plagas*), there is some excuse for violence of language there: here, in a quiet discussion with a friend, such a use of the term (even if possible elsewhere, which I doubt,) seems almost beyond Roman bad taste. May it not mean ‘to feel disgust at having to utter such nonsense’ as Epicurus puts in your mouth? So Heind. takes it, and would even omit the following words as a gloss. *Phaedrus iv* 6 25 has *si qui studio nauseas* of over-critical readers who are disgusted with everything, which Lewis and Short wrongly translate ‘to cause disgust’; (the reading is however doubtful).

*sibi disdicere*: the change to the 3rd person is allowable, as the use of
the 2nd person was merely indefinite ‘to confess one’s ignorance’: cf. for a similar change from the 1st to the 3rd, § 122 utilitatum suarum.

an—sapientia: ‘Or (am I mistaken in supposing you to be dissatisfied with your position?) do you really believe God to be a man like you or me? That is impossible. Then am I to call the sun or moon God? But you Epicureans have yourselves shown that the divine attributes of happiness and wisdom are incompatible with such deities’.

trunco: ‘a senseless block’, contrasted with man’s powers of feeling and motion, as in Laed. 48, where see Seyffert, and Juv. viii. 53 trunco Hercæus with Mayor’s n.

haec vestra: this may refer to such passages as the criticism on Zeno § 36 rebus inanimis et mutis.

§ 85. visu: cf. § 12 n. and Ruhnken on Paterc. ii. 94. On the omission of the verb, see § 63 n.

tali aliquo: if the reading is right, this must refer to the heavenly bodies just mentioned, but I prefer Heind.‘s alio aliquo.

quod—ita: see above on istud—ita.

hoc loco: see § 13 n. and § 76. It is equivalent here to the in hujus modi sermone of § 61.

omnia sigilla: ‘even the least images’, not merely statuettes, but emblems on rings or other ornaments.

Epicurum—deos sustulisse: this is asserted by Posidonius below § 123, cf. Plut. M. p. 1102 n, 1112 D.

reliquisse: tollere is regularly opposed to relinquuere in the Academica, as ἀναμείν to ἀπολείπειν in Sext. Emp., Philodemus and elsewhere. verbis—re: cf. § 16.

itaque: the particle properly refers to the sentence beginning in hae ita exposita, to which this should have been subordinated. For exx. of similar looseness of construction, which makes two separate and independent sentences out of the protasis and apodosis of a compound sentence, and yet leaves the original introductory particle in the protasis, see etenim § 91, nam § 93, and Madv. Fin. i. 18, where censet enim properly refers to itaque attulit in the next sentence.

κυρίας δύοις ‘articles of belief’ see § 45 quod beatum n. In Fin. ii. 20 C. gives, as an explanation of the title, quasi maxime ratus, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae.

Ch. xxxi. inscitia loquendi: cf. §§ 58, 72 nn. Diog. L. x 13, says that he employed words in their strict literal sense (λέξει κυρία), and that his style was blamed by Aristophanes the grammarian as being ἰδιωτάτη, (does this mean too much given to the use of ἤδια ἄνωματα? or ‘a marked individual style’? or should we read ἰδιωτικώτατη, ‘an untrained style’?) σαφῆς 8’ ἤν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς μητροπίτης αἵδιοι μηθέν ἄλλο ἢ σαφῆνειν ἀπαιτεῖν. Rhetoric he called κακότεχνια Amm. M. xxx 4, and said that φῶς ἔστιν ἢ κατορθοῦσα λόγους τέχνη δὲ ὀνειδικα, Val. ad loc. Elsewhere C. allows the merit of perspicuity, Fin. i. 15 oratio me istius philosophi non
offendit; nam et complessitur verbis quod vult, et dicit plane quod intelligam, and Seneca speaks of a nobilis sententia, apertior quam ut interpretanda sit, et discerter quam ut adjurenda Ep. 21. Gallius II 9 defends his style from some attacks of Plutarch. [Theon the rhetor blamed Epic, for an excessive attention to rhythm, see Blass Die Attische Beredsamkeit, p. 52. J. S. R.]

**hominem minime vafro:** cf. Tusc. II 44 venit Epicurus, homo minime malus vel potius vir optimus; tantum monet quantum intellegit. In R. P. III 26 the Epicureans are described with the same contemptuous good-nature as il qui minime sunt in disserendo malii, qui non sunt in disputando vafri, non vetatumores, non malitiosi, and in Tusc. III 50 as viri optimi, nam nullum genus est minus malitiosum.

§ 86. an si quid sit. There is the same ambiguity in the original τὸ μακάριον as in C.'s translation quod beatum est; both assert that ἀπαραμ- σίτης is a necessary accompaniment of blessedness and immortality, without positively asserting the existence of a blessed and immortal being. The apodosis omitted after si quid is of course id nec haberene—negotium. The ms reading id esse immortale is an attempt to supply the apodosis by a reader who misunderstood the sense, see Sch. Opusc. III pp. 318, 366.

**non animadvertunt hic—sed:** 'they do not observe that, though he speaks ambiguously here’ &c., cf. the use of μὲν and δὲ, and see nn. on § 20 cuius principium, § 23 ut ea sapientis.

**Metrodorum:** see § 93 n.

**quam—te:** the correct construction tu locutus es is subordinated to animadvertunt hic, see § 82 n.

**ille vero:** 'no, no! he is a believer’. The argument is ‘Ep. is eager to do away with religion because, he says, it inspires such overwhelming terrors; but experience does not show these terrors at work in ordinary men; Ep. must be judging others from himself’.

**quibus mediocres—perterrítas.** For the feeling as to religious terrors among Epicureans and others see §§ 45, 54, 56, Tusc. 1 10 nam te illa terrent? triceps apud inferos Céberus?...Adione me delirare censes ut ista credam?...Atqui pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa disserentium. Inepte sane; quis est enim tam excors quem ista morcant? Tusc. 1 48 liberatos se dicunt (Epicurei) gravissimus dominis, terrore sempiterno et diurno ac nocturno metu. Quo terrors? quo metu? Quae est unus tam delira que timeat ista quae vos videlicit, si physica non didicissetis, terrytis? foll.; Fin. 1 64 e physicis et fortítudo simulatur contra mortis timorem, et constantia contra metum religiosis, et sedatio animi, omnium rerum occultarum igno-ratione subdita, et moderatio, natura cupiditatum generibusque earum exp lúcatis; Lucr. 1 62, 102, 110 acte sunt quos quos in morte timendum est, 146 foll.; above all the very interesting discussion on the nature and effects of religious fear in Plutarch's treatise, Non posse suaviter vivi secrum Epicureos, pp. 1101—1107, of which the purport is given in the following, βελτιον γὰρ ἐκπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκράσατι τῇ περὶ θεῶν δοξῆς κοινῶν αιδων καὶ φύσων πάθως, ἣ τούτο φεύγοντας μὴ ἐλπίδα μὴτε χάριν ἑαυτῶς μὴτε
ch. under see and see in it cf. the Of 52 see the reasoning arguing where from the sun their like employing experience united, but aXAcoy 6apTos Epicureans have do lustrationem bane the quinque solis that fining no. the former fis tv 

credо: ironical. religionis: it seems better to take this as an objective Gen. like mortis; the sacrilegious do not fear the religionem templi any more than robbers fear death, cf. Fin. r 64 quoted above. Religiones, the reading of most mss defended by Klotz (Adn. Crit. II 11), would be rather awkward after the Sing.

§ 87. cum ipso Epicuro loquar: see § 67 n.

in deorum numero ponere: for const. see § 29 n. Numero is Walker's corr. for natura of mss [written nā in U and therefore easily confounded with no. J. S. R.].

numquam vidi—figura: see § 48 and § 76.

quid? solis—vidisti? C. has made a mess of his argument. Ep. says 'I do not believe in the existence of reason apart from human shape, for I have no experience of it.' The answer is 'You have never seen anything like the sun and stars moving in regular order, therefore you must disbelieve their existence'. Of course the cases are entirely unlike: in the latter case the senses, which (acc. to Ep.) always tell truth, assert the existence of the sun; in the former they assert nothing, and we have to proceed by general reasoning from analogy. What C. was really aiming at may be gathered from the remarkable treatise of Philodemus, peri σμειων και σμειώσεων, where we find it stated (p. 37 Gomp.) that 'the opponents of Epic., in arguing that there may be unique existences in the unseen world, are employing the Epicurean argument from analogy', and (in p. 10) that 'Epicureans allow that ἕλιος εἰς ἑστιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ σελήνη καὶ πλῆθος ἄλλων υπάρχουν ἰδιοτήτων (e.g. the magnet as contrasted with other stones), but they hold that when certain properties have been found constantly united, where one exists the other will exist, μηδένος ἄνθελκοντος'. The anti-Epicurean argument therefore must evidently have been of this nature, 'there may be rational beings without human shape, though our experience presents no parallel, for many things in our experience are unparalleled, and, on this principle, would have been incredible prior to experience'.

quinque errantium: so Milton speaks of 'five other wandering fires', viz. Mars, Venus, Mercury, Jupiter, Saturn, see N. D. II § 52 foll.

sol duabus—conficit: 'the sun completes his annual revolutions, confining his motion within the limits of the ecliptic at either solstice' (lit. 'by the two extreme points of one circle'), cf. II 49, 50, 101 foll.

hanc: 'under similar limitations'; see II 50 in lunae quoque cursu est et brumae quaedam et solstitii similitudo.

lustrationem: cf. the use of lustro in II 53, 106.
a terris: the plural is unusual in this sense, though in Agr. ii 62 we find in terris, meaning 'the whole world'.

ab isdem principiis: 'starting from the same point they finish their course in longer or shorter time'. For the pl. cf. Orat. i 121 exulbescam in principiis dicendi.

umne: found also in Lael. 36, where see Seyffert.

§ 88. ergo: 'on this principle of experience we must disbelieve everything unusual in history or science'.

ita fit: 'it follows from this', cf. §§ 37, 121.

mediterranei: Verr. v 70 homines mediterranei are opposed to homines maritimi just before.

quae sunt tantae animi angustiae: 'what an excess of narrow-mindedness is this'? cf. § 90 quis iste tantus casus? and Virg. Geo. iv 495 quis tantus furor? Heind. following Davies and Walker took quae as the relative and joined these words to the following sentence, but the explanation is more Ciceronian here, and the connexion tantae ut putares would be very harsh, especially coming after the comparison as to the mediterranei.

ut—non crederes: 'in like manner (lit. just as), supposing you had been born in Seriphus and had never seen any animal larger than a fox, you would never have believed in the existence of lions'. Sch. compares ii 86 ut, si qui dentes natura diecit existere, Dir. i 86 ut, si magnetem lapidem esse dicens, and refers to Madv. Fin. iv 30 ut...si vita jucunda addatur, where other exx. are given.

Seriph: one of the Cyclades, used as a place of banishment under the Empire, proverbial for its insignificance and the borné tone of its inhabitants, cf. Mayor on Juv. x 170, Ael. H. A. iii 37, Plato Rep. i 329 (the famous story of Themistocles and the Seriphian, which is also given by C. Senect. § 8).

(§ 97) an quicquam—vidimus. I have followed Bake (Mnemos. ii 4 p. 414) in transposing this passage, which comes in very inappropriately where it is placed in the mss, separating two sentences which clearly belong to each other, and having itself no proper connexion with what precedes; while here, on the contrary, it serves to round off what was previously abrupt, and makes an easier transition to the new topic introduced in et tu quidem Vellei. Connecting it thus I understand an to refer to quae sunt angustiae? 'is it not narrow-mindedness' or (still to press the same point) can we imagine anything more childish than to deny the existence of the animals which inhabit the Red Sea? 'an implying 'the needlessness of the preceding remark', Roby § 2255.

quae gignantur: there is no occasion for reading the Ind. with Sch., or for any elaborate explanation, such as Müller gives Adh. Crit. p. vi: the Subj. is that which naturally belongs to a subordinate relative clause in Orat. Obl. For nulla esse cf. § 61.
rubro mari Indiave: a sort of hendiadys for the ἐφυθραὶ βόλασσα of the Greeks, which comprehended the Indian Ocean together with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The allusion is probably to the whales, of which Pliny says (N. H. ix 2) plurina et maxima in Indico mari animalia, εἰ quibus balaenae quaternum jugerum, pristes duxerum cubitorum; and further on, speaking of Cadara, rubri maris paeninsula ingens, he says that hujus loci quiet ad immobiled magnitudinem beluae adesse est; so Strabo xv 2 12 mentions among the difficulties experienced by Nearchus, in his voyage from the mouth of the Indus to the Euphrates, the shoals of enormous whales (φυσιτήρων); he continues λέγουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ νῦν πλέοντες εἰς Ἠφέσος μεγέθη θριον, 'which are however frightened by shouting and the sound of the trumpet'.

curiosissimi: used in a good sense as of Chrysippus, *Tusc.* i 108, in omni historia curiousus.

tam multa—quam sunt multa quae existiunt: this somewhat verbose expression is intended, I suppose, to give greater prominence to the idea of multitude, cf. *Orat.* 108 nemo orator tam multa scripsit, quam multa sunt nostra. For the substantival use tam multa is more common than tot, which is so used however in *Cael.* 66 tot unum superare possent.

negemus esse, quia numquam vidimus: cf. Locke's story of the King of Siam, who refused to believe the Dutch Ambassador's description of the ice in Holland; and the controversy on the value of experience, as opposed to testimony, between Hume, Campbell and others. In Ep.'s argument against the Stoics, who are here speaking through the mouth of Cotta (see *Introduction*), the point debated is the value of particular experience as opposed to general reasoning. 'The universe', said the Stoics, 'exhibits the working of what we call reason (this is shown at length in Bk. ii), therefore it must be animated by a rational soul': 'no', replies the Epicurean, 'experience shows that a rational soul can only exist in human form'; which the Stoic meets by a reference to the limited nature of our experience, and the vastness of the universe, pointing out the erroneous conclusions which would necessarily flow from the assumption that there can be nothing in the infinite unknown but what is a repetition of the infinitesimal known. In point of fact the Epicureans did not themselves adhere to this principle; their doctrines of atoms, of images, of the gods, of the origin and growth of the world, were anything but matters of ordinary experience (as Lactantius points out *De Ira* 10 quis illa vidit numquam? foll.) nor did they care about their scientific truth, except in so far as it offered an escape from the acknowledgment of a divine government of the universe.

