OBSERVATIONS

O N

MR. S T E D M A N ' s

HISTORY

OF THE

AMERICAN W A R .

BY LIRUTRNANT-GRNERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

1794.

OBSERVATIONS

O N

MR. S T E D M A N' s

HIST OR Y

OF THE

AMERICAN WAR

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. DEBRETT, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

1794.

:

• Jfcf

FIFTY COPIES,

PRIVATELY REPRINTED.

NEW YORK: 1864.

J. M. BRABSTREF.T & Sox, PRINTERS

iT has been a fashion with many (owing to what cause I will not pretend to say) to declare, that in losing America, we have neither lost commerce, military character, or consequence. Tho' I had differed 'in opinion respecting all these, I know full well that until this country felt some dire misfortune, in consequence of the lofs of that, I should meet with few advocates for my opinion. Alas ! has not that dire misfortune now befallen us ? Notwithstanding the zealous^ officer-like, and succefsful exertions of our land and sea chiefs, and their gallant navies and armies, these last are^ reduced by sicknefs to a debility the more alarming, as it carmot, I fear, diminish, but must increase. Had we pofsefsed the continent of America, our fleets and armies might have retired to its ports during the hurricanes and sickly season, attended to their sick, recovered and recruited both navy and army, and returned to the West Indies with the means of further exertion. Where have we now a healthy safe port ? Halifax is almost as far. as Europe; while in the American ports the tri- colored flag flies triumphant, and scarcely a Britifli fhip is to be seen except as capture. If appearances are so unpromising now we are said to be in alliance with America, how it will happen, fhould we unfor- tunately add them to the number of our enemies, I need not predict. Altho' I had received my Sovereign's fullest approbation of my con- duct during that American war, as will appear by my correspondence with His ministers, contained in my narrative, &c. publifhed in 1783, and in the following pamphlet, yet, considering every person employed in so

important

important a command as accountable at all times for their conduct, I con- ceive myself called upon by a recent publication, which has miftated material facts, whether from error, or a desire of courting a late Governor General of India, I will not pretend to determine; but at a time when my services were actually called for, and these more than insinuations may make an imprefsion on the public, it is my duty to refute them ; I there- fore submit the following observations on Mr. Stedman's History of the American War, to the candid and impartial public, who will, no doubt, give me credit for my forbearance in not troubling them on such a subject until forced into it by an unprovoked attack.

H. C.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

kOIR Henry Clinton finds himself obliged to notice some insinuations, and contradict some afsertions in Mr. Stedman's History of the American War, lately publifhed. The affair of Bunker's Hill has been stated to the public by the general officer who commanded there : the volunteer services of Sir II. Clinton in that action were amply rewarded by the manner in which Sir W. Howe accepted them.

But there are other parts of the History which prove, that Mr. Stedman wanted either attention or candour. He afserts, that the army, during the cannonade of the fleet on the 28th of June, 1776, had embarked two or three times in boats, but did not proceed or co-operate with the attack of the navy. Vol. I. page 186, Mr. Stedman says as follows; "at twelve o'clock " the light infantry, grenadiers, and the fifteenth regiment embarked in boats, " the floating batteries and armed craft getting under weigh at the same time, "to cover the landing on Sulivan's Island; scarcely, however, had the " detachments proceeded from Long Island before they were ordered to dis- " embark, and return to their encampment. Early in the morning of the " 29th they were again embarked, and almost immediately afterwards ordered

B "to

"to disembark." The fhortfaS is as follows: It had beenjftna/Iy settled by Commodore Sir P. Parker and General Clinton, that part of the troops (there were boats for) were to have landed not on Sulivan's Island, as Mr. Stedman says, but on the main land, proceeding to it by creeks communi- cating with it ; three of the frigates were to have co-operated with the troops in an intended attack upon Hedrall's Point, where the enemy had a work covering their bridge of communication with Sulivan's Island : the three frigates intended for co-operation with the troops, almost immediately run aground ; in the hope they would soon float and proceed, the troops em- barked on the 28th, and finding the frigates did not proceed, the troops of course disembarked, the same on the ipth, and as the frigates did not pro- ceed, the troops could not. General Clinton did not see Sir P. Parker's public letter, or know that his own had not been publijhed, till the November following, when he received a letter from Lord G. Germaine with his Majesty's approbation of his conduct at Sulivan's Island; but as there were certain parts of the Commodore's letter by which it appeared he had not been sufficiently explicit with respect to the conduct of the General and the army, and as the Minister had not judged proper to publifh General Clinton's letter, General Clinton shall first give an extract of Sir P. Parker's letter, and then an extract of his own letter, certain queries he made to Sir P. Parker, and that Gentleman's answers.