§ 89. et tu quidem: 'yes, and you Vell. have gone further and given us a syllogistic proof of anthropomorphism'; see this in § 48.

non vestro more, sed dialecticorum. Cf. § 70 n. Hirzel p.177 foll. argues that Zeno is here alluded to, and that there was an important section of the Epicurean school, commencing with Apollodorus ὁ κατοικὲων, who set a
higher value on logic and on literary culture generally than Epicurus did; he thinks these are referred to by Diog. L. x 25, when he speaks of those disciples of his who studied "Epikoureyo "sofistias apokalouy." It is certain that C. (Fin. i 30 foll.) contrasts the procedure of Ep. himself, who held that his doctrine of pleasure was self-evident and needed no proof (negat opus esse ratione necpe disputatione, quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit: sentiiri hoc putat ut calere ignem), and that of some of his followers who, having regard to the criticisms of other schools, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputationem putant.

quae agrees with the neuter dialectico, implied in the preceding masculine. The neuter is also found Off. i 19 al.: elsewhere we have the feminine, both in a Gr. form, dialectico, and in the Latin, see Fin. ii 17 dialecticum pugni similis esse dicerat, III 41 &e. Sch. illustrates the construction from Tusc. i 4 in Graecia musici floruerunt discebantque id omnes, cf. also ib. iv 48 gladiatorium id quidem; quamquam in iis ipsis videmus saeppe constantiam, N. D. i 80 equos silos—quae, Brut. 112 ad senatoriam sententiam, cujus (se. senatus) erat illae principis, (aptum videbatur), Fin. i 17 Democritia dicit...ille, v 16 Carneadia divisio est—ille (where see Madv.), and a remarkable instance in Sall. Cat. 18 antea conjuravere pauce: in quibus Catilina fuit; de qua dicas, where see Dietsch. [Perhaps however it is better, as Mr Roby suggests, to refer quae to argumentis, translating 'and you V., deviating from the custom of your school, have logically stated your opinion in arguments of the Dialecticians, totally unknown to your tribe'; though it must be confessed there is some harshness in the position of the relative.]

gens vestra non novit: cf. § 70 nn., Ac. ii 97, Zeller Stoics tr. p. 399. C. goes more into detail Fin. i 22 (Epicurus) tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet, non quo modo efficatuar conclusurque ratio tradit, non qua via captione solvitur, ambigua distinguatur ostendit. According to Seneca Ep. 89 the Epicureans at first made philosophy consist of Ethics and Physics only, but afterwards cum ipsis rebus cogerunt ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latint as coarguere, ipsi quoque locum, quem de judicio et regula appellant (N. D. i § 43) alio nomine rationalem induxerunt; sed cum accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant. We may take Gellius' statement (ii 8) that Ep. inverted the order of the syllogism, as a sign that he had treated the subject with his usual independence and originality of thought; and the treatise of Philodemus περι σημείων καὶ σημειώσεων shows that the Inductive Logic at any rate was deeply studied by some of the later Epicureans. gens vestra 'your people' is used, like natio (cf. ii 74 saltem istum, quo caret vestra natio) and ἐῶς, for a set or class of people: similarly familia, of a philosophic sect, Div. ii 3.

argumentis sententiam conclusi. Most ms have argumenti, but this could only mean 'the general sense of the argument,' which does not
suit the context. What is wanted is a phrase to express strict logical procedure as opposed to a mere statement of belief, and I think this is better expressed by the Abl. than by Sch.'s argumenta (or summam) sententiae, see his Opusc. III 289 and 328. Madv., it is true, denies the possibility of this reading, see his note on Fin. i 30 Latina 'rationem, argumentum conclusere' dicimur, etiam 'aliquid conclusere' ut accusatius pronominis addatur; 'sententiam rem' non magis 'conclusere' dicimur quam 'rem negare' aut 'veratatem rei'. But negative statements of this kind are to be received with very great suspicion even when made about the writer's own language, and the correctness of the expression is, I think, shown, by the citations in Müller Adn. Cr. v, e.g. Ac. i 32 itaque tradebatur omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est, orationis ratione conclusae, which Reid translates 'speech drawn up in syllogistic form'; cf. too Div. i 82 quam (divinationem) esse re vera hac Stoicorum ratione concluditur, where we might surely have had quae sententia rat. concluditur. The phrase occurs in the more general sense of 'rounding off' in Brutus 34 ipsa natura circumscriptione quadum verborum comprehendit concluditique sententiam, Orator 230 aptius explet concluditique sententias, so Quintil. sensum numeris concludere.

Ch. xxxii. beatos esse—hominis figura. This is an example of the composite or chain syllogism (see Hamilton Logic i pp. 366—385), also called the 'sorites', though that term is confined to the synonymous sophism by C., unless we except the doubtful passage in Fin. iv 50. The simple syllogisms of which the sorites is composed are as follows, (1) All that are blessed are virtuous, the gods are blessed, therefore the gods are virtuous; (2) all that are virtuous are rational, the gods are virtuous, therefore rational; (3) all that are rational are in the shape of man, the gods are rational, therefore in human shape.

et libenter quidem: cf. §§ 82, 83 and n. on § 79.
conveniit—necesse est: 'we cannot but agree to that.'

quem—datum. The Epicureans no doubt would answer, not perhaps with the French materialist, that thought was a secretion of the human brain, but that experience told us nothing of the operations of reason except as contained in a human body; and so in fact we find it stated in a Herculanean treatise, quoted on § 48.
opus erat: so bellum erat § 84 n.

sumpsisses tuo jure: Madvig on Fin. ii 35 gives this as an example of the jussive use of the Subj., on which see Roby § 1604 and my n. on dedisse iii 76. Thus taken it would mean, 'if reason were confined to human shape, you should have assumed the doctrine of anthropomorphism on your own authority' (without all this reasoning). Otherwise we might take it as an ordinary apodosis after si ita esset, 'you would have been justified in assuming it'; Sch. suggests that it is equivalent either to debebas or to poteras sumere. The second no doubt gives the most natural sense, 'you might have assumed it on your own authority, without asking
any one’s leave’; but, though the Inf. with poteram sometimes stands where we might have expected the Pluh. Subj., is there any instance of the converse? On tuo jure see § 77 arripere vestro jure n.

quid est istuc gradatim: ‘what do you mean by this phrase of yours?’ In the ms these words stand before sumpisses, and Walker followed by Davies and Ernesti omitted them as an expression of bewilderment on the part of some ignorant fraterculus, but gradatim is not a particularly puzzling word; and the clause comes in quite naturally with Facciotti’s transposition. The emendation qui (Sch. Opusc. III p. 325) is unnecessary; it only expresses in a literal proosic way what is implied by quid; cf. N. D. III 21 cum mundo neugas quiqnam esse melius, quid dieis melius? (Allen).

praecipitere istuc quidem: ‘that is not a step, but a plunge’, ‘herabstürzen nicht herabsteigen’, Kühner; cf. Ac. II 63 sustineunda est omnis assensio, ne praecipitet si temere processerit. On the fallacy known as the saltus or hiatus in demonstrando see Hamilton Logic II p. 51. For the form of expression cf. Tusc. II 30 optare hoc quidem est, non docere (Heind.). The Nom. and Acc. N. both in S. and Pl. of the archaic istic are found in C., cf. Ac. I 13 istuc quidem considerabo, Div. II 35 istuc quidem dicunt, Att. XIV 1 non posse istuc sic abire.

§ 90. deos hominum similes—quam homines deorum. Cf. the language in which C. speaks of the anthropomorphific gods of the poets, fingebat haec Homerus et humana ad deos transferbat; divina mallem ad nos. Quae autem dicina? vigere, sapere, invenire, meminisse, Tusc. I 65.

esse illud huic: Orat. Obl. in loose dependence on dices implied in quaeris.

video: ‘I see your point’, almost equivalent to ‘granted’.

formae figuram: ‘the outline of their shape’, see § 47 n. If this is a genuine phrase, and not a gloss for formam, its precision was probably intended to prevent the misapprehension of formam in the sense of ‘beauty’. Sch. quotes Lucr. IV 67 formae securre figuram, and Off. I 126 formam nostram reliquamque figuram in qua esset species honesta, where see Holden.

nati numquam sunt. Immortality was the most universally accepted of the divine attributes, but this was not understood to mean eternity. On the contrary, detailed accounts of the birth of the reigning gods of Olympus were to be found in the poets, and even the primeval gods were supposed to have sprung from Earth and Chaos. Yet we find traces of the higher doctrine, as in the oracle of Dodona reported by Pausan. X 12 5 Zeus ἃπ, Zeus ἡστεν, Zeus ἡστεστα, ὁ μεγάλε ζεό; and Plat. Stoic. Rep. 38 p. 1051 treats this as the universally accepted opinion, ὕπαρτον κὰ γεννητον θεῖας, ὃς ἐπος εἶπεν, διαμοιεῖται θεόν (Nüg. N. Hom. Theol. pp. 9, 71).

siquidem aeterni sunt futuri: ‘that is, if they are to be eternal’ (as you Epicureans hold, cf. §§ 45, 49, 107, 109). The Fut. Part. is used because the question whether the gods are in future to be called aeterni
would be decided by the fact of their having been born in the past, cf. § 103 n.

ante igitur—immortales. Bake's reading exaeque, adopted by Baiter, seems to me to give the thought rather awkwardly, as though the human form were something self-existent, and happened to be also an attribute of the gods. If an alteration is needed, I should prefer to insert a second di immortales before humana forma, translating 'so the gods existed in human form before men existed in that form which belonged to the gods'. With the present reading, humana forma must be Nom.; ea is also so taken by Moser and Seibt, and, if one may judge from the punctuation, by Schömann, but this seems to me extremely harsh; the only possible construction is quam homines ea (forma erant) qua erant forma di.

nostra divina: on the difference between this and the Christian doctrine, that man is made in the image of God, see below § 96 virtus quam figura, n.

hoc quidem: sc. esto, cf. §§ 68, 84.

ut voletis: cf. Phil. ii 118 with Mayeur's n.

illud: 'that other point', used, like εκείνο, of that which follows, Madv. § 485 b.

sed tamen: 'however, not to dwell on this'. On this resumptive use of the particle after digression see Madv. § 480, and cf. De Orat. ii 365 and Heind. on Hor. Sat. i 1 27.

quis iste tantus casus: 'what is the nature of this chance which you tell us can produce such results?' cf. § 88 quae tantae angustiae, n.

§ 91. seminane deorum decidisse: cf. Ov. Met. i 78 natus homo est, sive hunc divino semine fecit | ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo, | sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto | aether, cognati retinebant semina caeli, | quam satis Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis | finxit in effigiem modernum cuncta deorum; Leg. i 24 extitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sporsum in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere, cunque alia quibus cohaerent homines e mortali genere sumpserint, animam esse ingeneratum adeo, ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum caelestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest. It is in a different sense that the Epicurean poet says denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi, Lucr. ii 991. The enclitic interrogative, when it is not attached to the principal verb, is often expressive of surprise, and suggests a negative answer (Madv. § 451 a), as here seminane, and omnesne below.

putamus: cf. § 80 arbitramur, § 82 facimus n.

deorum cognationem agnoscere: cf. § 1 ad agnationem animi, n.

et nunc: 'and after such absurdities as this'. Other examples of this exclamatory, or pathetic, use of et (= eèra) are found § 93 et soletis queri, § 100 et viuperabas, Div. ii 121 totas noctes somniamus, et miramur aliquid quando id quod somniavimus evadere? (where Allen cites Liv. ii 38 et hoc urbem ducitis, iii 19 et vos privis signa &c.) Div. ii 69 et negant historici, where Allen cites other passages; Tull. 42 et miramini (with Beier's n.),
BOOK I. CH. XXXII  § 91.

Tusc. i 92 et dubitas, III 35 et tu oblivisci jubes, Phil. i 19 et vos acta Caesaris defenditis, see Draeg. § 311 11.

tam facile vera invenire: see §§ 57, 60 with nn. on quid non sit and Simonides.

Ch. XXXIII. etenim commences the refutation, showing how easy it is falsa convincere. Like itaque in § 85, its force spreads over to the sentences which follow.

memoriter: ‘exactly’ = μυμονοκός in Plato Polit. 257 n, see Rost and Palm’s Lex. Madv. in his n. on Fin. i 34 shows that this is the only proper use of the word.

admiri liberet: Heind. takes offence at the phrase as implying that wonder was a matter of choice, and Cobet (Var. Lect. p. 461) proposes, with Moser, to read subiret = ἀστρί ἐμνογε θανατέων ἐπιλθεν; but perhaps we may translate ‘I was fain to express my wonder’ (referring to § 58 dilucide, copiose &c.), see n. on admirabur § 24.

§ 92. omnesne—delirare visi: ‘do you mean to say that you thought them all out of their senses?’ Almost the same thing is said in § 94. See above on the use of ne and cf. istišne § 93. On delirare see § 42 n. and Ac. fr. 34: Orelli, roga nunc Stoicum quis sit melior, Epicurusne, qui delirare illum clamat, an Academicus.

qui—decreverint: ‘for deciding’; even without this causal force, qui, being indefinite, would naturally be followed by a Subj.

ne hoc quidem vos movet considerantes: ‘when you reflect on the special conveniences and adaptations of the limbs in man, are you still unconvinced (lit. does not even this incline you to judge) that the gods have no need of human limbs?’ Hoc is explained by considerantes, the participle here taking the place of an infinitive or noun in apposition. The same thought (deos non egere membris) appears in the Timaeus c. 6, where the formation of the world by the Demiurgus is described, nec enim octis egubal, quia nihil extra, quod corni posset, relicium erat, nec auribus, quia ne quod audiretur quidem...ne manus aejixit, quoniam nec capiendum quicquam erat, nec repellendum, nec pedes aut alia membra, quibus ingressum corporis sustineret.

ingressu: ‘the act of walking’, so in § 94; incessus is used Off. i 123.

discriptione: see § 26 n.

nihil supervacaneum occurs also in § 99, 11 121; the form supervacaneus is more common in later Latin.

itaque nulla ars—potest: ‘and so (since there is nothing without a reason in nature) no art can approach the cunning of her handywork’. The sentence comes in awkwardly, and Heind. proposed to read ut—possit for itaque potest: Stamm (De N. D. interpolationibus, Vratislav, 1873) thinks it is an interpolation from II 81 (naturam) cuius sollertiam nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex consequi posset unitando; cf. 142 quis vero opifex praeter naturam, qua nihil potest esse callidius, tantam sollertiam persopoi potuiisset in sensibus. So Aristotle contrasts nature with art, Part. Anim.
§ 93. *istisme—dixerunt*: 'Was it in such dreams as these that they put their faith when they spoke against Pythagoras &c.?' For *somnia* cf. §§ 39, 42.

Metrodorus: the most distinguished of the disciples of Epic. d. b.c. 277. His fragments have been collected by Duening (Teub. 1870), cf. § 113.

Hermarchus: of Mytilene, the successor of Ep., cf. Madv. *Fin.* ii 96. Dio. l. mentions writings of his peri 'Εµπεδοκλέους, πρὸς Πλάτωνα and πρὸς 'Αριστοτέλευν. 'Porphyry (*Abstin.* i 26) speaks of a treatise in which he controverted the vegetarianism of the Pythagoreans.' Sch.

Leontium. 'Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross impropriety because they admitted not only women, but women of loose morality into the philosophic circle', Zeller *Stoics* tr. p. 384. To judge this matter fairly we must remember (1) the strict seclusion imposed upon Athenian matrons, (2) the esteem in which such a man as Socrates held the Hetaerae Aspasia and Diotima, (3) the slanderous pens of controversialists and anecdote-mongers, which left no philosophic reputation unassailed, and

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1 His words are έι φοινάν ἑστι (ὁ θεός), φωνὴ χρῆται καὶ ἔχει φωνητικὰ ὄργανα, καθάπερ πνεύμα καὶ τραχείαν ἀρτηρίαν γλῶσσαν τε καὶ στόμα. τούτω δὲ ἀτοπών καὶ ἕγγυς τῆς Ἐπικούρου μυθολογίας. ταῦτα ῥητών μὴ ύπάρχουν τῶν θεόν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ έι φωνὴ χρῆται, ὡμελεῖ: έι δὲ ὡμελεῖ, πάντως κατὰ τινὰ διάλεκτον ὡμελεῖ. έι δὲ τούτῳ, τι μᾶλλον τῇ Ἐλληνίδι ή τῇ βαρβάρῳ χρῆται γλῶσση; καὶ εἰ τῇ Ἐλληνίδι, τι μᾶλλον τῇ Ἱπποδίᾳ ή τῇ Λιονίδι ή τινὶ τῶν ἄλλων; It is strange that Hirzel can have read the argument of Carneades, as given in the 9th book of Sext. Emp., and yet have believed that Cicero’s critique on the Epicurean theology was borrowed from him. Carn. is impartially destructive; his opponent is welcome to choose any view, and he will show that on that view, whatever it may be, the existence of a deity is impossible: Cic. on the contrary is fundamentally Stoic with a slight Academic varnish.
which, if we may believe Diog. x 3, were especially venomous in the case of Epicurus. Among the female members of the school were Themista, wife of the Epicurean Leontius, to whom C. jestingly alludes as a sort of female Solon in his speech against Piso, 

*Ant. Adv. Themistæ sapiens tæber sis, and Leontium, the mistress of Epicurus, here mentioned. Her attack on Theophrastus is noticed by Plin. *N. H.* *praef.* 23, who also mentions two portraits of her by distinguished artists (*XXXV* 36 36 and 40 19).

*sic* illa—*sed* tamen: ‘in neat Attic style it is true, but still’ (*meretricia contra Thoephrastum, what a piece of impertinence!*). Cf. the ellipse with ἐμφοι ὃς τῇ Plato *Parm. 137 λ, διὰ* ἐμφοί Arist. *Ach. 956.*

*tantum—licentiae:* ‘such was the freedom of speech in which the Garden indulged’: *tantum* often sums up, or gives the moral, like *adeo* in Juvenal.

et soletis queri: ‘and then (after abusing others so freely) you complain (if you are attacked yourselves),’ cf. § 91 n. *et nullae.*

*litigabat:* Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of C. (who alludes to his writings *Att.* *iv* 11, *vii* 11) stated in his treatise *Περὶ Ὀμονίμου* that Zeno was successful in prosecuting Theotimus, who had attacked Epic., *Θεότιμος δὲ ὃ γράφως τὰ καὶ Ἕπικοφών βισ.Αἰα ὑπὸ Ζήμωνος ἐξαιτήθεις* (*cf. Eur. *Or.* 1657) ἀνωρίθης, Athen. *xiii* p. 611. It is supposed that ‘Diotimus’ should be read for ‘Theotimus’, as we are told that a Stoic of the former name fathered spurious letters on Ep. with the view of discrediting his moral character, Diog. *L.* *x* 3. For Zeno see *§ 59* n.

*Albucius: praetor in Sardinia b.c. 105, condemned on a charge *repetundarum* in b.c. 103, after which he retired to Athens, where he had been educated, and devoted himself to philosophy. His name often occurs in C.’s writings, e.g. *Proc. Cons.* 15 where he is called *Graccus homo ac leviss; Tuse. v* 108 T. *Abb. nonne animo aequissimo Athenis exul philosophabatur?* His Greek tastes were satirized by Lucilius, who makes Scaevola address him as follows *Graccum te, Albucii, quam Romanum atque Subinum | ...maluisti dici; Graccus ergo praetor Athenis, | il quod maluisti, te, quom ad me adduisti, saluto: | χαῖρε, inguam, Tite; victores, turma omnis colouraque: | χαῖρε, Tite! hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus* (*quoted in *Fin.* *i* 9*); also his affected style *Orator* 149.*

*nam Phaedro—sed stomachabatur:* ‘then as to Phaedrus, though nothing could be more refined or courteous, still he used to lose his temper’. Cf. *Ac. ii* 11 *Antinachus, homo natura lenissimus, stomachchari tamen coepit.* On *nam,* as a particle of transition, see *§ 27* n.; on the attachment to the first clause, of a particle which properly belongs to the second, *§ 85* *utque* n.; on coordination of contrasted clauses *§ 20* n.

*Phaedrus:* president of the Epicurean school, d. b.c. 70; C. says of him *Fin.* *xiii* 1 *nobis exum prieri essesum, antequam Philonic cognovimus, valde ut philosophus, postea tamen ut vir bonus ut suavis et officiosus probabatur.*
This was at Rome about B.C. 88, but in 79 C. in company with Atticus attended lectures at Athens by Zeno and Phaedrus, *Fin.* i 16 *cum Attico nostro frequenter audievi*, *cum miraretur ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret*, cf. *Fin.* v 3, *Leg.* i 50, and see *Introduction*.

**cum—Aristotelem vexarit**: 'and yet Epic. attacked Λ.'; cf. Roby §§ 1730, 1732. We find vezo similarly used in §§ 78 and *Tusc.* v 25 *vexatur Thoephrastus et libris et scholis omnium philosophorum*. *Diog.* L. gives specimens of the abusive language which, he says, was falsely imputed to Ep. (μεμήσαι δὲ οὔτοι x 9); Plato and his friends he styled Διονυσιακόλακας, *Aristotle ἀσωτον*, *Democritus Ἰηρόκριτον*, &c. x 8; cf. *Plut.* M. 1086 (speaking of Ep. and *Metr.*) τὰ ἐν ἀνθρώπως αἰσχρά ῥήματα, βωμολοξίας, ληκυθμοῖς, ἀλαζονείας,...σωφαγώστες, *'Aristotelēsou kai Σωκράτους kai Πυθαγόρου kai Πρωταγόρου kai Θεοφράστου kai Ἰρακλείδου kai Ἰππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐκ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπίθεων κατεκέδασαν*; similarly *Plut.* (M. 1108) describes the treatise of Colotes, entitled περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἔστιν, as *a pīnaka τερὴν*, consisting of parts of sentences wrested from their natural signification and spiced with rudeness and buffoonery. Even C., though far from mealy-mouthed, makes a protest against the abusiveness of Greek controversy, *Fin.* ii 80 *sit ista in Graecorum levitate perseveras, qui maledictis inexactum ut quibus de veritate dixerant*.

**Phaedoni—male dixerit**: Ph. was a well-born native of Elis, taken prisoner and sold as a slave in Athens B.C. 401, where he attracted the notice of Socrates and was ransomed by one of his disciples. He was present whilst Soc. uttered the famous discourse on immortality which is known to us as the Phaedo. Some time after his master's death he returned to Elis, and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which appears to have been closely allied with those of Eretria and Megaris. We read of a treatise of Epicurus which bore the name of διαπορίαι πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαρικοὺς, and it is possible that Phaedo may have been criticized in this. The epiteth turpissime refers, we may suppose, to the degradation he underwent as a slave, as *Diog.* (Π 105) tells us of another opponent who taunted him with this misfortune, cf. *Zeller*, *Socrates* p. 279 tr.

**Timocratem**: a disciple of Ep. described as fickle (*Diog.* x 6) and hot-tempered (*Philoed. De Ira Comp.* p. 48), who left him in consequence of a difference of opinion as to the grounds of happiness, cf. § 113. *Duening* (*Metrodorus p. 23*) thinks that the quotations there given are from a treatise by his brother Metrodorus περὶ τοῦ μείζων εἶναι τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς εὔδαιμονίαν τῆς ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων, and that *Metr.* is not there contrasting bodily and mental pleasure, but pleasure which originates αὑτὸ ἐντρά with that which originates αὑτὸ extra, but see *Hirzel* p. 165 foll. Other grounds of quarrel are mentioned by *Duening* p. 24. After this breach Timoc. seems to have used every effort to injure his former associates, charging them with debauchery of every kind in his *Euphranta*, as well as inveighing against them in public, cf. *Aleiph*. *Ep.* ii 210 τι ποιεῖ, Ἐπίκουρε; οὐκ οίνοσα ὅτι διακωμῳδεῖ σε Τιμικράτης ἐπὶ τούτως ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐν τοῖς
θεάτροις, παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις σοφισταῖς; To these attacks Ep. and Metr. published replies (Diog. L. x 24, 27, 136 and Plut. Col. p. 1126). The Timocrates mentioned by Ep. in his will is probably a distinct person, Zeller Stoics, tr. p. 387, Duen. p. 25.

concederit: exactly answering to our 'cut him up'.

in Democritum—ingratum: see above on Aristotelon, and §§ 29, 69, 73, Plut. M. 1101 f, also Fin. i 21 Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ub hoc qui sunt nonum secatus esset, nollem vituperatum. Both Metr. and Ep. wrote against Democ. but this was probably to make it evident where their system differed from his, as opponents charged them with being mere plagiarists (Duen. p. 36). Plutarch, in reporting the charges brought against Democ. by Colotes, mentions that Epicurus long called himself a follower of Democ., and that Leontaeus, one of his most distinguished disciples, τηρῆθαι φησὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου, while Metr. ἀντικρινεί εἰρηκεν ὥς ἐς μὴ προκαθηγήσατο Δημ. οὐκ ἀν προῆλθεν Ἐπίκουροι εἰς τὴν σοφίαν.

Nausiphanem—male acceperit: cf. § 73 n. and Epicurus' own words recorded by Sext. Emp. Math. i p. 216 τίνης ἀνδρωτος ἢν καὶ ἐπιτη- δεικτέω τοιαῦτα ἔξ ὧν οὖ δυνατὸν εἰς σοφίαν ἀλείων. I agree with Kühler in rejecting Pearce's addition of non before nihil. Epic. spoke of the Pyrrhonist Naus. just as Vell. speaks of the Academic Philo in § 17, where see n. Nothing could be more inane than non nihil, which adds nothing to magistrum, and in fact rather suggests an excuse for the slighting terms in which Ep. speaks of his master. According to the true reading, C. ironically repeats the words of Ep.

tam male acceperit: 'treated so badly', a colloquial expression frequent in the comic poets.

Ch. xxxiv. Apollodorum. It is doubtful who is meant, but it is more likely to be Apollodorus the Stoic mentioned in Diog. L. viii 39, than Zeno's own teacher, ὁ Κηπσούρανος, on whom see § 89 n.

Silum. The reading is very doubtful. In Diog. l.c. the name Ap. is followed by ὁ Ὀφιλλος, corrected by the cdd. into καὶ Σύλλος from this passage. Heind. on the contrary supposes some corruption of a nomen gentile here, but ceteros comes in more naturally after the mention of two distinct persons, as it is often used to close a list, cf. § 92. Krische's suggestion 'Syronem', the name of an Epicurean contemporary of C. and Virgil, is far from plausible.

securram Atticum. Cf. Brut. 292, where Ep. is said to have found fault with the irony of Socrates. Zeno, in addressing his Roman pupils, seems to have used the more expressive Latin for the Gk. γελοιοτοποί, cf. Kr. pp. 25, 26. Colotes, who was reputed to surpass all other disciples of Epicurus in his powers of abuse, κομιδὴ διαγελᾶ καὶ φλαυρίζει τῶν Σωκράτων in the treatise (ὁμοῦ πρὸς ἀπαντάς as Plutarch styles it) in which he endeavoured to show that οὐδὲ ζῆν έστιν on any other system than the Epicurean, cf. Plut. Col. p. 1118.
Chrysippam. The nickname was probably pointed at the verbosity and prolixity of his innumerable treatises, see Galen Plac. Hipp. iii p. 330, 'Chrys. himself confessed that some of his writings might seem to be the compositions γραμματιστοὺ τινος ἡ γραώς ἀδολεσχοῦσι', Zeller Stoics tr. p. 47, and cf. the phrase γραμματικὴ γραβολογία Sext. Emp. Math. i 141; so Zeno is styled λαχνεύραυς by Timon ap. Diog. L. vii 15.

§ 94. tamquam senatum—recitares: 'like the censor when he reads out the list of the senate, cf. Liv. xxiii 23, xxix 37, Pro Domo 84'. Sch. [Recitatio, the roll-call, is to be distinguished from lectio, the act of selection, which was the proper duty of the censor, cf. Liv. ix. 30. J. S. R.] Here C. returns from his digression to the point touched on in § 91.

ista—commenticia: reverting to § 93 istis somniis.

lucubratione anicularum: 'hardly fit to amuse old women at their evening work'. Wytt. quotes Liv. i 57 (Lucretium) inter lucubrantes anicillas sedentem inventit; cf. § 55 n.

suscienda: 'must be admitted', so in § 98 and Fut. 18.

omnis cultus—oratio repeats what had been said in § 92. We have a similar list in Ofr. i 128 status, incessus, sessio, accubito...manuum motus. These objections are noticed in the Herculanean De Sensionibus (II. V. vi pt. 2, col. xii) φασίν γὰρ ὃς εἰ διὰ τὸ λογισμὸν ἐξευτ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ἑστιν, καὶ τὴς ζωτικοῦ κοινῆς οὖν συνάπτωμεν αὐτῷ καὶ πολλὰς ἄλλας κοινόπληθες μορφῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ χρείας καὶ δαπάνας, and col. xiv 'if God has the eyes of a man he will be liable to the diseases of the eye'. The same objections are urged by Arnobius, bk iii, esp. c. 12 foll.

§ 95. retinendum hoc esse—ut. See § 75 pugnare ut sit, and Leg. ii 11 assentior ut sit with Dumesnil's n.

beatitas—beatitudo: cited by Quintil. viii 3, and i 5. Sch. gives exx. of similar double forms which continued in use, necessitas, necessitudo, claritas, claritudo, and others in Gell. xiii 3. Of the two forms offered by C. the latter won the day, beatitas being only found in Macrobi. Somn. Scip. i 8, and Apul. Dog. Plat. ii 10, but both writers take care to use the preferable form within a few lines of the other; see Nagels. Stil. § 33 n. In § 100 we have beatum used to express the same idea. [Beata vita is C.'s usual equivalent for evδαμονία. J. S. R.]

omnino—sed: see § 12 n.


verum: resumptive after parenthesis, Madv. § 480.

quaecumque est: 'however you like to call it'.

in solem—cadere: 'why is it incongruous with yonder sun?' Cf. § 19 n. The Stoic origin of Cotta's speech betrays itself here, as in § 87.