Extract of Sir P. PARKER'^ Letter tj P. STEPHENS, Esq. July 9, 1776.

"THE fort was silenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, but the " rebels finding the army could not take pofsefsion, re-entered the fort. " Their Lordfhips will see plainly by this account, that if the troops could "have operated in the attack, his Majesty would have been in pofsefsion of " Sulivan's Island."

ExtraEi

( 3 )

Extraff of General CLINTON'J Letter to Lord G. GERMAINE, Long Island, July 2, 1776.

" IT was about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 28th of June, when " we discovered the fleet going to the attack of Sulivan's Island; but as " they did not appear, when they brought up, to be within such a distance " as to avail themselves of the fire from their tops, grape-mot, or musquetry, " I was apprehensive no imprefsion would be made on the fort; I likewise " saw that the three frigates which the Commodore had destined to cut off " the rebel communication with Hedrall's Point, and to favour the attack " of the troops on that battery, were aground soon after the leading mips " had taken their station."

General Clinton thought it necefsary to put the rollowing queries to the Commodore, after that gentleman had acknowledged " he had been guilty " of some omifsion, and had not been sufficiently explicit in bis public letter " with respect to the conduct of the army."

§)uere ift from Gen. CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.

" DID I not, very early after I had landed on Long Island, inform you, " it was discovered that there was no ford at low water between Long Island " and Sulivan's Island ; and that I feared the troops could not co-operate in " the manner we at first intended they mould ?"

Sir P. PARKER'.? Answer to Sir H. CLINTON.

" YOU certainly made known your difficulties, and in your letter of the " 1 8th June you say, 'there is no ford, and that the Generals concurred with

" you

( 4 )

" you in opinion, that the troops could not take the mare in the intended " attack they at first expected to do.' '

<$uere 2d from General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.

"DID I not offer two battalions to embark on board the fleet, and General " Vaughan to command them, mould you see any service in which they " might be useful on your side ?"

Answer.

" SOME conversation passed between General Vaughan and myself about " troops, but I did not think it material ; and I was so extremely ill on my " bed during the time, that I could not attend to it, and am, therefore, " obliged to refer you to General Vaughan for the particulars."

Shtere jd from General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.

"DID I not request, that the three frigates might co-operate with the " troops on their intended attack on the post of Hedrall's Point?"

Answer.

"THE three frigates, besides performing the services mentioned in my " public letter, were intended to co-operate with you."

Quere ^.thfrom General CLINTON to Sir P. PARKER.

" IF the forts were silenced and evacuated for an hour and a half, was it " the troops that were first to take pofsefsion (as Sir P. Parker's letter may " seem to imply) or the sailors and marines, which Sir P. Parker informed " Sir H. Clinton in his letter of the 25th June, he had practised for that " purpose, that were first to land and take pofsefsion ?"

3 Answer.

( 5 )

Answer.

" I certainly did intend, as appears by my letter of 25th June, to have " attempted taking pofsefsion of the fort with the sailors and marines first, " but I could not have planned the doing of it with about 300 men, without " the prospect of speedy support from you ; and I saw, soon after the attack " begun, from a variety of circumstances, you could take no effectual steps " for that purpose."

Sir H. Clinton is persuaded there needs no comment on the above: if he mould make any, it would be the two following fhort ones :

First, Had the frigates been able to proceed to their stations, an attempt (pofsibly a succefsful one) might have been made on the port of Hedrall's Point.

Secondly, If Commodore Sir P. Parker had accepted the General's offer of two battalions to embark on board the fleet, he would have had a suffi- cient force to take and keep pofsefsion of the fort on Sulivan's Island, bad that fort ever been silenced or evacuated.

Page 2'2. Vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, that Sir H. Clinton had been censured for encumbering himself with such an enormous train of baggage, Sec. in his march through Jersey in June, 1778. Had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he would have seen the cause of his being so encumbered ; and also " of that enormous train not a " waggon or cart was captured by the enemy."

Respecting all that gentleman's remarks on the aclion of Monmouth Court House, Sir H. Clinton shall only observe, that had Mr. Stedman attended to Sir H. Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, and General Lee's trial, which last he seems to have read, he would have observed that the two Generals

C opposed

opposed to each other on that day, had described the ground and detailed the events of the action the same. The comment which it is said the late King of Prussia made on this was, " that there needed no other proof of " their being both correct."