§ 96. sescenta. It is supposed that this numeral came to be used for a round number generally, in consequence of the cohort having originally consisted of 600 men.

quaes sola divina natura est: 'for this blessed and eternal nature alone possesses the attributes of deity'. Cf. § 49 quae sit beata natura. Sch. in loc. (and opusc. p. 319) strangely takes quae as a neuter plural predicate, and sola divina natura as feminine singular subject. Can there be a doubt that quae is Nom. Sing., referring to the preceding beata et aeterna natura, and forming the subject to the divina natura following, which is also Nom.?


ut animi, item corporis. So Xenophanes (R. and P. § 133) eis theos en te theosi kai anathopoias megistas, | ou tı demas thetopoulos omoios oúde nóyma.

accedebat. The Imperf. refers back to the time marked by ratio docuit above, cf. Draeg. § 136, similarly videbas § 98, habebam § 100.

virtus quam figura. So Leg. i 25 virtus eodem in homine ac deo est,... est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summam perfecta natura. Est igitur homini cum deo similitudo. This was a Stoic doctrine contested by the Academics and Peripatetics, see III 38 n. So Origen against Celsus vi 63 'if man resembles God, it cannot be in the inferior part of his compound nature (i.e. the body) nor in both parts, for then God too would be compound, but in the inner man pevφκιτι γένεσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, according to the words μιμηταί τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεσθε'.

Ch. xxxv. § 97. ipsa vero—similitudo: 'how little to the point is even the argument from likeness of which you make so much'; ipsa contrasts the general theory with the special instance in dispute, viz. the resemblance between man and God. I understand here a reference to the Epicurean logic of induction, cf. nn. on 70, 87, 89.

simia quam similis: cf. Plin. N. H. xi 100, Arist. Hist. An. ii 8, and Top. iii 2 where A. discusses the Topos of Comparison (one ground of preference between two things compared is the degree of resemblance to a third object surpassing both of them); to which it is objected that the resemblance may be of the nature of caricature, as the ape is nearer to man than the horse, but is not therefore more beautiful), also Heracl. fr. xcviii, xcix Byw. πηθηκων ο κάλλιστος αιχρος άλλο γένει συμβάλλων... άνθρώπων ο σοφότατος προς θεων πηθηκος φανείται και σοφία και κάλλει και τῶν άλλων πάσιν. [And Pindar Pyth. p. 131 καλὸς τοι πιθον παρὰ παισίν, αλεὶ καλὸς. J. S. R.]

vastior: 'ungainly', 'clumsy', cf. De Orat. i 115 (of awkward speakers) sunt quidam ita valte motaque corporis vasti atque agrestes; 117 vastum hominem; Orator 153 ceter 'Àeilla' 'Ala' factus est fuga litterae vastioris (the awkward x).

§ 98. moribus paribus. I think Klotz's suggestion paribus is better than similiimis, which is usually supplied, not only because it would be
more easily lost after moribus, but because it makes a better antithesis to
similimis dispares.

suscipimus: cf. suspicienta § 94.

quo serpat: 'what it leads to', so III 51 illa quae tu a caelo duceras, quam
longe serpant; Nagels. Stil. § 129.

quodsi—obsistis: 'if you are proof against all these inferences (lit.
hold your ground in all these cases), why should you be shaken by the
figure only? i.e. why allow that inference to weigh with you?

his adjunctis—videbas: 'you never saw human reason except in
connexion with these qualities'.

sortiri, quid loquare: 'to toss-up what you should say'; cf. Fat. 46
num (atomi) sortiantur inter se quae decline, quae non? and Xen. Cyrop.
16 46 ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἴδε τὸ ἄριστον αἱρεῖται ἣ ei κληρο-
μενος, ὃ ἐναψχει, τοῦτο τις πράττει.

§ 99. nisi forte—obstare: 'unless indeed you have never noticed
that whatever is superfluous is mischievous'(in that case you may have
considered, though to little purpose). For the ironical nisi forte cf.
§ 117.

uno digito plus: 'a single finger too much', Abl. of Measure. Cf.
πι 92 sol multi partibus major quam terra, Liv. πι 7 uno plus Etruscorum
cecidit, Roby § 1204. We may understand quam satis est, as often, for
the second member of comparison.

quia nec—desiderant: 'because the five leave no need for (lit. do not
miss) another, either in respect of beauty or utility'.

capite—cruribus: repeating § 92.

si, ut immortalis sit: 'if he has these limbs (v. subaud. from redundat
as from quaeres § 90) in order to make him immortal'; cf. for omission of
verb after si, Draec. § 119 i 3 b, and my n. on § 22.

illa: as usual, of what follows (cerebrum &c.), which are afterwards
referred to as kaec.

domicilia vitae: 'the vitals', so dom. mentis § 75, dom. animi Gell.
XVII 15; cf. Arist. Part. An. πι 11 ἡ καρδία καὶ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος κύρια μάλιστα
τῆς ζωῆς.

oris habitus: 'the general set of the face', Fin. πι 56 hab. oris et
vultus.

vitae firmitatem: 'vitality', so we find firm. joined with corporis, 
capitis, valentudinis.

Ch. xxxvi § 100. et eos vituperabas. The reference is to § 53.
For the 'et' indignantis cf. et nune § 91 n.

terras, maria: see § 22 n.

horum insignia: 'their decorations', so Lucr. v 700 calls the sun
radiatum insigne diei.

suspicati essent. The Ppf. is used because the action is conceived
as anterior to that denoted by the governing verb vituperabas.
aberrant a conjectura: ‘miss their aim’. This is the reading of all the mss, but Sch. following Walker omits the preposition, and translates ‘go wrong in their guessing’. In his Opusc. iii 321 and 367 he stoutly maintains (against Wopkens, Heind. and Klotz Adn. Crit. ii 12) that the other reading makes nonsense; and he would therefore correct 12 Phil. 23 nunc, quaeo, attendite num aberret a conjectura suspicio periculi meli, and Att. xiv 22 1ereor ne nihil a conjectura aberrum, where Wesenberg keeps the preposition. I have myself very little faith in these a priori reasonings as to the impossibility of a word acquiring any particular use. It seems to me more improbable that the scribes should in several passages have inserted the preposition, without any inducement that I can see, than that conjectura should come to mean ‘hitting the mark’, as in fact Quintilian says iii 6 30 conjectura dicta est a conject, id est, directione quadam rationis ad veritatem, just as consec- quor has come to mean ‘I attain’, as the corresponding συνίμπμε means ‘I put things together rightly’, as conjector itself means an ‘interpreter’ or ‘seer’. Kl. quotes Plin. Ep. iv 28 ab imitatione aberrare.

quid sequantur: ‘what leads them to their conclusions’, cf. 12 n. Here again we see the Stoic.

quod opus tandem. So we find tandem separated from the Interrogative in Leg. i 9 quod tibi tandem tempus, where see Dumesnil.

et barbati quidem: ‘yes and of a bearded Jupiter’, cf. § 78 n. This is a repetition from § 83.

§ 101. quanto melius. For the ellipse of fuit see Roby § 1441. It is especially common with words like bene, as in § 121 quanto Stoici melius, Ora. iii 221 quo melius nostri senes; also with Acc., as in Hor. Sat. 1 2 90 hoc illi recte.

qui tribuant: ‘in assigning’ = aitines.

qui irridentur Aegyptii: cf. §§ 43, 82, iii 47. Plut. M. 379 d says that the Egyptians have made religion ridiculous by their worship of animals, and that, in consequence of this, men have fallen either into an irrational superstition or into atheism.

belnum: cf. § 77 n.

ob aliquam utilitatem: Herod. (ii 75) asserts this of the ibis; Diog. L. (proem. 11) of animals generally, τὰ εὐχρηστὰ τῶν ζῴων θεοὶς εἴδοξαν; Diodorus i 86 foll. gives various explanations of the worship of animals, e.g. that their images had been originally used as standards in war, but he appears to consider utility the main cause; Plut. l.c. laughs at the story of the transformation of the gods in fear of Typhon, and says the real causes are τὸ χρειάζεται καὶ τὸ συμβολικόν, ὅπως εἷς θατέρων, πολλὰ δ ὁμοίων μετάσχηκε; as an example of symbolism he notes especially the scarabaeus, and argues that the living symbol, though the resemblance may sometimes be fanciful and far-fetched, is no worse than the mystical emblems of the Greek religion or of the Pythagoreans. So Celsus ap. Orig. iii 19 ‘the Christians deride the Egyptians, but their worship embodies a deep meaning (ἀνώγματα), ἐπὶν ἰδεῶν ἀεὶων, καὶ ὦι, ὠς δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί, ζῷων ἐφημερίων τιμᾶς εἶναι
quam—caperent: Subj. after Indefinite Relative.
velut: cf. § 2 n.
ibes: cf. Juv. xv 3 suturam serpentibus ibin with Mayor's n. and the passage from Herod. quoted in my n. on § 82. In the notes to Rawlinson's Herod. (Vol. II p. 125) it is stated that the Turks still consider it a sin to kill an ibis, and that Cuvier found the skin of a snake in the stomach of a mummied ibis. Plut. I. c. mentions another reason for gratitude to the ibis, to which C. also alludes II 126.
vim serpentium: see § 54 n.
cum sint: 'being tall birds', &c., explains how they were able to kill the snakes, Roby § 1728.
cum—interficiunt. The Pres. and Perf. Ind. are used with cum to express 'identity of action' (Roby § 1729). In killing the snakes they are averting the plague.
volutres angues: Herodotus (I. c. and III 107 foll.) tells wonderful stories about the winged snakes, which guard the frankincense of Arabia and invade Egypt every spring, but are met and killed by the ibises. Sir G. Wilkinson (in Rawlinson, p. 124) discusses what amount of truth there may be in his account.
ex vastitate—inventas: 'brought from the Libyan desert by the south-west wind' (or more strictly W.S.W. blowing from Carthage to Sicily). This is in disagreement with Herod. and others, who represent them as coming from the east; Aelian II. A. II 38 makes the black ibis guard the eastern, and the white ibis the southern frontier. On the use of the abstract vastitas for concrete, see Draeg. § 8.
possum: see n. on longum est § 19.
ichneumonum: the 'mangouste' or 'herpestes', see Art. in Eng. Cyc. under the latter heading; and Rawlinson's Herod. II 67 n. Its utilitas was to destroy the eggs of the crocodile, which led to frequent quarrels between the people of Heracleopolis, the principal seat of the ichneumon-worship, and Crocodilopolis where the utilitas of the crocodile was similarly honoured. Extraordinary tales are told about it, as that it covers itself with a cuirass of mud before attacking the asp (Arist. II. A. ix 6), and that it enters the mouth of the sleeping crocodile and devours its heart and entrails (Strabo, xvii 39).
crocodilorum: see Herod. II 68 foll. with Rawlinson's nn. Diodorus tells us that the reply made to the question why creatures so injurious to men were worshipped, was that they formed a rampart to the country, and prevented invaders from crossing the Nile; another answer was that a crocodile had rendered a service to one of their ancient kings; Plut. on the other hand explains their worship as symbolical; the crocodile is μυμμα θεοί as being ἀγλαωσσως and therefore silent, and as watching his prey,
himself unseen in the water, διότε βλέπειν μη βλεπόμενον, ὁ τῷ πρῶτῳ θεῷ οὐμβίβασκεν, Isid. c. 75, p. 381.

fælius: see Herod. ii 66, 67 with the notes in Rawlinson's ed. and the exhaustive note in Mayor's Juvenal, xv 7. The word appears to be used for a kind of weasel in Varro and Columella, but in other writers it stands for the Gr. αἴλουρος, the tame cat of the Egyptians; see the graphic description in Plin. N. H. x c. 94 fauces quidem quo silentio, quam lecibus vestigis obrepunt aribus! quam occulte speculatae in musculos exsilliant! exercentia sua effossa obruant terram. Even the Greek word is ambiguous, for though it is plain from the mummies and pictures that the sacred animal of Egypt was our cat, yet Plut. Isid. p. 381calls it γαλῆ, on the other hand Diod. i 87 describes the αἴλουρος as useful πρὸς τὰς ἀστιθὰς δαίμονια δακτυλίσεως καὶ τάλλα διάκετα τῶν ἐρπητῶν. The statement that it killed snakes is probably due to some confusion in the mind of Diod., but Sir G. Wilkinson (Birch's ed. Vol. ii 106, iii 289) mentions that it is even now held in great favour by the Egyptians because it destroys scorpions and other reptiles. According to the old paintings it was employed as a retriever (ib. ii p 106).

longus: 'tedious', for the personal use cf. Quint. v 7 26 longus testis, and x 1 118.

tamen beluas. Fully expressed the thought is 'ridiculous (irridenter above) as these animal gods are, still there is more to be said for them than for the Epicurean gods'. For a similar elliptical use of tamen='at any rate' Sch. compares Div. ii 80 Etrusi tamen dubant autorem disciplinae. Nos quem? with Giese's n.; Verr. Act. ii 1 2 si reticat et absit, tamen impudentiae suae prudentem exitum quaesisse videatur; see also Munro on Lucr. ii 859, iii 553, iv 952. Σo διός in Greek. For the position of tamen cf. § 81 n.

§ 102. nihil habet negotii: cf. § 45, and on the change from pl. deorum, to sing., § 50 Balbe soleitis, &c.

quasi pueri delicati—existimatur: 'like spoilt children, thinks nothing better than idleness'. It is not cessatio however but otium, which is the proper contrary of negotium, and Ep. did not deny that activity might be essential to human happiness, cf. Plut. Tranq. c. 2, p. 465.

Ch. xxxvii. exercitatione ludica: 'some active game', see Madv. Fin. i 69. [Is it not rather some game which simulates real life?] J. S. R.

decum—possit: in or. rect. this would be decus sic torpet ut, si se commovirit, beatas esse non possit 'such is the nature of the divine inertia that movement would destroy the happiness which is of the essence of deity'. In order that this may be stated as an opinion, not a fact, columnus is added to the 1st clause, and cereremur to the 2nd, but the latter is improperly made the governing verb, so as apparently to give the measure of sic, whereas it ought to have been introduced parenthetically (quem ad modum nos cereremur), cf. Roby § 1746, Madv. § 357 obs. 2, and my n. on dixerit § 20, for examples of similar confusion. For exx. of adversative asyndeton
(down contrasted with puerti) see Zumpt § 781. For the Ind. volumus see § 80 n. on arbitramur.

ne—non: used rather than ut after vereamur, because of the ut preceding. [Or perhaps to bring in the negative emphatically at the end of the sentence. J. S. R.]