The fact is, that it would have been scarcely pofsible for General Wash- ington to have gained any advantage that day (as he had put three defiles between his main army and General Lee's corps) unless, as General Lee says, " depending on the ungovernable impetuosity of the British ; their rear " guard, which was all that had been engaged, had passed the third defile " and attacked General Wafhington's whole army, which I find, however, " by General Clinton's letter to Lord G. Germaine, he saw the impropriety " and danger of, and had no idea of doing." 'Tis true, however, that, from Sir H. Clinton's having been obliged to maintain the ground on his side the third defile till certain of the light troops (whose zeal and ardour had carried them much farther than was intended) had returned, the enemy might have hoped that Sir H. Clinton intended to attempt the pafsage of the third defile.

Mr. Stedman, after giving every merited credit to operations under those respectable officers, General Prevost and Sir A. Campbell in the Floridas and Carolina, and General Matthews and Sir G. Collier in the Chesapeak, in a note, page 134, vol. ii. says, " The campaign in the northern parts of " America was spent in desultory operations." Surely that Gentleman might have known, that all those desultory movements were necefsary preludes to others more solid, which could not be carried into execution for want of promised and adequate reinforcement ; nor did he know, perhaps, that Admiral Arbuthnot, whom Sir H. Clinton had been afsured would sail in March with the reinforcement, did not sail till July, or arrive in America till the end of August ; or that the Admira-l brought in his fleet a jail fever, 3 which

( 7 )

which fent 6000 men to the hospital immediately ; or that a fuperior French fleet, with troops on board, was on the coast.

Page i 80, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, " that General Lincoln had reflected " on the British Commanders for their tardinefs in making their approaches " to the fiege of Charles Town." Surely, it might naturally occur to Mr. Stedman (as it has done to others) that every delay (mortifying and unavoid- able as they were) tempted General Lincoln to fortify Charles Town Peninsula, and put the fate of both Carolinas on that of Charles Town.

Mr. Stedman imputes to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the jd June, 1780, (calling upon all perfons in the then ftate of the province to declare themfelves) what furely cannot be attributed to it.

He fays, page 200, vol. ii. "One Lifle, who had belonged to a rebel " corps while it was under the command of Neale, and who had been " banifhed to the iflands upon the fea coafts as a prifoner upon parole, avail- " inghimfelf of the Commander in Chief's proclamation of the jd of June, took " the oath of allegiance, and exchanging his parole for a certificate of his being " a good fubject; returning to his former abode he obtained a command " under Colonel Floyd, and as foon as the battalion of militia was fupplied " with arms and ammunition, had the treacherous addrefs to carry it off to " Colonel Neale." Is it quite so certain that fuch mifchievous confequences can be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the jd of June, 1780? Paroles had been given before the province of South Carolina had been fub- dued ; but when General Williamfon's furrender had put an end to all oppofition in that province, Sir H. Clinton, not as a Commander in Chief, but as his Majefty's sole Commiffioner to his provinces in America, did ifTue the above proclamation ; and, perhaps, under all circumftances, it was at the time it was ifTued both politic and proper. And if one Lifle did exchange his parole for a certificate of his being a good fubject, &c. &c. this furely cannot be imputed to Sir H. Clinton's proclamation of the jd June, 1780,

for

( 8 )

for thofe who read it will find, that very proclamation forbids and excludes, by defcription, almoft by name, Mr. Lifle from holding any commiffion in his Majefty's fervice, and that perfons having been banifhed to the iflands marked him fufficiently for fufpicion at leaft ; and furely if all this had been attended to, this fame Lifle would not have obtained a certificate of his being a good fubjecl, or have been appointed to any command, and confe- quently he would not have had it in his power to have committed the above traitorous act. Mr. Stedman may furely find other caufes for the revolution in the minds of certain people in South Carolina at the time he mentions, even though he mould have been convinced, the civil adminiftration under which the province then was had not contributed. The approach of General Gates with an army; the French already arrived, and reinforcements expected; the Spanish interference ; the Dutch added to Great Britain's enemies ; and the armed neutrality ; all these probably had their efFecl.

Page 319, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman, in a note, fays, "Dr. Ramfey, in his " History of the Revolution in South Carolina, charges the British with " seizing the property of the Americans, and their Commiffaries and Quarter- " mafters with taking provifions and all other things they wanted for the " army, wherever they could find them, and charging them to the Britifh " government." What Mr. Stedman obferves is as follows : " That pecula- " tion was carried on in fome of the departments of the army, and that many " individuals made large fortunes, cannot be denied ; but this never took place " to any extent in the fouthern army, and the writer of this (who was Com- " miflary of the army under Lord Cornwallis) takes the prefent occafion of " repelling the calumnies of Dr. Ramfey, as far as they may relate to himfelf."