C. e. Even if we grant that there are such images as Epicurus describes, what ground have we for assuming that there is any reality corresponding to them? And how is happiness, i.e. pleasure of sense, possible to his gods? Ch. xxxvii § 103—Ch. xli § 114.

§ 103. domicilium—sedes—locus: proceeding from less to more general, 'home, habitat, region'. ['What is his home? where is he living? At any rate where is he? How does he spend his life? What are the sources of the blessedness you attribute to him?' R.]

totum vitae: cf. § 2, n. § 45.

totum vitum est: i. e. beatus, cf. Madv. § 315 b.

[utatur—fratur: perhaps an allusion to the legal usus fructus; he who is to be blessed must not be a mere owner, but have the present use and enjoyment of his goods. R.]

qui beatus futurus est = δοτις μέλλει εὐθαίμων εἶναι, cf. Madv. § 341, Dumesnil on Leg. i 56.

naturis quae sine animis sunt: 'the material elements'. According to Aristotile each of these has its natural place, to which it naturally moves, cf. ii 44 n., iii 34, Tusc. i 43, and Zeller iii 439 foll., Whewell, Hist. Ind. Sci. i 35 foll.

infimum: i. e. the centre, cf. ii 84, 116 (medium infimum in sphaera est), Arist. Cael. iv 4.

inundet: more commonly used of excessive floods.

superior aeri, aetheris: Müller's excellent emendation leaves no doubt as to the origin of the ms reading: the eye of the scribe passed from the ori of superior to the same letters in the following word. On the i.g. aeth. cf. ii 101 foll.

reppatur: 'given as its right', Gr. ἀποδίδωμι.


qua igne nasci potentur. Sch. quotes a passage from Seneca Q. N. vi 6, which illustrates both the sense and construction, ignis, qui omnia consumit, quaedam atiam creat; et quod videri potest non simile veri, tamen verum est, animalia igne generari; so we find caelo natus, Nilo natus, spuma procreata, Nilo orta, iii 55 and 59. Aristotle is the first authority for this statement. He believed in spontaneous generation (Gen. An. iii 9, Hist. An. vi 19) and reports that in Cyprus οὐ ἡ χαλκίτις λίθος καὶ ἄταται, γίγνεται θηρία ἐν τῷ πυρί, τῶν μεγάλων μετὸν μικρῶν τι μείξονα ὑπόπτερα, αὐτὰ διὰ τοῦ

M. C.
πυρὸς πηδαί καὶ βαδίζει; then to prove that some animals can exist in fire he refers to the salamander, αὐτῷ γὰρ, ὡς φασὶ, διὰ πυρὸς βαδίζοντα κατασβέν-νυσι τὸ πηρ. Pliny (N. H. xi 42) calls this fire-born creature *pyreasta* or *pyrralis*: he has many wonderful stories about the salamander (x 86, xi 116, xxix 23) but never speaks of its being produced from fire, while Aelian expressly denies it (N. A. ii 31), ἡ σαλαμάνδρα οὐκ ἐστὶ μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐγγόνων, οὐδὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τίκτηται, ὅσπερ οἱ καλύμνοι πυρίγονι, θαρρέει δὲ αὐτῷ, &c. In ii 42 the stars are said to be the denizens of aether.


*denique—postremo:* so Agr. ii 62 regna denique, postremo etiam vetigalia, Cat. ii 25 denique aeritias, temperantium certant cum iniquitate, postremo copia cum egestatione,...bona denique specem cum desperatione, N. D. iii 23 omni denique doctrina eruditus, postremo philosophus erit mundus.

*uleus est:* 'it will not bear handling', is 'unsound'; *uleus* like *valus* is often used metaphorically, as in *Pro domo* 12 uaguis in ulceo (of a fresh irritant added to previous discontent), Ter. *Phorm.* iv 4 10 ules (al. *valus*) tangere 'to touch a tender spot'.

*ita male—exitum reperire:* 'reasoning which starts from such insecure premises can come to no result', so *Orat.* 116 in omnibus quae rationes ducantur et via, primum constituendum est quid quidque sit; nisi enim inter cos, qui discipitant, conceni, quid sit illud de quo ambiguitur, nec recte disseri, nec unquam ad exitum pervenire potest (see Schütz *Lex.*), also *N. D.* iii 36 videmus exitum, 1 § 107 exitum reperitis, § 53 explicare argumenti exitum. [Add Ac. ii 36 exitum non habebant. J. S. R.]

§ 105. *sic enim dicebas:* cf. § 49 with the notes.

*speciem dei:* in the parallel passage *vim et naturam deorum.*

*neque deficiat umquam ex infinitis corporibus similium accessio:* cf. § 49 cum infinita simillimarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus individuis exstat.

Ch. xxxviii *si—ad cogitationem valent:* 'if they are of force only for the production of mental (as opposed to visual) images' (lit. only for the thinking faculty).

* Eminentiam:* see n. on *eminens* § 75.

*Hippocentauro:* prose writers usually employ the compound form both in Lat. and Gr.; thus we find *ποικίλεταῦροs* used by Plato and Xenophon, *hippy* by Pliny and Quintilian. It is a stock word for a non-ens, see ii 3, Sext. *Emp.* Math. ix 49, 123, Hirz. p. 42.

*conformationem animi:* cf. Topp. 27 (of intangible things there is nevertheless) conformatio aequam insignit et impressa in intelligentia, quam notionem voco, *Hieron.* iii c. 20 *re totius imaginem conformabimus,* 'we will imagine the whole scene'; the word *informatio* is more common in this sense, cf. §§ 43, 76, 101.
motum inanem: the κενοπάθεια of Sext. Emp. Math. viii 184, cf. Ac. II 47 conantur ostendere multa posse videri esse, quae omnino nulla sint cum animi inaniter moveantur, and § 34 with Reid's nn.

§ 106. ut igitur Ti. Gracchum—intellegantur. I am disposed to agree with Klotz (Adn. II 15) as against Madv. ap. Orelli (who is followed by Sch. Baiter and Müller) and should translate the passage as follows: 'In the same way then as, when I imagine myself to see Gracchus in his speech presenting the voting urn about (to decide the case of) Octavius, I at the time assert this to be a mere groundless fancy, while you on the contrary assert that the images of the two men continue to exist, and after arriving in the Capitol are then carried on to me,—so (you assert it to be) in the case of God, whose recurring likeness strikes upon the mind and leads it to recognize the divine blessedness and eternity'. The simple framework of the sentence would be ut Ti. Gracchum cum videor videre...motum animi dico esse inanem, tu autem imagine ad animum meum referre; sic in deo dicimus ego motum inanem fieri, tu orebra faciec pelli animos, but C. after giving both the Academic and Epicurean views in the compared case of Gracchus, omits the former, as obvious, in the case of the gods, and so confuses the construction. Madv. omits igitur, which connects the special application with the general principle, takes ut=velut, as in § 88 ut Seriphil, and changes perererint into perererim, making hoc fieri a sort of corollary depending on dicis understood, instead of the apodosis of the sentence. Sch. (V. Jahrb. 1875, p. 691) points out that there is no occasion for perererim, the scene might be imagined without going to the Capitol, though it is true a visit there might suggest it; on the other hand the vagrant images of G. and O. may be supposed to attach to themselves images of the Capitol by their visit there, cf. Dic. II 137 ista igitur me inagno Marii in campum Atinatem persequabatur? The incident referred to is as follows. In 133 B.C. the passing of the Agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus was stopped by the veto of Octavius his colleague in the tribunate: after a vain attempt to induce him to desist from his opposition, G. proposed his deposition by the tribes. When 17 out of the 35 tribes had voted for the motion, G. once more urged O. to yield, but he answering 'complete what thou hast begun', the voting was continued and O. deposed.

in Capitolio. We read of the Comitia Tributa being held in the Capitol in Liv. xxv 3 cum dies advenisset, conciliumque tam frequens plebis adset ut multitudinem area Capitolii vic caperet, sitella lata est ut sortiren- tur ubi Latinii suffragium ferrent, xxxiii 25 ea rogatio in Capitolio ad plebem lata est, lxxi 16 ex Capitolio ubi erat concilium (plebis) abit, lxxv 36 cum in Capitolio rogationem tribunus plebis ferret, xxxiv 53 ea bina comitia Cn. Domitius praetor urbanus in Capitolio habuit, App. Bell. Civ. i 15 (Gracchus) καταλάβε τοῦ Καπητώλιον τῶν νεῶν, ἐνάχ χειροτονήσεις ἐμελλὼν, Plut. Ti. Gracch. 17 προσε ἐν ὑμῖν ἀκοῦ, τῶν δήμων ἡρῴδιαν περὶ τὸ Καπητώλιον πυνθανόμενος. Cf. Lange Röm. Alterth. p. 442, and Burn's Rome p. 84, 'The Vulcanal must have been close to the Senaculum
on the slope of the Capitol. It seems to have been originally an open space used for public meetings, especially those of the Comitia Tributa. The Comitia Tributa were also held in the Campus Martius (Flum. vii 30), and the Circus Flaminius (Liv. xxvii 21) as well as in the Forum.

sitellam: (dim. of situla ‘a bucket’) an urn filled with water (vodía) in which were placed the wooden lots to determine the order of voting of the tribes. The neck was made so narrow that only one lot could come to the surface, see Dict. of Ant.


quae referantur. We might have expected the Infinitival construction to be continued in the relative clause, as also in cunus pellantur below, but see n. on § 12 ex quo existit; perhaps too quae has more than a connective force here, implying a result ‘so that they are carried to me’.

pellantur—ex quo—intellegantur. More simply pulsi animi beatos intellegant. For the pl. beati after s. deo cf. § 50 Balbe soletis n.

intellegantur: for the personal, instead of the more common impersonal use, cf. Roby § 1353.

§ 107. fac imagines—quaedam: ‘suppose that there are such images impinging on the mind, that is merely the presentation of a certain form’.

num etiam cur: following objectur by a sort of zeugma, cf. § 99 si ut n., Zumpt § 775. The answer to this objection would be, according to § 49, that the idea of eternity was suggested by the never-ending stream of images, and further confirmed by the doctrine of isonomia (§ 109); and the idea of happiness by the delight afforded in their contemplation.


nec vos exitum repetitis: ‘you cannot find your way out’, ‘arrive at any satisfactory conclusion’, see § 104 n.

tota res vacillat et claudicat: ‘it is a lame and halting theory altogether’, ‘has no sure footing’. The lexx. supply many instances of the metaphorical use of these words.

quid est quod—fuerunt: ‘what is more improbable than that the images of all men, Homer &c., should be coming in contact with me, yet not in the shape which they had when alive?’ I have here accepted the emendation quem before omnium, but the reading of the MSS is tenable if we put a mark of interrogation after possess, and take omnium incidere as an exclamatory Inf. This would justify the rather exaggerated omnium, which is placed in sharp contrast with me: there is no excuse for Daiter’s feeble hominum. In denying the resemblance between the image and the object, C. anticipates the result of the reasoning which follows: ‘we see the images of that which is non-existent, and impossible, of scenes and persons unknown to us; and these images differ for different people;
therefore there can be no resemblance'. As the actual Epicurean view is that the image exactly resembles the reality, cf. § 81 foll., Zeller *Epic.* tr. p. 432, Lucr. iv 51, I was at one time disposed to read et quidem *ex* for *ne* *ex* of MSS; to the same effect is Mr Reid's emendation given in the note below. Mr Roby thinks the *ex forma* of MSS may be retained in the sense 'not cast by the form'.

*quod modo illi ergo:* sc. *inciderunt*, 'how then (if there is no resemblance between the images and their originals) did the originals come into my head?'

*et quorum imagines.* Allen considers the passage corrupt, as it has been already stated that the images are those of Homer &c. I think it may be defended as asking for a nearer definition of the *omnium* above, and so preparing for the question which follows: 'when you say *omnium* do you include, not only men now dead such as Plato, but imaginary characters such as Orpheus, or impossibilities such as the Chimaera?' [Perhaps better as Mr Roby takes it: 'Cicero says, if images which you say are Homer's &c. come, but are not like Homer's real form, then two questions arise, 1st how do the originals come to you at all? 2nd whose are the images which do come? They are copied from some real form, whose was that form?']

**Orpheum—fuisse.** Cf. § 33 n., Bernays' *Dialogue d. Arist.* p. 95, Lobeck *Aglaoch.* p. 339. The reference is to the lost *De philosophia*, but it is quite in accordance with the manner in which Arist. elsewhere alludes to the Orphic poems, e.g. *tā kalóvmva* 'Orphikos *τη τη. Αν. 1 5 15* with Tren- delenburg's n.; in commenting on which passage Philoponus says that A. speaks doubtfully as to the authorship of the poems, *δι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λέγει: αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ τὰ δόγματα ταύτα δὲ φησιν 'Ορφομά- κροτον ἐν ἐπιστ. κατατείνα. This differs from C.'s account, in recognizing the existence of Orpheus and attributing certain doctrines to him, but there seems no reason to doubt that C. is here correct.

**hoc Orphicum carmen—Cercopis.** Philop., as we have seen, names Onomacritus, but, if Bernays is right in supposing that the 1st book of the *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* contained a general examination of the Orphic theology, it

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1 [Accepting *quam* I would read *omnino* for *omnium* (a very common corruption). Then the *ex* of MSS is evidently a mere doubling of the *ex* in *nec*. For *nec ex* I would read *nedum*, which is very frequently written *nedum* in MSS. The meaning would be 'what is more improbable than that phantoms of Homer etc. should strike on my senses at all, to say nothing of their retaining just the shape those persons had when alive?' Then for *illi I should read *illae*, referring on to Orpheus Scylla, etc. The *e* would be easily dropped before *ergo*, and the unintelligible *illa* would be altered to *illi* which the scribes referred to Homer etc. wrongly. Thus the argument rises from one stage of difficulty to another, 'putting aside the cases of Homer etc. all of whom we admit to have once existed, what have you to say about persons and places which never existed at all?' It is quite in Cicero's style to break the continuity of the argument by the insertion of *quid quod—tuum.* The *De Finibus* contains many things of this kind. *J. S. K.*]
is probable that different treatises may have been cited in it, some of which were attributed to Onom. as the Χρησμοί and Τελεαι, and some to Cercops as the Ιερός Λόγος and (Ορφείως) κατάθεσις εἰς ἄθων, see Clem. Strom. i 397 and Suidas quoted in Lobec l. c. On the Orphic doctrines generally, and on the connexion between the Orphic school and the Pythagoreans, compare Lobec l. c. Zeller i p. 71 foll. Döllinger Gentile and Jew i bk. 3, p. 125, tr. Herod. ii 81 (on the prohibition of woollen garments) ορμολωγίαν δὲ ταύτα τοῖς Ὄρφηκοιτοι καλεομένοις καὶ Βακχικοῖς, ἵτου δὲ Αιγυπτίωσι καὶ Πυθαγορείου. The mass of what has come down to us under the name of 'Orphica' is probably later than the Christian era, but some fragments may be as old as Onomacritus, see Hermann's ed. Cicero's friend, Nigidius, the Pythagorean, referred to the Orphic theogony in his treatise De dis (Serv. ad Verg. Æcl. iv 10).

hoc Orphicum carmen: cf. haec § 79 n. and Krische p. 20.