Mr. Stedman has in the courfe of this Hiftory repeatedly implied, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in his examination at the Board of Public Accounts, in February, 1782, that this abufe, this fcandalous peculation had

exifted ;

( 9 )

exifted ; and Mr. Stedman further implies, that owing to his carrying into execution the orders of Lord Cornwallis, it had been flopped. Mr. Stedman points out the great advantage arifing to the Army and the Public from thefe orders of Lord Cornwallis, as the CommifTioners of Public Accounts had done before, in their Seventh Report on Expenditures, wherein they afcribe to the orders of Lord Cornwallis, of the 2jd December, 1780 the merit of having flruck at abufes, which, fay thofe Gentlemen, did actually exift when his Lordfhip ifTued thofe orders. Sir H. Clinton has already, in a Letter to thofe Gentlemen, written and publifhed in 1784, (a copy of which was then deli- vered to Lord Cornwallis) explained this whole bufinefs fully, and proved, first, that thofe Gentlemen had made their Seventh Report on ex parte infor- mation, when they might have had his, and thofe of certain Officers of the different departments, who had actually announced themfelves to the Board before they delivered in their Seventh Report ; that they had not availed themfelves of authentic information and Sir H. Clinton's correfpondence with the Treafury, both of which had been recommended to them by Mr. Robin- fon, and by order of the Lords of the Treafury ; that they had pafsed an implied cenfure on Sir H. Clinton of negligence in the expenditure, and had given a merit to Lord Cornwallis that did not belong to his Lordfhip, but to Sir Henry Clinton : and, finally, that Letter proves, that there would have been no neceflity for Lord Cornwallis's order of the 2jd December, 1780, if his Lordfhip had paid proper attention to thofe of Sir Henry Clinton of many months prior date, and of which his Lordfhip could not be ignorant, as his Lordfhip was, at the time Sir H. Clinton ifsued thefe orders, in the fame camp with him. But as Mr. Stedman chufes again to refume this fubject, and to afcribe the merit of the oeconomical fyflem to Lord Cornwallis, as Sir H. Clinton's letter to the Commimoners of Public Accounts did not (Sir H. Clin- ton apprehends) circulate fo generally as Sir H. Clinton hoped and intended

D it

it fhould, he thinks it neceflary to anfwer all the above infmuations and aflertions, from whatever quarter they may come, in the following manner :

That Sir H. Clinton had ifTued orders of fimilar effect to those of Lord Corn- wallis, of Dec. 23, 1780, as far as -respects the CommifTary General's depart- ment, and the delivering captured provifions to the troops gratis, and faving the Crown rations to the Public in 1776 and 1777, even before he com- manded the army: that in July 1779, ne appointed Commiffioners of Captures (totally diftinct from the Commiffary General's department) and for the above purpofes ; that it had been reported to Sir H. Clinton, by the Deputy Commiflary General, that near a million of rations had been faved to the Public while he remained in South Carolina, and his orders were attended to ; during which time Lord Cornwallis was under his immediate orders, and Mr. Stedman was acting as Deputy Commiflary of captured forage, by Sir H. Clinton's orders of February 1780. Sir H. Clinton perfectly agrees with Lord Cornwallis, the Commiffioners of Public Accounts, and Meflrs. Sted- man and Ramfay, that infamous abufe and peculation might have exifted, but takes leave again to aflert, that he iflued orders, foon after he came to the command, moft effectually to prevent it ; nor could it well have exifted to the northward, at that time, for to enable Lord Cornwallis to act offen- fively, Sir H. Clinton had reduced the army under his immediate orders to a ftrict defenfive. There needs no other proof when and where this peculation was effectually flopped, than the following letter from Mr. Robinfon, written by order of the Lords of the Treafury, approving Sir H. Clinton's having efta- blifhed Commiflaries of Captures for the purpqfe of Juf -plying the army gratis, and faving the Crown rations to the Public.

Copy

Copy of a letter from John Robinfon, Efq. late Secretary to the Treasury, to Sir H. Clinton, late Commander in Chief of His Majefly s Army in North America, dated Treasury Chambers, igth December, 1780.

" The Lords of his Majefty's Treafury having received information of the " fteps which were taken by your Excellency to appoint Commiffaries of " Captures, upon your expedition to South Carolina, for the purpofe of pre- "ferving the property of his Majefty's loyal fubjedts in that country, and " making them fome recompenfe for their lofles and damages fuftained ; and " for the purpofe of converting to the good of his Majefty's fervice, and to " the ufe, convenience, and benefit of the army, all the cattle and moveable " property which might be captured from his Majefty's enemies ; and finding "that Major Hay, one of the gentlemen appointed by your Excellency in " February, 1780, one of the Commiffioners was in England, on account of " his health, their Lordfhips defired the favour of his attendance on their " Board, to explain to them all the circumftances of that commiffion, and "the nature of the proceedings thereon: and Major Hay having given their " Lordfhips every fatisfaftory information thereon, it appears to their Lord- " fhips, that this meafure has been not only of great utility and convenience " to the army and navy, and his Majefty's loyal fubjecls, but is an act of "juftice and humanity, and may be hereafter of the greateft confequence to " prevent many abufes, and fave considerable expenfes ; I am, therefore, "commanded by their Lordships to acquaint your Excellency that they "approve entirely not only of your continuing fuch Commiffioners in Caro- " Una, but alfo of your eftablifhing others of the like nature ; and their Lord- " ships request that you will acquaint me, for their information, whether any "fuch plan was adopted in the expeditions in Jerfey, and from head of " Elk to Philadelphia, in 1776 and 1777, or in any other; and whether the "cattle and moveables taken in fuch expeditions were brought to any account

"for

" for the benefit of the army, or advantage of the public, by fuch Commif- " faries, or any other perfons whatever ?

Sir H. Clinton, in anfwer to this letter, could only inform their Lordfhips, he was not in the chief command at that period, and refer the Lords of the Treafury to the Commiflary General, Mr. Weier, afluring them at the fame time, " That even before he came to the command, whenever he had been de- " tached, he had always appointed Commiflaries of Captures, that the army " and navy might receive fuch captured provifions gratis, and the Crown " provisions faved to the Public."

Sir H. Clinton now leaves fuch of the Commiffioners of Public Accounts as neglected to avail themfelves of the information offered by the Treafury to Lord Cornwallis, and the Commiflary of Captures, Mr. Stedman, to make their comments on the above; it will be obvious to the candid Public, that if the above ceconomical fyftem, fo much approved by the Lords of His Ma- jefty's Treafury, was eftablifhed by Sir H. Clinton, in February and May, 1780, and near a million of rations were faved to the Public during that period, if there were no favings to the Public made between June and De- cember, 1780, and that scandalous abuje alluded to did actually exift at that time, as Lord Cornwallis implies, and the Commiffioners of Public Accounts aflert it did, fo far from commending his Lordship for having ftopt the abufe by his order of the 2jd December, 1780, they would have blamed him for having, by his inattention to Sir H. Clinton's orders, fuffered it to exift fo long.

Dr. Ramsay has, it is said also, infinuated, that the plunder taken at the fiege of Charlestown was fo confiderable, that the Brigadier-Generals, ferving at that fiege, fhared upwards of 5000!. Sir H. Clinton need not fay, that he did not think it became him, as His Majefty's Commiffioner to the Revolted Colonies, to take any fhare of plunder mjuch a war. That there was money arifing from the fale of public (lores, &c. &c. is very certain, and that the navy, ferving on that expedition, fhared considerably fourteen years fince : that a fmall fum, not exceeding io,oool. was placed in the hands of agents,

appointed

( 13 )

appointed by the field officers of the army, is equally certain ; but it is no lefs certain, that thofe agents, though they have repeatedly received the Trea- fury mandates to pay that money into the Bank, have as conftantly evaded the order under moft frivolous pretences ; and that the army is now waiting to receive a very fmall mare of plunder taken at a fiege, and of which the navy divided their ample mare full fourteen years fince ! !

Page 244, vol. ii. Speaking of the attempt in Jerfey, in June, 1780, Mr. Stedman fays, " The real object of this expedition was probably againft the " American magazines at Morris Town ; but the oppofition which the Com- " wander in Chief met with at Springfield, was an indication that every mile " of his future march through a country naturally difficult, and abounding "with ftrong pafles, would be not lefT obftinately difputed, and determined " him to abandon the enterprize."