§ 108. quid, quod ejusdem—Chimaerae: cf. ii 5, and Div. ii 138 istae imagines ita nobis dicto audientes sunt, ut, simul atque valimus, occurrat? etiamne earum rerum quam nullas sunt? quae est enim forma tam inexistita, tam nulla, quam non sibi ipse fingere animus possit? ut, quae nunquam vidimus, ea tamen inchoata habemus, oppidorum situs, hominum figurae? num igitur cum aut neros Babylonis aut Homeris factum cogito, inaquo illo rerum me aliqua pellit? omnia igitur, quae volumus, nota nobis esse possunt. Lucrètius iv 752 meets these and similar arguments. Centauros itaque et Scyllarum membra videmus | Cercereasque carum facies simulacraeque eorum | quorum morte obita tellus ampletitur ossa: | omne genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur, | partim sponte sua quae sint aere in ipso, | partim quae variis ab rebus eunque recedant, | et quae confund ex horum facta figuris, | as the Centaurs from the mingling of human and equine images.

quas nunquam vidimus: this argument, of which Sch. failed to see the force, is more fully stated at the end of the passage from the De Div. given above.

simul ac mihi collibitum est. So Lucr. iv 779 quaeque in primis quare, quod quidque libido | venerit, extemplo mens cogit et eandem id ipsum, | to which he answers that quaeque cum tempore quaeque | praesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata, | but because they are so fine, the mind can only see those which it strains itself to see, 802; cf. Fum. xv 16.

ad dormientem: Lucr. iv 757.

invocatae: a compound of the negative in and vocatus, occurs also Nep. Cim. 4 quos invocatus vidisset, omnes derocaret, Ter. Erm. v 8 29, Plant. Cüpt. i 1 2 (with a play on the double sense of the word); compare the similar case of immutatus, infectus, indictus, and even indicens: the verb ignoscere forms an exception to the rule that the negative in is only compounded with adjectives, adverbs and participles. [It is probably ἀπαλός ἐπιμαῖος in C. though it occurs in a letter of Caellius, Fam. viii 8. J. S. R.]

nugatoria: 'it is a piece of humbug from beginning to end'; so nugator means 'a humbug', in the sense of playing upon other people.
inculcatis: 'you cram these images into our minds as well as into our eyes', cf. fat. 6 quid attinet inculcare factum, cum sine fato ratio omnium rerum ad naturam fortunamve referatur? Cotta in his jaunty way treats this quite as a new idea, but it has been assumed throughout the discussion; cf. § 105 intenta mens, ad cogitationem, adventum in animos, pellantur animi &c. It is one of the many marks of haste which disfigure the book.

impunitas garriendi: 'so little you care what you say'.

Ch. xxxix § 109. quam licenter: 'what extravagance it is!' cf. § 65.

fluentium—videatur: cf. § 49, Lucr. iv 228 nec mora nec requies interdatur alla fluendi, Epic. ap. Diog. l. x 48 πεῦσι απὸ τῶν σωμάτων τῆς ἐπιστολῆς συνεχῶς συνμβαίνει.

visionum: here = imaginum the thing seen (as in Div. ii 120 animos externa et adventicia visione pulsari), in § 105 the process of seeing.

dicere non intellegere: for the omission of the subject cf. § 84 confiteri nescire.

quo modo aeternae: the omission of sunt makes the change of construction unusually harsh.

suppeditat: 'there is an endless supply of atoms'.

inquit: 'quotha', this reading is better supported than inquis. Bentley, on Hor. Sat. i 4. 79 (cited by Creuzer on N. D. i 100), compares the use of φησι, and says perpetua formula est, ubi aliquid ex adverso nobis objici et opponi fingimus, sive id ab uno seu pluribus, sive ab absente seu praeente fiat, adding many exx.

num—sempiterna: 'do you mean to say then that everything will be eternal for the same reason?' The infinity of the atoms is given by Vell. l. c. as an explanation of the continuous stream of images, and apparently as suggesting the eternity of the Being revealed to us in them; so Philod. p. 110 'the divine individuality (ἰδιότης) having its origin in the resemblance of the images may exist in perfect blessedness for ever'. Sch. denies this, and says that the Epicurean argument for the eternity of the Gods is (1) the πρόληψις (2) ἵσονομια. But the πρόληψις is simply the unconscious effect of experience, i.e. of the impression of the images on the mind, and ἵσονομια is mentioned in § 50 as the ground of the infinite number, not of the infinite duration, of immortal beings. It is probable however, as stated in the note there, that c. has wrongly spoken of beings instead of forces, and we may therefore allow ἵσονομια to stand as one of the arguments. A third argument (denied by Sch.) was the fineness of the atoms of which the Gods were composed, see § 71 n.

aequilibiratam: cf. § 50; the word appears to be άπ. λεγ. though Vitruvius uses aequilibris.

isto modo—sint aliqui immortales: 'according to that, since men are mortal, some would be immortal'. Sint is the ἄποδοσις to a protasis contained in isto modo = si hoc ita sit.

et quia sunt—sentio: 'and since there are destructive forces, there are also (or reading sint with some of the best ms., 'let there be also')
conservative forces. By all means, but let the conservative forces be exerted on what is actually in existence. I don't perceive that your Gods do exist." So Davies, Madv. Sch. Opusc. iv p. 343; others take ea as subject of conservent ("let the conservative forces be such as really exist themselves") implying that the Epicureans identified these forces with their Gods; whereas the Epicurean Gods were confessedly free from the toils of superintending the universe. Still this is not conclusive, as the disputants in C.'s dialogue are quite capable of forgetting or passing over any point which might be inconvenient. The reference is to the words of Vell. § 50 so quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debeere.

§ 110. omnis tamen—oritur: 'however (to leave the Gods and return to the question asked in § 107), how do you explain the origin of your object-pictures generally out of the atoms?' effigies oritur is a loose expression for effigiatus (or efieteria) fit.

Ch. xl. de beato. Cic. prefers to use the neut. adj. instead of his invention of § 95, so we find Tusc. v 45 ex bonis, quae sola honesta sunt, efficiendum est beatum, Fin. v 55 (virtutem) in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum.
sine virtute—vita: for the omission of the verb in these short clauses see § 68 n. That virtue is essential to happiness is asserted by Vell. § 48, and by Ep. himself in the 4th κυρία δόξα, Diog. L. x 140, οὐκ εἶστιν ἤδεος ζην ἀνευ τοῦ φρονίμου καὶ καλὸς καὶ δικαίος. The Academic disputant in iii § 38 endeavours to prove that we cannot ascribe to God any virtue known to us.

actuosa: but elsewhere C. recognizes the Aristotelian division of the moral and intellectual virtues (Part. Or. § 76) est igitur vis virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur virtus, aut actione. Nam quae prudentia...appellatur, hac scientia pollcit una: quae vero moderandis cupiditatis regendisque animi motibus laudatur, igitur est manus in agendo, and it is the former virtue only which belongs to divinity, according to Aristotle, τῷ δὲ ζωῆς τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρομένον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λειτείται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε η τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριστη διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἄν εἰς, E. N. x 8.
et deus: Mr Roby proposes to read at (which might easily lose its vowel after actuosa, and change into et) as it introduces a minor premiss in a quasi-syllogistic argument. But where one syllogism is subordinated to another (as in this passage virtus autem—igitur represents the minor premiss in the syllogism of which sine virtute nullo modo is the major, and ne beatus quidem the conclusion) it is not uncommon to omit the signs of opposition between the propositions of the subordinate syllogism: thus, A, none are happy without virtue; B, but virtue is active and your God inactive, therefore not virtuous; C, therefore your god is not happy.

ne beatus quidem: 'not happy either' (wanting in happiness as well as in virtue), cf. § 72 n., and § 113.
§ 111. quorum tandem — pertinentium: ‘what possible goods? pleasures, I presume; that is, of course, bodily pleasures’.

profectam a corpore: so Fin. i 55 quamquam et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor affertat, corum tamen utrumque et ortum esse corpore et ad corpus referri, see Madv. in loc. and on π 7 and 92, also Plut. M. p. 1089 τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τὸ χαίροντε τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπερείδουντες, αὐτὸς δ᾽ εἴ τοι χαίροντες εἰς τὸ ἡδόμενον τῇ ὑπίδι τελευτῶντες quoted by Zeller Epic. p. 452 tr.

quos pudeat: most of the editors spoil the irony of the passage by inserting non. Cotta is complimenting Vell. on his superiority to the scruples of the weaker brethren (called imperitos Fin. i 55) who think that there may be pure mental pleasures entirely unconnected with the body; cf. Fin. π 7 (Epicurus declares) ne intelligere quidem se posse, ubi sit aut quod sit ulla bonum praeter illud, quod cibo et potione et aurium delectatione et obscena voluptate capiatur. An haec ab eo non dicuntur? to which Torquatus replies quasi vero me pudeat istorum, aut non possim quemadmodum ea dicantur ostendere! C. rejoins that there is no reason why to pudet sapienti adsentiri; also § 21 ille non pertinuit, § 28 est tanti philosophi audacter sua decreta defendere, 1 69 sunt quidam Epicurei timidiores contra vestra convicia. Just in the same way Socrates compliments Calicles on his freedom from false shame Gorg. 492 and 483. Klotz Adn. Cr. π 16 points out that if Vell. were ashamed of the doctrine referred to, there would have been no propriety in calling upon him to refer to, and explain it, as is done in the following sentence quem cibum īgitur &c., also that his recognition of these doctrines is stated below, annuere te video § 113.

delicatis et obscenis: ‘the pleasures of the voluptuary and sensualist’, cf. Epic. περὶ τελους quoted by Diog. L. x 6 and more fully by Athen. vii p. 280 οὗ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐκ τοῦ νοημός τάγαθόν, ἀφαιρέω μὲν τάς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρέω δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφροδείας, καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκραμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς, which is translated in the Tusc. iii 41, see Fin. π 29, Ac. 1 7 with Reid’s n.

§ 112. perfundas voluptatibus: ‘to steep them in pleasure’, cf. Tusc. iv 20 (the pleasures of sense) sunt omnes unus generis ad perfundendum animum tanquam illiquefactae voluptates.

ut poetae—comparant. I see no reason for changing the ut of the mss into ac or et; ‘as the poets indeed do’ is a very natural continuation of the question as to food and drink; quidem of course points the contrast to tu autem. On the other hand there is great harshness in the ms reading nectar ambrosium before epulas. It can hardly be taken either as an instance of asyndeton, or of apposition (as Klotz Adn. Crit. π 18), while it would be a very natural gloss for a scribe to add. Omitting it, we must throw the stress of the sentence on the following clause, referring to the beautiful cup-bearers, otherwise the mere mention of epulas would scarcely add anything to what has been said before. For comp. ep. cf. iii 68 funestas epulas comparans and comp. convivium Verr. A. π 1 65. For
the general sense cf. Tusc. i 65 non enim ambrosia does aut nectar aut Juventate poca et ministrante lactari arbitravi, nec Homerus audio, qui Ganymeden ab dis ruptum ait propter fornam ut Jovi bibere ministraret.

§ 113. at has—sensibus: 'your answer is that you count these as inferior pleasures which merely tickle the sense' Titill. ill. C. 's translation for Epicurus' γαρ γαλακτωδες σωματος (CLEONIDES cycyl. theor. ii 191, Athen. xii 546); he uses it always with the apologetic quasi (Fin. 139, Tusc. III 47, Off. ii 63, Senect. 47); in Leg. i 47 he employs the phrase duodevi haec et scabies (= pruritus), see Dunænil ad loc.; Lucr. also has titillare sensus i 429.

quoque—scriptae: 'when will you cease your mockery? (it must be such) for Ph. too could not stand Epicureans affecting to repudiate effeminate pleasures; he would quote verbatim many sayings of Ep. to the same effect'. For ludis cf. § 123: nam refers to pronuntiabat in the second clause, the first clause taking the place of some such form as indignatus, cf. n. on itaque § 85. Etiem implies 'I am not the only one to feel impatience at this shuffling'. For Philo see § 6, 59.

Metrodori: cf. § 93 and Dusing pp. 47—51, where the following fragments occur, πείρα γαστέρα γύρος, ὃς φυσιολόγει Τιμάκρατα, τὸ ἄγαθόν (Plut. M. 1098 D), πείρα γαστέρα, ὃς φυσιολόγει Τιμ., περί γαστέρα ὃ κατὰ φύσιν βαδίζων λόγοι τὴν ἀπάσαν ἔχει σπονδύν (Athen. vii 280, xii 546), τὰ καλὰ πάντα καὶ σοφά καὶ περιτίτὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εξενήματα τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ἡδονῆς εἰς εὔεκα καὶ τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς ὑπέρ ταύτης συνεστάναι καὶ πᾶν ἐναυ κέφαν ἔργαν, ὃ μὴ εἰς τοῦτο κατατείχει (Plut. M. 1125 D), ὃς καὶ ἔχάρην καὶ ἐθρασσόμενον, ὃτι ἐμαθὼν παρ’ Ἑπικούρον ἄρθρος γαστρὶ χαρισθεῖσαν (Plut. M. 1098 c), οὕδεις δὲν σῶξεν τοὺς Ἑλληνας, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ σοφία στεφανῶν παρ’ αὐτῶν τυγχάνει, ἀλλ’ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν οἴνον, ὃ Τιμάκρατες, ἀδὰν δαφὸς τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένος Plut. M. 1125 D, also Plut. M. 1087, 1108, and Hirzel p. 165, Tusc. v 27, Fin. ii 92.

collega sapientiae: so Fin. ii 92 paene alter Epicurus. The two were often represented in a double bust.

dubitet—metiri: 'hesitates to measure by the standard of the belly', cf. Demosth. Cor. p. 324 τῇ γαστρὶ μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς τὰ τοῦ θνατοῖς έπι μετροῦν ης. Allen quotes Varro ap. Non. i 273 quidem modulus est vita culina. Dubito in this sense is generally followed by the Inf. in a negative sentence, more rarely in a positive sentence; Draeg. (§ 424 8 d) cites Curtius as the earliest instance of the latter, but, besides the present passage, Reid on Lael. i quotes Sall. Cat. 15. [See also Att. x 3 a, venire dubitarint quoted by G. Müller, Progr. d. Gymnas. zu Görlitz 1878. R.]

ne beatos quidem: 'wanting in happiness also' (as well as pleasure), cf. § 72.