Mr. Stedman feems, in this account, to have followed American writers; had he inquired, he would have found Sir H. Clinton did not arrive at New York till after this expedition had taken place ; that Sir H. Clinton knew no- thing of this anticipated movement (which, as he had not the leaft reafon to expect it, he had not forbid). If it had not taken place, or could have been ftopt in time by either of the officers he had fent to prepare for one, in which he intended to have taken a part with the corps he had purpofely brought from Charleftown, fuccefs of fome importance might have been the confe- quence : as it was, every movement that did take place after Sir H. Clinton's return to New York, was merely to retire the corps (which had moved into Jerfey) without affront.

Page 245, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, " When the French armament of " eight fail of the line and 6000 troops, under Rochambeau and De la Ternay, " arrived at Rhode Ifland, the Britifh fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot was infe- " rior, and a plan was laid for attacking New York ; but the arrival of fix fail " of the line from England, which followed clofe on the track of Chevalier de

E " Ternay,

( 14 )

" Ternay, foon gave Admiral Arbuthnot the fuperiority, and the British com- " manders, inftead of waiting to be attacked, made preparations in their turn "for acting offenfively against the French at Rhode Ifland. Sir H. Clinton " with the tranfports and troops deftined for this expedition proceeded to " Huntingdon Bay, in the Sound, whilft Admiral Arbuthnot with the mips " of war failed round Long Ifland, in order to co-operate by fea. But, in the " mean time, General Washington, whofe army had been increafed by the " arrival of feveral reinforcements, suddenly parted the North River and ap- " proached Kingfbridge ; fo unexpected a movement obliged Sir H. Clinton " to abandon the expedition to Rhode Ifland, and return with the troops for " the protection of New York."

Perhaps Mr. Stedman affigns here the beft reafon why the expedition could not take place ; but as he proceeds and fays, " the object of this expedition " was loft from a circumftance but too frequent in the hiftory of this country, "a dif agreement between the Commanders In Chief of the land and naval Jervice." As this is the fecond insinuation of this fort Sir H. Clinton finds himfelf called upon to fay a few words.

Sir H. Clinton, on receiving private information of the expected arrival of a French armament at Rhode Ifland, propofed to Admiral Arbuthnot (when he fhould be joined by Admiral Greaves) that the French troops fhould be met at their landing; for which purpofe Sir H. Clinton was to have entered and landed in the Seconet Paflage with 6000 men, covered by fome frigates ; and all that was requefted of the Admiral was to block with his large fliips the principal harbour, until any fuccefs the troops might meet with fhould induce the fleet to co-operate; but if the expedition fliould not take place before the French troops fhould have been landed, and have repaired the works of New- port, and they fhould alfo have been reinforced, in that cafe Sir H. Clinton had given it as his humble opinion, that the troops could not venture to act, un- lefs the fleet would take an active part as well as the troops. It so happened,

4 that

( '5 )

that the French armament arrived at Rhode Ifland many days before Admiral Greaves had joined Admiral Arbuthnot, or that this laft had been informed of their arrival : thus circumftanced, all were of opinion the troops could not act alone, and the Admiral did not judge it prudent to attempt the great entrance with his fleet, oppofed by that of the enemy covered by batteries, and thought that of the Narraganfet unfafe for mips of draft. Could this attempt have been made immediately on the arrival of the French armament, as it would have been unexpected, it might have fucceeded ; but after the enemy had been in pofsefsion of fuch a place as Newport, and the Harbour and Iflands, fixteen or eighteen days, Sir H. Clinton is free to own, he could have had little hopes (even if the fleet could have co-operated), which Sir Henry is far from faying he thinks they could.

Page 317, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, "in the fall of the preceding year, the "lofTof Major Fergufon's detachment obliged Lord Cornwallis to return " from his Northern expedition, and fall back to Wynnefborough in South " Carolina. Still, however, the projected movement into North Carolina " was deemed so eflential, that he only waited for reinforcements to renew it."

In the firft place, Sir H. Clinton cannot help being of opinion, that the lofl" ~j of Colonel Fergufon was owing, in a great meafure, to Lord Cornwallis's having detached Colonel Fergufon with a body of Militia, without any fupport of regular troops, notwithftanding his Lordfliip had informed Sir H. Clinton, although that brave and zealous officer, judging of himself, had hoped he would make the militia fight without any fupport of regular troops.

His Lordfhip obferved, " That fuch hopes were contrary to the experience / " of the army, as well as of Major Fergufon himfelf." That his Lordfliip fhould, after this opinion, not only fuffer Colonel Fergufon to be detached without fupport, but put fuch a river as the Catawba between him and Fer- gufon, was matter of wonder to Sir H. Clinton and all who knew it.