Ch. xii § 114. abundantem bonis: cf. omnibus bonis aestacu § 50.
cogitat: on the sing. following pl. vacant cf. § 50 Bulte solutis n.

mihi pulchre est: a colloquial phrase 'how jolly this is!' cf. Mur. 26 practor interea ne pulchrum se ac beatum putaret, Hor. Sat. ii 8 18 quies cenantibus una pulchre fuerit tibi, nosse laboro; Allen cites Mart. xii 17 9, Catull. xxiii 5. The reference is to § 51.
non vereatur—ne interest. Klotz Adn. Cr. II 19 has well defended this reading (supported by the quotation in Aug. Ep. 118) against Madv. and Ba. whose emendations are inconsistent with the general purport of the argument, viz. to prove that the Epicurean God is not beatus, it having been already shown (§ 110) that he is not immortalis.

pulsetur—sempiterna: cf. Or. c. Cels. iv 14 αί τού Ἑπικούρου θεοί, σώθεται εξ ἀτόμων τεχνάνωτες, καὶ τὸ ὅσον εἰπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀνάλυτα, πραγματεύοντα τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀπασέισθαι, and my n. on § 49. The argument is fatal to the Gods of the internundia (see Lucr. v 351 foll.), but there was in all probability a party among the Epicureans who had accepted a modification of the less vulnerable Democratian theology (§ 120). This latter is apparently the view propounded in § 49, but the criticism here is directed against the former.

ex ipso imagines affluant: cf. Lucr. vi 76 nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur | in mentes hominum divinae nuntia formae, &c.

C. f. The Epicurean principles, if accepted, are fatal to religion. What induction is there to worship beings without activity and without benevolence? xli § 115—xliv § 124.

§ 115. at etiam—everterit: 'but (you reply) Ep. wrote a work on piety. Yes, but how? In a manner entirely inconsistent with his general theory, so that you might fancy yourself listening to C. or S.' Diog. L. x 27 mentions a treatise of Ep. peri ὁσιάτης, and Philod. often refers to his teaching on the subject, as in p. 104 ὅτι μὲν ὅρκως καὶ θεῶν ἐπιφύλάσεως ἑδακτίμαξεν χρήσαι, γελοίοιν ὑπομιμήσεις, ἀναμετά τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιοῦτων ὅσης, p. 118 peri τι γὰρ ἔφρων καὶ θυσίων καὶ πάσης καθόλου τοιοφόρων ὡς ἀκολούθως ἐπράξεν οἷς ἐθυγμάτωσεν...αι θρόνων γεγομένην συναγωγὸν διασαφέως, p. 120 (Ep. laid down the plain rule) ὅτι δὲι πάντα πείθεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἑθισμοῖς ὡς ἀρ μή τι τῶν ἀσβέων προστάτωσιν, p. 125—132 (writing to Phyrsos he bids him to sacrifice according to the laws, as he himself observed the feast of Choes and the Mysteriés, offering prayer, not only as a duty enjoined by law, but as a natural offering to beings surpassing in power and goodness).

Coruncanum: the first plebeian Pont. Max. 252 B.C. compared for his wisdom with Lycurgus, Solon, Cato, &c. (De Orat. iii 56), noticed as especially beloved by the gods (N. D. ii 165), as an authority in religious matters (iii 5).

Scaevolam: P. Mucius Sc. (father of C.'s friend and patron the Pont. Max. Q. Mucius Sc.) was consul in B.C. 133, the year in which Tib. Gracchus lost his life, succeeded his brother Mucianus in the Pontificato n.c. 131, so famed for his knowledge of law that he is called one of the founders of the Jus Civile, cf. iii 5.

homenes non colant: for the play on words cf. Ov. Met. viii 724
cura pii dis sunt et qui coluere coluntur; Sch. quotes Plant. Poen. v 414
Juppiter qui genus colis alicuë hominum; ciæπεθαν has a similar reciprocal
use in Aesch. Prom. 545 θνατοις ὠγαν σιζετι.
cujus nullum meritum sit. The reason for this relative clause being
prefixed to the antecedent, is probably to give it greater emphasis, as the
climax.
pietas justitia adversum deos. There is a great resemblance be-
tween this passage and Sext. Emp. Math. ix 123 where the existence of
the Gods is argued from the fact of ευσέβεια and ὁσίωτης, the latter being defined
as δικαιοσύνη τις πρὸς θεοὺς. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ καὶ ή δικαιοσύνη κατὰ τὴν ἐπιπλοκήν
tων ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ δικλησιον εἰ μὴ εἰσί θεοί, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη συστήσεται. The definition is attributed to the Stoics
by Stob. Eld. II 124, but it occurs (amongst others) in Plato Euthyphro 12,
where τὸ εὐσεβεῖ καὶ ὁσίον (they are not distinguished) is explained as that
part of justice (righteous dealing) which is concerned with τὴν τῶν θεῶν
θεράπευαν, cf. Protag. 331. So we frequently find τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
diēs contrasted with τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ὁσία. If one may venture to say
so, C. seems to have been unfortunate in his translation of the Greek terms:
pietas is certainly nearer to εὐσέβεια than to ὁσίωτης, but he makes it stand
for the latter both here and in i 3, 1153, cf. Or. Part. 78 justitia erga
deos religio; we find a different definition in Pro Domo 107 nec est uita
gerā deos pietas nisi honesta de nomine eorum ac mente opinio, cum expeti
nihil ab ipsis; quod sit injustum atque indonestum, arbitrare, which approaches
more to Epictetus' definition of εὐσέβεια, Ench. 31, ὁρὰς ὑπολήφεις περὶ
θεῶν ἔχειν, ὃς ὄντως καὶ διακοινών τὰ ἄλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.
hominis—communitas. In the De Legibus i 21 foll. three grounds are
mentioned for this communitas (1) the benefits received from God; (2) the
common possession of reason, inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta
ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis
putandi sumus, and so we arrive at the grand Stoic description of the
world as the civitas communis deorum atque hominum § 23; (3) their
common kinship, ut homines deorum a natione et gente teneantur, see Dumesnil
in loc.
sanctitas—deorum: so Sext. Emp. l.c. ἐστι γὰρ εὐσέβεια ἐπιστήμη
θεῶν θεράπευα, a Stoic definition, as we learn from Stob. l.c. and Diog. L.
vii 119, borrowed however from Socrates, see Xen. Mem. iv 6 4 ὁ ἐρωτά πῶς περί
toûν θεῶν νομιμα εἰδώς ὀρθῶς ἢ ἤμων εὐσεβῆς ὁρισμένοι εὑρ. And Plato
Euthyphro 14 (ὁσίωτητα) ἐπιστήμην τῶν τοῦ θεῶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι. The
explanation of this rather inappropriate definition must be sought in the
Socratic and Stoical identification of virtue and knowledge (Zeller Socr.
p. 143 tr., Stoics p. 239). In the Planc. 80 Cic. asks quī sancti, quī religionum
colentes nisi qui meritam dis immortalibus gratiam justis honoribus et memori-
mente persolvunt.
videmus: Madv. Fin. ii 15 says expectabam ‘videamus’, as we have actura sit in § 116 and videantur in § 55; but in both those passages the relative is general or indefinite, meaning ‘of such a kind as’; here there is no reason why we may not take quae as the simple relative referring to a particular known case.

nam. Its force seems to be as follows: ‘What reason is there for adoring the gods when you leave nothing adorable in their nature? For in doing away with the divine attributes, you do away not only with superstition but with religion itself’.

quod—soletis: referring to the following liberari. For the matter see nn. §§ 54 and 56.

Diagoram aut Theodorum: see on § 63.

Protagoram: see on § 29.

cui neutrum liceruit: cf. quod ligueat § 29, so deliquesco makes delicui, ov. Met. iv 253, vii 381.

superstitionem—continetur. On the difference between superst. and vol. see ii 72 n. and cf. Plut. M. 1101 c δε μὲν γὰρ τῆς περὶ θεῶν δύνης, ἀπὸ δὲν οὐκ ἐμπνεῦσαι τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατο, μὴ συνεκκοπῶμεν μὴ δὲ τυφλοῖς τὴν πίστιν, ἢ νῦ πλεῖστοι περὶ θεῶν ἠχονεί.

§ 118. ii qui dixerunt—sustulerunt. Sext. Emp. (Math. ix 51, cf. 14 where Critias is alluded to without being named) giving a list of atheistical philosophers, mentions Diagoras, Theodorus, Protagoras, Prodicus and Euhemerus, as C. does here, and goes on to say that Critias, one of the Thirty, must be classed among them, as he held that οἱ παλαιοὶ νομοθετεῖ ἐπίσκοποι τινὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν καταρθωμάτων καὶ ἀμαρτήματων ἐπισκαίς τῶν θεῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ μὲν διὰ γὰρ τῶν πλήθου Εὐθείων, εὐλαβοῦμεν τὴν ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν τιμωρίαν. In proof of this he quotes from the Sisyphus (a δράμα Σατυρίκων attributed by others to Euripides, cf. Plut. M. 879 e) ἐπείδη ἑπίδειγμα μὲν οἱ νόμοι | ἄπηγον αὐτούς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία, | λάβαρα δὲ ἐπρασσόν, τινικαῦτα μοι δοκεῖ | πυκνός τις ἄλλος καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνήρ | γεγονέναι, οὐ θυσιασίς ἔξοφοι ὕποσ | ἐτι τι δείμα τοῖς κακοῖς, καὶ λάβαρα | πράσσον μὴ λέγοσιν μὴ φρονοσθείτι, | ἐντεῦθεν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο | and placed the Gods in the region of storms and lightning in order to make them more terrible. Plato alludes to this theory of religion Leg. 8 889 e, θεοὶ εἶναι πρῶτον φαίνειν ὁτοῦ δέχηται, οὐ φύσει ἄλλα τι τῆς νόμους, καὶ τούτων ἄλλους ἄλλους, ὑπὲρ έκαστοι λαυτοίς συνωμολογήσαν νομοθετοῦμεν’ καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, νόμῳ δὲ ἑτέρα.

Prodicus: see Introd. and Art. by Brandis in Dict. of Biogr. His name appears in the fragments of Philod. pp. 112 and 76 (quoted in n. on § 38), cf. also p. 71 and Sext. Emp. Math. ix 18 Πρόδικος ὁ Ἐκίος, ἡλιοῦ, φησι, καὶ σεληνήν καὶ σταυρός καὶ κρήνας καὶ καθόλου πάντα τὰ ὕφελματα τῶν βίων ἕμοι οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς ἐνόμιζαν διὰ τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν οὐφέλειαν, καθόπερ Ἀργυτοί τῶν Νείλου, καὶ διὰ τούτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτων Δήμητραν νομοθέτημαι &c. and id. 52, Min.
222 BOOK I CH. XLII § 118.

Fel. c. 21. Persaeus (§ 38) and other Stoics had the same belief (Π 60, Plut. M. 378).

habita: referring to the time when the worship was introduced.

§ 119. fortes ad deos pervenisse. It has been already stated (§§ 38, 39) that Persaeus and Chrysippus held this view, which is also maintained by Balbus (Π 62), cf. Zeller Stoic, p. 330, Döllinger Gentile and Jew I p. 343, p. 32, 163 foll.; but it would seem that C. has wrongly identified with theirs the doctrine of Euhemerus, who acc. to Sext. I. c. supposed this worship to have been instituted during the life-time of its founders, οἱ περιγενόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἵσχύς καὶ συνήθεις, ὡστε πρώτα ὑπ' αὐτῶν κελευ- μένα πάντας θεούς, σπουδάζοντει μείζονα θυμαματικόν καὶ σεμαντικόν τυχεῖν, ἀνέπλασαν περὶ αὐτῶν ὑπερβαλλουσάν των καὶ θείαν ἄνωμαν, ἐνθεὶ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἑνόμισθέντας θεοὶ.

Euhemerus: fl. 300 B.C., sent on an exploring expedition to the Red Sea by Cassander, the results of which he professed to recount in his 'Sacred Records' (τήρη ἀναγραφή). In this he gave a long account of an island named Panehaia, lying towards the south, in which there was a temple of Zeus Triphylius, ab iuventum columnam positam esse ab ipso Jove titulus indicabat; in qua columna gesta sua perscrisit ut monimentum esset posteros veram suam. Lact. I 11. Euhemerus is the chief representative of the pragmatizing or rationalistic mythologists, but traces of the same tendency may be seen in Hecataeus and Herodotus, and much more in Ephorus, and Dionysius of Miletus, whose Atlantis is described by Dio. II 51, 55 foll. Cf. Keightley Mythol. c. 2, Döllinger l.c. I 345, Zeller Soc. p. 343 tr.

interpretatus—Ennius. The fragments (in Lactantius' prose version) are given in Hessel's ed. of Ennius p. 312 foll., in Vahlen's p. 169 foll. As exc. we may cite fr. 13 Veneris artem meretricium instituit, auctoreque multiceps in Cypro fuit uti vulgato corpore quaestum fucerat (Lact. I c. 17), fr. 12 'the tomb of Jupiter is shown in the Cretan Cossus, and on it is inscribed in ancient characters ΖΑΝ ΚΡΟΝΟΥ' (Lact. I. 11). The influence of Ennius' work is seen in Virg. Aen. vii 47, 177, viii 353, Gēo. ii 139. It is constantly referred to by the early Apologists.

sepulturae deorum: cf. previous n. and III 53. It is of this that Callimachus wrote Κρήτης αἵνευσα, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, οὐ ἄνα, σείο | Κρήτης ἐπεκτύμησεν' αὐτῷ ὁ ἄνευ, ἐπάυ γὰρ αἵνευ, quoted by Or. c. Col. lliii 43.

penitus sustulisse. Though Euhemerus is often charged with atheism, as by Sext. I. c. ὑπερτυλθεὶς άθεος, and Plut. M. p. 300 l, πάσαν ἀδελεύη κατακεκλάμνη ὁ θεός, τοὺς νομιζοώντας θεόν πάντας ὁμαλῶς διαγρά- φον, ἐν ὁνόμα στρατηγῶν καὶ ναύαρχων καὶ βασιλείων ὡς δὴ πάλαι γεγονότων, κ.τ.λ., yet he appears to have admitted the existence of the elemental gods, the sun, the heavens, &c. (Eiseb. P. Ep. ii 2) and to have represented Zeus as offering sacrifice to Aether (Lact. I 11).

omitto Eleusinem. As there is nothing corresponding to this in the parallel passage of Sext. Emp, who passes on at once from Prodicus
§ 18 to Democritus in § 19, Schwencke (p. 61) thinks that C. here departs from his author (as he often does where he wishes to enliven the discussion by a quotation) perhaps through a reminiscence of Tusc. i 29 quaere quorum demonstrantur sepulcrac in Graecia, reminiscere, quoniam es initiatus, quae traduntur mysteriis, where the tombs of the gods are also brought into juxtaposition with the mysteries. On the general subject of the mysteries, see Döllinger l. c. 130—200, and Lobeck Aeglaophamus.