Mr.

( 16 )

Mr. Stedman feems to imply, " that the fecond movement into North " Carolina was made in confequence of a fettled plan approved by Sir " H. Clinton." Sir Henry, when he left Lord Cornwallis in command in South Carolina in June, 1780, left his Lordfhip with the following order: " 'Tis not my intention to prevent your Lordfhip acting ofFenfively in cafe " an opportunity offers confiftent with the Jecurity of Charles 'Town, which is " always to be confidered as a primary object." Lord Cornwallis had therefore Sir H. Clinton's tacit approbation for any move he mould judge proper to make with perfect Jecurity to Charles "Town ; and Sir H. Clinton, in- formed of Lord Cornwallis's intentions of going into North Carolina, had certainly approved. In his letter, however, to Lord Cornwallis, after he heard of the unfortunate affair of Cowpens, it will be feen, that if Sir H. Clinton had hopes, thofe hopes were founded in the opinion Sir Henry had of Lord Cornwallis's knowledge and abilities ; but hearing his Lordfhip had loft all his light troops at Cowpens, convinced what little hopes he could have without them, though Sir H. Clinton certainly did not difapprove for the above reafons then : if his Lordfhip had informed him before he made the movement (as Sir Henry is perfuaded his Lordfhip will acknow- ledge it would have been more regular to have done*) " that the works of " Charles Town had been in part thrown down," and that capital (which had been Jo flrongly recommended to his particular care) confequently open and expojed, Sir H. Clinton could not have approved of an operation of fo much danger to South Carolina and its capital : nor, indeed, is it quite fo certain that Lord Cornwallis was perfectly confiftent when he made his fecond movement into North Carolina, for it would rather feem he made it fomewhat in con- tradiction to his own opinion, given not many weeks before through Lord Rawdon, after his Lordfhip had returned from an unfuccefsful attempt to recover North Carolina, in October, 1780. Lord Rawdon wrote to Sir H. Clinton, at Lord Cornwallis's desire, thus : " The people of North Carolina

"had * Lord Rawdon's Letter lo Lord Cornwallis.

( I? )

" had not given evidence enough either of their numbers or activity to jus- " tify the ftake of South Carolina for the uncertain advantages which might •> " attend an immediate junction with them :" and again, " Lord Cornwallis " forefees all the difficulties of an offensive war ; but his Lordmip thinks " they cannot be weighed againft the dangers which muft have attended an " obftinate adherence to his former plan of marching into North Carolina." But notwithftanding the above opinions of Lord Cornwallis, and after he had loft his light troops, that he had opened Charles Town, and was cer- tain he mould leave it in an expofed ftate, that he had deftroyed his waggons, (except a few) and confequently had not the means of making z.Jolid move, or of giving the experiment a fair trial, he proceeds on this expedition into North Carolina.

Page 348, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, " three days after the action of " Guilford, Lord Cornwallis began to retire, by eafy days marches, towards " Croffcreeks."

Nobody can give Lord Cornwallis more credit for his zealous exertions at the battle of Guilford Court Houfe than Sir H. Clinton ; but, alas ! that victory had every confequence of a defeat.

Page 352, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, "nothing now remained to be done, " but to proceed with the army to Wilmington."

Perhaps Mr. Stedman does not know that Lord Cornwallis had been ordered, and had promifed, in cafe of failure in North Carolina, to fall back on South Carolina, "and fecure it;" that when at Croflcreek his Lordmip was nearer to Campden (where Lord Rawdon was, and where he could be fupplied with every thing) ; or, that by falling back from thence on Campden, he faved South Carolina, Charles Town, and Campden, as by going to Wil- mington he expofed all three.

Page 353, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman affigns reafons for Lord Cornwallis's not going to South Carolina, and for his going to Virginia.

That

That Gentleman could not furely be ignorant that Lord Cornwallis could return fafely into South Carolina. He may alfo have probably heard, that Colonel Balfour, Commandant of Charles Town, had entreated his Lordfhip to return to South Carolina, informed him that nothing elfe could fave the province or its capital, that he might return by the Waggermaw river, and that in the hope he would, he had fent gallies, &c. into that river, and had alfo occupied George Town ; nor could there be the leaft doubt, but that by going into South Carolina, (even though his Lordfhip had embarked and proceeded there) he faved that province and its capital ; and that, on the contrary, by going into Virginia, he not only difregarded the orders of the Commander in Chief, as before ftated, but put the fouthern provinces, his own corps, and that of General Phillips (which he had called into co-opera- tion) into imminent danger ; that by going into Virginia, he was about to break in upon the Commander in Chief's plan of operations for the cam- paign, to force him into others (he had always declared againft) in the moft inimical provinces, in the moft fickly province, at the moft fickly feafon ; in a diftrict where he could not long fupply his army ; from whence he could not retreat except under moft difgraceful facrifices ; in which he could not re- main in fafety unlefT protected by a fuperior fleet, or a refpecttable place of arms till fuch fleet mould arrive ; and this while there were laying (and had been laying at Charles Town, from the yth to the 24th of April) and coming to him, and he knew it, and that there might be hourly expected difpatches, orders, and inftructions of the Commander in Chief, by the firft line of which he would have read the following words, which must have prevented his going into Virginia ; March 2d, 5th, and 8th, " Your Lordfhip may probably " have heard, that the navy and army in Virginia are blocked up by a " fuperior French fleet to that under Commodore Symonds ; and he would have feen alfo, that General Phillips had not been detached into Virginia, as his Lordfhip said he had underftood from Colonel Balfour to have been i the

( 19 )

the fubftance of the Commander in Chief's difpatches, but that he waited the event of a naval action hourly expected, before he could venture to fail for Virginia.

Page 393, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman fays, as Lord Cornwallis had done before, " that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended his plan of operation to the " Southward or Delaware River ;" and continues thus, " neither did his " Lordfhip mean to engage in the expedition to the upper part of the " Chefapeak Bay, of which he difapproved, without exprefT orders from the " Commander in Chief, which would exempt him from all refponfibility, at " leaft, for the plan of that expedition."

With refpect to the plan, it has been fo often and fo fully detailed in Sir H. Clinton's narrative, and in his obfervations to Lord Cornwallis's reply to it, that Sir Henry thinks it needier!" to fay any more than that it had been formed upon very general information, been approved by his Majefty's Cabinet early in 1781, and again re-approved in July, 1781, alas! too late, for Sir H. Clinton was then deeply and dangeroufly engaged in operation forced by Lord Cornwallis, and which, as he before ftated, Sir Henry had received the King's commands to adopt and fupport. With refped: to Sir H. Clinton's having barely recommended bis plan, it will have been feen, that General Phillips (to whom Lord Cornwallis had fucceeded) had been ordered to carry it into execution, and was actually on his march to do fo when Lord Corn- wallis called him back. In ftrictnefl" it will be acknowledged, that Lord Cornwallis thus circumftanced, was required, when he arrived in Virginia, to obey fuch orders as he found General Phillips acting under : but on Mr. Stedman's own conftruction, " that Sir H. Clinton had barely recommended it," was not Sir H. Clinton refponfible for a plan which, out of delicacy to Lord Cornwallis's high rank, and after the above inftructions he had received from his Majefty, he only barely recommended?

Page

( 20 )

Page 396, vol. ii. Mr. Stedman implies, as Lord Cornwallis had done before in an official letter, " that his Lordship had occupied the naval ftation " in York River, according to the fpirit of Sir H. Clinton's order of the "nth July, 1781." The fhort fact is, there were two letters of that date, the firft requiring his Lordfhip to occupy the Peninfula of Williamfberg (which Sir H. Clinton thought he had quitted a little too hafty, and owing to a mifconception of orders) his Lordship was by that letter defired to wait there for further directions as to the poft he mould occupy, to be fent after Sir Henry had confulted the Admiral. The fecond letter was written after that confultation had taken place ; and his Lordmip was directed in it " to " examine and fortify Old Point Comfort in James River, to cover the naval " ftation of Hampton Road in that river ;" and as an additional fecurity to Old Point Comfort, his Lordship had Sir H. Clinton's confent to his fortify- ing York Heights alfo, /hould he think thatnecejfary. How this can be con- ftrued, either by Lord Cornwallis or Mr. Stedman, into an implied order to remove the naval ftation from James River to York River, will be difficult to comprehend. Sir H. Clinton, fo far from confidering it as according to the fpirit of his order of the nth of July, thinks it was in direct difregard of it. Lord Cornwallis, if he difapproved of the ftation he had been directed to take in James River, should (Sir H. Clinton conceives) have reported his objections to Old Point Comfort, in James River, and recommended York River, and waited the Commander in Chief's approbation. Sir H. Clinton is free to acknowledge, however, he did not, nor should he not have difap- proved of the choice his Lordship had made in preference in York River, as his Lordship, when he made it, aflured Sir H. Clinton, " that it was