Sanctam illam et augustam. C. and Atticus were initiated, as we learn from Leg. ii 36, where the beneficial influence of the mysteries is thus spoken of: nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenae tuae peperisse atque in vitam hominum attulisse, tum nihil melius illis mysteriis, quibus ex agresti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus, initiaque ut appeliantur, ita re vera principia vitae cognovimus, neque solum cum lactitia vivendi rationem accipimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi; and in the preceding paragraph, discussing the prohibition of nocturnal worship, he asks quid ergo aget Iacchus Eumolpidaeque nostri et augusta illa mysteria, si quidem sacra nocturna tollimus? On the special force of the word augustus see Ov. Fast. i 600 sancta vocant augusta patres, augusta vocantur | templo sacerdotum rite dicata manu | ; it is joined, as here, with sanctus in ii 62, iii 53.

Ubi initiantur—ultimae. It is not known from whence this iambic line is taken. Orarum is the Inclusive (partitive) Genitive after ultimae, which I take as Nom. Pl. agreeing with gentes, not (as Sch. apparently) as Gen. Sing. It is loosely added, like locorum, terrarum, &c., to define the meaning of ult. With regard to the admission to the mysteries, Isocrates Paneg. 42 mentions that barbarians were not allowed to be initiated, but the rule seems to have been relaxed in later times, as in the case of C.; indeed Lobeck considers that any one already initiated was at liberty to introduce a friend of whatever nationality (p. 28 foll.), so that the word μυσταρταγωγος came to mean no more than cicerone. But the form of initiation was always required, the uninitiated could only enter the temple at the peril of their lives, as is shown by the fate of the two Acarnanians whose death led to the war between Athens and Macedonia B.C. 200 (Liv. xxxi 14).

Samothraciam—Lemni: these islands together with Imbros were the seat of the Cabiric worship, on which see Düll. l. c. p. 164 foll., Lobeck Aql. p. 1109—1329, Preller Gr. Myth. i 660—673. Herodotus ii 51 is the first who mentions the Samothracian mysteries. Preller thinks that these were not of much importance till after the Persian War, and that they were partly copied from the Eleusinia. Aristophanes (Pax 278) speaks of the Samothracian initiation as a safeguard in danger; especially at sea, as we learn from other sources, cf. N. D. iii 89. Under the Macedonian and Roman rule (partly owing to the supposed connexion of Rome with Troy) these mysteries were continually growing in importance. See Liv. xlv. 5, Galen De usu part. xvii 1, Juv. iii 144 jures licet et Samothracum et nos-
Lobec\:\: denotes that there was any difference between the Sanothracian and Lemnian mysteries\(^1\). The latter are only mentioned here and in another passage from the Philoctetes of Attius quoted by Varro \L. L.\: VII 11 \textit{Lennia praesto \textvert| litora rara, et celsa Cabirum \textvert| delubra tenes, mysteria quaeis \textvert| pristina cistis consaepta sacris} \textvert| Ribbeck \textit{Frag. Lat.} \textvert| p. 173.

\textbf{nocturno\:-|\:-densa}: anapaestic meter followed by the \textit{versus paroemiacus}; probably a quotation from the Philoctetes of Attius: ‘those rites which are celebrated at Lemnos in nightly procession, deep shrouded in their leafy covert’ \textit{(silvestribus saepibus densa} a sort of hyppallage for \textit{densis silcis saepta}).

\textbf{quibus explicatis\:-|\:-deorum}. Compare III 63 on the allegorizing of the Stoics. The mysteries themselves appear to have been a kind of miracle play illustrative of the story of Demeter and of other deities, such as Zagreus, who were in later times associated with her. It is doubtful whether the symbolical action was accompanied by any authorized interpretation, but philosophers and moralists sought to explain the mysteries in such a manner as to recommend their own views. While the ordinary spectator, satisfied with the splendid and impressive scenes which passed before his eyes, carried away with him no distinct ideas beyond the suggestion of a future life of happiness which was in store for the initiated, the Stoics (as Döllinger says, p. 198) regarded them as symbolizing the truth that the gods were merely a portion of the material universe; the Peripatetics as showing that God had laid the foundation of civilization in agriculture; the Euhemerists that the objects of worship were only deified men; the Pythagoreans and New Platonists that the secret of all religions was contained in the ancient theology of Egypt and the East. Plutarch expressly says that he who would rightly understand and profit by the mysteries must take with him \textit{λόγον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας μνηματωγών} (Is. c. 68). For \textit{exx.} of the ‘physical interpretation’ here referred to by C. cf. Lobec\:\: l.c. p. 136 foll., who quotes Themistius \textit{Or.} 29 for the view of Prodiens that the mysteries only referred to the operations of agriculture; similarly Cornutus c. 28, and Varro (ap. \textit{Aug. C. D.} VII 20) \textit{V. de Eleusinis nihili interpretatur nisi quod attinet ad fragmentum}; \textit{Prosperpinam dicit significare fecunditatem seminum, quae cum defuisset tempore, exortum esse opinionem quod Ceresis filiam Orcus abulatorit, &c., ib. VII 28 V. Sanothracum mysteria sic interpretatur; dicit se ibi multis indiciss collegisse in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum, quas Plato appellat ide\:|\:s; caelum Jovem, terram Junonem, ide\:|\:s Minercam vult intelligi}; somewhat different is the account given by the same author in \textit{Ling. Lat.} v 58, \textit{terra enim et caelum, ut Sanothracum initia docent sunt Dei Magni et h\:i quo\:s dicit multis nominibus}; so Plut. (\textit{et ap. Delph.} p. 389) speaks of the Zagreus myth as symbolizing the divine soul of the world which is ever clothing itself in new shapes.

\(^1\) See on the other side, Döll. p. 170.

Ch. xliii § 120. Democritus: cf. §§ 29, π 76. His fragments have been edited by Mullach.

vir magnus: so Ac. π 73 quem cum eo conferre possimus non modo ingeniis magnitudinis sed etiam animi? where see Reid.

hortulos irrigavit: playing on the word, cf. § 93 and, for the metaphor, Ac. π 8 (I recommend my friends to study the Greek philosophers themselves) ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant quam rivos consentetur.


tum enim censeat: see Sext. Emp. ix 19 Δημ. ‘δε ειδωλα τινα φησιν εμπελαζειν τοις ανθρωποις και τουτω μεν ειναι αγαθοποια, τα δε κακοποια. ένθεν και ειχεται ευλογον 1 τυχειν ειδωλον. ειναι δε ταυτα μεγαλα τε και υπερμεγεθη, και διυσφαρτα μεν, αν διφαρτα δε, προστηαινεν τε τα μελλοντα τοις ανθρωποις, θεορομενα και φωνας αφιεντα, and ib. 42 το δε ειδωλα ειναι εν τοι περιεχοντι υπερφυι και ανθωρωσειδεις έχουτα μορφις παντελως έστι δυσπαραδεκτον. Cf. Plut. M. 361 of the demons of Xenocrates. ‘It will be obvious’ (says Mosheim in his excellent note on Cudworth π p. 644) ‘from a comparison of these passages, that one and the same opinion of Dem. is here broken up into several tenets by C. Perhaps here, as in other cases, he has designedly perverted the opinion of this philosopher in order with better effect to confute him’. The principia mentis are the fiery particles of which soul is composed; these coalesce and constitute the imagines which float around us, and which, when they enter into our consciousness (itself composed of the same divine particles), are recognized as divinities. Democritus attributed to them vast size, a lengthened but not everlasting existence (see Plut. Def. Or. p. 415 ώ δε Ἡσιόδος οίεται και περιοδοι τιοι χρώνων γίγνεσθαι τοις δαιμοσι τοις τελευταῖς, thus the Naiad’s life is ten times as long as that of the phoenix, which is itself nine times that of the raven), benignant or malignant influence, in order to agree with the popular theology: and for the same reason, we may suppose, he considered them to be perceptible by the lower animals (as Athene by the dogs in the Odyssey), cf. Clem. Strom. v 590 c, τα γαρ αυτα πεποιηκεν ειδωλα τοις ανθρωποις προστίπατον και τοις αποτξης ξειον απο της θειας ουσιας.

mundum complectantur. This absurd exaggeration probably arose from a careless reading of the Gr. quoted above, εν τοι περιεχοντι υπερφυι.

sint—soleant. Sch. (Opusc. III 308, 365), in accordance with Heindorff’s suggestion, changed the Ind. of the ms for the Subj., stating an opinion, not a fact, and has been followed by the later edd.

animantes: for the adjectival use cf. §§ 23, 123, π 22, III 11.

patria Democriti. Abdera in Thrace had a reputation like our Gotham, cf. Juv. x 50 (Dem.) cujus prudentia monstrat | summus posse

1 Al. ειλόγχων.

M. C.
vivos et magna exempla daturos, verecund in patria crasseque sub aere nasce
with Mayor's note; the first instance of its proverbial use is in Cic. Att. iv 16 § 6, hic (Romae) Abdera non tuente me, and vii 7 § 4 il est διδομένων. Hirzel (in Horm. xiv p. 402) thinks that Abdera got its character from D.'s habit of ridiculing the follies of his neighbours; thus we have several fragments (Mullach 16, 31, 51—56) commencing with ἄναψιν, e.g. 'fools, though they hate life, wish to live from fear of Hades', 'fools learn nothing all their life long', &c. He thinks that the reproach had reference rather to inconsistency (mutat) than stupidity.

§ 121. dis—gratiam sustulit. There seems no need for Ba.'s insertion of in before dis: the dative is simply 'for the gods'; 'as far as they are concerned', cf. Att. xii 6 nihii quidem omnem habituationem tolleret. So we find a dative with αυτός, ερπίο, ετεργούο, ἀλλός (Verr. ii 2 § 22 Dionem Veneti absolverit, sibi condemnavit 'releases D. from his obligation to Venus'). The reference is to the κυρία δόξα quoted on § 45. Aristotle while allowing that God took care of men (Eth. N. x 8 εί τις επιμελεία τών ἀνθρώπων υπὸ θεοῦ γίνεται, ἀσπέρ δοκεῖ), denied that there could be any friendship between God and man, both on account of the inequality, and because God has no friend of a friend, Eth. N. viii 9, Eth. Eud. vii 12, M. M. ii 11 ἀτοπών γὰρ ἰν εἰς εί τις φαίνει φιλείν τῶν Δία.

cum enim—naturae: 'while asserting the perfection of the divine nature, he at the same time (idem, cf. § 30) denies to it the attribute of kindness, and thereby does away with that which is the essential characteristic of a perfect nature'. Heind. reads dicit after Walker, but that would imply the identity of the two actions, 'in asserting he denies'. For the asyndeton, cf. § 70.

quid praestantius bonitate: a Stoic utterance, as we learn from Plut. M. 1075, of γὰρ ἀθικόν καὶ μακάρων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάθρωπον καὶ κηρευμάτων καὶ ὡφέλιμον προλαμβάνειν καὶ νοείσθαι τῶν θεών.

amari: used of the feeling, diliugi of the judgment.

Ch. xliiv. consent autem: so also sometimes, where we might expect γὰρ, giving a sort of side explanation instead of a reason; 'they hold, you know'. Enim is reserved to give the proof of melius.


quid mali datis: ‘what mischief you cause’ (=mali quid affert ista sententia? Tusc. 1 82), a colloquial expression, so hauit paternum istuc dedisti Ter. Adelph. III 4 4, and malum dare frequently.

§ 122. in imbecillitate ponitis. Cf. Diog. L. x 77 ov γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματείαι καὶ διονυσίδες καὶ όργαί καὶ χάριτες μακαρίστηι, ἄλλοι δοθενεία καὶ φόβω καὶ προσθέτεις τὼν πλείον ταύτα γίνεται, Lael. 29 quum (beneficentiam) si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficiisci, ut sit per quem assumuatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinguant et minime generosum, ut ita diceam, ortum amicitiae.

vim et naturam deorum: little more than a paraphrase for τὸ θεῖον as in § 32, cf. Nägelsb. Stil. § 3 2 d, Beier on Off. I 18 honesti naturam viniqve; ‘setting aside the Gods and their attributes’.

ne homines quidem: ‘do you think that even in the case of men it is true, that they would have been devoid of kindness, if it had not been for their weakness?’

 nisi essent — futuros fuisse: orat. obl. for the direct nisi essent — fuisse, see Roby § 1784, Madv. 351, 409.

ista amicitia: on the attraction (ista for istud) cf. § 67.

mercatura — suarum. Cf. Zeller Stoics, p. 465 tr., on the Epicurean view of friendship, who quotes Ep. ap. Diog. L. x 120 τὴν φιλίαν δία τὰς χρείας γίνεται, δειν μέντοι προκατάρχεσθαι, συνιστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κυριακαὶ ἐν ταῖς ἱδοναῖς, Fin. I 66, II 78. In the parallel passage of Lael. 31, we read neque enim beneficium feneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus, where Seyffert quotes Fin. II 117 (kindness done from interested motives is a feneratio not a beneficium), Sen. Ep. 9 ista, quam tu describis, negotiatio est, non amicitia. On the change of person, where the subject is indefinite (nos—suarum), see § 84 sibi displivere.

§ 123. at etiam liber est: recurring to § 115.

ludimur: cf. § 113, III 3.

non tam faceto: cf. II 46 hic quum volet Ep. jocetur, homo non aptissimus ad jocandum, II 74 salem istum, quo caret vestra natio, irridendis nobis nolitote consumere molt, Div. II 40 deos jocandi causa induxit perluckidos.

familiaris —Posidonius. He was sent as ambassador from Rhodes to Rome B.C. 86; Cic. attended his lectures at Rhodes B.C. 78, where Pompey also visited him on two occasions. Cic. in vain urged him to write a panegyric on his consulship. The fragments have been collected by Bake.

invidiae detestandae: ‘deprecatig odio’. So Cat. I 27 ut a me patriae querimoniam detester et deprecer, lit. ‘to call the Gods to avert’.

tam desipiens fuisse. Strictly speaking this should have been expressed in the Inf. as a part of the argument of P. See Madv. Fin. III 50.

exilem: ‘emaciated’.

omnino: summing up, ‘in a word’.

quid enim—propitius sit: 'for why should I offer the usual prayer?' Cf. the formula in Cato R. R. 141 Mars pater, te precor quae soque, uti siēs solens propitius mihi domo familiaeque nostrae.
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